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Abstract: The Sympathetic Imagination in the Novels of J.M. Coetzee - 
Empathy and Mirror Neurons in Literature 
 
The following study attempts a comprehensive evaluation of how the sympathetic imagination 
evolves in the works of J.M. Coetzee. The underlying assumption is that the way Coetzee 
employs his sympathetic imagination in his fiction enhances the reader’s empathetic 
capabilities. A starting point for the central categories of analysis and the close readings of his 
novels will be a brief exploration of the neuronal basis of empathy as discussed in the context 
of the discovery of and continuously extending research on mirror neurons as the neurological 
basis for empathy. Shared attention and perspective-taking constitute the focus of 
neuroscientific discussions of the connection between empathy and mirror neurons. A close 
look at Coetzee’s fiction will reveal comparable mechanisms in literary representation. 
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1. It is difficult not to sympathize... 
In the epigraph of his first novel, Dusklands, published in 1974, J.M. Coetzee quotes 
US war strategist Hermann Kahn: “Obviously it is difficult not to sympathize [...].” In my 
readings of Coetzee’s fictions, my imagination could not help but respond in a sympathetic 
fashion to the characters presented; in other words: it was impossible not to sympathize. In 
The Lives of Animals Elizabeth Costello conceptualizes an “ethical imperative to sympathise 
with the embodied experiences of other beings,” as the critic Kate McInturff has noted 
(McInturff 2007: 5). 
The remainder of Kahn’s quote runs a sinister twist, for his sympathies are directed at 
US-American cinema audiences’ “horror and disgust” upon witnessing the exhilaration of 
pilots dropping bombs on Vietnam. Kahn continues with a thought about the selection of 
necessarily ruthless soldiers who are not prone to become “excessively depressed or guilt-
ridden” after the deed. While Kahn acknowledges the horrors of warfare, his sympathies are 
not extended to the victims of the war but rather to the American audiences witnessing the 
war atrocities on screen. Ironically complicating the constellation of perpetrator, victim and 
witness, Coetzee sets the tone for the following novella that explores the mind of Eugene 
Dawn, a strategist of psychological warfare, exposing how the meditated violence turns 
against him and estranges him from all others. 
If we take up the impulse of this opening and give in to the sympathy Coetzee 
awakens for all his characters, we will find out that the type of literature Coetzee writes is 
primed for this effect by its unparalleled depth of introspection into the mindspaces of others. 
Follow me on a tour through all of Coetzee’s novels, exploring how the sympathetic 
imagination is enacted and how processes of empathy are evoked in the characters, the reader, 
and ultimately the author himself. In the early novels, published between 1974 and 1983, the 
reader’s sympathetic imagination is confronted with monologic characters who fail to build 
meaningful relationships. From Foe (1986) onwards, the cast is expanded and the main 
protagonists, who still constitute the epicentre of the narratives, encounter a variety of other 
characters. These serve as catalysts for the emotional development of the protagonists, and we 
as readers partake in their perspectives, guided by the narrative strategies employed by 
Coetzee.1 With Age of Iron (1990) and The Master of Petersburg (1993) the tone becomes 
more personal, and the setting and themes are closer to Coetzee’s own biography, such as the 
 
1 See also Heister 2008. 
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themes of parenthood and loss of a child, as well as the complicated relation to South Africa 
as a home country. This trend is continued with the autobiographical fictions Boyhood (1998), 
Youth (2001), and Summertime (2009), only now Coetzee redirects his attention to his 
childhood self, himself as a young man, and finally his dead self as remembered by others. At 
this point the sympathetic imagination has reached a high degree of complexity and maturity, 
suited to the task of thorough self-inspection refracted in literature. 
In both Elizabeth Costello (2003) and Diary of a Bad Year (2007) Coetzee experiments 
with a format that allows him to present a wide range of personal opinions underscored by a 
narrative that relegates responsibility to the proxy characters Costello and Señor C. While in 
Elizabeth Costello opinions are embedded in the narrative, presented as lectures held by 
Costello, in Diary of a Bad Year Coetzee separates opinions and narrative by using a split-
page format, preparing the ground for the polyphonic narration of Summertime. In the novels 
Disgrace (2003) and Slow Man (2005) Coetzee expertly portrays how the aging men David 
Lurie and Paul Rayment learn to open up to others, while simultaneously showcasing their 
limitations. The Childhood of Jesus (2012) finally shows a return to a more allegorical setting, 
in which the sympathetic imagination seems to run dry in the face of the benevolent but 
impartial goodwill of the people. 
1.1 Sympathetic Imagination, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons 
In The Lives of Animals (1999) Coetzee has Elizabeth Costello air her opinions on 
animal ethics. Costello proposes a particular form of sympathetic engagement with animals, 
claiming that “there are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination.” (EC 79, also LOA 35) 
Costello stresses the importance of an embodied representation of the animal other for the 
sympathetic imagination to be invoked by poetry. What she exactly means by sympathetic 
imagination, she doesn’t say, it can only be inferred from the text. I take sympathetic 
imagination to be a central idea in the work of Coetzee, with embodiment as a complementary 
concept. 
The sympathetic imagination is basically a literary tool for engaging with the other. In 
the first instance, the author employs it in the creation of his characters, who potentially 
employ it in their encounters with textual others, while the reader employs it in his experience 
of these characters. The sympathetic imagination represents a benevolent and hospitable 
attitude, a state of mind prepared and willing to engage with otherness. Sympathy is arrived at 
consciously, we decide to be sympathetic – or not. In the process of engaging with the other 
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empathy can be triggered, the emotional basis for the sympathetic imagination to become 
effective. Empathy is a subconscious reflex to the actions we perceive; we cannot control it –
just imagine seeing a person suffering an accident and experiencing severe pain; our body will 
most likely respond, be it with a jerk or a tingling sensation.2 
The cognitive basis for empathy is the activity of mirror neurons which enables us to 
read the emotions of others.3 As readers we co-inhabit the perspectives of Coetzee’s “paper 
beings”. Following the cue of Fritz Breithaupt’s study Kulturen der Empathie (2009) and his 
concept of narrative empathy, I concentrate on the conflicts acted out in Coetzee’s novels. On 
the textual level, I examine character constellations of enacted conflicts; on a extra-textual 
level the author is acting out a conflict with himself through his texts, into which he has 
inscribed himself, sometimes more, sometimes less visibly – the overarching argument being 
that Coetzee ultimately applies the sympathetic imagination to his earlier selves and thereby 
manages to reach out to his current self empathetically. 
In his expansive biography, JM Coetzee - A Life in Writing (2012), John Kannemeyer 
touches on the subject of sympathy and empathy several times. He analyses a scene of 
Boyhood where young John and some boys have ice cream on the occasion of his birthday. 
Through the shop window, coloured children observe their pleasure (and empathetically take 
part in it). The boy John feels the children outside are spoiling his occasion and ponders 
whether to chase them off. The following comment, however, lays bare how racial segregation 
affects him emotionally, regardless of or especially due to his social position: “Whatever 
happens, whether they are chased away or not, it is too late, his heart is already hurt.” (BH 73) 
Kannemeyer, who reads Boyhood quite literally as autobiography, comments: “He felt 
empathy with these children who did not have the same privileges.” (Kannemeyer 2012: 56) 
The portrayed selfishness of the boy John (his fun was spoilt) coexists with a sympathetic 
attitude (the coloured boys are permanently excluded from the same fun). Kannemeyer relates 
this ambivalence to Coetzee’s social situation, illustrating his sympathetic and empathetic 
sensibilities with an anecdote: 
The fact that John was younger than his classmates hampered his social development. 
When confronted with a problem, physical or intellectual, his instinct was to bottle up his 
emotions. He was an outsider who often did not share in the fun and games of his 
classmates. In the college annual of 1956, where each of the matrics is summed up in a 
single phrase, John is characterised by the declaration “I refuse to Rock and Roll.” Apart 
from the social marginalisation John experienced on account of his reserved nature, there 
was a political marginalisation stemming from the Coetzees’ support of the United Party, 
 
2 The differentiation of sympathy and empathy will be revisited several times over the course of the introduction. 
For a detailed discussion see also Chismar 1988. 
3 See the excellent discussion of mirror neurons as a basis for empathy in Preston/de Waal 2002. 
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though this would not have been an issue at St. Joseph’s. John’s undemonstrative manner 
did not preclude an early empathy with his fellow-beings. Nic Stathakis remembered him in 
2008 as a youth with a strong sympathy with others, especially with the underprivileged: 
“One small example is fixed in my memory. In Cape Town in the Fifties the suburban trains 
going down the peninsula to the suburbs would stand at Cape Town station with the whites-
only section at the buffer or concourse end. The non-white coaches were way down at the 
end of the platform. While still schoolboys John once told me that one of the saddest things 
he had seen was a large black woman weighed down with shopping bags sweatily 
running/shuffling down the platform to get to the non-white section in time, the departure 
whistle already having been blown. Entering the first coach (whites only) and walking 
through the train as would be done in any normal country, was out of the question.” 
(Kannemeyer 2012: 66) 
The anecdote illustrates the complex interplay of sympathy, empathy and embodiment. The 
emphasis on the physical properties of the black woman indicates embodiment, evoking 
empathy in the youth, in compliance with his general sympathetic attitude towards the 
suffering of underprivileged people. 
1.2 The Sympathetic Imagination in Elizabeth Costello (1997) and The 
Lives of Animals (1999) 
In his novels Coetzee explores the frontiers of literary representation and discourse, 
engaging the reader to reflect on issues as varied as censorship, torture, poetics, reciprocity, 
authenticity, truth, confession, ethics, animal rights, and encounters with others. Along with 
his fictions Coetzee published various academic inquiries into above-named issues – which 
then again are reflected in his fictional work; a large number of essays is dedicated to the 
work of a variety of other writers.4 An autobiographical turn in his work, dating back to the 
publication of the essay and interview volume Doubling the Point in 1992, the novel Age of 
Iron in 1990 and the pseudo-biographic novel The Master of Petersburg in 1993, ultimately 
resulted in the publication of his trilogy of autobiographical fictions: Boyhood (1997), Youth 
(2002), and Summertime (2009). In his later work Coetzee explores the theoretical and ethical 
implications of his own writing more deeply and explicitly. The essay volume The Lives of 
Animals (1999)5 and the subsequent novel Elizabeth Costello (2003), which builds on two 
chapters already included in Lives of Animals and expands these by six additional lessons, 
which (except for the final two) Coetzee had presented as guest lectures at various 
universities.6 For these occasions Coetzee created the persona Elizabeth Costello, an aging 
 
4 See in particular Stranger Shores (2001) and Inner Workings (2007). 
5 The Lives of Animals starts off with Coetzee’s two essays “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets 
and the Animals,” followed by responses by a variety of scholars from different disciplines. 
6 For a comprehensive account of the academic settings where Coetzee presented these lectures see Attridge 
2004a. 
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Australian fiction writer, whose public lectures Coetzee relates as fictional accounts – a mirror 
device allowing for a distance between author and the positions stated by Costello. Since 
Elizabeth Costello is a proxy character created by J.M. Coetzee, it remains uncertain in how 
far Coetzee himself would subscribe to Costello’s beliefs and propositions. However, I 
explore the sympathetic imagination as presented by Costello – meaning I might be taking her 
more seriously than Coetzee himself would. In my reading, these two central lectures have the 
qualities of a manifesto.7 The two lessons most relevant to my discourse are “The 
Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals,” both of them discussing 
ethics of human-animal relations in the light of the sympathetic imagination.8 
In the first of Coetzee’s two lecture-essays, “The Philosophers and the Animals,” 
Costello discusses in her lecture how philosophy has provided the ideological framework of 
the principal dichotomy between human beings and animals which allows the use – or rather 
abuse – of animals for human consumption and experimental procedures. Costello evokes the 
image of the slaughterhouse and rejects the underlying reasoning on the grounds that “reason 
looks to me suspiciously like the being of human thought; worse than that, like the being of 
one tendency in human thought” (LOA 21), echoing the epistemological assumptions of 
Kant.9 Accordingly, Costello opposes the rationalist discourse of the philosophers and sets 
against it the sensation of life, shared by humans and animals: 
 
7 Paola Splendore is more careful in her formulation: 
Thus, the novel cannot be considered a manifesto, in which Coetzee discusses his poetics under 
false pretences; it is rather the space of a prolonged reflection on questions which have always 
engaged Coetzee: the form of the novel, the role of the arts in Africa, the freedom of artists, the 
humanity of animals, the pact between ethics and aesthetics. Though occasionally Costello 
expresses Coetzee’s ideas, becoming almost his female ‘embodiment’, a sort of ‘portrait of the 
artist as an old lady’, she in fact represents a dramatization of the author-function, specifically that 
of a white female writer, form an ex-Commonwealth country, Australia. (Splendore 2004: 147) 
Jeff McMahan puts it more simply: “It is, however, unimportant whether the views expressed in the essays 
within the novel are Coetzee’s own. They are the views of a great many people. They are the views, in particular, 
of people of a certain familiar type, people generally on the political left who are earnest, decent, and humane.” 
(McMahan 2010: 91) Michael Bell takes a similar stance: 
Without collapsing author into character, one could take as a significant clue Lurie’s remark 
“Excuse me for talking this way. I am trying to be frank.” For it would seem that Coetzee’s own 
frankness is exercised in the mode of the open secret, constantly made available through, and yet 
significantly bracketed as, literature. In Coetzee, the literary as such proves over and again to be 
the radically discomforting, and yet indispensable category for a certain kind of truth telling. (Bell 
2007: 218) 
For a more comprehensive discussion on Coetzee/Costello see Sevry 2000, Splendore 2004, Poyner 2006, 
Walton 2008, Sanders 2009, Dancygier 2010. 
8 First presented as Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University in 1997. 
9 Roux simply states: “Her [Costello’s] advocacy of literature over philosophy can be captured by two terms: 
embodiment and sympathetic imagination.” (Roux 2005: 25) An interesting argument is offered by Laurence 
Wright, drawing on the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, proposing the possibility of “transcendental insight” and 
the existence of a “cognitive escape-hatch” as opposed to Kantian limitation of our perceptual framework 
(Wright 2008: 5). 
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To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation of being – not a 
consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on 
the contrary the sensation – a heavily affective sensation – of being a body with limbs that 
have extension in space, of being alive to the world. This fullness contrasts starkly with 
Descartes’ key state, which has an empty feel to it: the feel of a pea rattling around in a 
shell. (LOA 33) 
Costello aims to promote the empathetic faculties of human beings, which allow us to engage 
with animals in a significant and sympathetic way. She urges everybody to feel for others – 
that is, to experience sympathy for others – and to feel with and like others; that is, to 
experience empathy for them. In Sanford Budick’s words, “it’s the reversal and reciprocity of 
a chiastic frame of mind that enables the novelist and reader alike to enter into the being of a 
fictional character in a relationship of intersubjectivity.” (Budick 1996: 243) A sympathetic 
imagination of this sort,” continues Budick, “should enable one all the more to enter into the 
existence of non-human being.” (Budick 1996: 243) The sympathetic imagination paves the 
way for an empathetic engagement with others. In an old-fashioned way, Costello locates this 
potential in the human chest: “The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to 
share at times the being of another.” (LOA 34; original italics) Costello calls on her audience 
to open their hearts and make room for the empathy that lies within. In yet another rebuttal of 
hegemonic philosophical traditions, she goes on: 
Despite Thomas Nagel, who is probably a good man, despite Thomas Aquinas and René 
Descartes, with whom I have more difficulty in sympathizing, there is no limit to the extent 
to which we can think ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to the 
sympathetic imagination. […] If I can think my way into the existence of a being who has 
never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an 
oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life. (LOA 35, emphasis added) 
At no point does Costello clearly define what she understands the sympathetic imagination to 
be, but her lucid comments on Kafka’s Red Peter, relating this parable to the historical story 
of Wolfgang Köhler’s Sultan, as well as the horror she expresses at factory farming and 
industrial-scale slaughterhouses, suggest it to be, at the very least, a means of opening up to a 
more positive engagement with the other, in this case the primate Sultan. Unlike Wolfgang 
Köhler, Franz Kafka made extensive use of his sympathetic imagination in creating Red Peter, 
encouraging the readers to extend their empathy to the animal world. In The Lives of Animals 
Coetzee expands Kafka’s line of thought in a meta-discourse on fiction exploring our 
perception of animals. Some of Coetzee fictions – earlier and later – extend the range of 
others encountered by the main character, including both human and nonhuman animals. 
These encounters with otherness in all their variety test the achievements, failures, and 
limitations of the sympathetic imagination while simultaneously challenging the reader’s own 
sympathetic imagination. 
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In Coetzee’s second lecture-essay, “The Poets and the Animals,” Costello conducts a 
poetry workshop for the (also fictional) Department of English at Appleton College and gives 
an account of two (actually existent) poetic engagements: firstly in Rilke’s poem “The 
Panther,” and then in Hughes’ poems “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at a Jaguar.”10 More 
in favour of Hughes, she compliments the way his poems “ask us to imagine our way into that 
way of moving [as the currents of life move within it], to inhabit that body” and claims them 
to be the “record of an engagement with him [the jaguar].” (LOA 51) In her account of 
Hughes’ particular encouragement to inhabit the jaguar’s body, Costello emphasizes the role 
the body in the evocation of the jaguar’s “being-in-the-world,” again a technique mirrored by 
Coetzee, who embodies his characters with physical presence and, by doing so, with the joy 
and distress that come with inhabiting a body. This also applies to Lives of Animals and to 
Elizabeth Costello, but also, and perhaps even more notably so, to earlier characters such as 
Michael K in Life & Times of Michael K, the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians, and 
Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron.11 The notion of embodiment described by Costello forms the 
basis for a process of identification with the other that allows the sympathetic imagination to 
engage with it fully. The congruence of physical being – both in joy and suffering – 
constitutes a fundamental similarity between all humans and animals. In poetry – and in 
literature more broadly conceived – this potential for congruence can draw us into a moment 
or much more of sharing the body of the other and perhaps also of discovering or 
rediscovering the joy of being ourselves embodied beings: 
By bodying forth the jaguar, Hughes shows us that we too can embody animals –by the 
process called poetic invention that mingles breath and sense in a way that no one has 
explained and no one ever will. He shows us how to bring the living body into being within 
ourselves. When we read the jaguar poem, we are for a brief while the jaguar. He ripples 
within us, he takes over our body, he is us. (LOA 53) 
The notion of embodiment is a prerequisite for the author’s application of his sympathetic 
imagination to be effective in promoting empathy. The physical other comes with a 
consciousness of its own. In a derogatory note on the logics of behavioural sciences Costello 
claims: “We understand by immersing ourselves and our intelligence in complexity.” (LOA 
62) Her lecture on the lives of animals, in which she discusses the work of primatologist 
Wolfgang Köhler, gives an example of what such an understanding might look like and how it 
 
10 For a more extensive discussion (including a reprinting of the poems discussed) see Mulhall 2009: 110-121. 
Lawrence Wright comments on Coetzee’s choice of poets, relating them to philosophical discourses contested 
and embraced by Costello: “Roughly speaking, the comparison of Rilke and Hughes represents a contrast 
between a neo-Kantian epistemology, exemplified by Rilke, and the particular post-Kantian epistemology 
espoused by Schopenhauer, and borrowed by Hughes.” (Wright 2008: 3) 
11 For an in-depth exploration of Coetzee’s use of the body see Hughes 2007. 
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might work. She imagines herself into the position of the chimpanzee called Sultan under 
Köhler’s experimental tutelage. Köhler supplies food to Sultan with obstacles that require 
Sultan to figure out how to reach the food. Costello imagines Sultan asking himself what he 
might have done to deserve such cruel treatment. One might question the acumen of 
Costello’s arguments against philosophical reasoning, just as one might dismiss or reject the 
ethical stance she takes on behalf of the nonhuman animals.12 But Coetzee endows her with 
the passionate conviction of a sentient being who doesn’t claim to hold a greater truth, and 
who instead follows her intuition and her experience, both of which lead her to believe that 
the sympathetic imagination only needs to be awakened in order to make available an 
empathetic bond with the other. Costello concedes that her lecture lacks rational appeal and 
philosophical perspicacity, but supplements such deficit by modestly referring her audience to 
the imaginative realms of more capable poets: 
If I do not convince you, that is because my words, here, lack the power to bring home to 
you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintellectual nature, of that animal being. That is why 
I urge you to read the poets who return the living, electric being to language; and if the 
poets do not move you, I urge you to walk, flank to flank, beside the beast that is prodded 
down the chute to his executioner. (LOA 65) 
Costello here provides a clue as to what the sympathetic imagination might be, namely a tool 
of the poet/writer to “bring home” to the reader the “unabstracted, unintellectual nature” of 
another, in this case an animal being. Her alternative suggestion of visiting an abattoir in order 
to experience the terror of the animals suggests that the poets’ representations might be able to 
achieve a similar effect on the reader as the shocking reality of industrialized death; that is, if 
the reader allows himself to “be moved” by the poets. Through the sympathetic imagination 
both author and reader gain access to the minds and bodies of others in the form of a positive 
engagement, which then potentially leads to an empathy effect. 
1.3 Criticism on the Sympathetic Imagination 
Historically, the concept of the sympathetic imagination can be traced back to its first 
appearance in the moral philosophy of Adam Smith in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” 
(1759).13 Smith opens his study by proposing that all humans are subject to feeling pity or 
compassion: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
                                                 
12 I widely support Costello’s claims. See also McKay 2010 or Tremaine 2003. For an overview of current trends 
in the discussion of animal rights see Cavell et al. 2008. For an anthropologist’s response see Fuentes 2006. 
13 Cf. Brady 2011. 
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though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are 
made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith 1971 [1759]: 1-2) 
In Smith’s understanding, compassion and pity are qualifiers of sympathy. The logic of 
mirroring others is implied in Smith’s argument, when he states what part the imagination has 
in engaging with others: 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the 
like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us 
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception 
of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by 
representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of 
our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we 
place ourselves in his situation [...]. (Smith 1971: 2) 
Smith’s notion of a sympathetic imagination was picked up by the poets of English 
Romanticism, most prominently by the poet John Keats and the critic William Hazlitt. A 
strong faith in the human imagination was pitted against the rationalism promoted by the 
Enlightenment – comparable to the efforts of Elizabeth Costello. The poets William 
Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lord Byron and William Blake can be seen as 
similarly disposed towards favouring the imagination over rationality. The essayist William 
Hazlitt draws on and responds to Edmund Burke, outlining how the imagination might be 
involved in our reception of literature and how it might serve to promote ethical behaviour. In 
the context of discussing Keats’ poetry, Hazlitt formulates the concept of negative capabilities 
(imagining that which we are not), which complements the concept of the sympathetic 
imagination, which preferably runs on similarity but is ideally challenged to imaginatively 
move beyond similarity.14 
As vast and diverse the Coetzee industry is today, a large part of the criticism has been 
preoccupied with following the traces of philosophical discourses Coetzee has imbibed his 
fictions with. The philosophies and ethics of Hegel, Schopenhauer (see Laurence Wright), 
Nietzsche, Derrida (see Derek Attridge), Levinas (see Mike Marais), Blanchot (see Sam 
Durrant), Lacan (see Michaela Canepari-Labib), Foucault and more have been originally and 
fruitfully linked and/or applied to Coetzee’s novels.15 Although encounters with the other (and 
the reader’s experience of these encounters) have featured prominently in some criticism, 
most expansively in Attridge’s two-prong approach in J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading 
                                                 
14 For an expansive discussion of concepts of the imagination prevalent in English Romanticism see Whale 2000. 
15 For an extensive overview of criticism on Coetzee see López 2011: 3-43; also: Clarkson 2011, Head 2009, De 
Jong 2005, Kossew 1998. For a more comprehensive study of the theoretical discourses Coetzee is linked to see 
Boehmer et al. 2009. 
18 
 
                                                
(2004) and The Singularity of Literature (2004), the concept of the sympathetic imagination, 
however, has so far received little specific attention. If it has, it cropped up in combination 
with discussions of animal ethics, as in Anton Leist and Peter Singer’s expansive and 
compelling essay collection J.M. Coetzee and Ethics (2010) or in Wendy Woodward’s 
imaginative response to Coetzee’s Costello fictions, The Animal Gaze – Animal Subjectivities 
in Southern African Narratives (2008). These works draw more on Elizabeth Costello’s 
general stance and attitude than on her fundamental proposition of a limitless sympathetic 
imagination. Most notably Sam Durrant and Mike Marais have discussed the sympathetic 
imagination, though both remain carefully sceptic of Costello’s claims, while sensing the 
potential of her approach. Using Levinas (the other’s face; Antlitz) and Derrida (hospitality), 
Durrant and Marais argue that Coetzee repeatedly sets up the stage for acts of the sympathetic 
imagination, but in the act shows how limited its scope actually is – both Marais and Durrant 
refer to the frustration experienced with self-other encounters in Coetzee’s fictions.16 My 
readings will in parts confirm their suspicions, but at the same time tease out how the staging 
of the sympathetic imagination combined with empathetic engagement might be more 
consequential. 
Geoffrey Baker’s excellent essay “The Limits of Sympathy: J.M. Coetzee’s Evolving 
Ethics of Engagement” maps out how Coetzee’s literary representations could be read as 
calling for change that begins with the reader. According to Geoffrey Baker, Costello 
illustrates how “Coetzee’s thematization of sympathy operates […] somewhere between the 
prescriptive call for political action and the Derridean/Adornian notion of transformation in 
the epistemological realm and as a necessary herald of practical change.” (Baker 2005: 45) 
Baker speaks of “Coetzee’s middle road – a practical agenda for transformative action that 
occurs on a seemingly non-political plane, at sites of interpersonal sympathy,” which he sees 
as the “affective aim of Coetzee’s fiction.” (Baker 2005: 29/27) 
In her essay “‘Miracles of Creation’: Animals in J.M. Coetzee’s Work” Josephine 
Donovan notes that Coetzee’s protagonists often experience an “intense empathetic 
identification with animal suffering and loss of dignity” (Donovan 2004: 83); most obviously 
in Disgrace, where David Lurie’s encounter with animals proves to be a key to the 
development of his empathetic capacities, but also clearly so in Waiting for the Barbarians, in 
which the Magistrate feels for the “barbarians” who are treated as though they were 
nonhuman animals. Similar themes occur regularly throughout Coetzee’s oeuvre. This process 
 
16 See in particular Marais 2006. Also Marais 1998a/2001/2009 and Durrant 2006. 
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of identification is closely related to bodily experience, which provides a link to empathy via 
a visceral response. Both Lurie and the Magistrate suffer physical attacks that prepare the 
ground for a heightened moral awareness born of suffering: “Costello theorizes the attitude 
the Magistrate and David Lurie inarticulately exhibit, namely, that moral awareness depends 
upon a kind of visceral empathy.” (Donovan 2004: 85) Donovan’s notion of “visceral 
empathy” – empathy experienced primarily through the body – points to the importance of 
literary embodiment in regard to processes of empathy. Embodiedness also appears to be a 
central category in Elizabeth Costello’s notion of understanding others and in their literary 
representation. 
Kate McInturff’s essay "Rex Oedipus: The Ethics of Sympathy in Recent Work by 
J.M. Coetzee" (2007) offers valuable insight and criticism on Elizabeth Costello and 
Disgrace, relating the former to the question of kinship and the latter to the Ancient Greek 
myths of Oedipus and Antigone, with today’s prisoners of war (i.e. Abu Ghraib) as a further 
point of reference. McInturff argues that Elizabeth Costello grounds her assertion of sympathy 
and empathy, of the “kinship of living beings,” on “the ability of human beings to recognize a 
kinship with imaginative and fictional beings” – McInturff reads this as an “extension of 
Judith Butler’s argument” presented in “On the Limits of Sovereignty,” questioning the 
hierarchical “logic of patriarchy.” (McInturff 2007: 2)17 Like Baker, McInturff recognizes 
“Costello’s ethical imperative to sympathise with the embodied experiences of other beings.” 
And like Durrant and Marais, she notes the gap between the sympathetic imagination “in 
theory” and the sympathetic imagination “in practice,” which McInturff finds confirmed by 
Costello herself in the chapter “The Problem of Evil” in Elizabeth Costello (McInturff 2007: 
5). There, Costello discusses how Paul West’s account of The Very Rich Hours of Count von 
Stauffenberg (1980) had taken her to a place she would have preferred not to be at: 
There are many things that it is like, this storytelling business. One of them (so she says in 
one of the paragraphs she has not crossed out yet) is a bottle with a genie in it. When the 
storyteller opens the bottle, the genie is released into the world, and it costs all hell to get 
him back in again. Her position, her revised position, her position in the twilight of life: 
better, on the whole, that the genie stay in the bottle. (EC 167)18 
In McInturff’s reading – supported by the arguments of Marais and Durrant – Costello shows 
there might necessarily be ethical limitations to how far the sympathetic imagination should 
be allowed to take both reader and author. Nonetheless, all three critics are much in favour of 
 
17 “Read together, Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello and Disgrace provide an important interrogation of the nature of 
the human and the violence concomitant to racially and sexually exclusive definitions of that category.” 
(McInturff 2007: 3) 
18 Paul West kindly provided a response to Coetzee’s text (West 2004). 
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Costello’s fundamental appeal for sympathy and for all to embrace others more 
empathetically. 
This notion is picked up by Don Randall in his 2007 essay “The Community of 
Sentient Beings: J.M. Coetzee’s Ecology in Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello,” where he 
argues that Coetzee’s discourse responds to “atrocity [situated] at the very core of modernity,” 
referring both to our treatment of animals as well as our treatment of each other. (Randall 
2007: 209) Randall sees affinities between Coetzee’s texts and Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation (1975).19 Randall stresses Costello’s attempts to open the human borders “by 
making sentience rather than reason the criterion for inclusion in community.” (Randall 2007: 
211) Using the Magistrate of Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians as an example, Randall 
argues that the reduction to “a life that is no more than bodily life” constitutes a “ground zero” 
on which to build “a sense of the human that is more expansive and more inclusive.” (Randall 
2007: 214) For what Randall terms Costello’s “eco-ethics” the body has central importance: 
The body, clearly, is the coin, the currency, sustaining the fiction’s ecological economy. 
Fullness of being absolutely requires the experience of embodied life, its gratifications and 
its liabilities; ecologically ethical life requires the recognition that such experience is 
profoundly shared. (Randall 2007: 220) 
Coetzee writes in “a zone of intersection between sociopolitical and ecological concerns, to 
elaborate an ecologically oriented ethics that sharpens the critique of modern political 
regimes.” (Randall 2007: 210) At the end, Randall quotes Lady Chandos’ “primordially 
ecological” key statement from the Postscript of Elizabeth Costello: “Each creature is key to 
all other creatures.” (EC 229; quoted in Randall 2007: 223)20 
Another noteworthy contribution comes from Steven G. Kellmann. In “Coetzee and 
the Animals” (2002), Kellmann sees in Coetzee’s empathetic engagement with animals a 
“logical extension of engagement with the Other” (Kellmann 2002: 327). Kellmann 
awkwardly applauds “Coetzee’s skill at imagining the lives of dark-skinned men” and the 
“negative capability” Coetzee demonstrates: 
Michael K, in Life & Times of Michael K (1983), Friday, in Foe (1986), and Vercueil, in 
Age of Iron (1990), are all assertions of negative capability, of Coetzee’s skill at imagining 
the lives of dark-skinned men […] consistent with Coetzee’s project of engaging alterity by 
transcending his own race, gender, and nationality. (Kellmann 2002: 326) 
In the “coy autobiography” Boyhood (1998), Kellmann writes, Coetzee “attempts to realize 
Rimbaud’s program of transforming the self into an Other; as if to demonstrate the French 
 
19 Alan Northover also chooses a link to Singer’s Animal Liberation as point of departure in his essay, adding 
Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (1983) as another possible point of reference. Alisdair McIntyre’s After 
virtue: a study in moral theory (1981) provides the framing discourse for Northover’s argument (Northover 
2009). 
20 Cf. Nethersole 2005. 
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poet’s credo that ‘Je est un autre,’ Coetzee inscribes his life in the third-person.” (Kellmann 
2002: 326) The programmatic approximation to the other exercised in Coetzee’s fictions is 
reflected in some of his characters: “Those Coetzee characters who resemble or possess 
special empathy with other species tend to share their author’s respect for the alterity of the 
Other.” (Kellmann 2002: 328) This respect for the other is dramatized in The Lives of Animals 
by putting “what Mikhail Bakhtin would call his dialogic imagination in the service of the 
author’s sympathetic imagination.” (Kellmann 2002: 330) 
Lastly, Brenda Deen Schildgen’s 2003 essay “’No Bounds to the Sympathetic 
Imagination’ in J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello” deserves special mentioning. She likens 
the discourse presented in Elizabeth Costello to Plato’s Symposium, “a dialogue in which no 
single viewpoint can dominate, even though one particular voice has more discursive power.” 
Schildgen aligns Coetzee with a number of “western philosophers in recent decades”, listing 
Jacques Derrida, Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Giorgio Agamben, Hélène Cixous as 
examples for thinkers turning their attention on the “question of animals and our ethical 
responsibilities to them.” (Schildgen 2003: 324) Schildgen is more confident in her appraisal 
of Costello’s “ethical imperative” to employ the sympathetic imagination in engaging with 
others, and she expresses her faith in the capacity of literary expression to foster this notion: 
Poetic language, particularly metaphor, can make us ‘feel’, the precise capability that 
modern philosophers have suggested aligns humans with animals. In other words, metaphor 
offers us this insight – to perceive, think, feel, even perhaps be or become like another. […] 
In other words, the novelist tells us, the poet can make us become the jaguar. This is not just 
sympathy or empathy. Through language, she implies, our souls/beings can ‘poetically’ 
transmigrate. (Schildgen 2003: 331) 
Schildgen proposes that “poetry itself, through the metaphor and simile (or poetic discourse), 
overcomes, unifies, or attempts to unify the affective and the cognitive.” (Schildgen 2003: 
330) Like Randall she finishes her essay with a discussion of the Postscript to Elizabeth 
Costello, only that she links it to a reading of the preceding chapter “At the Gate,” in which 
Costello expresses her belief in frogs.21 
While I am most sympathetic to the faith expressed by Schildgen and the optimism of 
Kellmann and Randall, the acute criticism of Marais, Durrant, and McInturff reminds us that 
Coetzee’s presentation of Costello and her ideas contains intellectual ambiguities and ironies 
that slightly unsettle a straightforward reading of her ideas. Both in my readings and in the 
theoretical framework presented in this introduction, the implicit limitations of the 
sympathetic imagination are taken into account. Often enough, the literary representation of a 
character’s failure of the sympathetic imagination can be integrated as a demonstration that 
 
21 See also Head 2006. 
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challenges the reader in his own engagement with fictional characters. When the sympathetic 
imagination fails, the limitations become apparent and the underlying mechanisms are 
partially revealed to the reader. In accordance with the neuroscientific argument of empathy 
blockades, the staging of the sympathetic imagination necessarily implies failures on the side 
of the respective agents; for without limits the sympathetic imagination would not be best 
suited to trigger empathy in the reader. The double movement of approximation and 
distancing in parts affirms the scepticism of Marais and Durrant, but at the same time it 
enhances the empathetic effect of the sympathetic imagination. 
1.4 Sympathy through Empathy 
Having supplied a framework of how Coetzee via Costello outlines the sympathetic 
imagination in a literary discourse, I will now discuss how the sympathetic imagination 
relates to empathy. The terms empathy and sympathy are often used synonymously, but it is 
vital to note the difference. The definition offered here is synthesized mainly from social 
neurosciences. Sympathy means a feeling of compassion for another being, and implies a 
position of concern for their well-being. Empathy means the capacity to feel yourself into 
another being.22 Sympathy therefore asserts an outside perspective, whereas empathy implies 
the notion of attempting to gain an inside perspective or at least an approximation of insight 
into the other’s experience. Most commonly both terms are used in regard to suffering, but 
they can be applied to all kinds of emotional states. Sympathy, which occurs consciously, 
requires at least a minimal amount of empathy to facilitate grasping the inner state of the 
other, before one can feel with him, her, or it. Empathy (as opposed to sympathy) occurs pre-
consciously and does not necessarily imply a position of well-meaning concern followed by 
the intention to help, since it initially occurs in a preconscious affective neutral mode. For the 
purpose of my argument the distinction importantly marks two different stages of engagement 
with the other. The author’s sympathetic imagination becomes manifest in the mode of 
representation, including modalities of narrative structure and perspective, and these in turn 
can trigger the reader’s own sympathetic imagination. Such a sympathetic engagement of the 
imagination within the complexity of a novel can further the reader’s capacity for empathy. 
 
22 Promoting the concept of “radical compassion,” Anita Nowak collected fifty-two definitions of empathy, 
illustrating the wide range of discourses on empathy. One of Nowak’s sources, Khen Lampert, offers a definition 
that resonates with Costello’s account of the poets’ engagement with animals: “[Empathy] is what happens to us 
when we leave our own bodies [...] and find ourselves either momentarily or for a longer period of time in the 
mind of the other. We observe reality through her eyes, feel her emotions, share in her pain.” (quoted in Nowak 
2011: 16) Lampert links empathy to compassion; Costello might be considered sympathetic to such an approach. 
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Exactly how empathy works has been discussed at length in a large variety of discourses (see 
Nowak 2011), but the range of answers provided is testimony to the fuzziness of both terms 
and the lack of specificity in attendant explanations. The underlying mechanism of current 
neurological speculation about empathy is the mirroring of neurons. The fictional text carries 
traces of the sympathetic imagination of the author and of her or his empathy, which can be 
picked up and adopted by the reader. In this way, empathy takes place both in the creative 
process on the side of the author as well as on the receptive-creative side of the reader through 
a process of neurological assimilation to the representation.23 
1.5 Neuroscience, Mirror Neurons, and Empathy 
1.5.1 Rizzolatti/Pellegrino: The Discovery of Mirror Neurons 
Elizabeth Costello situates sympathy in the heart, but neurosciences want us to locate 
this faculty in the brain and its neurological circuits. The initial discovery of mirror neurons 
through Giuseppe di Pellegrino, Giacomo Rizzolatti, Luciano Fadiga, Leonardo Fogassi, and 
Vittorio Gallese at the University of Parma dates back to 1992 (Zaboura 2009: 59). After 
some years of groundwork, in 1996 mirror neurons were tested in the context of action 
perception and consequent action simulation in macaque monkeys.24 The experiments 
revealed that a certain type of neuron participates in a “mirroring” reaction or response on the 
part of the experimental subject, who imitates the neurological pattern active in the observed 
agent. 25 One early experiment involved a macaque monkey observing a man grasping a glass 
of water and raising it to his lips in order to drink; the neurons activated by the observation 
mirrored the performed action, revealing a nearly identical activation pattern: as if the 
observing macaque monkey had performed the action himself.26 
 
23 According to Nadia Zaboura the mirror neurons evoke “a so-called direct matching mechanism, which 
assimilates the perceived action pattern to the own action repertoire; direct because it happens without 
mediation. By this process the observer is enabled symmetrically to co-experience what goes on inside the other, 
what moves him – in a literal sense referring to the neurophysiologic level. Due to the almost identical biological 
configuration of the interacting parties an intersubjective shift of perspectives takes place from a third person to a 
first person perspective, which accordingly is titled simulation.” (Zaboura 2009: 63; my translation, emphasis 
added) 
24 Gallese et al. 1996. 
25 These findings resulted from a series of experiments with macaque monkeys made in a spirit not unlike that of 
Wolfgang Köhler, even though the methods this time are neurologically based: electrodes were implanted into 
the monkeys’ brains to record the activities of their neuronal networks. In the spirit of Elizabeth Costello we 
should engage our sympathetic imagination to get an idea, however vague, of how disturbingly invasive such 
procedures must surely be for the subjects of such experiments. The debatable methods employed to obtain these 
results does not discredit the research. 
26 Rizzolatti/Sinigaglia 2008. Also: Rizzolatti/Craighero 2004. 
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1.5.2 Gallese: Empathy, the Shared Manifold, and Resonance Mechanisms 
In 2001, Vittorio Gallese linked mirror neurons to empathy in his essay “The ‘Shared 
Manifold’ Hypothesis: from mirror neurons to empathy.”27 Gallese proposes that mirror 
neurons and empathy are instrumental for intersubjective understanding, which he considers 
fundamental for meeting the complex demands of contemporary human society: “Living in a 
complex society requires individuals to develop cognitive skills enabling them to cope with 
other individuals’ actions, by recognizing them, understanding them, and reacting 
appropriately to them.” (Gallese 2001: 33) Choosing this assessment as starting point for his 
argument, Gallese continues to assume that “we are able to understand the behaviour of others 
in terms of their mental states,” which he chooses to designate as mind-reading (Gallese 2001: 
33). 
Gallese briefly discusses the representation of mental states as understood by 
proponents of the ‘Theory of Mind’ (short TOM; Gallese primarily refers to Premack and 
Woodruff 1978 and a later survey of the issue by Carruthers and Smith 1996; see Gallese 
2001: 42-43). For the purposes of his argument, Gallese chooses to “conceive TOM as the 
result of a simulation routine by means of which we can pretend to be in the other’s ‘mental 
shoes’ and use our own mind as a model for the mind of others.” (Gallese refers to Gordon 
1986; Harris 1989; in Gallese 2001: 42) Just as Theory of Mind gives access to the 
mindworlds of others, literature can evoke a simulation routine in the reader. 
On Mirror Neurons 
The neurological basis for the simulation postulated by proponents of Theory of Mind 
has been found to be a specific type of neurons that since have been termed mirror neurons. 
Gallese gives a brief overview of their discovery, which I shall attempt to summarize here. 
Initially, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, David Perrett and co-workers discovered 
“in a cortical sector buried within the anterior part of the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STSa)”28 
 
27 Gallese 2008. 
28 In spite of extensive reading of neuroscientific research, I cannot claim to have comprehensively grasped brain 
architecture. Research located mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex, area F5. Or, in more detail and with 
another distinction: 
Mirror neurons have been discovered in area F5, which constitutes the most rostral part of the ventral premotor 
cortex. This area can be functionally parcelled in two sectors: one sector occupies the cortical convexity, and it is 
in this sector that mirror neurons are mostly clustered. The second sector is buried within the inferior limb of the 
arcuate sulcus, of which it constitutes the posterior bank. In this latter sector, a second class of visuomotor 
grasping-related neurons have been described, ‘canonical neurons’ (Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Murata et al., 1997; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2000; Gallese, 2000a). Canonical neurons are activated during the execution of goal-related 
movements such as grasping, holding, and manipulating objects. Unlike mirror neurons, however, they are not 
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a type of neuron that was “selectively activated by the observation of various types of body 
movements such as walking, turning the head, stretching the arm, bending the torso, etc.” (for 
a review, see Carey et al. 1997; Jellema and Perrett 2001; quoted in Gallese 2001: 34) These 
neurons respond to goal-related behaviour, not to static presentations of hands or objects. 
(Perrett et al. 1990; quoted in Gallese 2001: 34) A series of single neuron recording 
experiments revealed, “that a particular set of neurons, activated during the execution of 
purposeful, goal-related hand actions, such as grasping, holding or manipulating objects, 
discharge also when the monkey observes similar hand actions performed by another 
individual.” (Gallese 2001: 34) Early research was limited to the brains of macaque monkeys 
– with experiments that are not explicitly mentioned, but can well be imagined as highly 
intrusive and unpleasant for the animals. As to be expected, research was aimed at transferring 
these discoveries to the human brain, as Gallese notes: 
All these studies suggested that humans have a ‘mirror matching system’ similar to that 
originally discovered in monkeys. Whenever we are looking at someone performing an 
action, beside the activation of various visual areas, there is a concurrent activation of the 
motor circuits that are recruited when we ourselves perform that action. Although we do not 
overtly reproduce the observed action, nevertheless our motor system becomes active as if 	
we were executing that very same action that we are observing. To spell it out in different 
words, action observation implies action simulation. (Gallese 2001: 37; original italics) 
Gallese speaks of the necessity of a link being established between observed agent and 
observer and proposes that “the embodiment of the intended goal, shared by the agent and the 
observer” constitutes this intersubjective link. Gallese reads embodiment as depending on the 
“motor schema of the action,” as opposed to “a purely visual description of its agent.” 
(Gallese 2001: 36; original italics) Yawning and laughter are everyday examples of such a 
matching mechanism and the resulting contagious behaviour. (Gallese 2001: 37-38) 
As we can see, the intentionality of (goal-directed) actions plays a vital part in the 
activation of mirror neurons. Or, as Gallese puts it: “Agency constitutes a key issue for the 
understanding of intersubjectivity and for explaining how individuals can interpret their social 
world.” (Gallese 2001: 34; original italics) Gallese tentatively proposes: “I posit that a similar 
functional architecture might be at work also in the far more complex domain of 
intersubjective relationships.” (Gallese 2001: 40) 
activated by action observation. They discharge during object observation, typically showing congruence 
between the type of grip they motorically code and the size/shape of the object that visually drives them. Both 
sectors of F5 are reciprocally connected to the primary motor cortex, area F1 (see Matelli et al. 1986; Rizzolatti 
et al. 1998). 
In a particular sector of the premotor cortex – area F5 – there are therefore two distinct classes of neurons that 
code goal-related hand movements, and which differ for their visual responsiveness: mirror neurons respond to 
action observation, while canonical neurons respond to object observation (Gallese 2001: 39-40). 
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Empathy and Embodiedness 
Vittorio Gallese gives a concise account of the history of the term empathy: 
Empathy is a later English translation of the German word Einfühlung, originally 
introduced by Theodore Lipps (1903a) into the vocabulary of the psychology of aesthetic 
experience, to denote the relationship between an artwork and the observer, who 
imaginatively projects herself into the contemplated object. Lipps (1903b) extended the 
concept of Einfühlung also to the domain of intersubjectivity that he characterized in terms 
of inner imitation of the perceived movements of others. When I am watching an acrobat 
walking on a suspended wire, Lipps (1903b) notes, I feel myself inside of him (Ich fühle 
mich so in ihm). (Gallese 2001: 43; original italics) 
Gallese continues to trace the term’s further road into phenomenology, most prominently 
picked up by Husserl, who (in his posthumously published Ideen II) emphasizes the role of 
the acting body in perceiving – Merleau-Ponty similarly emphasizes the body’s role.29 Gallese 
mentions how Edith Stein (On the Problem of Empathy, 1912) stressed the notion that 
empathy largely relies on patterns of similarity between observer and observed, and he 
concludes: “[T]his seems to suggest that our ‘grasping’ of the meaning of the world doesn’t 
exclusively rely on its visual representation, but is strongly influenced by action-related 
sensorimotor processes.” (Gallese 2001: 43-44) This also applies in terms of intersubjective 
encounters: “Self and other relate to each other, because they both represent opposite 
extensions of the same correlative and reversible system self/other. The observer and the 
observed are part of a dynamic system governed by reversibility rules.” (Gallese 2001: 44) 
Gallese concludes “that the neural matching mechanism constituted by mirror neurons – or by 
equivalent neurons in humans – described in the present paper, is crucial to establish an 
empathic link between different individuals.” (Gallese 2001: 44) 
The Shared Manifold 
Finally, Gallese expands the concept of the shared manifold, which “can be operationalized at 
three different levels: A phenomenological level; a functional level; and a subpersonal level”: 
_The phenomenological level is the one responsible for the sense of similarity, of being 
individuals within a larger social community of persons like us, that we experience anytime 
we confront ourselves with other human beings. It could be defined also as the empathic 
level, provided that empathy is characterized in the ‘enlarged’ way I was advocating before. 
Actions, emotions and sensations experienced by others become meaningful to us because 
we can share them with them. 
_The functional level can be characterized in terms of simulation routines, as if processes 
enabling models of others to be created. 
 
29 Gallese notes: “Merleau-Ponty argues against the Cartesian equivalence between seeing and thinking, 
emphasizing the ‘narcissistic’ character of vision.” (Gallese 2001: 44) Here we might feel prompted to think of 
Elizabeth Costello’s anti-Cartesian stance or of Jacobus Coetzee and Eugene Dawn in Dusklands (see also 
Chapter 2). 
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_The subpersonal level is instantiated as the result of the activity of a series of mirror 
matching neural circuits. A dual mode of operation, an expressive mode and a receptive 
mode characterizes these circuits. The activity of these neural circuits is, in turn, tightly 
coupled with multi-level changes within body-states (see below). (Gallese 45) 
Translated into terms of literature, we can conclude that the phenomenological level lays the 
foundation for an empathetic shared experience of others. The functional level can be applied 
to both the writing and the reading process, where either the author or the reader simulates 
models of others. The subpersonal level might serve to distinguish between the expressing 
(author) and receiving (reader) end of this process. In this context, the case of a Huntington 
patient illuminates how our capacity for empathy might be under- or well-developed: 
A recent study published by Calder et al. (2000) shows that a Huntington patient who 
suffered damage to subcortical structures such as the insula and the putamen, is selectively 
impaired in detecting disgust in many different modalities, such as facial signals, non-
verbal emotional sounds, and emotional prosody. The same patient is also selectively 
impaired in subjectively experiencing disgust and therefore in reacting appropriately to it. 
This clinical case, with all cautions required when single cases are involved, seems to 
suggest that once the subject has lost the capacity to	 experience and express a given 
emotion, the same emotion cannot be easily represented and detected in others. (Gallese 
2001: 45; original italics) 
Thought in terms of literature, this indicates the challenge of transmitting empathy through a 
text to an unknown reader, whose disposition has decisive influence on his text reception. I 
assume that reading might include the activity of mirror neurons, following a simple 
syllogism: If literature can evoke empathy in the reader, and mirror neurons constitute the 
neurological basis for empathy, then literature must induce the activity of mirror neurons. 
Gallese concedes the possibility of mirror neurons working in far more complex ways than 
just in goal-related action observation: 
To summarize, there is preliminary evidence that the same neural structures that are active 
during sensations and emotions are active also when the same sensations and emotions are 
to be detected in others. It appears therefore that a whole range of different ‘mirror 
matching mechanisms’ may be present in our brain. (Gallese 2001: 45) 
Resonance Mechanisms 
One important aspect of the self is the result of the individual’s mirroring in the social 
organization of the outer world. According to Mead, the only way to objectify us is to 
assume the other’s perspective, like looking at our reflection in a mirror. Through the 
medium of intersubjective communication the consequences produced by our actions in the 
observed behaviour of others contribute to build our personal identity (see Mead, 1934). 
(Gallese 2001: 44) 
Gallese stresses our dependence on others in order to define ourselves. The mirror neurons 
enable our motor system to resonate with the observed agent (Gallese 2001: 38). Such 
‘resonance mechanism’ can be triggered only through the establishment of an intersubjective 
link (Gallese 2001: 47). Gallese links this to the Shared Manifold discussed above, which 
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both “determines and constrains this intersubjective link.” (Gallese 2001: 47) Gallese adds 
that “explicit theorizing is the only strategy available when the embodied resonance 
mechanisms of the shared manifold are deficient, as likely occurring in the case of autism.” 
(Gallese 2001: 47) Literature is similar to such “explicit theorizing,” since it takes place in our 
mind and within the realm of language. Coetzee’s fiction shows how such theorizing can be 
augmented through techniques of literary embodiment and the strong focus on the mindworld 
of the protagonist and the intersubjective links established by him. Coetzee creates characters 
that resonate with the reader or other characters, offering complex simulations of isolation or 
attempted social interaction. Gallese states that simulation and resonance are fundamental 
aspects of our cerebral being: 
It appears therefore that a whole range of different ‘mirror matching mechanisms’ may 
be present in our brain. This subpersonal architecture of simulation, that we originally 
discovered and described in the domain of actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et 
al., 1996a; Rizzolatti et al., 1996a), is likely a basic organizational feature of our brain. 
(Gallese 2001: 46) 
1.5.3 Jean Decety and Daniel Batson: Empathy and Morality 
In contrast to Gallese, Jean Decety and Daniel Batson argue in their essay “Empathy 
and Morality: Integrating Social and Neuroscience Approaches” (2009) in more technical 
terms as can be seen in their initial definition of empathy: 
In social neuroscience, empathy refers to a psychological construct that involves 
representations (i.e., memories that are localized in distributed neural networks that encode 
information and, when temporarily activated, enable access to this stored information, e.g., 
shared affective representations) and processes (i.e., computational procedures that are 
neurally localized and are independent of the nature of modality of the stimulus that is 
being processed –e.g., decoupling mechanism between self and other). (Decety/Batson 
2009: 110) 
Decety and Batson distinguish between “bottom-up (rapid and unconscious) and top-down 
(conscious) information processing” in regard to empathy, which “can be broken down into a 
number of interacting macro-components”: 
1. Motor and physiological resonance mediated by the perception-action direct coupling 
and the autonomic nervous system that regulates bodily states, emotion and reactivity. This 
aspect primarily draws on motor, premotor, and somatosensory cortices, limbic system, and 
insula. 
2. Meta-cognitive abilities to infer or imagine another person’s thoughts or feelings to infer 
or imagine one’s own thoughts or feelings in another’s situation, including the capacity to 
distinguish between one’s own thoughts and those of others, which is a key component of 
interpersonal interactions. The medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulated cortex 
and temporo-parietal junction play a critical role in these processes. 
3. Emotion regulation modulates negative arousal and adds flexibility, allowing the 
individual to be less dependent on external cues. The lateral prefrontal cortex and the 
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anterior cingulate with their reciprocal connections to the amygdala orbitofrontal cortex are 
part of a circuit that regulates emotion and cognition. (Decety/Batson 2009: 110)30 
This admittedly very technical classification indicates the complexity of neuronal networks. 
Decety and Batson stress how empathy occurs on various levels that include both 
physiological and cognitive, as well as emotional aspects. Another statement in the essay of 
Decety and Batson resonates strongly with Elizabeth Costello’s claim about the sympathetic 
imagination: “One of the most striking aspects of human empathy is that it can be felt for 
virtually any target – even targets of a different species.” (Batson, Lishner, Cook, Sawyer 
2005; quoted in Decety/Batson 2009: 113). Decety and Batson go on to speculate that our 
verbal expression of emotions privileges our empathetic potential over that of animals: 
These reports provide an opportunity to share, explain, and regulate emotional experience 
with others that is not found in other species. Conversation helps to develop empathy, for it 
is often here that one learns of shared experiences and feelings. (Decety/Batson 2009: 113) 
If we understand a novel (and other literary forms) as a long asynchronous (and 
asymmetrical) conversation between author and reader, the same might apply to literature. 
Another aspect supporting this claim is the importance Decety and Batson attribute to 
perspective-taking: 
Further, successful perspective taking has been linked to altruistic motivation (Batson et al., 
1991). Using mental imagery to take the perspective of another is a powerful way to place 
oneself in the situation or emotional state of that person. Mental imagery not only enables 
us to see the world of our conspecifics through their eyes or in their shoes, but may also 
result in similar sensations as the other person’s (Decety and Grèzes, 2006). (Decety/Batson 
2009: 117; see also Decety 2005) 
What Decety terms “mental imagery” seems to me a paradigmatic trait of literature, since a 
text offers hardly any visual stimuli, but instead relies almost completely on the reader’s 
capacity for creating the according mental imagery during the reading process. 
Another helpful distinction discussed by Decety pertains to how we might attempt to 
gain access to the mind-worlds of others, either by “focusing on another’s feelings (imagine 
other), [which] may evoke stronger empathic concern, while explicitly putting oneself into the 
shoes of the target (imagining the self) induces both empathic concern and personal distress.” 
(Decety/Batson 2009: 117) Remaining detached is a third option, but clearly less conducive 
than empathy; as was shown in a study by Batson, Early, and Salvarini in 1997. Decety 
concludes: “This observation may help to explain why observing a need situation does not 
 
30 “It is worth noting that there are bidirectional anatomical and functional links between the (widely distributed) 
areas in which representations of emotions are temporarily activated (including autonomic and somatic 
responses) during empathic experience and the areas involved in emotion regulation and meta-cognition. Each 
region has unique patterns of intracerebral connections, which determines its function, and differences in neural 
activity during the experience of empathy are produced by distributed subsystems of brain regions. 
Even though there is massive parallel processing, the dynamic interaction of these regions is also an important 
aspect to be investigated further.” (Decety/Batson 2009: 110) See also Decety/Jackson 2004. 
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always yield to prosocial behavior: if perceiving another person in an emotionally or 
physically painful circumstance elicits personal distress or a detached, objective perspective, 
then the observer may tend not to fully attend to the other’s experience and as a result lack 
sympathetic behavior.” (Decety/Batson 2009: 117) 
Decety’s argument goes on to discuss how perspective-taking might be processed on a 
neurological level: 
Interestingly, cognitive neuroscience research demonstrates that when individuals adopt the 
perspective of others, neural circuits common to the ones underlying first-person 
experiences are activated as well. However, taking the perspective of the other produces 
further activation in specific parts of the frontal cortex that are implicated in executive 
functions, particularly inhibitory control (e.g. Ruby and Decety, 2003, 2004). In line with 
these findings, the frontal lobes may functionally serve to separate perspectives, or resist 
interference from one’s own perspective when adopting the subjective perspective of others 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004). This ability is of particular importance when observing 
another’s distress, since a complete merging with the target would lead to confusion as to 
who is experiencing the negative emotions and therefore to different motivations as to who 
should be the target of supportive behavior. (Decety/Batson 2009: 117) 
In other contexts this phenomenon is tagged as emotional contagion. (see Decety/Batson 
2009: 119-120) Imagining-Self-as-Other lacks emotional distance, which negatively affects 
the potential for empathy to develop; in Decety and Batson’s terms: “The behavioral data 
confirmed that explicitly projecting oneself into an aversive situation leads to higher personal 
distress – while focusing on the emotional and behavioral reactions of another in distress is 
accompanied by higher empathic concern and lower personal distress.” (Decety/Batson 2009: 
118) 
Whether these results may rightfully be transferred to the narratological aspects of 
literature remains to be seen. Coetzee’s fictions provide many instances of first-person and 
third-person perspective-taking, which could be correlated to imagining-self and imagining-
other. Decety and Batson here provide a framework that might be fruitfully applied to literary 
narration. Decety concludes: 
This finding was interpreted as indicating that a focus on the target’s feelings (imagine 
other) produced more other-oriented feeling for the target when focusing on his affective 
expressions and motor responses, while the first person perspective (imagine self) led to 
more self-oriented responding that was less a response to the presumed feelings of the 
target. (Decety/Batson 2009: 119)31 
In my discussion of Coetzee’s fictions I will argue that emotional contagion is largely avoided 
in favour of an empathetic response. Again, in Decety and Batson’s terms: 
These important aspects are likely to be involved in distinguishing emotional contagion, 
which relies heavily on the automatic link between perceiving the emotions of another and 
 
31 “Yet a minimal distinction between self and other is essential for social interaction in general and for empathy 
in particular, and new work in social neuroscience has demonstrated that the self and other are distinguished at 
both the behavioral and neural levels.” (Decety/Batson 2009: 123) 
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one’s own experience of the same emotion, from empathic responses which call for a more 
detached relation. The neural responses identified in these studies as non-overlapping 
between self and other may take advantage of available processing capacities to plan 
appropriate future actions concerning the other. (Decety/Batson 2009: 119) 
Another crucial aspect of Decety and Batson’s larger argument pertains to emotion regulation, 
something we continually are confronted with in the characters created by Coetzee: 
Emotion regulation seems to have a particularly important role in social interaction, and it 
has a clear adaptive function for both the individual and the species (Ochsner and Gross, 
2005). Importantly, it has been demonstrated that individuals who can regulate their 
emotions are more likely to experience empathy, and also to interact in morally desirable 
ways with others (Eisenberg et al., 1994). In contrast, people who experience their emotions 
intensely, especially negative emotions, are more prone to personal distress, an aversive 
emotional reaction, such as anxiety or discomfort based on the recognition of another’s 
emotional state or condition. (Decety/Batson 2009: 120) 
Fritz Breithaupt (discussed in 1.6) presents a similar argument when he proposes the concepts 
of cognitive empathy and narrative empathy. 
Like Gallese, Decety and Batson cannot help but think of how these findings might 
benefit society: 
Further studies are required to increase our knowledge about the various factors, processes 
and (neural and behavioral) effects involved in and resulting from the modulation of 
empathic responses. This knowledge will inform us how empathy can be promoted to 
ultimately increase humankind’s ability to act in more prosocial and altruistic ways. 
(Decety/Batson 2009: 122) 
Decety and Batson also don’t fail to emphasize the importance of taking into account the 
notion of embodied cognition: “These accounts of empathy are in harmony with theories of 
embodied cognition, which contend that cognitive representations and operations are 
fundamentally grounded in bodily states and in the brain’s modality-specific systems 
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Ric, and Krauth-Gruber, 2005).” (Decety/Batson 2009: 123-124)32 
In conclusion I might say that Decety and Batson’s comments on perspective-taking in 
terms of imagining-as-self and imagining-as-other will prove helpful in my discussion of 
Coetzee’s narrative strategies. Decety and Batson add some complexity to these processes, 
which in Gallese’s account were not so prominent for the sake of presenting his larger 
argument of the Shared Manifold. The three levels on which empathy might become effective 
include our physical properties, our cognitive functions as well as our emotional processing of 
situations. 
 
32 For a more interdisciplinary approach see Decety/Ickes 2009. 
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1.5.4 Damasio, LeDoux, Tomasello: Embodied Cognition 
Apart from first encounters with cognitive studies during my studies of philosophy, 
Antonio Damasio, Joseph LeDoux and Michael Tomasello paved the way for a more 
comprehensive understanding of how the brain works, of its evolution and the inescapable 
embodiedness of cognitive processes. All three authors have succeeded in making new 
discoveries of the neurosciences accessible to the average reader. They share an abstention 
from narrowly focusing on brain functions, and establish instead a larger context by linking 
cognition with emotions (Damasio and LeDoux) or with cultural evolution (Tomasello). In the 
context of my research, I have taken several cues from these authors, of which I shall present 
some in the following. 
The observations made by these authors regarding embodied cognition will prove 
useful in the discussion of literary embodiment in the fictions of Coetzee, creating a link 
between the bodily states of characters and their mindsets and, at the same time, shedding 
light on their relations to others. 
Damasio: Feeling and Thinking beyond Descartes 
As early as 1994, Antonio R. Damasio prominently launched an attack against the 
Cartesian logic of the mind-body dualism in his book Descartes‘ Error: Emotion, Reason and 
the Human Brain. He did so by arguing from the viewpoint of neurosciences and used the 
case studies of Phineas Gage33 and his own patient Elliot. In the context of my research I will 
only mention some cues I took from Damasio. 
I find the assumption of visual dispositional representations in our brain of external 
visual stimuli very convincing (Damasio 1994: 104-106). As an example Damasio chose the 
act of remembering somebody’s face and claimed that whoever else would remember the 
same person would show a similar activity pattern in his visual cortex. 
But more importantly, Damasio establishes the fact that cognitive processes cannot be 
thought independently from the body; his theory of somatic markers guiding our decisions is 
of minor importance here. Following the intuition that reading might activate mirror neurons, 
I am interested in cerebral perception of external stimuli. Damasio gives a captivating brief 
account of how a visual impression might register in our mind: 
 
33 The case of Phineas Gage has often been represented as the initiation of neuroscience. A metal rod severely 
damaged his brain, and the resulting effects on his character gave cause to suspect a strong connection between 
certain character traits and certain brain regions. Due to ethical restraints regarding experiments on live test 
subjects, cases of brain lesions have often been the starting point for neuroscientific research. 
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Nonconsciously, automatically and involuntarily, the response of the prefrontal 
dispositional representations [...] is signaled to the amygdala and anterior cingulate. 
Dispositional representations in the latter regions respond a) by activating nuclei of the 
autonomic nervous system and signaling to the body via peripheral nerves, with the result 
that viscera are placed in the state most commonly associated with the type of triggering 
situation; b) by dispatching signals to the motor system, so that the skeletal muscles 
complete the external picture of an emotion in facial expressions and body posture; c) by 
activating the endocrine and peptide systems, whose chemical reactions result in changes in 
body and brain states; and finally, d) by activating, with particular patterns, the nonspecific 
neurotransmitter nuclei in brain stem and basal forebrain which then release their chemical 
messages in varied regions of the telencephalon (e.g., basal ganglia and cerebral cortex). 
This apparently exhausting collection of actions is a massive response; it is varied. It is 
aimed at the whole organism, and in a healthy person, it is a marvel of coordination. 
The changes caused by (a), (b), and (c) impinge on the body, cause an “emotional body 
state,” and are subsequently signalled back to the limbic and somatosensory systems. The 
changes caused by (d), which do not arise in the body proper but rather in a group of brain 
stem structures in charge of body regulation, have a major impact in the style and efficiency 
of cognitive processes and constitute a parallel route for the emotional response. (Damasio 
1994: 137f) 
Dispositional representations primarily refer to visual stimuli, since these can most easily be 
tested. However, reading also renders representations; since these are coded in writing, their 
impact might be less immediate and must be translated semantically, but by and large the 
impact might occur in a comparable fashion. 
Damasio speaks of the “apparatus of primary emotions,” which includes the capability 
to process signals pertaining to the personal or social behaviour; this apparatus is capable of 
pairing a large number of social situations with adaptive somatic reactions (Damasio 1994: 
219-222). Put more simply, these somatic markers remind us how to react to a given situation, 
given that we have made a comparable experience previously. 
Transferring this notion to the realm of literature, which confronts us with more 
situations than we could possibly experience in real life, since – once, because our 
experiences tend to be limited in both time and space, but more importantly because literature 
allows us to experience the world through another mind (a similar argument might be made 
for other forms of art, but that is another story). 
LeDoux: The Emotional Brain 
In 1996 Joseph LeDoux presented an account of how emotions come into being and 
how they affect the brain: The Emotional Brain. The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional 
Life.34 Again, I will only present a few aspects of the study. 
LeDoux starts with the basic assumption that emotional reactions are produced 
unconsciously, but in our recording of the feeling we experience it very consciously; this leads 
 
34 In this section all quotes are taken from Ledoux 1998 [1996]. 
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LeDoux to conclude that an emotional experience encompasses a far more complex process 
than we are aware of. Emotions happen to us rather than being called for (LeDoux 1998: 16-
21). The emotional process in the brain is largely restricted to the emotional unconscious 
(LeDoux 2010: 55-64); quoting McLean, LeDoux compares the image of the large cells of the 
hippocampus to an emotional claviature (piano keyboard). These cells are arranged 
scrupulously next to each other: “When the elements of the sensory world activate these cells, 
the tunes they play are the emotions we experience.” (LeDoux 2010: 95; 92-98) 
Brought together with Damasio’s idea of somatic markers, we might, when imagining 
literature, enhance both our external repertoire of perceived situations and emotions as well as 
our internal repertoire of experienced emotions and emotional reactions. Imagine the author as 
a pianist performing on his own claviature, but in a second instance prompting the reader’s 
emotional claviature to resonate with the emotional soundscape presented in the text. 
Tomasello: Cultural Evolution of Empathy  
The neurosciences are increasingly paying attention to interactions between body and 
brain to develop a more holistic model of how our minds works, and this trend is continued by 
Michael Tomasello, who argues from an evolutionary point of view in his study The Cultural 
Origins of Human Cognition (1999). His observations on the cultural evolution of human 
beings are insightful and precise. One starting point of his argument is the assumption that the 
impressive set of cognitive capabilities of modern man is the result of a singular method of 
cultural transfers across generations (Tomasello 1999: 4-12). An illustrative metaphor for this 
process is the ratchet effect, which understands our cultural evolution as a cumulative process, 
stabilizing invention and innovation in the human community through cultural heredity 
(Tomasello 1999: 5). Tomasello goes on to analyze learning techniques which supported this 
cultural evolution, postulating that learning was primarily enabled by a special form of social 
cognition that allows individual organisms to understand others as beings similar to 
themselves, with a comparable intentionality and inner life as themselves (Tomasello 1999: 8-
10). The role of language representation plays an important part for the cultural revolution, 
since the language symbols free human cognition from immediate sensory perception not only 
by allowing a reference to things outside of the subjects’ immediate context, but far more by 
allowing simultaneous representation of a large variety of imaginable situations (Tomasello 
2002: 9). Again, I propose that literature poses an excellent example of how a multitude of 
thoughts and images can transfer cultural knowledge to the reader. 
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1.5.5 Zaboura: The Empathetic Brain 
In 2009, Nadia Zaboura related research on mirror neurons to the social sciences and 
the humanities, ultimately suggesting that there might exist a more complex network of 
different types of mirror neurons allowing for more complex functions than just mimetic 
learning and adaptation.35 Whether this can be applied to the reading process is hard to tell, 
because research on reading has so far concentrated on single words; extending research to 
integrated text comprehension is a future goal. So far it has been proved that reading a text 
involves various cognitive areas of the brain, performing a circuit that ends up in the frontal 
cortex where the final integrated text comprehension takes place.36 It remains a highly 
speculative hypothesis at this point that this could involve a complex system of mirror 
neurons; however, my readings of Coetzee’s fictions will offer numerous instances that 
support this claim. 
Although mirror neurons have been primarily found to respond to intention-directed 
actions, their involvement in more complex cognitive processes cannot be precluded (Zaboura 
2009: 8). Zaboura’s description of mirror neurons employs a series of interesting word 
choices: 
[The mirror neurons] cause a so-called direct matching mechanism, which assimilates the 
outer action pattern to the own action repertoire; ‘direct’ because it happens without 
mediation. By this process the observer is enabled to symmetrically co-experience what 
goes on inside the other, what moves him – in a literal sense referring to the 
neurophysiological level. Due to the almost identical biological configuration of the 
interacting parties an intersubjective shift of perspectives takes place, from a third person to 
a first person perspective, which accordingly is titled simulation. The significance of the 
resonance phenomenon as creating intersubjectivity becomes apparent: „A crucial element 
of social cognition is the brain’s capacity to directly link the first- and third-person 
experiences of these phenomena (i.e. link ‘I do and I feel’ with ‘he does and he feels’).“ 
(Gallese et al. 2004: 397) (Zaboura 2009: 61; original emphasis)37 
 
35 Zaboura notes that the search for other types of mirror neurons remains a huge task considering the sheer 
amount of 100 billion neurons available. She reports the discovery of mirror neurons responding to audiovisual 
input, with more discoveries lying ahead. (Zaboura 2009: 75-76) Gallese had a similar intuition (see above). 
36 Perfetti and Bolger have charted how the brain manages text comprehension: 
Increasing skill is marked by the coordination of these constituents into a more integrated 
functional system of cortical structures. Neuroimaging research provides a surprisingly clear view 
of the reading circuit that develops with this learning. This circuit includes three major cortical 
regions: from back to front, (a) ventral (occipito–temporal), (b) dorsal (a temporo–parietal area, 
roughly corresponding to Wernicke’s area), and (c) left frontal (Broca’s area, the inferior frontal 
gyrus, and insular cortex). We characterize these regions rather broadly (each includes 
differentiated structures), and we caution against simple local mappings of functions to areas. 
However, the three regions are engaged in functions critical in reading: visual–orthographic 
processes in the ventral region; phonological decomposition in the dorsal region; and, in the frontal 
region, both phonological–articulatory processes (Fiez & Petersen, 1998) and semantic processes 
(Poldrack et al., 1999). (Perfetti/Bolger 2004: 294) 
37 All quotes from Zaboura are rendered in my translation from German original. 
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If we transfer this description to the reading process, we must take into account that the reader 
is not reacting to an outer action pattern, but instead to an imagined action pattern (substitute 
action by self-reflective thought for readers of Coetzee). Let us imagine how our bodies 
respond to a text, how a text can affect us, make us symmetrically co-experience joys and 
worries of a literary character. The intersubjective shifts continuously prompted by Coetzee’s 
fictions are of the second order to the intersubjective shift underlying the reader’s primary 
social cognition. 
Zaboura also speaks of an “inner parallelism” establishing itself when an exogenous 
pattern is reproduced endogenously (Zaboura 2009: 65). While the reader more and more 
aligns his sympathies with Coetzeean characters, the characters themselves rather experience 
endless parallels that never meet, just as the boats pass each other in Coetzee’s Nobel prize 
speech “He and His Man”: “Their ships pass close, […] they pass each other by, too busy 
even to wave.” (HHM 14) But the sheer presence of an other can resonate in our motor 
system (Zaboura 2009: 65). A specific neuronal blocking mechanism exists, however, that 
limits the firing energy of the neurons to a certain threshold, thereby inhibiting the neuronal 
simulation of the perceived action from causing motor action in the observer (Zaboura 2009: 
69). 
Zaboura describes the opening of an interpersonal space, when it is informed by the 
internal representation and by collating of the perceived with the own repertoire of actions: 
“This form of intersubjectivity is hence useful for actions of a higher social order, such as 
interactions mediated by symbols.” (Zaboura 2006: 69; my translation) This interpersonal 
space is opened by the subconscious perception of gestures that indicate “meaningful” 
content. Applying this to fictional texts, the reader might respond to representations of bodily 
gestures in a way that involves an activation of mirror neurons. 
Zaboura points out that around thirty percent of the mirror neurons discovered so far 
are strict congruent mirror neurons, meaning that they can be attributed to specific types of 
actions (such as grabbing hand etc.). The larger percentage (around sixty percent) represents 
broad congruent mirror-neurons, meaning that they respond to various and more general 
stimuli (Zaboura 2009: 70). Multimodal overlaps of different sense systems, as for example a 
tactile-auditory combination, are assumed to occur (Zaboura 2009: 74). Zaboura’s larger 
argument proposes the possibility of far more complex interactions between mirror neurons 
than so far researched. She puts into perspective the early stage of the research on mirror 
neurons: 
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In spite of the progress made so far, the investigation of the brain and the onerous search for 
mirror neurons in the Cortex cerebri is still at the beginning. Looking at a total number of 
100 billion neurons it will take considerable time to detect single mirroring cells. Even 
though it is the search for a needle in a haystack, by now cells have been found – in 
addition to the F5 and PF neurons with visual-motor capacities – that react to acoustic 
stimuli: audiovisual mirror neurons, that not only discharge when perceiving or performing 
an action, but also when hearing the action, as when a paper is torn to pieces. (Zaboura 
2009: 75-76) 
From here it is only another step – scientifically a leap of faith – to imagining that mirror 
neurons could be activated by purely symbolic, i.e. literary, representations. We all know how 
a fictional text can affect our sensual perception, such as conjuring a smell or certain sounds, 
let alone the activation of memories. 
Another aspect raised by Zaboura pertains to a possible evolution of mirror neurons: 
“The resonance phenomenon and Tomasello’s social constructivism share in common the 
potential of a face-to-face-encounter; this is a precondition for a shared inherent and co-
created joint attention [...] that upholds communicative intersubjectivity.” (Zaboura 2009: 77-
78) In our human evolution, Zaboura argues, not alone the general progressive 
enzephalisation (i.e. growing brain) but also a re-wiring of existing neuronal networks to 
more complex circuits were required for the senso-motor coupling of mirror neurons (Zaboura 
2009: 79). The new feature, supposedly not available to primates, is perspective-taking. 
Joint Attention and Perspective-Sharing 
Humans are capable of imagining third person perspectives. This can happen 
consciously through symbol-mediated language or through the unconscious resonance 
phenomenon (Zaboura 2009: 82-83). In any case, the perspective is always embodied, not 
necessarily but possibly in a physical sense; at least insofar as through perception-matching 
the space of the other is inhabited. Zaboura draws on Tomasello to mark the shift from a 
purely individual research perspective to a broader social context: 
What he [Tomasello] and the Italian researchers [Rizzolatti and Gallese] share is the 
principle of body-bound [körpergebunden] perspectivity, which humans are capable of 
occupying. Whereas the discoverers of the mirror neurons explain this exclusively through 
pure auto-simulation [Eigensimulation], Tomasello places this in a larger social context. 
The complex overall situation, in which individuals per se are embedded through their 
spatial-somatic physical extension, is always kept in mind. Exactly at this point the 
importance of such a parallel must be emphasized and extended to the connection 
mentioned several times before: the understanding of mirror neurons as fundamental 
substance of the resonance that enables higher cognitive and social processes, shared by 
individuals. For humans are not exclusively body- and therefore ego-centered, but a living 
and experiencing body, in which a fundamental perspective shift within the individual 
becomes manifest. (Zaboura 2009: 86-87; my translation) 
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 The „experiencing body,“ mentioned in the last sentence, comes very close to what Elizabeth 
Costello says about embodiment, and maybe even closer to Coetzee’s stark portrayal of 
Michael K. 
Zaboura, again drawing on Tomasello’s work, continues to move towards a broader 
social context and notes that humans share the capacity for a triadic attention, constituting a 
subject-subject-object interrelation, or along the poles Ego, Alter Ego, and environment. 
Zaboura illustrates this with the shared attention of babies after their “socio-cognitive nine 
month revolution” (Tomasello 2002: 88), when they begin to understand and recognize a 
shared visual focus – as for example when their eyes follow the direction of another’s look. 
This constitutes an intersubjective social context, in which symbolic representations become 
possible (Zaboura 2009: 87-88). 
In the novels of Coetzee we can find countless occasions that can be seen as staged 
moments of joint attention between characters, and even with the author himself. The 
resulting intersubjective space requires a response from the reader, urges him to open up and 
embrace the presented other. This quality of activating the sympathetic imagination of the 
reader and encouraging his empathetic engagement I attribute largely to the craftsmanship of 
Coetzee, as I will later show in detail. 
1.6 Fritz Breithaupt: Narrative Empathy 
Also in 2009, Fritz Breithaupt published his study Kulturen der Empathie, which 
combines the research of mirror neurons with the literary analysis of narratives. Breithaupt 
provides the toolkit for looking at literature and its relation to empathy with the aid of 
neurosciences. Beginning with a fundamental assessment of empathy as an evolutionary 
pattern, in which narrative improves the predictability of future actions. In a wording 
resonating with Costello’s statement about the unlimited potential of the sympathetic 
imagination, Breithaupt states: 
Wir besitzen anscheinend die Fähigkeit, uns wie unbegrenzt in alles einfühlen zu können, 
um es auf uns vertraute Schemata zu beziehen und dadurch imaginäre Brücken zwischen 
uns und anderen zu errichten, ohne das tatsächlich Unähnliche als Unähnliches mitdenken 
zu müssen. 
[We seem to possess the ability to feel ourselves into anything without limitations, in order 
to relate it to familiar schemes and thereby erect imaginary bridges between us and others, 
without having to think the actually dissimilar as dissimilar.] (Breithaupt 2009: 20)38  
 
38 This and all subsequent Breithaupt translations into English are mine. 
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Breithaupt considers the easiness of seeing similarities and assumes that the production of 
dissimilarity might strongly contribute to the process of empathy. Coetzee’s constructions of 
others and the way his protagonists encounter them is an excellent illustration for this. 
Breithaupt’s insistence on dissimilarity as a prerequisite for empathetic engagement is 
highly original. Only a mechanism that reflects dissimilarity can guarantee the canalisation 
and focalization of empathy (Breithaupt 2009: 21). Empathy (understood as a de-coding of 
emotions, affects and actions of an other as other) requires the drawing of a borderline 
between me and the other – a borderline that is defined by empathy (Breithaupt 2009: 31). 
Breithaupt uses the argument for dissimilarity to achieve a transfer to the performing arts, in 
particular the drama: Along with our growing awareness of difference empathy could be 
thought to grow. Empathy becomes our medium to translate the difference in a way that 
allows it to remain different. For Breithaupt the theatre stage constitutes a place that trains 
empathy with the new individual (Breithaupt 2009: 56). The staged scene of a drama creates a 
typical triadic setting: viewer-actor-actor (unless of course it is a monologue or suchlike). 
When an observer witnesses a conflict which sets two parties against each other, he will pick 
up cues as to the intentions of the players and their goals. This process requires the observer 
to employ his empathy. Depending on the scene, he will develop sympathy towards either one 
or both of the acting parties and pass judgement on them; all this under the as-if clause of 
dramatic representation. Breithaupt assumes that the observer adopts a stance outside of his 
usual self, an intersubjective being that extends further beyond him than at other times: 
It is as if an intersubjective being is activated, which might as well be me or someone else. 
This intersubject or hypersubject (even before differentiating between me and others) 
allows me to concentrate on the situation and shed the individual ballast of myself and 
others for the moment. (I allege:) In this situation we are all equal. (Breithaupt 2009: 73) 
The equality of observers proposed here refers only to the situation, not to the individual 
perceptions that follow. Each observer – and each reader – will experience the presented 
situation individually and draw his own conclusions. 
In his chapter on narrative empathy Breithaupt proposes a “narrative intelligence 
hypothesis” (Breithaupt 2009: 115), implying that “narrative consciousness” means thinking 
in hypotheses and excuses. People affected cannot help but think in terms of narrative, 
thereby continuously producing narrative excess (on top of that they feel a constant pressure 
of having to explain themselves, to legitimate themselves. Breithaupt sees one central feature 
of narrative in the (sometimes surprisingly) emergence of the alterity of characters presented. 
Narrative destroys the perspective of the observer (annuls it). Breithaupt differentiates 
between beings with narrative intelligence and those without, naming three aspects that 
40 
 
                                                
qualify this distinction: 1) the ability to manipulate events by narration 2) the strategic 
communication of experiences und the potential to learn from others’ experience 3) the 
regime of narratability. The last aspect gets elaborated: 
Whoever has the ability of narration, does not only store the behavior (of oneself and of 
others) in the memory, but prior to this already observes and selects behaviors according to 
narrative criteria and activates this narrative self-observation whenever an action occurs, 
even when it has not been brought to its conclusion. The texture of consciousness consists 
at least in parts of narration. (Breithaupt 2009: 130) 
While this may sound like a high-brow classification, Breithaupt assumes narrative 
intelligence to be a fundamental aspect of our self-understanding and our construction of 
identity. More interesting than his basic assumptions are the conclusions he draws from them. 
In the above-mentioned dramatic situation (while Breithaupt speaks of it as an Urszene – a 
primeval foundational scene – of empathy, the search for evolutionary beginnings is not 
relevant here) the observer approaches the scene with his narrative intelligence, in the act 
developing alternative perspectives and constructing various causal chains. The body and 
psyche of the other become the boom box (Resonanzkörper – resonating body)39 of our 
experience, our actions and emotions. Breithaupt postulates that narration can only take place 
if the unfolding events affect a body that allows us to share their suffering and their 
experience (Breithaupt 2009: 145). Breithaupt indicates how this experience can affect the 
observer: 
The body and the psyche of the inhabitant of the perspective are the boom box of the event. 
And insofar as the viewer or observer is connected to this perspective, insofar that he has 
taken part in enabling it, he is also affected, resonates and in the case of a cathartic rupture 
of the character achieves a maximum sound – and is evicted simultaneously. The potential 
alterity of causal connections grips the person/the character: The character becomes 
different/other. (Breithaupt 2009: 146) 
Becoming other could be seen as the central goal in the fictions of Coetzee, and Breithaupt’s 
descriptive analysis runs to the conclusion that our empathy is maximized, if and when the 
perspective-sharing with the character is disrupted. While perspective-sharing is the access 
point for any observer to experience empathy, only the disruption of this narrative perspective 
can bring about a maximum of empathy: 
Only those who inhabit the perspective of an involved character can register and sense the 
significance of events. At the same time, the perspective of another person is only inhabited 
or shared when the result affects this perspective, damages it, corrupts it, destroys it. 
Therefore a perspective is adopted that will stop being one. Empathy in its most extreme 
augmentation is the form of identification that simultaneously suspends all identification. 
Empathy is the culmination of excitement with or close to the other, and it represents a 
cleansing of the excitement. Empathy is maximized shared suffering, which depletes itself 
in the moment. (Breithaupt 2009: 147-8) 
 
39 Empathy relies on the possibility of insight into the motivations and intentions of the parties, whereby they 
become the “soundbox of experience” (Resonanzkörper des Erlebens); Breithaupt 2009: 145, 146). 
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The ambivalence of perspective-taking, at once the facilitator of empathy and its inhibitor, is 
an essential part of Breithaupt’s theory. As argued above, empathy only becomes possible 
through an awareness of difference, and a total identification with the other is not desirable, 
since emotional contagion will create unrest rather than empathy. 
Breithaupt applies his narrative theory of empathy to drama and assumes a dualistic 
setting based on the three-fold structure of two opposing parties and an observer. The setting 
must provide the observer with the opportunity to engage with the protagonist and his actions 
by implicating him in the outlook and predictability of the future course of events. However, 
in a second step the observer must be able to beware himself from a loss of self in this 
process, wherefore the empathetic process necessarily includes blockades of identification,40 
allowing the observer to stay at a safe distance – otherwise he would risk losing himself in the 
process of identification. Nearly all of Coetzee’s fictional texts can serve to exemplify these 
notions of empathy. The protagonists always suffer in one way or the other, are tragic heroes 
of a kind. The narrative strategies Coetzee employs allow the reader much insight into the 
respective characters, but at the same time keeps him at a distance by questioning narrative 
authority and reliability, be it of the character or the author himself. 
The theory of narrative empathy is a vital link between the neuroscientific concept of 
empathy and the sympathetic imagination of Coetzee’s fiction, as it bridges the gap between 
literature and neuroscience, allowing for a meaningful intersection; narrative empathy 
explains the transformation of input into information via mirror neurons: “Erst durch die Filter 
der narrativen Empathie kann aus dem Mitlaufen der Spiegelneuronen Information werden.” 
[Only the filters of narrative empathy enable the coactive mirror neurons to produce 
information.] (Breithaupt 2009: 187) Coetzee’s sympathetic imagination uses narrative to 
create an intersubjective space, which allows a “hypersubject” (Breithaupt 2009: 73) or the 
“intersubjective manifold” (Gallese 2001) to come into being, which offers the perfect stage 
for the mirror neurons and empathy to play out. 
1.7 The Empathy Effect 
Coetzee offers the reader a vast amount of situations, character constellations, and 
conflicts to be added to the already available cognitive repertoire. All these scenarios enhance 
the ability of the reader to deal with real-life situations, even though he may never find 
himself in a think tank designing war strategies, on a desolate farm, in a military outpost of an 
 
40 „Es gibt viel empathisches Geräusch, aber erst die Blockade erzeugt eine Kultur der Empathie.“ [There exists 
a lot of empathetic noise, but only the blockade creates a culture of empathy.] (Breithaupt 2009: 114) 
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empire, in a camp or a burrow, affected by cancer in a racially segregated society, washed 
ashore on a solitary island, in the streets of Petersburg mourning the loss of a child, in a 
childhood memory, in a slaughterhouse, in an academic lecture, putting dogs to sleep, 
breaking a leg in a bicycle accident, or musing on one’s own death. But all these scenarios 
will have equipped him well to open his heart and let the sympathetic imagination take hold 
of it/him.41 As De Vega puts it: 
Knowledge is organized around situations, because situations are what we live in and act 
out our lives in. Scenarios constitute proxy-situated cognition. That is, on the basis of a 
mapping between a language description and a scenario, proxy-situated cognition can 
occur. This is because the constraints of reasoning employed in real situations apply by 
proxy in reasoning with scenarios. (quoted in Sanford 2009: 184)42 
In his analysis of Disgrace with reference to Sophocles’ King Oedipus – a link also 
explored by Kate McInturff – Michiel Heyns tells the story of the actor Laurence Olivier 
imitating the death cry of a trapped mink to illustrate on stage the ultimate realization of 
Oedipus; noting its effect on the audience Olivier exits with a vindictive smile on his lips (Got 
them!). Heyns sees this as “the artistic implementation of the sympathetic imagination”: 
It enables Olivier in the first place to enter into the consciousness of the trapped mink and 
to transpose his sympathetic understanding to his rendering of the character he is playing – 
in order to activate the sympathetic imagination of the audience: the agony of the mink is 
transmuted into the audience’s pity and terror. For the trapped mink read dog with maimed 
hindquarters, for audience read us, the reader, for Oedipus read Lurie, for Olivier read 
Coetzee, for ‘Got them’ read the near-imperceptible smile on Coetzee’s face on the dust 
jacket. (Heyns 2005: 215) 
Not that Coetzee ever intended a sensationalist effect like Olivier surely did, but nevertheless 
his fiction has successfully drawn readers in and activated their sympathetic imagination, 
thereby increasing their empathetic capabilities. The countless encounters with the other, in 
various forms and guises – lastly leading to a grand moment of myriad self-reflection in 
Summertime, in which Coetzee brilliantly reapplies the sympathetic imagination to himself 
and his public image – have trained the reader to engage with the other while preserving its 
autonomy as well as his own, thereby creating the optimal situation for empathy to come into 
 
41 The use of the male pronoun here reflects my own position as a male reader; whether gender is relevant to our 
experience of empathy will not be answered in this study, but would certainly add an interesting additional twist 
to the argument. 
42 Another insightful account of how scenarios and situations represented in texts can be related to processes of 
cognition can be found in Lope De Vega’s Symbol and Embodiment (2008). De Vega claims that “[s]emantic 
fields are ‚situated‘” (De Vega 2008: 182) and that „meaning has to be rooted in our physical (and social) 
interactions with the world.” (De Vega 2008: 183) In a more practical sense: 
Reading about rock climbing is not the same as doing it, though to the extent that we can 
understand what we read, the language processing involved is proxy-situated. The question for 
embodiment is: do we make (at least some) use of the same mechanisms in reading about a rock 
climb as we do in executing it? (De Vega 2008: 185) 
The tentative answer of course is yes: in reading we employ similar cognitive processes as in the actual act. 
Mirror neurons are the obvious link between action perception and the event itself. 
43 
 
full effect. Timothy Costelloe and Ian Hacking see in Coetzee’s literature an attempt to awake 
the sympathetic imagination in the reader, which they relate to Hume’s “progress of 
sentiments” (Costelloe 2003: 128; Hacking 2000: 22). In a similar fashion, Gareth Cornwell 
enlarges the scope of what literature, in particular Coetzee’s fiction, might be able to achieve, 
or at least might promote: 
What literature affords us above all is the opportunity to encounter other minds in their full 
complexity, to imagine and to empathize with a range of human thought and feeling that it 
is impossible for us to experience directly. If the ultimate goal of the humanities is full 
social justice, then a pre-requisite is a sufficient degree of objective self-awareness, of 
awareness of the extent of our own contingency, the extent to which our values and beliefs 
are historically and ideologically positioned (conditioned, determined).” (Cornwell 2005: 
52) 
Even though my arguments remains closer to the ground in proposing that Coetzee’s fiction in 
a very special way allows for empathy to flourish – with a little help from mirror neurons – I 
cannot resist the temptation of imagining the larger impact and implications of this. Even the 
neurosciences, which will hopefully provide evidence for my speculation on the connection of 
reading and mirror neurons, seem to be aware of possible future benefits beyond the seeking 
of pure knowledge, as Decety and Batson state: 
Further studies are required to increase our knowledge about the various factors, processes 
and (neural and behavioral) effects involved in and resulting from the modulation of 
empathic responses. This knowledge will inform us how empathy can be promoted to 
ultimately increase humankind’s ability to act in more prosocial and altruistic ways. 
(Decety/Batson 2009: 122) 
1.8 Methodology of Reading - Coetzee’s Fictions as Neuroscience 
Fictions 
Fundamental similarities exist between Coetzee’s narrative explorations and the 
assumptions made by the neurosciences about mirror neurons and their relation to empathy. 
Firstly, the focus on the body both in Coetzee’s fiction (the notion of embodiment) and in the 
discourse of neuroscience (embodied cognition) emphasize the important role the body plays 
beyond being a host for our brain and our heart. In the same way that Coetzee’s notion of 
embodiment is a prerequisite for the sympathetic imagination, the bodily perception is a 
prerequisite for the mirror neurons to be activated and incite a process of empathy. 
Another vital aspect of both discourses is the encounter with the other and its 
reflection in the self. In Coetzee’s fiction it supplies the testing ground for the effectiveness of 
the sympathetic imagination, at its best when it reaches epistemological boundaries. In the 
discourse of neurosciences the imagining of self (putting yourself into the position of the 
other) is differentiated from imagining the other (intuiting the position of the other while 
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maintaining the autonomy of the self). The first position leads to emotional contagion, 
whereas the second process allows for an empathetic approach. Perspective-taking informs 
the discourse of Coetzee’s fiction as well as the discourse of neuroscience. In literary 
narrative, first-person and third-person perspectives are the two most readily available modes 
of approaching the other. 
Having outlined the theoretical framework, based on the sympathetic imagination as 
described by Elizabeth Costello and on the research on mirror neurons and empathy, the 
challenge now lies in the application of these concepts to the literary prose of Coetzee. My 
readings of Coetzee’s novels focus on the literary enactment of the sympathetic imagination 
and how its representations evoke empathy. The underlying hypothesis is that at different 
stages in Coetzee’s literary career the sympathetic imagination plays out in a number of ways, 
developing towards increased complexity in its staging. 
Psychologist Martin L. Hoffmann from New York University, who regards empathy as 
“the spark of human concern for others, the glue that makes social life possible” (Hoffmann 
2000: 2), offers a classification for the developmental process of prosocial behaviour and 
empathy,43 identifying five variations of empathy. The first three resemble passive, 
involuntary affective responses resulting from mimicry (imitating the other’s emotion), 
conditioning (learning from the other’s response) and direct association (relating the other’s 
emotional states to own experiences); these three are classified as “primitive” cognitive 
modes, acquired during infancy. The two “higher-order” cognitive modes are mediated 
association (relating to others through a second-hand account of emotional states) and role- or 
perspective-taking (taking another’s perspective to relate to him) (Hoffmann 2008: 5).44 
For us readers, Coetzee’s fictions are exercises in the “high-order” cognitive modes of 
empathy, mediated association and perspective-taking. Coetzee’s narrative style aligns us 
closely with the minds of the characters, almost forcing us to relate to their experiences, 
thereby inducing association mediated by literature. Within the framework of the narrative 
Coetzee repeatedly manipulates the reader into imagining or taking the perspective of either 
the protagonist or the others he encounters. In this process our engagement with the characters 
also involves “primitive” modes of empathy such as mimicry, conditioning and direct 
 
43 Drawing on three decades of research, Hoffmann published Empathy and Moral Development – Implications 
for Caring and Justice in 2000. For a concise summary see also Hoffmann 2001. 
44 Anita Nowak gives a more elaborate recapitulation of Hoffmann’s modes of empathy. (Nowak 2011: 46) 
Hoffmann’s classification corresponds with the dual-path theory of Joseph LeDoux concerning emotional 
learning. In brief: the “lower path” is based on early evolutionary neural components (sensoric thalamus and 
amygdala), whereas the “higher path” involves a processing of sensoric input in more recently developed cortical 
areas of the human brain (LeDoux 1998: 163ff; also von Schewe 2009: 91f). 
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association. In first-person narration especially, we co-experience events and thereby imitate 
the emotions the characters go through. The use of thematic repetition and variation, including 
reiterated text markers, conditions the reader’s response to related events. And last but not 
least, the universal themes of violence, parenthood and desire offer plenty opportunities for 
direct association. 
On the text level all modes of empathy are staged through the characters and the 
encounters they have. In my readings of the novels I pay close attention to the interactions of 
the characters as well as the reader’s perspective and consequent involvement. The analyses 
of the technique by which the sympathetic imagination and empathy are staged in the novels 
of Coetzee provide a matrix of case studies that illuminates how the narratives foster both the 
sympathetic imagination and empathy of the reader. 
1.8.1 Discovering Sympathetic Imagination and Empathy in the Fiction of J.M. 
Coetzee 
Reading Coetzee with a focus on the sympathetic imagination and empathy has 
certainly affected and transformed my reception and perception of his novels. Before that, I 
had a vague feeling or intuition that Coetzee’s fiction was not as bleak and cold as perceived 
by many due to his fastidiously precise prose style that seemingly lacks warmth. Now, the 
entire atmosphere of the novels is showered in a warmer light. Where I had before seen the 
failure to connect, the failure to communicate, the failure of creating a bond, I now see 
characters reaching out to others, making an effort, seeking to embrace and be embraced. I am 
aware of the magnitude of this shift and urge any reader to also re-evaluate her or his previous 
readings. 
Coetzee’s early fiction relies heavily on first-person narratives, directing the reader’s 
empathetic attention – attentiveness is another analogous procedure of literary and 
neuroscientific discourse – almost exclusively to the protagonists, with their relations to 
others as a complementary aspect of their self-constructed identities. The characters of the 
early novels and their solipsistic and idiosyncratic narratives illustrate how stunted the 
sympathetic imagination can become, but at the same time constitute a challenge for the 
reader to employ his own sympathetic imagination to empathetically approximate stony 
characters such as Eugene Dawn, Jacobus Coetzee (Dusklands, 1974), Magda (In the Heart of 
the Country, 1976), and the Magistrate (Waiting for the Barbarians, 1980). My analysis 
attempts to trace the narrative mechanisms by which the text manipulates our perception of 
the characters. On the one hand, the self-imaging of the characters, rhizomatic part of the 
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monologic structure of the narratives, reveals the attitudes of the characters towards 
themselves, allowing the reader to take part in the enacted self-perspective while remaining at 
a critical distance that enables cognitive empathy. On the other hand, the way the characters 
relate to others, both emotionally and physically, needs detailed attention, thus it can be 
shown how each character’s sympathetic imagination strains to break free from the 
constraints in place. In this regard, there is a clear progression in the characters’ efforts to free 
themselves. As Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee demonstrate the failure of the sympathetic 
imagination, and Magda resigns after a frustrated attempt of activating hers, the Magistrate is 
the first one to act out a sympathetic engagement with others, prompted by his own bodily 
experience of violence that shifts his perception from mediated association (related events) to 
direct association (experienced events) and prepares the ground for his sympathetic 
imagination to become effective and enable a more empathetic engagement with others. 
Tellingly, the Magistrate is presented in third-person narration, a shift that increases the 
distance between the reader and the related events, but, interestingly, this distance promotes 
the cognitive empathy of the reader. Furthermore, third-person narratives prime the reader’s 
attention to the protagonist’s relations to others, while still maintaining a close focus on the 
central consciousness of the main characters. 
The Life & Times of Michael K (1983) again employs a third-person perspective, now 
with a shift to a non-position of marginalization. As opposed to the previous characters, none 
of which were particularly appealing, Michael K compels the reader to feel compassion or at 
least pity from the very beginning. How much we allow ourselves to be drawn into his world 
indicates the reach of our sympathetic imagination and the extent of our empathy. How 
Michael K relates to others is a lesson on human interaction, wherefore it will receive detailed 
attention. 
Foe (1986), Age of Iron (1990) and The Master of Petersburg (1993) mark a 
significant shift in both themes and narrative presentation. While Coetzee continues to 
focalize the narrative through one central consciousness, both in first- and third-person 
narration, the social interactions and relations bear far greater weight than in the early novels. 
The self-imaging of the characters remains a significant factor for the empathetic engagement 
of the reader’s sympathetic imagination with the protagonist. Utilizing the writer figures of 
Susan Barton, Elizabeth Curren and Dostoevsky (Elizabeth Costello continues this trend) to 
reflect on the creative writing process (a writer’s responsibilities) and questions of authorship 
(a writer’s authority), Coetzee introduces a more transparent metafictional discourse into his 
fiction. Whereas so far our attention was focused on the sympathetic imagination of the 
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characters and our response to them, the thematic shift incorporates the writer’s perspective 
and the involvement of the writer’s sympathetic imagination in the creative process. 
The essay collection The Lives of Animals (1999) and the essay novel Elizabeth 
Costello (1997), both containing the chapters “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The 
Poets and the Animals,” have provided the backbone for my approach. The staging of the 
sympathetic imagination moves to the background for the sake of Costello’s discourse on 
animal ethics; the later short story “As a Woman Grow Older” (2004) takes us deeper into the 
private life of Elizabeth Costello and experiments with the extensive use of dialogue (largely 
substituting narrative prose), but even here the sympathetic imagination is stunted by the 
double nature of Costello as author and character, undermining our encounter with her as 
character as well as her encounters with others. 
Disgrace (1999) complements Costello’s discourse on the sympathetic imagination, 
starts with illustrating the failure of David Lurie to empathetically engage with others, to then 
indicate an awakening of his sympathetic imagination. After Age of Iron, this is the second 
novel with a setting contemporary to its time of production. The theme of parenthood is again 
prominent and ultimately Lurie’s daughter Lucy is one test case for David Lurie’s awakening 
sensibilities. Lurie’s way of relating to women changes significantly over the course of the 
novel and serves to indicate the progress of his sentiments. A close look at his attitudes 
towards and dealings with Soraya, Melanie and Lucy illuminates his shift of perspective. 
Lurie’s encounters with animals and his creative invocation of Byron’s mistress Teresa 
Guccioli are two further aspects reflecting his emotional growth and opening up. 
Slow Man (2005) repeats a similar experiment. The aging man is now named Paul 
Rayment, who unlike Lurie is beyond actual seduction but still haunted by his desire. Paul 
Rayment’s encounter with the blind woman Marianna constitutes a prime example of how our 
imagination is involved in shaping the encounters we make; my analysis will focus briefly on 
this scene. 
Finally, the autobiographical fictions Boyhood (1998), Youth (2001), and Summertime 
(2009) present a complication insofar as the author chooses to engage with himself as a 
fictional subject, a constructed version of himself, as seen in retrospect. The author’s 
sympathetic imagination is now redirected and applied to himself, with the reader as 
bystander and witness. The analysis will focus both on the self-imaging of Coetzee as well as 
on the encounters portrayed in the narratives. Diary of a Bad Year (2007) complements the 
autobiographical fictions as it represents a comprehensive spectrum of opinions presented via 
the proxy JC; opinions we can easily imagine Coetzee subscribing to, whereas Elizabeth 
48 
 
                                                
Costello (1997) offers opinions less obviously identical with Coetzee’s own. The use of a 
split-page technique in Diary of a Bad Year imitates musical polyphony in narrative and 
prepares the ground for the kaleidoscopic self-portrait presented in Summertime (2009). The 
five interviews, framed by Coetzee’s diary entries, represent fictionalized self-perspectives 
presented in dialogue (with the fictional biographer Mr Vincent). They provide a polyphonic 
murmur with a multitude of perspectives which in turn create a multi-faceted image of the 
persona constructed by the author. It is not the encounters with others themselves, but their 
reported impressions of Coetzee which matter. Summertime constitutes Coetzee’s self-
application of the sympathetic imagination, who now embarks on a process of self-evaluation, 
a seemingly “endless cathartic exercise” (Julia in Summertime, Coetzee 2009: 59). Coetzee 
engages with himself in a mode of empathy, and even though the fractured self-portrait is far 
from favourable, it gives the author a new perspective onto himself. At the centre of my 
discussion of Summertime will be the analysis of its textual surface and how it affects the 
reader’s and the author’s sympathetic imagination. My close reading will be restricted largely 
to the interview with Julia. In the end, a short look at The Childhood of Jesus (2009) aims to 
show how the failure of the sympathetic imagination impoverishes social relations, spoiling 
for David and Simon the utopian community they encounter. 
1.8.2 Levels of Analysis: Author, Character, Reader, and Critic 
My analysis comprises various levels of textual experience. The author-text-reader 
matrix offers a number of ways of looking at the sympathetic imagination and empathy. 
Narrative perspective controls our access to characters and guides our attention.45 This is 
initially reflected in the grammar of personal pronouns, as Carrol Clarkson has discussed in 
her original study Countervoices (2009): 
Using the linguistico-philosophical underpinnings of his fiction and critical essays as a 
starting point, the book [Countervoices] explores Coetzee’s ethics of writing, which is 
perhaps most striking in its consideration of the grammar of subject positions: what is 
ethically at stake in the use of proper names, or in recourse to a first-person plural ‘we’, or 
in the projection of an implied second-personal ’you’ through the very logic of literary 
address? What authorial commitments arise by writing in the first person, or in the third? 
Grammatical choices such as these frequently arise in Coetzee as having profoundly ethical 
ramifications – especially in relation to questions about the authority, and hence the 
responsibility, on the part of the writer.” (Clarkson 2009: 2) 
The responsibility Clarkson ascribes to the writer is shared by the reader, as he takes part in 
Coetzee’s experiments: “Just as philosophers develop thought-experiments, Coetzee develops 
formal and literary ones, setting up various conditions of possibility within language for 
 
45 My understanding of narrative has been strongly influenced by Cohn 1978 and Fludernik 1996. 
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aesthetic play and therefore, contingently, for historical and ethical awareness.” (Clarkson 
2009: 13) The interplay of narrative and ethical awareness lies at the heart of how the 
sympathetic imagination is staged in the fictions of Coetzee. 
The Author’s Sympathetic Imagination and Empathy 
When Elizabeth Costello speaks of the sympathetic imagination, her speech is directed 
at an academic audience and the text addresses philosophers and poets, the former illustrating 
a failure of the sympathetic imagination (hampered by rationality), the latter illustrating the 
enactment of the sympathetic imagination supported by a strong notion of embodiment. In a 
subservient notion Costello urges the listeners to employ their sympathetic imagination (here 
in order to sympathize with animals). The framing narrative shows how her relationships with 
others (including her own son) lack warmth and reciprocity, seemingly contradicting her own 
proposal – or otherwise privileging animals over humans. 
If we consider how the sympathetic imagination of an author might work, we depend 
on hints in his textual output. In the case of Coetzee, the fictional autobiographies offer an 
expedient vantage point for such an undertaking. In Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime we can 
see how the sympathetic imagination of the author Coetzee is directed at his former selves, 
allowing the author to develop new forms of self-empathy. In his previous novels we only see 
the result of the author’s application of his sympathetic imagination in the creation of his 
fictional characters. But with the introduction of writer figures (beginning with Susan Barton 
in Foe) and proxy personas (first Elizabeth Costello, then Señor C in Diary of a Bad Year) 
into the narratives, and ultimately with the self-insertion into his fictions we gain deep insight 
into the creative writing process as reflected on within his fiction. This intense interrogation 
of authorship and narrative authority finally allows the author Coetzee to engage with himself 
empathetically. 
The Character’s Sympathetic Imagination and Empathy 
Whereas the author’s sympathetic imagination becomes transparent only in his later 
fiction (1990 and after), the fictional characters’ sympathetic imagination is repeatedly staged 
and highlighted throughout Coetzee’s oeuvre. On the text level we can detect patterns that 
indicate a staging of moments when the characters employ their own sympathetic imagination 
in their encounters with others (and with themselves). We read about Eugene Dawn and 
Jacobus Coetzee and how they perceive others and how this reflects their own self-perception. 
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We read about Magda’s and Michael K’s struggle in either establishing a connection with 
others or escaping social conventions, and so on. All of Coetzee’s characters offer a rich 
variety of material for a discussion of the sympathetic imagination and a potential empathetic 
engagement with others. The characters’ encounters with others constitute a central concern of 
my readings of the novels. 
The Reader’s Sympathetic Imagination and Empathy 
The waterskater or long-legged fly. An insect. The waterskater thinks it is just hunting for 
food, whereas in fact its movements trace on the surface of the pond, over and over, the 
most beautiful of all words, the name of God. The movements of the pen on the page trace 
the name of God, as you, watching from a remove, can see but I cannot. (J.M. Coetzee: As 
a Woman Grows Older, 2004) 
The theological pathos aside, Coetzee here pinpoints how the reader is at an advantage in the 
reception of a text, the writing of which bears less revelation for the author than for the reader. 
This is related to Coetzee’s general conception of writing as a creative process beyond the 
author’s control; though of course Coetzee’s tight management of form somewhat betrays this 
Barthesian proposition. Nonetheless, the reader, being at a remove from the actual site of 
production, does have the advantage of taking in the whole panorama of human portrayals in 
a spirit of responsiveness. The effect on the reader is difficult to generalize. As Wolfgang Iser 
(The fictive and the imaginary: charting literary anthropology, 1993) and Derek Attridge (The 
Singularity of Literature, 2004) have shown, the reader co-creates the fiction presented by the 
author, filling in gaps and creating an own mental representation of what the text depicts. 
How the sympathetic imagination of the reader responds to any given text will depend on his 
personality and experiences – most obviously a South African will have a privileged access to 
Coetzee’s novels. The analysis presented in the following will reflect my personal reading 
responses, resulting from repeated readings of the novels and in-depth study of both Coetzee 
criticism and criticism on Coetzee. 
The Critic’s Sympathetic Imagination and Empathy 
Parts of my discourse may diverge from the neuroscientific approach by delving into 
broad analyses of character’s attitudes and their interactions with others. However, these 
diversions are meant to contribute to the larger picture of how the sympathetic imagination is 
enacted in the fictions of Coetzee. Especially the discussion of the first three novels and their 
monolithic characters serves to show the ambivalence of acts of the sympathetic imagination, 
or rather the stalling of such acts. The isolated selves of Eugene Dawn, Jacobus Coetzee and 
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Magda in particular serve to illustrate how the reader’s sympathetic imagination is challenged 
by the failure of the character’s sympathetic imagination. With Michael K and the Magistrate 
– and the shift to third person narration – Coetzee presents to the reader less isolated 
characters, so that the challenge for the sympathetic imagination takes place both on the 
textual level as well as in the reader. 
My readings have gained an almost cinematic quality, by choosing to see events in 
fast-forward or slow-motion mode, zooming in on faces and encounters, at times even trying 
to zoom inside the character’s heads (herein lies one privilege of literature over film). This 
cinematic impression will be stronger when my argument follows the plot of the novel, less so 
when I highlight certain aspects and themes with little attention to the larger narrative context. 
To continue the cinema metaphor, my readings occur in the spirit of my sympathetic 
imagination and the resulting empathy, both of which create an empathetic lens that focuses 
on processes of the sympathetic imagination in Coetzee’s narratives. 
The interlocking of theoretical approach and textual analysis presents a number of 
challenges. There is no point at which one can say precisely that mirror neurons are activated 
by a text passage and trigger empathy. My close readings constitute an act of my sympathetic 
imagination in response to Coetzee’s fiction. While the neuroscientific theoretical framework 
informs my assessment, I will avoid an all too technical application of its terminology in 
favour of an imaginative encounter with Coetzee’s narratives and its characters. 
In the first three novels my analysis focuses on the semantic fields of the “eyes”, the 
“heart,” and the “self”. This is in part due to the monolithic self-narration of the characters, 
which lends more significance to their inner discourse than to their encounters with others. 
However, their attitudes towards others play into their construction of their own identities. 
In Life & Times of Michael K, we find a shift towards a more specific reading of 
encounters. Both approaches, semantic and situational, are not exclusive to each other and can 
be productively combined. In most cases one criteria of significance is emotional intensity. 
This registers either in the characters themselves, in the staging of encounters, or in the 
reader’s response. This approach is continued in chapters three and four. Chapter five is 
dedicated to the autobiographical fictions of Coetzee, which offer an interesting shift towards 
a more self-reflective application of the author’s sympathetic imagination. In addition, a 
discussion of Coetzee’s critical reflections on the genre of autobiography and on the 
confessional mode will precede the close readings of Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime. This 
self-application of the sympathetic imagination by Coetzee will be refracted in my 
sympathetic and empathetic readings of his self-representations. 
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2. The Early Novels (1974-1983) 
2.1 The Sympathetic Imagination of the Unsympathetic 
In the comparative analysis of the first three novels, and subsequently in the discussion 
of Life & Times of Michael K, I will outline the staging of a stunted sympathetic imagination 
and analyse the textual sites of empathy, attempting to map the moral development – or lack 
thereof –of the various characters and how this may trigger the reader’s sympathetic 
imagination and his empathy. 
In his early writing Coetzee focuses on individuals and their inner truths they struggle 
with and cannot fully attain. The novels examine the movements of the souls of the 
characters, or the lack of development in the hearts and minds. The metaphysical framework 
for Coetzee’s writing about “matters of the heart” is far removed from positivist psychology, 
psychoanalysis and neurosciences, his concept points instead towards a religious 
understanding of the human being, with damnation and grace just around the corner; the 
“saving of the soul” becomes one central concern for many of Coetzee’s characters – such as 
Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron. Despite this religious-spiritual undercurrent, Coetzee’s 
analytical prose touches on aspects and terminologies of the before-mentioned areas of 
research, namely the language of neurosciences in regard to mirror neurons and empathy as 
articulated by Rizzolatti, Gallese, Decety, Zaboura, and Breithaupt (see chapter one). 
Whatever idea of humanity we prefer, the language of Coetzee is not restricted and dedicated 
to one particular discourse, and the religious implications are not more than an undertone of 
varying intensity. More importantly, his prose always cuts deep into the inner workings of the 
character’s minds, hearts, and souls. 
At the beginning, my readings will concentrate on the eyes, the exchanges of looks 
and glances, and also the closing of the eyes. The face is the primary site of empathy between 
humans, and the eyes in particular establish a connection between characters, prominently so 
on the cinema screen, but equally so in literature. The way Coetzee’s characters regard the 
world and the people they encounter informs us about their attitudes. The way the 
encountered people regard Coetzee’s characters informs us about their respective social 
position. The eyes and their gaze direct the attention, creating a joint attention including both 
the characters involved as well as the reader as external observer; a position that Breihaupt 
(see section 1.6) claims to be beneficial to the development of empathy. 
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The second category to be explored in my readings of the early novels is the “heart” as 
a seat of sympathy along with passions and desires. The characters wish to speak “from the 
heart,” and their “hearts reach out” to others. The discourse on the heart in Coetzee’s early 
fiction also exposes to the reader the inner life of the protagonists in its moral dimensions. In 
an essay about Musil Coetzee mentions Musil’s artistic persona “Monsieur le vivisecteur,”46 a 
title that also befits Coetzee. Coetzee lays bare the insides of his characters with clinical 
precision and displays the movements of their hearts for the reader to observe. The opening of 
their hearts serve as an indicator of how successful the protagonists have been in employing 
their sympathic imagination, and in awakening their empathetic capabilities. 
The chapter will end with a separate discussion of Life & Times of Michael K. The 
narrative mode shifts and therewith the perspective the reader gets to inhabit. Michael K has 
often been characterized as deficient in intelligence, but a closer analysis of his mode of 
encounter will show the intelligent design behind his silence, which has been described by 
several critics as a mode of resistance.47 In the reading presented here, Michael K is 
understood as reaching out, but with a frightened heart. His social isolation dates far back into 
his childhood, and the looks he has received and continues to receive from others have 
stabilized his isolation. Furthermore, Michael K and his stay on the farm are a first lesson in 
Coetzee’s fiction on reducing ourselves to our animal bodies, an act of the imagination and of 
the body that Michael K nearly literally sets out to accomplish. 
2.1.1 The Main Characters – Eugene Dawn, Jacobus Coetzee, Magda, the Magistrate, 
Michael K 
Coetzee employs his sympathetic imagination (as expressed by Elizabeth Costello) 
already in his early novels and tests its limits. As readers we closely follow the footsteps of 
Jacobus Coetzee, Eugene Dawn, Magda, the Magistrate, and Michael K, co-inhabiting their 
 
46 „In his diaries he developed for himself the artistic persona of ‘Monsieur le vivisecteur’, one who explored 
states of consciousness and emotional relations with an intellectual scalpel.” (Coetzee 2007) Mehigan in the 
context of his discussion of Slow Man comments: “Coetzee’s project might be likened to that of the vivisector, of 
the surgeon who, with scalpel in hand, probes ever more deeply through layers of tissue in search of the 
affliction that has brought about the subject’s suffering […]” (Mehigan 2011: 195) 
47 Stefan Helgesson in the conclusion of his 2004 study Writing in Crisis. Ethics and History in Gordimer, 
Ndebele and Coetzee notes: 
It is also in my discussion of that [LTMK] book that the ethical significance of blankness is properly 
foregrounded as a mode of resistance – historically marked as post-colonial – to the appropriations of the 
imperial subject. Representation of difference is in this regard not viable, as the structures of representation elide 
difference once it is represented. Each narrative tends therefore to be most loyal to the notion of heterogeneity 
and difference in their moments of blankness. […] As aesthetic artefacts, the all participate in the successive 
dismantling of the authority of the Western subject by resituating, symbolically, the foundations of subjectivity as 
well as literary form. (Helgesson 2004: 239f) 
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physical spaces, their minds, and their hearts. With them we experience the “empathic 
unsettlement” of the protagonists, who all show symptoms of trauma in some form or other.48 
In the “Vietnam Project” (Dusklands, first section) we are confronted with the complicity of 
Eugene Dawn in the war efforts aimed at the subjugation of the Vietnam people, and witness 
the effects it has on him. Jacobus Coetzee, on the other hand, is explorer and conqueror, a 
perpetrator of colonial and imperialist violence. Kannemeyer acutely comments:  
In ‘The Narrative’ Coetzee would for the first and last time employ a speaker inflicting pain 
with violence and from a lust to power. In the novels to follow, as David Atwell points out, 
such characters would be the antagonists of the narrator. As against Jacobus Coetzee, the 
narrating Magda in In the Heart of the Country is the victim of pain, with her overbearing 
patriarchal father as the antagonist. (Kannemeyer 2012: 275) 
In a similar vein, Peter McDonald characterizes Jacobus Coetzee and Eugene Dawn as one of 
the “pathological rationalists who attempt, without success, to redeem their solipsistic selves 
through horrifyingly savage acts of violence.” (McDonald 2009: 307) 
In the Heart of the Country and Life &Times of Michael K the inner life of victims is 
portrayed, once exemplified by the white female position of Magda (who is implicated in the 
colonial settler’s scheme of domination but suffers from it and attempts to resist it), then by 
the – presumably ‘coloured’ – Michael K. After Dusklands, Coetzee’s first novel, we witness 
a shift from perpetrator to victim. Both Magda and the Magistrate constitute a transitive 
middle ground between the position of a victim and a perpetrator; they are implicated in the 
hierarchical structures of settler-colonialism and patriarchy, but struggle to defy their position 
and the systematic violence and oppression involved. In a way they enunciate the position of 
the white liberal humanist faced with the decision of looking away (and enjoying the benefits) 
or taking action against the atrocities dealt out to the marginalized and oppressed. 
Coetzee allows readers a close encounter with all his characters, and our sympathies 
are tested in each case – none of the characters are heroic and admirable, and thus an easy 
positive identification is prevented. While suffering from his mental isolation Eugene Dawn 
experiences a breakdown in which he stabs his own son with a pencil. Jacobus Coetzee gets 
lost in his raging retribution. With these two characters the reader will find it hard to 
sympathize, but Coetzee’s text makes it nearly impossible not to engage with them and be 
empathetic towards them, even though they become instruments of violence and fail to 
connect with any respective other: 
 
48 Dominic LaCapra in his excellent 2001 study Writing History, Writing Trauma writes: “Being responsive to 
the traumatic experience of others, notably of victims, implies not the appropriation of their experience but what 
I would call empathic unsettlement, which should have stylistic effects or, more broadly, effects in writing which 
cannot be reduced to formulas or rules of method.” (LaCapra 2001: 41; emphasis added) 
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Jacobus Coetzee fails because, paradoxically, his all-consuming advance into Africa 
eliminates everything outside of himself, destroying the limits which would allow the self 
to distinguish self from Other; Eugene Dawn fails as he is inevitably recaptured by the 
institutions embodying societal control. (Dovey 1998: 20) 
Magda at least attempts to overcome her isolation, but in the end is bound to fail. The 
Magistrate presents a more ambivalent case. Here, the reader’s judgment is suspended, 
waiting for the events to unfold. The obsession with the barbarian girl’s wounds of torture 
allows for a reflection on his implication in the physical torture of prisoners of an 
authoritarian system, as well as an opening up of his empathetic faculties. The Magistrate 
experiences a desire to close the gap between him and the barbarian girl, but in the end the 
reader is left to judge the accomplishment. 
In the private thoughts of the protagonists the reader can witness the perceptual 
boundaries engraved in their minds causing the failure of the sympathetic imagination. The 
complex portrayal of the characters does not avoid contradictions inherent in their narrated 
self-portrayal: 1) Dawn’s cold rhetoric stands in contrast to his violent breakdown 2) Jacobus 
Coetzee’s isolation contradicts his imagined superiority; as does his unreliable narration 3) 
Magda’s unreliable narration and her meandering thoughtscape 4) Michael K’s mental 
eloquence in contrast to his silences. Especially in the case of Magda, Coetzee presents such a 
variety of facets to the reader, that I find it tempting to label it cubist literature; alluding to 
Pablo Picasso’s cubist technique in his portraits of Gertrude Stein, Dora Maar, Henry 
Kahnweiler, and others, where various perspectives are collapsed into one picture, resulting in 
a multi-fractured image.49 Picasso had aimed at deconstructing the genre of the portrait to 
accommodate modern tendencies of art, more specifically the paradigms of cubism. Picasso’s 
portraits no longer ennoble the portrayed person, but instead show him/her in their vast 
complexity by including a multitude of perspectives in one portrait, resembling the fractured 
identities present in all of us. Coetzee’s style of characterization, particularly in the early 
novels, employs an analogous procedure in writing. There is no central authority that can give 
us readers the truth about the characters, their self-narration provides a multitude of facets 
instead, which create a fractured portrait of the protagonist. The autobiographical fiction 
Summertime employs a cubist approach again in the process of subverting and deconstructing 
the genre of autobiography. 
2.1.2 I am I – Self-Imaging in the Early Novels 
I should like to be styled J.M. Coetzee on the title page. (Coetzee to Randall, 6 March 1974) 
 
49 Patrick Denman Flanery draws the same connection in his review of Summertime (Flanery 2009). 
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The first three novels contain more than two hundred sentences beginning with “I am…” The 
protagonists either attempt to assert their identities or to extend the metaphorical dimension of 
their self-interpretation. To give a first impression of their self-imaging I quote a few 
examples: 
I am the embodiment of the patient struggle of the intellect against blood and anarchy. I am 
a story not of emotion and violence […] but of life itself […]. (Eugene Dawn, DL 28) 
I am a transparent sac with a black core full of images and a gun.” and “I am a tool in the 
hands of history. (Jacobus Coetzee, DL 79 and 106) 
I am incomplete, I am a being with a hole inside me, I signify something, I do not know 
what […].” (HOC 10)  
I am plainly not myself in as clear a way as I might wish.” (HOC 62)  
I am I! (HOC 72, also 5 and 54)  
I am not simply one of the whites, I am I! I am I, not a people. (HOC 118) 
I am a blur, a voice, a smell, a centre of energy. (Magistrate, WFB 32)  
Reading Cartesian existentialist philosophy into these statements would be highly misleading, 
not only in the light of Coetzee’s later critique of rationality as expounded in Elizabeth 
Costello. The “pathological rationalists” (McDonald 2009: 307) Eugene Dawn and Jacobus 
Coetzee come closest to a Cartesian Ego, and their “solipsistic selves” fail to recognize the 
others as ends in themselves and remain isolated. All the characters in the early novels are 
willing themselves into being, in their own particular ways. The language of metaphors suits 
their desperate but futile search for the stable core of their self-fashioned identities. Teresa 
Dovey comments: 
The notion of saving the self works metaphorically to imply the achievement of identity. 
Magda, in In the Heart of the Country, asks: “How shall I be saved” (16), lamenting her 
inability, in the absence of an interlocutor, to transcend the endless duality of the 
intrasubjective imaginary relationship of self to self, expressed in her repeated statement, “I 
am I.” (Dovey 1998: 23) 
Magda’s voice of doubt, with her unreliable narration and ambiguous self-characterization, 
unsettles the reader and stalls any premature judgment of her dilemma, since the unsure 
ontological footing of her narrative forces the reader to tread carefully in his assessment of 
Magda. Magda’s insistent proclamation of her self endows her with a fool’s sincerity.50 The 
Magistrate is the first character in Coetzee’s fiction that allows for positive identification, in 
spite of the self-indulgence in his narrative. He is also the first character who undergoes a 
moral transition in the course of his narrative. Magda rebelled against her static self, but in the 
end remains a prisoner of her time and place. Michael K rebels against his time and place, but, 
in the end, his journey leads him back to his starting point. All five characters in the early 
 
50 Cf. Erasmus of Rotterdam as discussed in Coetzee 1996: 83-103. 
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novels are strong projections of unitary selves, represented as fractured and multi-faceted 
beyond any simple “I am I”. 
2.1.3 Inhabiting the Narrative – Perspective-Taking in the Early Novels 
The three first novels are presented as first person narratives in the present tense. The 
autodidactic narrators lend the texts a monologic quality, but as Dovey acutely observes, they 
“[…] are dialogic in a profound sense, engaging in a discursive confrontation with the 
discourses they inhabit.” Dovey recognizes that “[w]hile they articulate a strong desire for a 
reciprocal speech from the victims of colonization and of apartheid, they do not imagine that 
they can fabricate, in a facile way, a cross-cultural dialogue within their own structures: they 
recognize that, if this kind of dialogue does ensue, it will have to be a product of their 
reception.” (Dovey 1998: 27) The desire for reciprocity is strongly expressed by Magda and 
the Magistrate, but also features in the narratives presented in Dusklands. Even though 
Coetzee denies his early protagonists – and for all that matters, all later ones as well – and the 
reader a comforting exit strategy in regard to reciprocal engagement, Coetzee at least gives 
expression to the desire for a genuine connection with others. In regard to Eugene Dawn, 
David James observes: 
What sounds at first like an indulgent exercise in self-pathologization turns out to be a 
commentary on the need for such an exercise to be carried out in the first place. It’s as 
though Dawn is standing at some distance from the subject of his own dissemination. 
(James 2011: 44). 
The distance to the self can be observed in all the narrators of the first three novels – maybe 
less so in the case of the Magistrate, but even there we experience moments of self-reflection 
from a certain distance. In regard to patterns of empathy, this distance can be correlated to the 
“narrative blockades” postulated by Fritz Breithaupt, which he considers a prerequisite for 
empathy to be triggered and fully realized (see 1.6). These narrative shifts seem to take place 
within the narratives, but reach across the limits of the written page and out to the reader, who 
as an observer is more likely to develop empathy towards the protagonists because of their 
self-distancing. 
Coetzee uses his protagonists as exclusive focalizers of the events in all his early 
narratives: we either share their present perspective or we share their reflections on the past. 
This narrative technique invites the reader to inhabit the characters, giving them access to an 
inside perspective of the focalizing consciousness in its embodied state, barring both author 
and reader from inhabiting any position in the text external to the featured character. Due to 
this exclusive intimacy the reader employs his sympathetic imagination and is lured into 
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engaging with the characters in an empathetic manner, sharing their feelings. On a formal 
level, one might engage with the complicated palimpsest of historical meanings and literary 
influences hidden in the multiple folds of the text, but more existentially we are confronted 
with mirror images of human consciousness, refracted through the narratives given to us by 
Coetzee. We might wonder in what form or genre these narratives address the reader. Are they 
statements of belief? Testimonials? Reports? The Magistrate asks himself about his own 
writing: “A testament? A memoir? A confession? A history of thirty years on the frontier?” 
(WFB 62) The narratives contain only singular markers that show they are addressing the 
reader; but the texts obviously reach out to us, and through his sympathetic imagination 
Coetzee has created characters that speak to us. 
In the “Afterword” of “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee,” the second narrative of 
Dusklands, we read: “To understand the life of this obscure farmer requires a positive act of 
the imagination.” (DL 109) In a similar vein, the first narrative of Dusklands, “The Vietnam 
Project,” is preceded by an epitaph by the cold war strategist Herman Kahn, who applied 
‘game theory‘ to the cold war and its nuclear stand-off, that begins: “Obviously it is difficult 
not to sympathize […]” – the rest of the quote then takes a complicated turn. 51 The sympathy 
is directed at the “European and American audiences” and their disgust at the exhilaration of 
the fighter-bomber pilots over successful napalm bombings. Kahn continues to explain the US 
government’s strategy to choose pilots who don’t suffer from a moral conscience. The 
obvious victims in this scenario, the people of Vietnam, are not addressed, nor is sympathy 
directed towards the perpetrators. Instead, the audience that witnesses the conflict is 
addressed, and in turn the actions of the government are justified as being beyond moral codes 
of conduct. The question of responsibility is not broached by Coetzee here, but looms behind 
the text. The reader is now prepared for the complex moral scenarios surrounding Eugene 
Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee, for he is aware of his own conflicted position as witness, albeit 
‘only’ in the realm of fiction. Following Herman Kahn – something to avoid at all costs – we 
as readers deserve sympathy for witnessing the atrocities dealt out by the novel’s protagonists, 
and the responsibility is delegated to the superstructure of some kind of empire, whose agents 
are driven by the hunger for conquest, only barely coming to any realization about the 
 
51 “Coetzee was disgusted by the sophistical justification for the continuation of the war formulated by Herman 
Kahn, a physicist who had earlier been involved in planning nuclear war and, as a founding member of the 
Hudson Institute, had done research into government policy and served as an advisor to the Department of 
Defence, In the book Can We Win in Vietnam?; which he published with a few colleagues, Kahn articulated and 
defended inhumane solutions to the war.“ (Kannemeyer 2012: 167) In a letter to Randall (Ravan Press) Coetzee 
provides the full reference of the source for this epigraph: Frank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil, Herman 
Kahn, William Pfaff & Edmund Stillman, Can We Win in Vietnam? London: Pall Mall Press, 1968: 10. (Coetzee 
1998 [1974]) 
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implications for their life paths. Coetzee opens his literary arena with a careful approach to 
individual perspectives and the scope of their inner life. “Obviously it is difficult not to 
sympathize […]” are the first words we read from the novelist Coetzee. As readers we are 
primed to observe our sympathies. With Magda in In the Heart of the Country this exercise is 
continued in a more private setting, but still embedded in a greater historical context, though 
the setting is far less clearly defined than it was in Dusklands. Horse wagons and airplanes 
indicate a fairly recent time, but other markers point to a rural place removed from modernity; 
Macaskill observes that “the novels action is only vaguely located around the turn of the 
century in a diction replete with anachronisms.” (Macaskill 1998: 72) Unlike the settings 
Eugene and Jacobus operate in, it is the family farm which constitutes the centre of Magda’s 
existence. Her narrative presents a female victim and her intimations of liberation and the 
resulting conflicts with the servants. The violence against her father and Hendrik’s rape of 
Magda might only be imagined, since Magda proves to be an unreliable narrator right from 
the beginning, empowered only in her function as narrator, but in her actions remaining 
trapped in her colonial scenario. In the third novel discussed here, Waiting for the Barbarians, 
the Magistrate presents us with a more complicated and ambiguous scenario. The Magistrate 
is the first character in the fiction of Coetzee going through a development. Confronted with 
the barbaric practices of imprisonment and torture enacted by Colonel Joll, emissary of the 
Third Bureau, the Magistrate recoils, and, realizing his complicity, turns his attention on one 
of the victims of torture, even developing a form of intimacy. After returning the barbarian 
girl her to her people, undertaking an arduous journey through a fantastic sequence of 
landscapes (marshes, a salt lake, a snowstorm, mountains), the Magistrate is branded as a 
traitor and is himself tortured. The reader accompanies the Magistrate on the journey his 
conscience takes, from silence to outrage to humility. 
In all three novels the reader is confronted with complex portrayals of the central 
characters. The site of empathy lies in the encounters and character constellations, which the 
reader witnesses as a third party. In the now following analysis I will concentrate on a number 
of encounters, with special attention to facial expressions and exchanged looks and the eyes as 
a special site of co-recognition, a site of interpersonal exchanges, ideally a site of the 
reciprocal gaze. A second instance is formed by the attitudes towards animals and the use of 
metaphors of the self. I will finish with a closer look at the ‘language of the heart’ and how it 
reflects the inner life of the protagonists. Eugene Dawn’s crystal heart and his fascination with 
insects, Jacobus Coetzee’s butcher mentality and his empathy towards birds, Magda’s 
searching eyes, and the Magistrate’s longing heart are all subjects of Coetzee’s sympathetic 
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imagination, and all are qualified to awaken our sympathetic imagination and to engage us 
empathetically. 
2.1.4 J.M. Coetzee’s Speculative History – The Settings of the Early Novels 
In all of his first three novels, Dusklands (1974), In the Heart of the Country (1976), 
and Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), Coetzee engages in “speculative history” (Magda in 
HOC 19), creating complex characters in (pseudo-)historical settings: Eugene Dawn and the 
Vietnam War, Jacobus Coetzee and the early colonization of the Cape,52 Magda in the later 
colonial context of the Cape, the Magistrate on the frontier of a fictional Empire, and lastly 
Michael K in apartheid South Africa. All of these settings can be traced back to the 
biographical stations of Coetzee’s life, which shows his concern for his heritage and the 
history he comes from: “Coetzee’s doing-writing, in other words – and in words other than 
those employed by most contemporary historians of South Africa – provides a compellingly 
important encounter with the time and place of its birth.” (Macaskill 1998: 67) 
While writing Dusklands and imagining Eugene Dawn sitting in a library, Coetzee was 
sitting in a library in the United States of America.53 The character John in Youth – who we 
can fairly presume to concur with the author Coetzee to a large degree – resigns from IBM 
shortly after discovering their involvement in a military project in the context of the Cold War. 
In Austin, Texas, Coetzee experienced an eruption of irrational violence when Charles Joseph 
Whitman, perched on the upper deck of the campanile, killed and wounded a number of 
people. Coetzee was at the time teaching a course in the same building complex. While 
writing Dusklands Coetzee also became witness to the protests against the war in Buffalo, 
where he was a lecturer at the time; the protest he took part in was rather against the conduct 
of the university administration, who had called for a strong police force to occupy the 
campus, than directly against the war – but one can fairly assume he was sympathetic to the 
students’ cause.54 Jacobus Coetzee’s and Magda’s narratives deal with the conflicted historical 
 
52 For his first novel Coetzee draws on historical sources he discovered in the library of the university in Austin: 
“The 1799 edition of The Journal of Hendrik Jacob Wikar includes the short account of a journey undertaken by 
Jacobus Coetzé in 1760 along the West Coast and through Namaqualand to the Orange River and beyond, an 
account that would form the basis of the second part of Dusklands, Coetzee’s first novel, which he was shortly to 
commence.” (Kannemeyer 2012: 159) 
53 Kannemeyer once again points out a link to Coetzee’s own biography: “When not having to attend or give 
classes, Coetzee spent his days in Austin’s spacious library. Some years later, in the first part of Dusklands, he 
describes Eugene Dawn working in the basement of a library, and it is not far from the bookish Coetzee’s own 
experience.” (Kannemeyer 2012: 157) 
54 For a detailed account of this episode see Kannemeyer 2012: 159-162; also Scott 1997: 86. Kannemeyer’s 
biography also features a satirical essay by Coetzee on the Vietnam war printed in the Daily Texan in Austin. 
Kannemeyer further makes available a blurb Coetzee himself had written for the publication by Ravan Press: 
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past of Coetzee’s home country, South Africa; the former being written together with Eugene 
Dawn’s narrative in the US, the latter being mainly written after his return to South Africa. In 
Life & Times of Michael K Coetzee explores a virtual present time, South Africa in a state of 
emergency similar to how it was when the book was written in the 1980s.55 Coetzee’s 
characters are placed in their historical contexts and exposed to its contingencies. The 
realization how history has shaped their being rests with the reader and occurs to the 
characters only in brief flashes of insight, none of which they manage to hold on to. Engaging 
in speculative history frees Coetzee from the constraints of historical accuracy, and gives 
space to the unfolding of complex characters. Correspondingly, Macaskill sees Magda’s 
narrative as an act of “speculative linguistics” with Coetzee as scripteur, as an agent behind 
the voice of Magda: “Coetzee writes Magda into being both as a ‘real’ person and as paper 
entity, shaping her – and allowing her to shape herself – between the demands of the 
verisimilitude valued by historical materialism and the discursive play practiced by 
poststructural theories of language.” (Macaskill 1998: 73) On a more pragmatic level, Magda 
is placed “between the two natural languages that articulate her and that she articulates, 
English and Afrikaans.” (Macaskill 1998: 73) As we know from Boyhood (and Kannemeyer), 
Coetzee himself grew up with a similar tension between English and Afrikaans. Brian 
Macaskill goes on to argue that Magda desires to find a middle ground and escape the history 
that restricts and stunts all intersubjective relations available to her: 
Here [HOC 133] Magda expresses – in writing – her hope of being a middle voice, her 
desire to write herself into a new existence, to escape the “old locutions” that have forced 
her to veer to and from the “master-talk” between mistress and servants and alternate 
attempts at intimate chatter with Anna and Hendrik. (Macaskill 1998: 76) 
The allegorical nature of Coetzee’s early novels in particular has been discussed 
widely, and the vague settings invite allegorical readings.56 The universal character of the 
narratives can hardly be denied, but the specific allegorical framework depends largely on the 
reader. The South African reader will most likely relate Coetzee’s fictions to the landscape 
and social climate surrounding him, whereas the non-African reader might relate Waiting for 
In the Vietnam Project and The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee we visit the dead souls of the explorers, 
conquistadors, and administrators whose work it is, in 1970 as in 1760, to absorb the wilds into the Western 
dusklands. Is it contempt for their victims, or is it fear of the damage that love may do to the screens of 
abstraction through which they see the world, that makes them monsters of callousness? Are they simply the 
barbarians of ‘progress,’ or are they creatures of the apocalypse determined to involve mankind in their personal 
damnation? (Kannemeyer 2012: 247) 
55 “If it [LTMK] is set ahead in time at all, then this is done as a way of looking, as if it had come to the surface, 
at what lies under the surface of the present. The harried homelessness of Michael K and his mother is the 
experience, in 1984, of hundreds of thousands of black people in South African squatter towns and 
“resettlement” camps. A civil war is going on in 1984 on South Africa’s borders, between black and white […].” 
(Gordimer 1998: 141) 
56 See Attridge 2006a. See also Dovey 1988. 
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the Barbarians more readily to the Russian or Chinese Empires than to South Africa. The 
allegorical reading ultimately rests with the reader. 
2.2 From Imperial Gaze to Sympathetic Gaze 
The face is the primary site of emotional display. Babies pick up the expressions from 
their parents, learn to interpret them, learn to mimic them and thereby indicate and 
communicate their emotional states. In encountering others the eyes play a vital part – be it in 
the sense of a stare contest (think of Western movies) or the sympathetic gaze of lovers (think 
of your own experiences or again: movies). Some characters of Coetzee’s novels speak of the 
eyes as the “windows of the soul,” and in the early novels the eyes of the protagonists are 
ascribed a variety of metaphorical meanings, all reflecting on how they approach others. This 
will be the first category of analysis of Coetzee’s first three novels. 
2.2.1 The Imperial Gaze in Dusklands (1974) 
Eugene’s pornographic gaze of penetration 
Eugene Dawn’s primary mode of engagement is that of penetration, be it the 
penetration of Vietnamese minds through radio propaganda, or his pornographic gaze 
penetrating pictures of torture. Eugene suffers from bodily spasms, and Coetzee creates a very 
detailed corporal representation of Eugene’s troubles, of which the following quote gives a 
good impression: 
Hemmed in with walls of books, I should be in paradise. But my body betrays me. I read, 
my face starts to lose its life, a stabbing begins in my head, then, as I beat through gales of 
yawns to fix my weeping eyes on the page, my back begins to petrify in the scholar’s hook. 
[…] Behind my temples too, behind my cheekbones, behind my lips the glacier creeps 
inward toward its epicenter behind my eyes. My eyeballs ache, my mouth constricts. If this 
inner face of mine, this vizor of muscle, had features, they would be the monstrous 
troglodyte features of a man who bunches his sleeping eyes and mouth as a totally 
unacceptable dream forces itself into him. (DL 7, emphasis added)57 
Embodied Eugene’s weeping eyes, here a physiological rather than a metaphorical 
phenomenon, are an indicator of his inner state. A photography of Eugene shows an earlier 
self with “liquid brown eyes” (13), but he characterizes his current state as an inner “frozen 
sea”, a recurring trope in Coetzee’s fiction (recently in Summertime, page 61), signalling 
isolation and the inability to engage with others. He keeps various photos of scenes of 
prisoners, torture and other atrocities. One picture in particular fascinates him, a still from a 
 
57 Coetzee 1998 [1974]. All quotes in section 2.2.1 will be from DL unless indicated otherwise. 
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movie. In his description of the movie itself, Eugene mentions “the eyes of prisoners,” and 
when the camera focuses on one prisoner: “The man in the cage turns languid eyes on us.” 
(16) Eugene responds to this gaze with pornographic excitement:  
I have a 12” x 12” blowup of the prisoner. He has raised himself on one elbow, lifting his 
face toward the blurred grid of the wire. Dazzled by the sky, he sees as yet only the looming 
outlines of his spectators. His face is thin. From one eye glints a point of light; the other is 
in the dark of the cage. 
I have also a second print, of the face alone in greater magnification. The glint in the right 
eye has become a diffuse white patch; shades of dark gray mark the temple, the right 
eyebrow, the hollow of the cheek. 
I close my eyes and pass my fingertips over the cool, odorless surface of the print. Evenings 
are quiet here in the suburbs. I concentrate myself. Everywhere its surface is the same. The 
glint in the eye, which in a moment luckily never to arrive will through the camera look 
into my eyes, is bland and opaque under my fingers, yielding no passage into the interior of 
this obscure but indubitable man. I keep exploring. Under the persistent pressure of my 
imagination, acute and morbid in the night, it may yet yield. (16-17) 
His gaze is that of penetration, not of a sympathetic engagement. Later in the narrative he 
recalls the prisoner’s gaze and imagines a gesture of awakening sympathy: “The man in the 
tiger cage flashes a black eye at me. I stretch out my hand.” (34) Eugene has his moments of 
realization, of which I will give one example: 
There is no doubt that I am a sick man. Vietnam has cost me too much. I use the metaphor 
of the dolorous wound. […] Inside my body, beneath the skin and muscle and flesh that 
drape me, I am bleeding. […] I imagine a wound weeping somewhere in the cavern behind 
my eyes. (32) 
His realizations, however, are only momentary, not followed up, without consequences. 
Eugene Dawn remains a static self, unable to gain a fresh perspective, even though 
perspective-taking plays a role both in his work life and his personal life. Tellingly, Eugene 
Dawn employs his empathetic capabilities solely for the purpose of dominating the other; 
whereas towards his family these faculties remain dormant. When he speaks of the alienation 
from his wife, he comments: “As an exercise I watch her through a strange man’s eyes. New 
perspectives excite me.” (11) The exercise of perspective-taking reaches an extreme, and 
Eugene Dawn loses himself in the other’s perspectives, failing to relate them back to his self 
and his attitudes towards others: 
What sounds at first like an indulgent exercise in self-pathologization turns out to be a 
commentary on the need for such an exercise to be carried out in the first place. It’s as 
though Dawn is standing at some distance from the subject of his own dissemination. 
(James 2011: 44). 
The distance to himself is the tragic flaw of Eugene Dawn’s self-appraisal. In terms of the 
sympathetic imagination, he only completes the first level, the task of thinking himself into 
others, but fails in relating the gained insight to his own self.  
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In the end Eugene rejects the explanations of his pathological state offered by his wife 
Marilyn, that his “human sympathies have been coarsened, […] and [he] ha[s] become 
addicted to violent and perverse fantasies.” (9). Marilyn’s friends speak of “psychic 
brutalization” (9), and the doctors also deliver a plausible rationalization: “The hypothesis 
they test is that intimate contact with the design of war made me callous to suffering and 
created in me a need for violent solutions to problems of living, infecting me at the same time 
with guilty feelings that showed themselves in nervous symptoms.” (48) Instead of 
considering these answers, Eugene Dawn ends his narrative with a question that externalizes 
the responsibility for his doings: “I have high hopes of finding whose fault I am.” (49) 
Jacobus Coetzee: Penetration and Domination 
I am in two minds about supplying the particular personal information you suggest, not 
because I am at all against idle curiosity, and not either because I think the facts of a 
writer’s background irrelevant to his work (they are and they aren’t), but because the 
information you suggest suggests that I settle for a particular identity I should feel most 
uneasy in. A few words about my schooling, for example, make me a player in the English-
South African game of social typing and can even be read as a compliment to those 
monsters of sadism who ruled over my life for eleven years. As for my family background, 
I am one of 10,000 Coetzees, and what is there to be said about them except that Jacobus 
Coetzee begat them all? (Coetzee to Randall, 17 January 1974) 
Jacobus Coetzee follows a similar path as Eugene Dawn, only about two centuries 
earlier in the Cape region of imperial conquest, and in a more active mode of penetration: “I 
meditated upon the acres of new ground I had eaten up with my eyes.” (77) And later: “The 
Hottentots knew nothing of penetration. For penetration you need blue eyes.” (96-97) He 
expands the metaphor of the “eating eyes” penetrating the wilderness in his discourse: 
Only the eyes have power. The eyes are free, they reach out to the horizon all around. 
Nothing is hidden from the eyes. As the other senses grow numb or dumb my eyes flex and 
extend themselves. I become a spherical reflecting eye moving through the wilderness and 
ingesting it. Destroyer of the wilderness, I move through the land cutting a devouring path 
from horizon to horizon. There is nothing from which my eye turns, I am all that I see. Such 
loneliness! Not a stone, not a bush, not a wretched provident ant that is not comprehended 
in this travelling sphere. What is there that is not me? I am a transparent sac with a black 
core full of images and a gun. (79, emphasis added) 
The spherical eye – one might be reminded of Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s prison 
designs, his panopticon58 – incorporates the outside world; in the Afterword it is referred to as 
“the spherical eye of a frog or toad” (109). Perspective-taking hardly figures in the narrative 
of Jacobus Coetzee. In contrast to Eugene Dawn, who lacks an own perspective properly 
 
58 Bentham 1995. 
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related to his self, Jacobus Coetzee raises his perspective to be his ultimate reasoning, similar 
to the eye of God (cf. the eye within a triangle in freemason insignia or the US dollar bill).59 
In his first encounter with the Nama people Jacobus is cautious, but rather for fear than 
for curiosity. Only later, after he has been violated and humiliated, does he question himself: 
“With what new eyes of knowledge, I wondered, would I see myself when I saw myself, now 
that I had been violated by the cackling heathen. Would I know myself better?” (97) We get a 
sense that Jacobus Coetzee has potential to engage with others, maybe on the not completely 
infertile ground of his life-long companionship with his servant Klawer, but the master-
servant divide remains intact up to the last moment when he leaves him behind on his trek 
home. The report of the second expedition nullifies any potential for an engaging approach, 
instead he and his party annihilate all others, leaving only the solitary self of Jacobus Coetzee 
behind. 
2.2.2 In the Heart of the Country (1976): Blank Mirror Images of the Mind 
In contrast to the male protagonists of Dusklands, Magda’s sense of self is far more 
fragile and less self-assertive. In a sense she resembles a historical descendant of Jacobus 
Coetzee, who observed: “Our children play with servants’ children, and who is to say who 
copies whom? In hard times how can differences be maintained?” (DL 57) Magda follows: “I 
grew up with the servants’ children. I spoke like one of them before I learned to speak like 
this.” (HOC 6)60 and reflects on her ancestry: “[…] why did he [her grandfather] pass on no 
humanity to my father but leave him a barbarian and me too after him? (46) […] the mark that 
has been left on me instead is the mark of intercourse with the wilds, with solitude and 
vacancy.” (47) 
In Magda we can see the failure of her sympathetic imagination, and consequently her 
failure to empathize with Hendrik and Klein-Anna. While on the textual level a failure of the 
sympathetic imagination is enacted, we as readers are challenged to employ our sympathetic 
imagination while encountering Magda together with all her contradictions, all unreliably 
 
59 Rukmini Bhaya Nair in her excellent study on Narrative Gravity comments on the search for a ‘true self’, here 
in relation to Virginia Woolf: 
Where Woolf poetically enquires: Is this the true self, which stands on a pavement in January, or 
that which bends over the balcony in June? Am I here or am I there? Dennett would deny the 
validity of this question. For, in his scheme of things, there is no ‘true self’; there is no real centre 
of ‘selfhood’. Paradoxically, though, our stories help us imagine a centre. This imaginary centre is 
the object we take to be, through a series of inspired references, an agentive human self, ‘a central 
oyster of perceptiveness, an enormous eye’. (Nair 2003: 205-206; original emphasis) 
The spherical eye of Jacobus Coetzee constitutes such an imaginary centre. 
60 Coetzee 1982 [1976]. All quotes in section 2.2.2 will be from HOC unless indicated otherwise. 
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narrated by her. Whether the text enables us to feel empathy for Magda cannot be answered 
conclusively, but she seems to remain closed to us. However, accompanying her on the wild 
journey of her imagination brings us closer to her during the course of her narrative – never 
do we get a full picture, but even the fragments (that offer more numerous access points for 
our imagination than a more coherent portrayal would) offered can stimulate our sympathetic 
imagination and elicit empathy. 
In the Heart of the Country takes the reader on a journey into the innermost recesses of 
a mind, a place without certainty but instead a world of ‘perhaps’.61 Not only are we invited 
to see what Magda (identified in name only late in the narrative) sees, inhabiting her 
perspective, but as readers are also challenged by the multiplicity of events. The reiterated 
‘perhaps’ clause creates a distance to the events, since we cannot know for sure whether they 
are really taking place. The very first series of events, opening the narrative – “Today my 
father brought home his new bride.” (1) – is immediately renounced and discarded. The 
numbering of the sections from 1. to 266., which in their length range from one paragraph to 
one or two pages, structures the narrative and on the one hand suggests a chronological order, 
but on the other in its numerical expression suggests exchangeability and a cont
ce of events. 
Magda creates her own narrative and proves to be an exemplarily unreliable narrator. 
This unreliability and the discourse on her unstable identity point to a discourse on madness 
(maybe schizophrenia – Donald Powers, UCT, in this context playfully suggested the 
alternative term
other: 
I create myself in the words that create me, I who have lived among the downcast have 
never beheld myself in the equal regard of another’s eye, have never held another in the 
equal regard of mine. While I am free to be I, nothing is impossible. In the cloister of my 
room I am the mad hag I am destined to be. … to the crazy hornpipe I dance with myself. 
(8) 
The “equal regard of another’s eye” points to the dominating presence of her father and to the 
servility of the domestic workers. Magda’s position keeps the middle ground, with no 
common ground available in regard to both father and workers. Macaskill discusses how 
language is “a social fact embedded within ideological matrices” and how the modulations 
Magda performs with her matrix parody the “hierarchy,” the “distance and perspective” 
 
61 “’Perhaps’ is one of the text’s most prevalent terms. It occurs no less than eleven times, for instance, in two 
passages that total only twenty lines in section 149 of the novel (79-80).” (Macaskill 1998: 82) 
62 For a more detailed discussion of the psychological dimension of Magda’s characterization, see Briganti 1998. 
For a follow-up on Donald Power’s comment see Cheney 2009. 
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evoked by it “as the ‘father-tongue’ slurs and distance diminishes” (Macaskill 1998: 76). 
Magda searches for “a middle locution between active and passive”, desires to be a median. 
The use of the middle voice occurs not only on the level of character, but also on the formal 
level of the text: “[T]he numbered entries in which she seeks to record this articulation come 
in turn to constitute Coetzee’s act of ‘doing-writing’ in the middle voice: a means, no less, of 
enumerating (for Coetzee) equally complex negotiations facing the writer at that time and 
place of contemporary South Africa (Macaskill 1998: 77). The middle voice allows Magda to 
avoid placing herself on either side of the dichotomies of master-s
stitutes her insecurity and the instability of her position.63 
Chiara Briganti discusses Magda’s position as a female subject and observes that “she 
is reduced to being only the other term of the dyad, only the father’s opposite.” (Briganti 
1998: 89) Simultaneously, the “inscription of the female subject demystifies authorial identity 
by questioning the legitimacy of the father/author as locus of authority and begetter of texts 
[…]” (Briganti 1998: 85) Her “self-representations also show Magda as engaged in a 
masquerade that enables her to parody the male gaze and those images that are seen culturally 
through men’s eyes, and also show her remarkable capacity for self-regeneration.” (Briganti 
1998: 86-87) The female subject constitutes a site o
e results apart from the demise of the father. 
Magda’s mode of communication never seems adequate. The silence between her and 
her father (only once in the entire novel does actual dialogue occur between them) is 
symptomatic, and even their eyes do not speak to each other: “We look at each other. Try as I 
will, I cannot work out what feelings his face expresses. I lack the faculty of reading faces.” 
(65) Even when assuming that the father’s face might not be an ideal site to study emotional 
expressions, the deficiency Magda expresses here indica
ly, an underdeveloped state of her mirror neurons.  
Her communication with the servants Hendrik and Klein-Anna starts off with a 
language of hierarchy, of imperatives: “I was born into a language of hierarchy, of distance 
and perspective. It was my father-tongue. I do not say it is the language my heart wants to 
 
63 “[The middle voice’s] capabilities of putting thought into place between the disjunctive logic of dichotomous 
options is suggestive not only in the context of Magda’s project but –more crucially –reveals also the import of 
Coetzee’s “doing-writing,” in which Magda functions only as a cipher, albeit a central one. Magda’s act of 
writing, which she herself recognizes as taking place in the modality of “an eternal present” that forever 
distinguishes it from history and even from story (114[115]) and that aligns it instead to the temporal and self-
referential vagaries of the middle-voice writing, […]” (Macaskill 1998: 77) For a more elaborate discussion of 
Coetzee’s use of the middle voice see also Dovey 1998; for a more general discussion of the middle voice in the 
context of trauma see LaCapra 2001. 
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language lovers speak but cannot imagine how it goes.” (97) Later she makes an effort to 
engage with Hendrik and Klein-Anna on more equal terms, but the communication is stunted: 
I am spoken to not in words, which come to me quaint and veiled, but in signs, in 
conformations of face and hands, in postures of shoulders and feet, in nuances of tune and 
tone, in gaps and absences whose grammar has never been recorded. Reading the brown 
folk I grope, as they grope reading me: for they too hear my words only dully, listening for 
those overtones of the voice, those subtleties of the eyebrows that tell them my true 
meaning: “Beware, do not cross me,” “What I say does not come from me. Across valley of 
space and time we strain ourselves to catch the pale smoke / of each other’s signals. (7-8) 
Communication primarily takes place through the body, not through the words uttered. This 
foregrounding of the body as a site of communication establishes an alternative to purely 
verbal communication on a semantic level. Not a lack of vocabulary, but a fundamental gap 
configured through the social environment, prevents any sincere exchange of words. The 
signs of the bodies are the only reliable indicators left for communication. 
The category of voice presents an interesting case in In the Heart of the Country. 
Magda’s narrative alludes to a variety of philosophical contexts that seem at odds with her 
situation and up-bringing – she was schooled in a shed (45-47). Two prominent examples are 
Blake and Nietzsche. Macaskill notes a “pervasive pressure of allusions to and direct 
quotations from the work of William Blake throughout the text” (Macaskill 1998: 83), and 
characterizes this disjunction well: 
The contradiction that emerges between the characterization of Magda and the intellectual 
qualities and qualifications of the voice in which she speaks underscores the extent to 
which Magda’s narrative is not only Magda’s narrative but also an act of “speculative 
linguistics” on the part of Coetzee, scripteur, who is inscribed within the writing and who 
acts as its agent. Coetzee writes Magda into being both as a “real” person and as paper 
entity, shaping her – and allowing her to shape herself – between the demands of the 
verisimilitude valued by historical materialism and the discursive play practiced by 
poststructural theories of language. (Macaskill 1998: 73) 
Again, Coetzee’s treatment of the character Magda attains a high degree of complexity, which 
serves not only her portrayal but also on a formal level implies the author’s voice and marks 
his interference with her identity construction. In the South African edition of In the Heart of 
the Country large parts of the dialogue are presented in Afrikaans, placing Magda “between 
the two natural languages that articulate her and that she articulates, English and Afrikaans” 
(Macaskill 1998: 73); reminiscent of Coetzee’s own position of having an Afrikaner father 
and a mother strongly affiliated with English culture and language.  
The eyes of Magda make more empathetic noise (see Breithaupt in 1.6) than her verbal 
communication, and she speaks of “the wind that roars in the spaces between the atoms of my 
body, whistles in the cavern behind my eyes.” (56) In the same space Eugene Dawn imagined 
“a wound weeping” (DL 32, see also above), and later in Foe a roaring wind will emit form 
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the mouth of Friday. In the case of Eugene, his inner self cries over the experienced isolation 
from others, in the case of Magda the “wind” signals the emptiness of her inner life, though at 
the same time the wind indicates movement and possible transformation. The roar coming 
from Friday’s mouth breaks his silence, but points beyond his individual fate and attests a 
shift in Coetzee’s fiction and its themes (see section 3.1.5). 
The Lighthouse 
Where Jacobus Coetzee resembled an all-seeing “spherical eye” in his conquest, 
Magda’s viewpoint, though still in the mode of the overseer, is elevated and opens the 
possibility of a more searching than dominating mode: 
[…] I have quite another sense of myself, glimmering tentatively somewhere in my inner 
darkness: myself as a sheath, as a matrix, as protectrix of a vacant inner space. I move 
through the world not as a knifeblade cutting the wind, or as a tower with eyes, like my 
father, but as a hole, a hole with a body draped around it, the two spindly legs hanging 
loose at the bottom and the two bony arms flapping at the sides and the big head lolling on 
top. I am a hole crying to be whole. (40-41) 
Magda here attributes the lighthouse metaphor to her father (cf. Jacobus as spherical eye), but 
in an earlier thought seems to compare herself with a lighthouse: “Inside my skull the walls 
are glassy, I see only reflections of myself drab and surly staring back at myself.” (38) Her 
eyes are searchlights that sweep over her surroundings in great circles; Magda imagines fixing 
her gaze on Klein-Anna: 
I have only, I tell myself, to throw off the straps and haul on the lever ready to my hand for 
the cogs to stop grinding and the light to fall steady on the girl, her slim arms, her slender 
body; but […] the beam swings on, and in a moment I am watching the stone desert or the 
goats or my face in the mirror, objects on which I can happily release the dry acid breath I 
have held back so painfully, breath that is, I cannot after all deny it, my spirit, my self, or as 
much so as the light is. (26) 
Her eyes search the human landscape, sending out light in a desire for contact, a relief from 
isolation. But her desire remains detached. Admittedly, this reading is reductive, and Magda 
resists singular characterization through one master metaphor: “[…] I am more than just […] 
a streak of light against the void of space, a shooting-star […].” (56) The contradictions 
inherent in her discourse support this resistance, and allow her to say: 
I am not a principle, a rule of discourse, a machine planted by a being from another planet 
on this desolate earth beneath the Southern Cross to generate sentiments day after day, night 
after night, keeping count of them as I go, until I run dry. (120) 
Eyes Wide Shut 
Taking a step back, it is important to register how “closed eyes” figure in her case. The 
closing of the eyes indicates a blocking out of the outside world, and can also indicate an 
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opening of the unconscious, the world of thoughts that is hidden within (a trope that keeps 
reappearing in Coetzee’s fiction). When she tries to protect Klein-Anna from Hendrik’s 
jealous reprise, he pushes her to the ground: “The blood thuds in my ears. I close my eyes: in 
a moment I will be myself.” (76) Here the idiomatic meaning of collecting oneself 
overshadows the metaphorical implication of returning to the self (from somewhere other). 
With closed eyes she opens herself to the forces and impulses of her unconscious. Tellingly, 
this occurs again in the moment when she points a gun at her sleeping father: “I am not bad, I 
am not even dangerous. I close my eyes and pull the trigger. I am stunned and deafened, there 
is a ringing in my ears.” (99) Closing her eyes enables Magda to focus on her inner self, and 
ultimately to partially set it free. 
Open Your Eyes 
Returning to the metaphor of the lighthouse and Magda’s search for human contact, 
the reader cannot miss the efforts she makes to reconcile herself with the servants, in part out 
of necessity, but also with great curiosity. Compared to her relationship with her father Magda 
suspects a far more genuine tie between the servants: “[…] if not acute ecstasy then at least a 
kind of gentle streaming of radiance from eyes and fingertips which I do not see […].” (78) 
Before her father is removed from the picture she maintains the “traditional distance” (25). 
After having disposed of him she engages more openly with the servants, but the master-
servant gulf ultimately cannot be bridged and in the end the servants leave her behind on the 
farm, alone. Toward the close of the narrative, her father reappears on the scene, now lifeless 
and quite likely no more than a decaying corpse (perhaps a moment of necrophilia, though 
some have read it as a return in full blood in accordance with the mode of ‘perhaps’ and her 
unreliable narration). In the context of my argument, it is interesting to observe her trying to 
make eye contact with her (now dead) father: 
His eyes are sightless, two glassy blue walls rimmed with pink. He hears nothing but what 
goes on inside him, unless I am mistaken all this time and he hears all my chatter but 
chooses to ignore it. He has had his outing for the day; it is time to carry him in so that he 
can rest. (137) 
Just like her father (the fact that she intends to “carry him in” indicates either extreme frailty 
or the lightness of a dried-up corpse), Magda cannot establish a connection with the others 
around her, and thereby remains in her isolated position, a clearly unfavourable state which 
reflects badly on her: “I look at myself in the mirror and try to smile. The face in the mirror 
smiles a haggard smile. Nothing has changed. I still do not like myself.” (96) 
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Similar to Eugene Dawn, who claims to be interested in explanations of his own being 
– though he rejects any explanations offered to him – Magda also seems to refuse the 
possibility of an explanation of herself: 
I am beyond the why and wherefore of myself. […] The woman in the nightcap watching 
me from the mirror, the woman who in a certain sense is me, will dwindle and expire here 
in the heart of the country unless she has at least a thin porridge of event to live on. I am not 
interested in becoming one of those people who look into mirrors and see nothing, or walk 
in the sun and cast no shadow. (23) 
Magda senses a self she cannot reach. Her fears expressed in this passage allude to the 
undead, more specifically to vampires, who have no mirror image, and to the doppelganger, 
taking over the self and misrepresenting him. 
Later, however, she offers a fairly plausible explanation (and thereby probably 
oversimplified) explanation:  
Is it possible that there is an explanation for all the things I do, and that that explanation lies 
inside me, like a key rattling in a can, waiting to be taken out and used to unlock the 
mystery? Is the following the key: through the agency of conflict with my father I hope to 
lift myself out of the endless middle of meditation on unattached existence into a true agon 
with crisis and resolution? (62) 
Ultimately Magda reaches no conclusion and her sense of confusion, expressed early on in the 
narrative, never really leaves her: 
I am lost in the being of my being. This is what I was meant to be: a poetess of interiority, 
an explorer of the inwardness of stones, the emotions of ants, the consciousness of the 
thinking parts of the brain. It seems to be the only career, if we except death, for which life 
in the desert has fitted me. (35) 
Magda’s despair results largely from the double bind of the master-slave dialectic controlling 
her fate; as a colonial subject she occupies the position of master, as female subject she might 
not quite be a slave, but not far from it. Her quest for redemption is more explicit than Eugene 
Dawn’s curiosity about whose fault he is. 
2.2.3 Waiting for the Barbarians (1980): Dark Eyes of Interrogation, Bright Eyes of 
Benevolence 
Waiting for the Barbarians has a far more cinematic scope than the chamber pieces In 
the Heart of the Country or Eugene Dawn’s account. I have in mind the style of a Western 
with a gory visual representation of torture (Werner Herzog attempted a screenplay, which 
might have developed in such a direction, but unfortunately it never materialized). In its 
setting it is comparable to Jacobus Coetzee’s narrative, but far more epic in its scope and more 
complex in the constellation of characters. 
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Coetzee gives us a conversion narrative. The Magistrate starts out as a bureaucrat of 
the empire with little else in mind than his everyday comforts. At the close of the novel, the 
Magistrate has changed considerably. At the moral centre of the narrative lies “the mutilated 
body under a postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion.” (Samolsky 2003: 117) In the beginning, 
the barbarian girl is tortured (and other prisoners too; off-scene), later the Magistrate himself 
is subjected to torture (on-scene).64 Her torture took place in a dark chamber, while the 
Magistrate’s humiliation happens in public.65 Marais comments: 
While this character is aware of his location in the society he resists, and must therefore 
doubt the motives behind his actions, he is nonetheless obliged to act by his encounters 
with the indubitable suffering of the body. My contention is that, in this novel, the authority 
of the body is staged in its ability to affect the Magistrate despite his own will. (Marais 
2011b: 66) 
In Waiting for the Barbarians the body constitutes the primary site of empathetic encounters. 
In the conversations of the Magistrate and Colonel Joll little empathy can be found (apart 
from trying to pry loose the intentions of the other; a destructive use similar to that of Eugene 
Dawn). Language also carries with it cultural constructions of difference among people, as we 
have seen in the case of Magda. The body predates these constructions, and is something 
equally shared by all human beings (and other sentient beings, as shall be discussed later); 
think of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and Shylock’s claim to a shared bodily 
existence. More specifically, the body in a state of pain reduces us to a core being with the 
bodily sensation of severe pain. Marais argues, “[t]he body in pain transgresses the 
linguistically and discursively inscribed difference between people by asserting an 
incontrovertible reality that lies beyond the cultural enclosure and its local forms of 
knowledge.” (Marais 2011b: 69) Coetzee faces the challenge of a textual representation and a 
narrative foregrounding of the body, thus establishing a site beyond language but expressed 
through language nevertheless. For “[t]orture in Waiting for the Barbarians is also a textual 
matter,” as Dominic Head points out, referring to the scene when the word ‘ENEMY’ is 
written on the backs of the prisoners, who are then thrashed until the writing has been washed 
off by blood and sweat (WFB 104-6). Head continues: “Coetzee is alluding to Kafka’s story 
‘In the Penal Colony’ here, a brutal story in which inscription and execution are conjoined in a 
deluded notion of justice.” (Head 2009: 50)66 
 
64 Russell Evan Samolsky discusses the tortured body with Foucault’s Discipline and Punish in mind in the third 
chapter of his dissertation (Samolsky 2003). 
65 For a discussion of the literary representation of torture in South African literature see Coetzee 1986. 
66 Michael Valdez Moses discusses in his essay “The Mark of the Empire: Writing, History, and Torture in 
Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians” how Kafka’s story is refracted through a Foucauldean lens in the novel 
(referred to in Head 2009: 33). 
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The Ritual Washing of Feet 
The foregrounding of the body enters the narrative when the Magistrate becomes 
aware of the torture of the prisoners. From general concern he moves to a particular concern 
when he orders the barbarian girl to be brought to his private rooms and develops a 
fascination for her injuries, her crippled feet and partially blinded eyes. In his ritual washing 
he is able to lose himself, in a way relieving himself of the horrors having taken place under 
the command of Colonel Joll, and maybe seeking some form of redemption, even if in a 
strange manner.67 Again, the closing of the eyes, now associated with sleep, opens him up, as 
the following collage of quotes from Waiting for the Barbarians illustrates: 
I lose myself in the rhythm of what I am doing. I lose awareness of the girl herself. There is 
a space of time which is blank to me: perhaps I am not even present. (30) My eyes close. It 
becomes an intense pleasure to keep them closed, to savour the blissful giddiness. (31) It is 
rapture, of a kind. (33) I close my eyes and lose myself in the rhythm of the rubbing […]. 
(33) I am abstracted, lost in the rhythm of rubbing and kneading the swollen ankle. (59)68 
Note the religious undertones in the Magistrate’s reflections, when he speaks of “bliss” and 
“rapture”.69 The site of the body allows him to imagine a positive state of being, a state of 
universal communion; altogether a deceptive intuition, but a first intimation of a change 
taking place within him. 
At one point he uses the image of the axe: “But more often in the very act of caressing 
her I am overcome with sleep as if poleaxed, fall into oblivion […]. These dreamless spells 
are like death to me, or enchantment, blank, outside time.” (33) For Magda the axe was an 
instrument of violence, in The Master of Petersburg it is a metaphor for reading (“[...] being 
the arm and being the axe and being the skull; reading is giving yourself up, not holding 
yourself at a distance and jeering.” MOP 47) and in Summertime Julia says: “A book should 
be an axe to chop open the frozen sea inside of us.” ST 61). Shutting the eyes opens our other 
perceptions, puts an emphasis on our more corporeal sensations; and the Magistrate in his 
treatments of the barbarian girl learns his lesson: “I shut my eyes, breathe deeply to still my 
agitation, and concentrate wholly on seeing her through my blind fingertips.” (46) The 
blindness of touch becomes a way of seeing, or rather sensing, a truth not available to the eye. 
 
67 Judie Newman offers an original discussion of Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger [“an analysis of concepts of 
pollution and taboo”] as “intertextual frame” for Waiting for the Barbarians. (Newman 1998:128; 126-138) 
68 Coetzee 1980. All quotes in section 2.2.3 will be from WFB unless indicated otherwise. 
69 “But the Magistrate’s ritual is not solely a parody of the liberal’s tendency to wallow in guilt. It also reinstates 
the dignity and mystery of the body of the other, partly through its undeniably Christian resonances, and partly 
through the Magistrate’s hesitation to consummate his relationship with the girl, as if her body were sacred and 
such an act a profanation.” (Pearsall 1998: 224) 
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Looking the Other in the Eye 
There are intriguing parallels between Colonel Joll’s torturous mode of interrogation 
and the Magistrate attempt to penetrate the dark open secret hidden in the girls blinded eyes, 
which she at first evades with a telling gesture: “‘I am…’ – she holds up her forefinger, grips 
it, twists it.” (29) and then reveals in an anti-climatic report the torture suffered by her, closely 
followed by the Magistrate’s realization of the negligible distance between him and Joll that 
comes to him “in the image of a face masked by two black glassy insect eyes from which here 
comes no reciprocal gaze but only my doubled image cast back at me” (48) 
Nevertheless, the glances exchanged remain a central discourse in the encounter. The 
injured eyes of the barbarian girl allow her only to see the other at an angle: “[…] the black 
eyes that look through and past me. […] Her eyes move from my face and settle somewhere 
behind me to the right. […] Each time she gives me a strange regard, staring straight ahead of 
her until I am near, then very slowly turning her head away from me.” (27) The fascination of 
the Magistrate leads him onto the path of penetration/interrogation – “[…] she cannot but feel 
my gaze pressing upon her with the weight of a body” (59) – which makes his curiosity 
invasive and clearly shows a lack of empathetic cautiousness: “I wave a hand in front of her 
eyes. She blinks. I bring my face closer and stare into her eyes. She wheels her gaze from the 
wall on to me. The black irises are set off by milky whites as clear as a child’s. I touch her 
cheek: she starts.” (28) Here the Magistrate fails to take her perspective, fails to engage with 
her empathetically; and the sympathy he extends does not take him even half the way. Laura 
Wright […] remarks that the Magistrate’s “inability to see what motivates his actions is a kind 
of blindness that results in a failure of the sympathetic imagination.” (Wright 2006: 80) In my 
argument, it is exactly the Magistrate’s perplexed sense of her otherness or strangeness that 
renders him responsible for the barbarian girl.70 The Magistrate enters a state of sympathetic 
responsibility, but yet has to reach out further to fully employ his sympathetic imagination and 
unleash his empathetic capabilities beyond mere general concern for the well-being of others. 
In the previous novels the others are only minimally endowed with a voice, but the 
barbarian girl is awarded her own perspective, which of course is related to us by the 
Magistrate – but unlike Jacobus and Magda he seems a more reliable narrator. The girl 
comments on her gaze: “There is a blur. But I can see out of the sides of my eyes.” (31) and “I 
am looking. This is how I look.” (28) What she sees is a faint image of the Magistrate; she 
 
70 See also Marais 2011b: 67. Marais comments: “Evidently, the Magistrate no longer knows himself. Since they 
bear little relation to his assumptions, intentions, and ostensible desires, he finds his actions totally 
unpredictable.” (Marais 2011b: 70) 
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cannot fully make out the other, but only sees “a grey form […] a blur, a voice, a smell, a 
centre of energy.” (32) The reader gets a sense that on a level beyond the visual, the 
Magistrate and the girl manage to engage with each other, if only to a limited extent. 
Ultimately, when they look at each other, they encounter a blank: “I look into the eye. Am I to 
believe that gazing back at me she sees nothing – my feet perhaps, parts of the room, a hazy 
circle of light, but at the centre where I am, only a blur, a blank?” (33) 
The Blank Face 
The Magistrate attempts to reconstruct the first time he laid eyes on the barbarian girl, 
before he called her in, when she was penned up with her now dead father, a scenery he had 
observed from his window (a glass interface, comparable to Eugene’s spying on his wife and 
the lighthouse metaphor of Magda). In the “honeycomb of [his] brain” he searches for the 
memory, but finds only “a space, a blankness.” (51) Instead he has a “vision of her closed 
eyes and closed face filming over with skin. Blank, like a fist beneath a black wig, the face 
grows out of the throat and out of the blank body beneath it, without aperture, without entry.” 
(45) “[I]t is as if there is no interior, only a surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking 
entry.” (46) Still haunted by the dark desire to penetrate her, though he resists the temptation 
of the flesh (yes: biblical tone intended); though at one point he strokes her intimately, only 
later on their trek to her people does he succumb to her advances (and yes: a very male 
construction). The Magistrate can recall in detail the entire scenery of the courtyard with all 
the prisoners, including the father of the girl, but: 
The space beside the man remains empty, but a faint sense of the presence of the girl, an 
aura, begins to emerge. … With a rush of feeling I stretch out to touch her hair, her face. 
There is no answering life. It is like caressing an urn or a ball, something which is all 
surface. (52) 
Again we can see how the Magistrate fails to penetrate the surface of the other; this 
corresponds with the girl appearing in his dreams, who ultimately also reveals a blank face.71 
With Eugene Dawn’s mode of encounter in mind, this might be for the better. But in a more 
positive light, the “rush of feeling” the Magistrate experiences could lead to a better 
intersubjective understanding. At least it is an indicator of a “heart reaching out.” Yet, as 
Stephen Clingman notes, the relationship between the Magistrate and the barbarian girl 
“shows only a distorted form of reciprocity.” (Clingman 2009: 227) 
 
71 The most insightful reading of the dreams featured in WFB is offered in Poyner 2009: 62-63. The “blank face” 
has invited numerous readings of Waiting for the Barbarians with Levinas in mind. Derek Attridge, Sam 
Durrant, and Mike Marais make extensive use of Levinas in their readings of Coetzee. 
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2.3 From the Heart 
In a second step, I intend to show how Coetzee stages the emotional life of his 
characters by having them speak in the “language of their hearts”. This can be taken literally, 
as references to the heart as the seat of sympathy (and the sympathetic imagination; cf. 
Elizabeth Costello) are fairly common in Coetzee’s fiction. It is shorthand for the emotional 
inner life and the state of the individual soul, again possibly to be understood as the ethical 
and moral substance of our being. This section will analyze how the four protagonists 
conceive themselves in the terms of their hearts. 
The four protagonists of Coetzee’s first three novels already show a clear development 
in their engagement with others, and thereby also of the sympathetic imagination and the 
implied empathetic processes. Elizabeth Costello identifies the heart as the seat of the 
sympathetic imagination (EC 61) and calls on us to “open [y]our heart and listen to what 
[y]our heart says.” (EC 82) The language of the heart in the early novels gives an indication 
of the protagonists’ position. In Dusklands we encounter the “cold hearts” of Eugene Dawn 
and Jacobus Coetzee, both of whom are presented as primarily concerned with themselves. 
Then again, they do “speak form the heart,” sharing intimate thoughts with the reader. But 
their hearts do not reach out to the other, not even in an act of “negative capability,” imagining 
that which they are not. Magda actively searches for a “language of the heart” and attempts to 
engage whole-heartedly with the servants Hendrik and Klein-Anna; her failure results from a 
compromised position of power. The Magistrate finally comes closest to finding an 
engagement with the other that involves the heart. With the body and the animal as catalysts, 
his inner being grows and reaches out sincerely. The barbarian girl as mysterious other serves 
as an interface and indicator of his success. He indeed reaches her, but only in a marginal 
sense, since her being remains alien to him until the very end. Michael K speaks little of the 
heart, instead demonstrates a mode of self-isolation, reflected by how others react to him (see 
section 2.5). 
2.3.1 Eugene Dawn: Isolation of a Bleeding Heart 
The image Eugene has of his seat of sympathy is poisoned: “When I think of the heart 
that holds my secret I think of something closed and wet and black, like say, the ball in the 
toilet cistern. Sealed in my chest of treasures, lapped in dark blood, it tramps its blind round 
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and will not die.” (DL 48)72 Only in his writing does he manage to be at one with himself, 
when “[t]he frozen sea inside [him] thaws and cracks.” (14) Eugene Dawn is a thought 
experiment on Coetzee’s side, re-imagining a mind that thinks up the horrors of war and 
illustrating the effects this might have on that person. Coetzee does not present ‘pure evil’ to 
the reader (he would most likely consider the notion absurd), but demonstrates the complex 
contradictions but also the strong convictions supporting Eugene Dawn’s stance. Eugene 
longs for a connection with his fellow beings, especially with his child and his wife: “My 
heart went out to her. I longed to stretch a hand through the glass.” (33) Or, more strongly: 
In euphoric gestures of liberation I stretch out my right hand. My fingers, expressive, full of 
meaning, full of love, close on their narrow shoulders, but close empty, as clutches have a 
way of doing in the empty dream-space of one’s head. I repeat the movement several times, 
the movement of love (open the chest, reach the arm) and discouragement (empty hand, 
empty heart). (34)  
Eugene Dawn is curious about the inner mechanisms of his being: “[…] I approve of the 
enterprise of exploring the self. I am deeply interested in my self.” (46) But this exploration 
does not involve others, it is self-serving and self-centred. He remains stuck within himself, 
even after his crisis that results in him stabbing his own son; this self-referentiality is 
poignantly expressed by him: “My true ideal (I really believe this) is of an endless discourse 
of character, the self reading the self to the self in all infinity.” (38) Eugene Dawn is on a path 
of self-assertion leading to personal crisis. Eugene is in seclusion in the library, his 
workspace. When he ventures into the world outside his actions bring about crisis and 
collapse. The reader accompanies him on his path of destruction, inhabiting his mind through 
an act of sympathetic imagination. 
2.3.2 Jacobus Coetzee: Sick at Heart 
Jacobus Coetzee has hardly any emotional reaction to the ‘Hottentots’, but he has a 
romantic notion of a pure ‘state of nature’. His heart is not cold, unmoved. In one instance he 
describes how as a child he was taught “how to dispose of wounded birds”: 
The thin red necks of such birds always awoke compassion and distaste in me. I revolted 
from repeating the snap, and untidier modes of annihilation like stamping the head flat sent 
rills down my spine. So I would stand there cuddling the expiring creature in my hands, 
venting upon it the tears of my pity for all tiny helpless suffering things, until it passed 
away. (105) 
Contrasting his caring attitude towards animals, he ponders whether in his former servants 
there “was not an immense world of delight closed off to my senses? May I not have killed 
something of inestimable value?” (106) But this world remains inaccessible to him, who has 
 
72 All quotes in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 will be from DL unless indicated otherwise. 
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hidden himself away “in the blindest alley of the labyrinth of [his] self.” (96) The sympathetic 
imagination involved in the creation of this character has not transpired into his paper being: 
“I was undergoing nothing less than a failure of imagination before the void. I was sick at 
heart.” (102) This notwithstanding, he maintains his sense of superiority and impenetrability: 
“I carried my secret buried within me. I could not be touched.” (75) 
2.3.3 Magda: Lonely Heart 
Magda presents a more ambivalent case. Early on, she evokes a positive image of 
herself: “The Angel, that is how she is sometimes known. […] Her heart sings. […] Her stores 
of compassion are boundless.” (HOC 5)73 Like Jacobus Coetzee she feels attached to the 
nature that surrounds her and like Elizabeth Costello she speaks of the “ecstasy of pure 
being”: “The farm, the desert, the whole world as far as the horizon is in an ecstasy of 
communion with itself, exalted by the vain urge of my consciousness to inhabit it.” (49) 
However, Magda does not feel herself as part of this nature, she has a sense of separation 
parallel to her isolation from her cohabitants: “I stare out through a sheet of glass into a 
darkness that is complete […]. I live inside a skin inside a house. There is no act I know of 
that will liberate me into the world.” (10) The dividing gulf (the glass interface) seems 
insurmountable to her: “[…] we [masters and servants] might as well be on separate planets, 
we on ours, they on theirs.” (28) Her isolation finds expression in her erratic monologue, 
which she once labels as “the macabre theatre of myself”: 
This monologue of the self is a maze of words out of which I shall not find a way until 
someone else gives me a lead. I roll my eyeballs, I pucker my lips, I stretch my ears, but the 
face in the mirror is my face and will go on being mine even if I hold it in the fire till it 
drips. (16) 
The “maze of words” and the “face in the mirror” represent the two sites of her self-
encounter: On the one hand she is a linguistic construction (pointing to Coetzee as author), on 
the other hand a bodily presence, a face that sticks to her far more than her identity does. 
Magda longs for a language that comes from the heart and establishes an empathetic 
connection with the others. When she invites Klein-Anna to sleep in the main house, she 
senses that she is approaching that language, as strange as it might feel to her: “The words 
come without premeditation. I feel joy. That must be how other people speak, from their 
hearts.” (87) She has a strong desire to overcome the gap that separates her from the others, 
and wonders: 
 
73 All quotes in this section will be from HOC unless indicated otherwise. 
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Why will no one speak to me in the true language of the heart? The medium, the median –
that is what I wanted to be! Neither master nor slave, neither parent nor child, but the bridge 
between, so that in me the contraries should be reconciled! (133) […] Or is it simply that 
the story took a wrong turn somewhere, that if I had found a more gradual path to a gentler 
form of intimacy we might all have learned to be happy together? (119) 
Unlike Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee, Magda maps out the possibility of a proper 
engagement with the other, and we find the sympathetic imagination to have taken root in this 
isolated woman out ‘in the heart of the country’: “In the heart of nowhere, in this dead place, I 
am making a start; or, if not that, making a gesture.” (110) 
2.3.4 Magistrate: The Budding Heart 
The Magistrate marks the next step of interrelation with the other. While Magda can 
only imagine the possibility of an empathetic interpersonal link, the Magistrate moves from a 
passive position (“My heart goes out to her, but what can I do?” WFB 37)74 to a position of 
sympathy and attempted empathy, as ambivalent as his approach might seem. Towards the 
end he develops a deep affection for the barbarian girl, particularly enhanced through their 
physical intimacy, so that his heart develops an “affectionate glow” (72) for his “little bird-
woman” who he warmly hugs. (45) The Magistrate understands the girl’s difficult position 
and acknowledges: “What bird has the heart to sing in a thicket of thorns?” (44) 
A first turning point for the Magistrate is reached by his encounter with a ram on one 
of his hunts. They “gaze at each other” (42) and the Magistrate refrains from pulling the 
trigger, giving himself up to a moment of deep insight:  
He chews again, a single scythe of the jaws, and stops. In the clear silence of the morning I 
find an obscure sentiment lurking at the edge of my consciousness. With the buck before 
me suspended in immobility, there seems to be time for all things, time even to turn my 
gaze inward and see what it is that has robbed the hunt of its savour: he sense that this has 
become no longer a morning’s hunting but an occasion on which either he proud ram bleeds 
to death on the ice or the old hunter misses his aim; that for the duration of this frozen / 
moment the stars are locked in a configuration in which events are not themselves but stand 
for other things. Behind my paltry cover I stand trying to shrug off this irritating and 
uncanny feeling, till the buck wheels and with a whisk of his tail and a brief splash of 
hooves disappears into the tall reeds. (43) 
What the Magistrate here terms an “obscure sentiment” can be read as the awakening of his 
sympathetic imagination. He senses the communion with all sentient beings, here in the form 
of a ram. The decision not to take its life marks a turning point for the moral awakening of the 
Magistrate. 
When the Magistrate travels with the girl and a small party, he feels the distance 
between them diminishing: “In twelve days on the road we have grown closer than in months 
 
74 All quotes in section 2.3.4 and 2.4 will be from WFB unless indicated otherwise. 
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of living in the same rooms.” (76) But he also realizes, when he notices the “fluency, [her] 
quickness, [her] self-possession” with which the girl converses with the accompanying 
soldiers in the “pidgin of the frontier” that he could have done better: “[…] But, like a fool, 
instead of giving her a good time I oppressed her with gloom. Truly, the world ought to 
belong to singers and dancers!” (68) As the singer expresses his soul in song through his 
voice, so does the dancer express his soul through the movements of his body. As readers we 
get to witness the first budding of the sympathetic imagination in Coetzee’s characters, and 
we have followed this development closely, we are most likely moved and feel the stirrings of 
empathy in our hearts. 
A second turning point in his moral development is marked by the violation of his 
body and his facing death at the hand of his executioners: standing on a horse with a noose 
around his neck. Susan Pearsall comments on the physical suffering as catalyst: 
Only the trials of actual suffering bring home to him the truth: that his own humanity 
consists of an embattled and possibly false set of values that disappear when confronted 
with the heavy, coarse reality of his own embodied status. The actual human body, which 
tends to dissolve in Foucault’s work, returns in Waiting for the Barbarians and haunts the 
text with its undeniable presence. But in becoming a symbol of universal justice, the body 
becomes, not a promise of immanence, but a call for transcendent values.” (Pearsall 1998: 
223-4) 
Coetzee’s staging of the body serves as enactment of the individuation of bodies in pain, 
followed by the transcendent realization that the sensation of pain is shared by all sentient 
beings. Don Randall comments: 
[The Magistrate’s] reduction to merely animal subsistence is equated with an exclusively 
carnal sense of self: like Pavlov’s dogs, he begins to salivate uncontrollably upon the 
presentation of food, and he comes to know “the misery of being simply a body that feels 
itself sick and wants to be well” (87). (Randall 2007: 214) 
Not the rational being is destined to engage with the other, but the embodied being: 
What is adumbrated in Waiting for the Barbarians, then, is a form of ethical action that is not 
grounded in the perceptions, experiences, and understanding of a rational, autonomous 
individual. Very clearly, this novel treats knowledge and reason with the utmost suspicion. 
Knowledge, that which invests the rational subject with a sense of control of both world and 
self, is always local and therefore generates rather than grasps otherness. It can only ever 
attempt to comprehend others by integrating them into the knowing subject’s priorly formed 
conceptual system. (Marais 2009: 31-32; also Marais 2011b: 72) 
Opposing knowledge and rationality with embodiment fits the overall gesture of Coetzee’s 
literary staging of characters. The sympathetic imagination requires embodiment in order to 
function properly without the body there is no encounter. Just as empathy, however, does not 
necessarily entail better moral judgment, embodiment is not a straight-forward strategy to 
enhance the encounter with the other. Pearsall observes: 
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As Coetzee’s renditions of embodiment indicate, “aestheticization” also refers to a strongly 
centralized power’s attempt to enslave and terrorize the citizens by reducing them to 
corporeal, vulnerable bodies while appropriating for itself the transcendent power of the 
artistic demiurge. The type of authoritarian embodiment particularly hinges on sexuality in 
South Africa, with its obvious puritan legacies; sex and sexual identity are aestheticized in 
Coetzee’s work because the state focuses on biological impulses as potential sites of political 
control as well as rebellion. (Pearsall 1998: 241) 
Coetzee could have written a more sexually driven narrative (and the manuscripts seem to 
suggest that this was a direction the text was taking at an early stage),75 and might have fallen 
prey to the “authoritarian embodiment” inscribed into South African society. Instead, he 
cautiously avoids this by reigning in the sexual impulses of the Magistrate for the benefit of a 
more profound encounter with the barbarian girl, and thereby with his own moral self. By the 
time he and the girl do have sexual intercourse, they have moved beyond the outpost of the 
empire and are on their way to “her people,” moving in presumably neutral territory. The off-
hand way the scene occurs downplays its prominent meaning in the larger picture. 
Responding to the barbarian girl’s menstruation and the fellow travellers’ disgust, the 
Magistrate improvises a cleansing ritual; he draws a line in the sand, and together (!) with the 
barbarian girl crosses the border-line to get back to the camp: 
The sequence of events reveals just how far the Magistrate has come. He is now prepared to 
“contaminate” himself with the girl, to cross the frontier, and recognize the illusory nature 
of social boundaries, mere lines drawn in the sand, the product of cultural projections. 
(Newman 1998: 134) 
The Magistrate may not have developed his sympathetic imagination fully, and his empathetic 
capabilities remain limited, but he has taken a big step away from the logic of empire towards 
a logic of the human heart. 
2.4 The Magistrate’s Journey – A Journey of the Soul 
To conclude this section about the “hearts” of the characters in the first three novels by 
Coetzee, I would like to consider Book X of Plato’s Republic as an intertext76 for Section III 
of Waiting for the Barbarians (62-83), proposing that the final journey to return the barbarian 
girl parallels a shift taking place in the Magistrate.77 Plato argues for the immortality of the 
soul, concluding his argument with the myth of the warrior Er, who was granted permission to 
 
75 Hermann Wittenberg was kind enough to share this thought with me after having consulted the early 
manuscripts. 
76 Brenda Dean Schildgen discusses Plato’s Symposium as intertext of Elizabeth Costello (Schildgen 2003: 325). 
Carrol Clarkson was so kind to point out the relevance of Book X of Plato’s Republic for the context of my 
discussion. Recently Coetzee addresses the allegory of the cave from Book VII in a letter to Paul Auster 
(Coetzee/Auster 2013). 
77 Emanuela Tegla presents a similar reading, though in her account the scene in the open square marks a 
culmination point (Tegla 2011). 
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travel into the realm of the dead and return to report what he saw. After 1000 years of 
punishment or reward, the souls gather to choose a new life for the next reincarnation of their 
souls. Based on previous experiences, most souls fail to choose a good life for themselves. 
After all souls have made their choices, supervised by the three Fates Lachesis, Clotho and 
Atropos, they embark on a journey out of the afterlife and into their new lives: 
[T]hey marched on the plain of Forgetfulness, in intolerable scorching heat, for the plain 
was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards the evening they 
encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were 
all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more 
than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to 
rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an 
instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. 
He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he 
returned to the body he could not say; only in the morning, awakening suddenly, he found 
himself lying on the pyre. (Plato’s Republic, 498-499; 621a-b)78 
Compare this account with the stations of the Magistrate’s journey to return the barbarian girl 
to her tribe. Section III is introduced with the beating of wings, a small trope Coetzee likes to 
use to foreshadow events of significance (cf. epiphanic moment in Youth, etc.): “The arrival of 
the first of the migrating waterfowl confirms the earlier signs, the ghost of a new warmth on 
the wind, the glassy translucence of the lake-ice. Spring is on its way, one of these days it will 
be time to plant.” (62) Coetzee immediately plays it down to an announcement of spring. The 
Magistrate composes two documents before he leaves the outpost. The first states his intent to 
restore the goodwill of the barbarians. As for the second document the Magistrate is not sure 
of what it should be: “A testament? A memoir? A confession? A history of thirty years on the 
frontier?” (62) It remains an “empty white paper,” but the finality of his departure and a sense 
of closure remain with the reader. The Magistrate conscripts three men and informs the girl of 
his plan: “Now that I have committed myself to a course I sleep more easily and even detect 
within myself something like happiness.” (63) 
Coetzee has them wander through a desert, across a frozen lake, a lagoon, and finally 
into the plains where they encounter the barbarians. The sun gives off no warmth, the wind 
brings tears to their eyes. (63) They pass “wind-eroded clay terraces,” “banks of red dust-
clouds” and travel under a “yellow hazy sky.” (64) Coetzee has commented on how he made 
an effort to create an unspecific landscape, not pointing to any specific locale. Coetzee uses 
the landscape as a background for the Magistrate’s evolvement. The party drinks water from 
an alkaline lake, which results in diarrhoea (64); in a sense a cleansing of the body, which in 
the case of the Magistrate has grown soft (65) – remember, this is before he undergoes torture 
 
78 See Plato 1953. 
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at the hands of Mandel and Colonel Joll. The wind howls and blows “from nowhere to 
nowhere, veiling the sky in a cloud of red dust. [...] Dust rather than air becomes the medium 
in which we live. We swim through dust like fish through water.” (65) We come from dust and 
we go back to dust. The eschatological allusions are present everywhere. The counting of the 
days alludes to the biblical genesis: “On the third day [...]” (65) “On the fifth day [...]” (66) 
“On the seventh day [...] (67); ironically, they “rest on the eight day.” (70) On the fourth day 
they cross an “ancient lake-bed”, a “terrain [...] more desolate than anything we have yet 
seen.” (65) This river-like terrain changes into duneland: “Standing on a dune-top, shielding 
my eyes, staring ahead, I can see nothing but swirling sand.” (67) One of the pack-horses 
reaches its limits, and the Magistrate takes on him the task of mercy: “I can swear that the 
beast knows what is to happen. At the sight of the knife its eyes roll. With the blood spurting 
from its neck it scrambles free of the sand and totters a pace or two downwind before it falls.” 
(67) The Magistrate takes responsibility for the horse – rightfully, since he has forced it on 
this trip – and acknowledges its terror; comparable to his earlier encounter with the 
waterbuck, only with a different outcome in accordance with circumstances. In both cases he 
looks the animal in the eye and feels its being. The act also contains a ritual component; if we 
take the idea of the realm of death seriously, we might be reminded of the sacrifice of a ram 
that Odysseus makes to summon the dead souls, an eerie passage in Homer’s Ulysses. The 
sacrifice establishes contact with the dead souls, but also appeases them. The environment the 
party encounters – ” the bed of an ancient terminal lagoon” – points in a similar direction: 
“Dead reeds, ghostly white and brittle to the touch, line what were its banks. The trees are 
poplars, also long dead. They have died since the underground water receded too far to be 
reached by their roots years and years ago.” (67) Coetzee inserts another incident pointing to 
the Magistrate’s development. One night the barbarian girl offers herself to him quite plainly, 
and he accepts, and “in a minute five months of senseless hesitancy are wiped out and I am 
floating back into easy sensual oblivion.” (69) The Magistrate loses himself, something Mike 
Marais sees as a prerequisite to encounter the other in a meaningful way. However, the 
Magistrate does not take to it easily: “When I wake it is with a mind washed so blank that 
terror rises in me. Only with a deliberate effort can I reinsert myself into time and space: into 
a bed, a tent, a night, a world, a body pointing west and east.” (69) Again with a playful 
biblical undertone alluding to God’s satisfaction with his creation, Coetzee lets the Magistrate 
acknowledge his ‘achievement’: “It is done, I am content.” (69) Having progressed 
considerably in terms of a moral awakening, the Magistrate cannot grasp his change of heart 
rationally: “I am with her not for whatever raptures she may promise or yield but for other 
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reasons, which remain obscure to me as ever.” (70) After attempting to repeat the love-making 
(now love, not sex), he has to admit that his “intuitions are clearly fallible.” But his heart 
“continues its affectionate glow towards this girl.” (71-72) 
During this episode the Magistrate senses the movement of his soul, senses that 
something beyond his control is happening to him, something he had not apprehended: 
My lips move, silently composing and recomposing the words. ‘Or perhaps it is the case 
that only that which has not been articulated has to be lived through.’ I stare at this last 
proposition without detecting any answering movement in myself toward assent or dissent. 
The words grow more and more opaque before me; soon they have lost all meaning. I sigh 
at the end of a long day, in the middle of a long night. Then I turn to the girl, embrace her, 
draw her tight against me. She purrs in her sleep, where soon I have joined her. (70; 
emphasis added) 
Surely, many readings of this passage are possible. In the context of my reading, however, I 
take the Magistrate’s thought to point towards the awakening of his new soul, a soul not yet 
articulated. The Magistrate is searching for a new life for his soul to live. After having crossed 
the “plain of Forgetfulness,”79 leaving behind his colonial self, having camped at the “the 
river of Unmindfulness,” allowing a physical communion with the barbarian girl, the party is 
now faced with a thunderstorm: “Rolling down upon us over the snowy plain is a gigantic 
black wave. It is still miles away but visibly devouring the earth in its approach. Its crest is 
lost in the murky clouds. ‘A storm!’” (72) 
The sequence presented in Plato’s account of the afterlife has been moved by Coetzee 
into the embellished realm of fiction, the surroundings made subject to a more detailed 
description and the stations slightly altered and interrupted by narrative events absent in 
Plato’s account. These events refer to a rather Christian context of sacrifice (the horse), 
communion (making love), and ultimately redemption from past disgrace. As the storm hits 
the camp it creates turmoil among the men, but the girl remains calm and tends the horses: 
“The girl stands with her arms stretched like wings over the necks of two horses. She seems to 
be talking to them: though their eyeballs glare, they are still.” (73) Like an angel the barbarian 
girl demonstrates the communality of humans and animals. Finally, the storm abides: 
 
79 One could object that the order of events does not comply with the sequence of Plato’s account. The salt desert 
the party crosses comes closer to resembling a „plain of Forgetfulness“ than the marshlands in the first section of 
the journey. Since Coetzee himself has never commented on his use of Plato in his fiction, my reading does not 
propose that Coetzee intended to create a simulacrum of Plato’s depiction of the afterlife; it is a context I impose 
on the text for the sake of my argument, something I believe all criticism is entitled to in order to create a 
creative reading that adds to the text instead of expounding a supposed meaning. Coetzee has commented on 
creating the landscape traversed by the Magistrate and his small party: „I wanted to create characters and a 
setting that belong to no recognizable contemporary situations. But people who know South Africa will probably 
pick up allusions.“ (Newsweek, 31 August 1982, from a conversation with Peter Younghusband; quoted in 
Kannemeyer 2012: 335-336) The most prominent allusion would be the torturing and subsequent death of Steve 
Biko, which found its way into Coetzee’s depiction of torture in Waiting for the Barbarians. 
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Then at midday the wind drops as suddenly as if a gate has been closed somewhere. Our 
ears ring with the unfamiliar quiet. We ought to move our numbed limbs, clean ourselves 
off, load the animals, anything to make the blood run in our veins, but all we want is to lie a 
little longer in our nest. A sinister lethargy! (73) 
The “sinister lethargy” resembles the hesitation of accepting the renewed state, the state of a 
re-born soul (this applies primarily to the Magistrate, since we have no insight into the souls 
of the other men and the barbarian girl). The blood running through the veins marks the 
completion of the reincarnation. As if to indicate to us the significance of this sequence, 
Coetzee sets it apart from the rest of the account with an asterisk, before continuing the 
narrative with the tenth day and the encounter with the barbarians. 
Coetzee takes us into the ‘far territory’ in Waiting for the Barbarians. In conclusion, I 
would like to pick up on the cinematic scope of this narrative. One scene in particular is 
emblematic for the approaching of others, a main theme in all of Coetzee’s fiction. After a 
strenuous journey through marshlands, a salt desert and finally a snow storm the party sees 
others on the horizon: 
The specks he points to in the distance are men, men on horseback: who but barbarians! I 
turn to the girl, whose shambling mount I lead. ‘We are nearly there,’ I say. ‘There are 
people ahead, we will soon know who they are.’ The oppression of the past days lifts from 
my shoulders. Moving to the front, quickening my pace, I turn our march towards the three 
tiny figures in the distance. 
We push on towards them for half an hour before we realize that we are not getting closer. 
As we move they move. ‘They are ignoring us,’ I think, and consider lighting a fire. But 
when I call a halt the three specks seem to halt too; when we resume our march they begin 
to move. ‘Are they reflections of us, is this a trick of the light?’ I wonder. We cannot close 
the gap. How long have they been dogging us? Or do they think we are dogging them? 
‘Stop, there is no point in chasing them,’ I say to the men. ‘Let us see if they will meet one 
of us alone.’ So I mount the girl’s horse and ride out alone towards the strangers. For a short 
while they seem to remain still, watching and waiting. Then they begin to recede, 
shimmering on the edge of the dust-haze. Though I urge it on, my horse is too weak to raise 
more than a shambling trot. I give up the chase, dismount, and wait for my companions to 
reach me.  
[…] 
With a pole and a white linen shirt I make a banner and ride out towards the strangers.  
[…] 
A swirl of dust obscures them, then they reappear: twelve mounted men on the skyline. I 
plod on, he white banner flapping over my shoulder. Though I keep my eye on the crest, I 
fail to catch the moment at which they vanish. (74-75) 
The gap cannot be closed, not even when bearing a white banner of peace. Numerous critics 
have pointed out the insurmountable gulf between the I and the other in Coetzee’s fiction. The 
prospects, however, are not quite as bleak as the landscape the Magistrate and his troop have 
passed through. And, after all, they do get to meet the troupe of barbarians. The white banner 
raised by the Magistrate can be compared to the fiction that Coetzee puts out in his efforts to 
encounter otherness in all its forms. More importantly, the Magistrate has undergone a 
transformation, has experienced a rebirth of his soul. And as readers we have participated in 
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this process, have witnessed his turmoil. And in the last section of the novel we see the 
Magistrate take a stand against Colonel Joll, who in turn makes him share the suffering of 
torture, teaching him yet another lesson of humility and compassion, himself learning nothing 
and being forced to retreat by the futility of his enterprise; the defeated Colonel rides off into 
the sunset in a state of disgrace. The Magistrate has not become a saint, at least not quite.80 
He is not a martyr, though he comes close to dying for his belief in compassion. But he is 
undeniably a new person, a transformed soul, at the close of the novel. 
2.5 Life & Times of Michael K 
Coetzee’s fourth novel, Life & Times of Michael K (1983), can be seen as a hinge 
between the first three und the following three novels. The grouping is admittedly somewhat 
arbitrary, but takes into account the shifts in formal aspects of Coetzee’s writing and a shift in 
emphasis. In the first three novels the individual is portrayed against the backdrop of colonial 
and imperial empires. All three are narrated in first person present tense. Dusklands and Heart 
of the Country are openly anti-realistic and metafictional, foregrounding the textuality of both 
narrative and character. Waiting for the Barbarians offers a more realistic setting and plot, 
and presents the first character undergoing vital changes within, as opposed to the undulating 
self of Magda – that ultimately remains in the same place and state – and the static selves of 
Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee. In Life & Times of Michael K Coetzee again presents a 
character with a rather static self, but a stasis of inner tranquillity in contrast to the inner 
turmoil of the earlier characters. 
On a formal level, Coetzee uses “the past tense as primary narrative” for the first time 
(Heider 1993: 83). Sarah Dove Heider explores the temporality of Life & Times of Michael K 
in her essay “The Timeless Ecstasy of Michael K” (1993): 
„Now was the time.“ This is the temporality of Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K, an 
indeterminant, endless nowness, a resistance to any other defining restrictions beyond the 
narrative attachment „was.“ For „Now is the time“ would release Michael K completely 
into an uncharted chaos, would, indeed, remove his subjectivity from the reader’s scope. 
(Heider 1993: 83; original emphasis) 
The reader can assume the middle voice employed by Magda also inhabiting Michael K’s 
narrative. The stasis in time, an ever-present now, is opposed by his movements in space, 
from Cape Town to Prince Albert and the Karoo and back again, which unsettle the 
 
80 Anton Leist’s assessment in his essay “Against Society, Against History, Against Reason: Coetzee’s Archaic 
Postmodernism” is similar: “[T]he Magistrate undergoes a development for the better and, refined through both 
brutal events and especially the ordeal of being tortured himself, ends up a more understanding person than he 
was at the beginning.” (Leist 2010: 205) 
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tranquillity and lack of impulsiveness so present in Michael K, instead handing him over to an 
“uncharted chaos.” The internal chaos of Magda is here replaced by an external chaos of 
oppression and resistance. 
Another formal shift lies in the use of the third person, which relieves the reader from 
the immediacy of the account, as does the past tense narration. This shift from I to He, from 
first person narrative to third person narrative, changes the game. In the first three novels the 
reader was a witness to four singular consciousnesses and their interplay with their 
environment, featuring a restricted number of human and animal contacts, with an author 
looming over the narratives, removed through an ingenious narrative focalization. Moving to 
a third person narrative might also have been motivated by the shift to a coloured protagonist, 
although any mentioning of skin tones is pointedly avoided – representing Michael K as other 
in the first person might seem presumptuous. In a more positive light, representing him in the 
third person can be seen as an exercise of negative capability. Steven Kellmann sees Coetzee’s 
portrayal of Michael K – and the later characters Friday (Foe) and Vercueil (Age of Iron) –as 
“assertions of negative capability, of Coetzee’s skill at imagining the lives of dark-skinned 
men.” (see also above p. 20) He goes on to claim this attempt as “consistent with Coetzee’s 
project of engaging alterity by transcending his own race, gender, and nationality.” (Kellmann 
2002: 326) Some critics disagree, however, and speak of the failure of Coetzee’s imagination 
in regard to crossing the colour line; this remains an issue of contention among readers and 
critics.81 
In this third person narration, Michael K is the focalizer of the narrative – interrupted 
only in Section 3 by the discourse of the medical officer;82 this focalization counters the 
distancing by an intimate and detailed account of Michael K’s inner life, through which 
Coetzee maps his mental attitudes: “The language of his inspection of the past is not that of 
memory, but of actual mental movement in time.” (Heider 1993: 88) This combination of 
distance and proximity constitutes a new avenue for the sympathetic imagination of both the 
author and the reader. Instead of co-inhabiting the first person perspective, the reader is 
allowed the role of an observer only; this prevents him from emotional contagion that may 
have agitated readers of the first two novels especially. And the path of Michael K is 
accompanied by a peaceful lightness, not by violence and torture. 
 
81 After a lecture of mine on “The Sympathetic Imagination in the Early Novels” at Stellenbosch University in 
2011, Sarah Nuttall poignantly put forward her doubts regarding Coetzee’s negative capabilities, instead pointing 
out the self-referentiality of his fictions. In my view, this doesn’t devaluate Coetzee’s efforts in encountering 
others in his fictions or portraying the encounters of his protagonists.  
82 “He [medical officer, LTMK] progresses from the use of the referential pronoun, he, in relation to K, to the 
pronouns of communication, I and you.” (Dovey 1998: 24) 
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A third aspect, indicating a shift in subject matter, is the setting of Life & Times of 
Michael K. After exploring colonial and imperial violence in the first three novels, Coetzee 
turns to a more contemporary setting. The narrative is set in Cape Town in a time of unrest 
and emergency laws, characterized by some critics as an apocalyptic future, but not too far 
removed from the South Africa of the 1980s and the growing conflict between apartheid rule 
and ANC resistance that in the 1970s entered a phase of increased violence, spurred by events 
such as the earlier Sharpeville massacre (1960), the Rivonia Trials (1963-64), the Soweto 
Uprising (1973), and the death of Steve Biko (1977).83 The vagueness of the setting, however, 
makes Life & Times of Michael K. another case of “speculative history.” The epigraph by 
Heraclitus preceding the novel points to the disastrous dichotomy created by the 
circumstances of war, the “father of all”: “Some he makes slaves, and others free.” (LTMK) 
Roadblocks, omnipresence of the military, the work camp Jackalsdrif, and railroad sabotage 
are all markers pointing to then current events in South Africa. With Life & Times of Michael 
K Coetzee moves closer to his own times and circumstances. That Coetzee draws on his 
experience of South Africa is beyond doubt. Michael K’s habitation in the Little Karoo can be 
related to Coetzee’s special bond to this landscape, as Manfred Loimeier has pointed out in 
his biography of Coetzee (Loimeier 2008: 9).84 David Atwell also sees Life & Times of 
Michael K as reflecting Coetzee’s personal situation as a writer in South Africa: 
Despite all the self-reflexivity, all the representational mirrors, to pretend that we can 
measure Coetzee’s achievements without considering the effects of biography and place is 
to ignore the elephant in the room. Each gesture of fictive displacement, each act of 
imaginative relocation, speaks of a struggle both to speak at all and to keep the country at 
arm’s length. Michael K’s efforts to remain free and unobserved, in a landscape that has 
been completely mapped, fenced, and policed, is representative of a general condition 
affecting Coetzee’s authorship. (Atwell 2008: 232-233) 
Employing his negative capabilities gives Coetzee the opportunity to explore the local 
situation more fully, now including a new perspective from the other side of the oppressive 
rule of apartheid, instead of the centre of colonial rule (Jacobus Coetzee) or its sidelines 
(Magda).85 
 
83 “If it [LTMK] is set ahead in time at all, then this is done as a way of looking, as if it had come to the surface, 
at what lies under the surface of the present. The harried homelessness of Michael K and his mother is the 
experience, in 1984, of hundreds of thousands of black people in South African squatter towns and ‘resettlement’ 
camps. A civil war is going on in 1984 on South Africa’s borders, between black and white […].” (Gordimer 
1998: 141) 
84 Loimeier’s biography was published in 2008 (available only in German). Kannemeyer’s monumental 
biography from 2012 was greeted as the first (authorized) biography of J.M. Coetzee. Both volumes are valuable 
sources in tracing the interconnections of fiction and biography in the work of J.M. Coetzee. 
85 Chris Ackerley adds an original take on the influence of Samuel Beckett’s Watt on the formation of this novel: 
Life & Times of Michael K, perhaps more directly than any of Coetzee’s other novels, reflects and 
refracts the complex tonalities of Watt, even to the extent of imitating its narrative form by having 
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In his contribution to the volume J.M. Coetzee and Ethics (Leist/Singer 2010), titled 
“Against Society, Against History, Against Reason: Coetzee’s Archaic Modernism,” Anton 
Leist argues that “Michael is not to be understood; he personifies the point from which one 
can look at the problem of understanding and living in society.” (Leist 2010: 203) The central 
theme of Life & Times of Michael K (and of Elizabeth Costello) is seen by Leist as “the 
problem of whether there is a ‘view from outside’ society and whether rationality is a morally 
foundational characteristic of humans.” (Leist 2010: 199) Coetzee’s de-centring of narrative 
perspective to the social periphery, inhabited by K., achieves the effect of giving us access to 
a socially impartial point of view. Leist picks up the cue from Sarah Dove Heider about the 
“timeless ecstasy” of Michael K, and situates him out of place and out of time: 
Michael is meant to be a figure trying to avoid all structures of society, roles, economics, 
paid work, history, and communication, someone who has radicalized the alternative 
suggested to him as a social outsider into a pure version of otherness, which leaves him in 
nature, in a dazed, dreamlike, and wordless state that is, when fully conscious, the 
consciousness of the immediate presence. (Leist 2010: 203-204) 
Leist’s argument also covers the Magistrate of Waiting for the Barbarians and Elizabeth 
Costello. He calls them archaic figures stranded in a modern world: 
Even if the life-form implied in these figures is a fairly clear one of animal-like 
primitiveness and innocence, how to transpose this life-form into our present situation 
remains open. [...] There are, in essence, two worlds coming into view: our everyday world 
of separation and time, words and power, and instrumental ends and means, and an 
alternative world, however vague, of amalgamation and presence, bodies and trance, self-
forgetfulness and nondirected joy. (Leist 2010: 217-218) 
Leist points out that this “alternative world” is the stage for Coetzee’s enactment of his 
sympathetic imagination and also the stage for the reader’s empathetic engagement. The 
“amalgamation and presence” of the characters and their bodies and the “self-forgetfulness” 
are ideal catalysts for inciting the reader’s sympathetic imagination. 
Leist also reads Coetzee’s fictions as “forceful proof” of a “pragmatic 
postmodernism,” that, on the one hand, keeps a critical distance toward specific forms of 
rationality and other ‘imperial’ achievements, but, on the other hand, guards itself against both 
arbitrary playfulness and a beautiful archaism (Leist 2010: 218-219). Perhaps Leist is pointing 
in the right direction, although I suspect that he underestimates the radical forcefulness with 
one part of the narrative told by another voice: in Watt, that of Sam; and in Life & Times of 
Michael K, that of the medical officer of the work camp in which Michael is detained. Watt is 
planted unobtrusively into the South African world with such sensitivity and skill that it becomes 
almost “native” within that landscape, and testifies to what Coetzee, with respect to the 
appropriation, noted above, of Beckett by Athol Fugard, called in his post-Nobel interview the 
‘unceasing cross-fertilization across fences and boundaries.’ (Ackerley 2011: 34) 
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which these “archaic characters” open new perspectives. The utopian dimension of Life & 
Times of Michael K might be more an indication of Coetzee’s resignation in the face of history 
than due to an ironical distance from Michael K. 
In his 2007 study Aesthetic Nervousness – Disability and the Crisis of Representation, 
Ato Quayson discusses Waiting for the Barbarians, Foe and Life & Times of Michael K in the 
sixth chapter, “J.M. Coetzee – Speech, Silence, Autism and Dialogism,” strongly drawing on 
Benita Parry’s seminal 1994 essay “Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J.M. Coetzee.” 
Quayson writes: 
Autism seems to me particularly relevant to a discussion of characters such as Michael K, 
the Barbarian Girl, and Friday not because they illustrate broad aspects of an autistic 
spectrum, but because of the scrupulous silence they enjoin upon themselves, which carries 
a hint of their extreme discomfort with extant forms of social communication. (Quayson 
2007: 150) 
Quayson relates the literary representation of silence/autism to Bakthin’s dialogism: 
Silence/autism and dialogism have to be seen as related and indeed dialectical pairs rather 
than as separate terms, for in the representation of inarticulacy an implied interlocutor is 
invoked whose role is to provide an ethos of continual dialogism and thus to maintain the 
process by which the silent character’s nonsocial musings are inflected in a manifestly 
socially significant way. (Quayson 2007: 150) 
The implied interlocutor of any literature is primarily the reader, and Quayson highlights this 
aspect: 
The final dimension of aesthetic nervousness is that between the reader and the text. The 
reader’s status within a given text is a function of the several interacting elements such as 
the identifications with the vicissitudes of the life of a particular character, or the alignment 
between the reader and the shifting position of the narrator, or the necessary reformulations 
of the reader’s perspective enjoined by the modulations of various plot elements and so on. 
(Quayson 2007: 15) 
Michael K’s limited mental capabilities endow him with a special status. The narrative 
repeatedly highlights his animal nature and his strong attachment to his natural surroundings. 
He thereby is likened to a subhuman status, bringing him closer to the animal state than to 
other humans.86 The qualification of being subhuman only applies within a system of 
classification that Michael K has moved beyond. Quayson quotes Matthew Belmonte as 
saying that persons with autism may be described as „human, but more so.“ (Quayson 2007: 
156) Concurringly we could say that Michael K has reached a similar transcendent humanity, 
 
86 “On the one hand, he performs all the predatory instincts of a carnivore without any sentimentality. 
Yet on the other, the silence and frailty of his person allows others to interpret him as bearing a 
resemblance to the lives of animals and therefore of carrying an excess of religious connotations. Like 
animals, insects, and birds, he is not of the human world. Thus the various points at which he is 
described as being asleep are supposed to mark his otherness from the world and proximity to that of 
animals. And yet this association with animals also means he is subhuman; the fog of stupidity that he 
refers to at least twice over the course of the novel references his animalhood yet registers his recoil 
from that ontological state.” (Quayson 2007: 171) 
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taking the reader by the hand to accompany him on his way. It is up to the reader how far he is 
willing to go: 
[…] he wondered whether by now, with his filthy clothes and his air of gaunt exhaustion, 
he would not be passed over as a mere footloose vagrant from the depths of the country, too 
benighted to know that one needed papers to be on the road, too sunk in apathy to be of 
harm. (39) 
Michael K is suspended between disappearing from the world and reaching out to others. His 
physical transformation towards an animal state and towards a communion with nature is 
contrasted with his numerous encounters with others, each of which illustrates his social 
status in some way or other, ranging from instant rejection to instant acceptance. 
The outspokenness of the narrative creates and reinforces the impression of Michael K 
as mute or speechless, but a second reading reveals him to be quite willing to communicate, 
but wary of other people’s intentions; and, regarding his environment, quite rightfully so. His 
muteness can be related to the silence wilfully adopted by ANC members in the face of 
apartheid rule; comparable also to the resistance in Nazi Germany, or for all that counts to 
almost any resistance movement. It follows the logic of oppression: the oppressive regime 
mutes all resistance, while the resistance tries to find its voice and a place to speak, always 
wary of the regime’s brutality in subduing dissent. Members of resistance can never know 
whether their interlocutor is sympathetic to their cause or might betray them to the oppressive 
regime. Though Michael K is a figure of resistance, his resistance does not take place in the 
public political arena of sabotage and gunfights, but on a more private and individual level by 
refusing to be incorporated into the system of classification imposed on him like on all other 
South Africans. 
2.5.1 Michael K Embodied 
While Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee experience their bodies as inconvenient and 
cumbersome additions to their mental apparatus, the body is staged as the shared substrate of 
all human beings in Waiting for the Barbarians, as shown in the encounter between the 
Magistrate and the barbarian girl and in the scenes of torture. The body of Michael K is 
foregrounded in a different manner. The very opening of the narrative is indicative for the rest 
of Michael K’s life: “The first thing the midwife noticed […] was that he had a hare lip. The 
lip curled like a snail’s foot, the left nostril gaped.” (LTMK 3)87 In brevis Coetzee relates how 
Michael grows up: “Year after year Michael K sat on a blanket watching his mother polish 
 
87 Coetzee 1998 [1983]. All quotes in section 2.5 will be from LTMK unless indicated otherwise. 
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other people’s floors, learning to be quiet.” (3-4) Most of his youth is spent in the children’s 
home Huis Norenius, of which memories resurface now and then in K’s narrative. 
After a very short exposition (merely one and a half pages) Coetzee picks up the main 
storyline. K is employed by the City of Cape Town as a gardener “in the thirty-first year of his 
[K’s] life.” (6) He lives with his mother, who suffers from dropsy (the observable swelling 
from fluid accumulation in body tissues): “The needs of her body became a source of 
torment.” (5) The physical suffering of his mother gives even more emphasis to the body. 
Michael K senses his duty towards his mother, and assumes that “he had been brought into the 
world to look after his mother.” (7) The mother proposes a return to the countryside where she 
spent her childhood (at “a farm in the district of Prince Albert,” in the Little Karoo; MK 7), 
and K eagerly picks up her idea. He attempts to buy train tickets, but the process proves 
highly complicated and time-consuming, so that K soon gives up. After spending some more 
evenings “sitting in the dark listening to his mother breathe,” (10) he constructs a wheelchair 
of sorts – displaying mechanical understanding and even prowess – and wheels his mother out 
of town, only to be sent back by the first roadblock sentries they encounter. In a second 
attempt he succeeds to leave the city behind, trying hard to avoid roadblocks and patrols. 
This arduous procedure places a strong emphasis on the physical bodies of Michael K 
and his mother. The sobriety of the situation outweighs its comical potential, since the reader 
is not invited to be amused but to engage with Michael K’s seriousness in complying with his 
mother’s wish to return to a farm where she grew up. They get no further than Stellenbosch 
before his mother succumbs to the hard journey and dies in the hospital. Michael K is 
unexpectedly confronted with her somewhat surprising demise: 
“Do you want to make a phone call?” said the doctor.  
This was evidently a code for something, he did not know what. He shook his head. 
Someone brought him a cup of tea, which he drank. People hovering over him made him 
nervous. He clasped his hands and stared hard at his feet. Was he expected to say 
something? He separated his hands and clasped them, over and over. (30-31) 
Clueless as to what to do next, he remains at the hospital. Without his mother he has lost the 
sense of purpose that had driven him so far. When he is asked about his mother, he begins to 
explain the purpose of their trip: “Then he began to fear he was giving away too much, and 
would answer no more questions.” (31) He roams around, until a nurse approaches him. She 
addresses him by his first name Michael, and informs him it is time to leave, giving him his 
mother’s ashes and some toiletries: “She looked him candidly in the eye and gave him a 
smile.” (32) The matter-of-fact tone is a code Michael K can understand, but not really relate 
to. The empathy his loss calls for is to be provided by someone not present, someone to be 
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called on the telephone; but Michael has nobody to call. Coetzee does not invite us to feel 
much empathy for him, for he seems to take the news fairly well, even in a slightly apathetic 
fashion. This lack of feeling complies with his generally lacking sense of community – he 
does not belong to any group of people. The only one he had was his mother. On receiving her 
ashes Michael K imagines the cremation of his mother along with the “old women from the 
ward”: 
So there is a place for burning, K thought. He imagined the old women from the ward fed 
one after another, eyes pinched against the heat, lips pinched, hands at their sides, into the 
fiery furnace. First the hair, in a halo of flame, then after a while everything else, to the last 
things, burning and crumbling. And it was happening all the time. “How do I know?” he 
said. “How do you know what?” the nurse said. Impatiently he indicated the box. “How do 
I know?” he challenged. She refused to answer, or did not understand. (32) 
Again we see Michael’s lack of understanding clash with the impersonal routine of the 
hospital personnel. Most of the staff are helpful, but in an empty way.88 The ashes he has 
received replace her body in a way Michael finds hard to understand. So far the narrative 
presented two bodies, reflected by the focalizing consciousness of Michael K. After the 
second body has been reduced to ashes, only Michael K remains as embodied character. The 
focus of the narrative, and with it the focus of Michael K, shifts exclusively to his physical 
embodiment. From this point onwards, hardly any specific descriptions of other human bodies 
are offered; instead, plants and animals become the only external objects receiving close 
scrutiny (minor exceptions granted). With this shift of focus, Michael K’s experience of 
himself as embodied character moves to the centre of the narrative. His bodily needs become 
the central aspect of his embodiment, sleep and hunger are central themes in his search for 
inner and outer tranquillity and serenity. 
2.5.2 Embodied Needs 
Sleep 
Michael K resumes his journey to the farm half-heartedly. Being on his own, he 
discovers himself in new ways. One aspect of his new self is his capacity for sleep: 
With nothing to do, he slept more and more. He discovered that he could sleep anywhere, at 
any time, in any position: on the sidewalk at noon, with people stepping over his body; 
standing against a wall, with the suitcase between his legs. Sleep settled inside his head like 
a benign fog; for he had no will to resist it. He did not dream of anyone or anything. (34) 
 
88 The goodwill displayed here will be explored on a greater scale in Coetzee to date latest novel The Childhoood 
of Jesus (2013). 
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Sleep becomes ubiquitous, a “benign fog.” In my discussion of Waiting for the Barbarians I 
had suggested that sleep might open avenues to the subconscious levels of the Magistrate, 
reflecting his inner journey. This does not seem to be the case with Michael K. Throughout 
the narrative there are hardly any signs of deeper layers of consciousness, no markers of 
internal struggles. The self-reflection of the protagonist shared with the reader is anchored 
mainly in the experience of his physical being. And his physical body proves to be strong and 
persevering, even under dire conditions: “He carried the suitcase on a stick over his shoulder. 
He had not eaten for two days; however, there seemed no limit to his endurance.” (35) On his 
way through the countryside – after choosing to avoid the roads – he feeds like an animal 
from a trough he comes across, from which he scoops “crushed mealies and bonemeal,” 
coming to the premature conclusion: “At last I am living off the land.” (46). He climbs a hill 
and rests, thinking: 
I could live here forever, he thought, or till I die. Nothing would happen, every day would 
be the same as the day before, there would be nothing to say. The anxiety that belonged to 
the time on the road began to leave him. Sometimes, as he walked, he did not know 
whether he was awake or asleep. […] he wondered whether there were not forgotten 
corners and angles and corridors between the fences, land that belonged to no one yet. 
Perhaps if one flew high enough, he thought, one would be able to see. (46-47) 
Again the reader is reminded of Michael K’s sense of time as a permanently present moment, 
an eternal now with a fleeting consciousness oscillating between wakefulness and sleep. This 
state also characterizes the way in which he remembers past incidents, such as getting a lift by 
a farmer, of whom he remembers only minute fragments: “His memories all seemed to be of 
parts, not of wholes.” (49)89 He finally arrives at Prince Albert: “K sat down on the stoep with 
his back to the mesh and closed his eyes against the sun. Now I am here, he thought. Finally.” 
(50) Added to the immediacy of his experience of time as an ever-present now, his sense of 
space becomes an ever-present here. 
Having reached the abandoned farmhouse of the Visagies (who might or might not be 
the people his mother referred to), he thinks: “Now I am here, he thought. Or at least I am 
somewhere. He went to sleep.” (52) In his first night on the farm, his sleep brings him dreams 
of the children’s home where he grew up, Huis Norenius. The dream transports him back in 
time and space, disrupting his present time and space. This dream and other recollections of 
his traumatizing childhood are the only psychological introspections granted to the reader. At 
 
89 This is one of several occasions where the contrast between narrated events and Michael K’s experience of 
them becomes apparent. The encounter is narrated together with some dialogue, but without any descriptive 
details. After this, one sentence moves the narrative on to his hiding place at night, immediately followed by his 
recollection of the encounter: “Remembering the farmer afterwards, he could recall only the gabardine hat and 
the stubby fingers that beckoned him. On each joint of each finger was a little feather of bronze hair.” (49) 
95 
 
                                                
other times, sleep remains simply a drifting away of consciousness: “His eyelids grew heavy. 
I am falling, he thought.” (56)90 
After the return of the young Visagie, who is on the run, and the danger of being 
imposed on by the returned owner of the farm, Michael K elopes to the nearby mountains and 
finds a cave. There he sits or lies in stupor at the mouth of the cave, too tired to move or 
perhaps too lackadaisical. He sleeps through whole afternoons, wondering if he is living in 
what was known as bliss. (68) The episode in the cave raises Michael K’s sleepfulness to the 
level of meditation: “Now, in front of his cave, he sometimes locked his fingers behind his 
head, closed his eyes, and emptied his mind, wanting nothing, looking forward to nothing.” 
(69) 
Later Michael K is taken to a detainment camp, where something like a friendship 
develops with a man named Robert, who comments: “‘I have never seen anyone as asleep as 
you,’ Robert said. ‘Yes,’ replied K, struck that Robert too had seen it.” (84) It is one of the rare 
moments when we get a sense of empathy building up between two characters. It remains for 
us, as readers, to inhabit the perspective of Michael K and develop our empathy for him 
through the use of our sympathetic imagination while sharing his experiences, narrated to us 
in the third person, which allows the necessary distance to avoid identification but yet feel 
close to him. Another scene in the camp illustrates how children treating his body 
indifferently signal a particular form of acceptance: 
He lay so still that the smaller children, having first kept their distance, next tried to rouse 
him, and, when he would not be roused, incorporated his body into their game. They 
clambered over him and fell upon him as if he were part of the earth. Still hiding his face, 
he rolled over and found that he could doze even with little bodies riding on his back. He 
found unexpected pleasure in these games. It felt to him that he was drawing health from 
the children’s touch […] (84) 
Imagine the reader as one of these children, at first keeping a distance, then urged to rouse 
him, and finally incorporating his body into the game of reading. Michael K’s light sleep 
allows him to accept this proximity, a mode of acceptance on the physical level that strongly 
contrasts with the repeated mentioning of the attention his harelip receives. The pleasure 
experienced by him and the feeling of drawing health from it are both signs of a functional 
mode of acceptance, both on the side of the children and the reader, as well as on the side of 
Michael K himself. 
 
90 The sense of falling in connection with sleep will return more prominently in The Master of Petersburg, where 
it is linked to Dostoevsky’s epileptic fits. 
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Killing Animals and Planting Pumpkins 
As Michael K leaves the city of Cape Town behind and enters the countryside, the 
veld, he is faced with having to provide himself with food. At first he attempts an Hobbesian 
approach of killing animals for sustenance: “In the fading light he was lucky enough to bring 
down a turtle-dove with a stone as it came to roost in a thorntree. He twisted its neck, cleaned 
it, roasted it on a skewer of wire, and ate it with the last can of beans.” (46)91 Michael K 
crosses the threshold between urban living and nature, entering the animal kingdom and 
leaving his urban self behind. The matter-of-factness of the killing shows two things: 1) His 
aptitude 2) His non-empathetic relation to animals. Ato Quayson comments on Michael K’s 
adaptation to animal nature, relating it to his silence and to his sleep: 
On the one hand, he performs all the predatory instincts of a carnivore without any 
sentimentality. Yet on the other, the silence and frailty of his person allows others to 
interpret him as bearing a resemblance to the lives of animals and therefore of carrying an 
excess of religious connotations. Like animals, insects, and birds, he is not of the human 
world. Thus the various points at which he is described as being asleep are supposed to 
mark his otherness from the world and proximity to that of animals. And yet this 
association with animals also means he is subhuman; the fog of stupidity that he refers to at 
least twice over the course of the novel references his animalhood yet registers his recoil 
from that ontological state. (Quayson 2007: 171) 
The turtle dove remains a minor incident in the narrative. The bird receives almost no 
attention and is devoured within the second sentence. At the farm Michael K makes an 
experience which makes a strong impression on him, and possibly also on the reader. He 
chases the goats roaming the farm, finally managing to catch one in the water at the dam. 
Unlike the dove, which was brought down by a lucky throw with a stone and had its neck 
twisted in the next moment, the goat puts up a hard struggle, described in all the details of an 
embodied one-on-one fight: 
K hurled the whole weight of his body upon it. I must be hard, the thought came to him, I 
must press through to the end, I must not relent. He could feel the goat’s hindquarters 
heaving beneath him; it bleated again and again in terror; its body jerked in spasms. K 
straddled it, clenched his hands around its neck, and bore down upon with all his strength, 
pressing the head under the surface of the water and into the thick ooze below. The 
hindquarters thrashed, but his knees were gripping the body like a vice. There was a 
moment when the kicking began to weaken and he almost let up. But the impulse passed. 
Long after the last snort and tremor he continued to press the goat’s head under the mud. 
Only when the cold of the water had begun to numb his limbs did he rise and drag himself 
out. (53-54) 
Michael K’s act of killing is shown as a hard struggle, in its lack of premeditation seemingly 
savage, but certainly recognizable as agony on the side of the ewe, a struggle Elizabeth 
Costello would have appreciated as bringing across the terror of death in an animal, showing 
 
91 Compare this to Jacobus Coetzee’s childhood memory of being ordered to kill a bird. (DL 105) 
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its “electric being” in its final struggle. Michael K returns to the farmhouse without the dead 
ewe, wet, cold, and exhausted. The next day he returns to the dam and retrieves the dead body, 
only to sense that what had driven him the previous day (hunger?) was now leaving him at the 
sight of the dead body and the distorted mien of the goat: 
The urgency of the hunger that had possessed him yesterday was gone. […] He found it 
hard to believe that he had spent a day chasing after them like a madman with a knife. He 
had a vision of himself riding the ewe to death under the mud by the light of the moon, and 
shuddered. He would have liked to bury the ewe somewhere and forget the episode; or else, 
best of all, to slap the creature on its haunch and see it scramble to its feet and trot off. (55) 
The “vision of himself” marks a minor shift of perspective; it is one of the seldom moments 
where Michael K gains a reflective perspective on himself that is not rooted in his past, but 
instead provides a nocturnal vision of madness, an act of the imagination. The wish to revive 
the dead body summons the frogs of Dulgannon and their resurrection after months of hiding 
in the caked mud of a dry river, as Elizabeth Costello points out to the jury in “At the Gate.” 
(EC 216f.) 
Notwithstanding his feelings of guilt or disgust, Michael K cleans the animal, removes 
guts and organs, and fries a haunch over an open fire. Afterwards he feels a little sick, 
thinking he might have caught a cold, and goes to fetch water at the dam. He takes a moment 
to sit down: 
Sitting in the bare veld with his head between his knees he allowed himself to imagine 
lying in a clean bed between crisp white sheets. He coughed, and gave a little hoot like an 
owl, and heard the sound depart from him without the trace of an echo. Though his throat 
hurt, he made the sound again. It was the first time he had heard his own voice since Prince 
Albert. He thought: Here I can make any sound I like. (56) 
The opposition of “crisp white sheets” and “a little hoot like an owl” shows his progressive 
return to a state of nature, where his own voice happens to sound like a bird of the night. After 
he recovers from his cold, he realizes that the goat will not provide him with food for long: 
“The goat in the pantry was stinking. The lesson, if there was a lesson, if there were lessons 
embedded in events, seemed to be not to kill such large animals.” (57) 
He checks the perimeter of the farm and continues to sleep in the house, even though 
he was “not at ease there. Roaming from one empty room to another he felt as insubstantial as 
air. He sang to himself and heard his voice echo from wall and ceilings.” (58) Michael K finds 
joy in expression, before in hooting like an owl (with no echo), and now singing to himself 
(with an echo). He remains attached to his former way of living, but already senses that the 
house is not the right place for him. Later in the narrative he will build a burrow for himself 
and enjoy the reunion with earth (similar to the Friday in Michel Tournier’s rewriting of 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe; Vendredi ou les Limbes du Pacifique, 1968). 
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Michael K buries the ashes of his mother in the soil of the farm, and Coetzee lets the 
reader know, in the aggrandizing tone of an epic: “This was the beginning of his life as a 
cultivator.” (59) Followed closely by: “I am a gardener, he thought, because that is my 
nature.” (59) While waiting for the pumpkins he plants to grow, Michael K lives on a diet of 
birds, which he kills with a catapult. (59) We read about a man attempting to live on his own 
terms, without interference by others, “in a pocket outside time.” (60) We see Michael K 
direct his attention to the earth and the pumpkins he nourishes as if they were his children. 
2.5.3 The Hermit 
He thought: Now surely I have come as far as a man can come; surely no one will be mad 
enough to cross these plains, climb these mountains, search these rocks to find me; surely 
now that in all the world only I know where I am, I can think of myself as lost. 
Everything else was behind him. When he awoke in the morning he faced only the single 
huge block of the day, one day at a time. He thought of himself as a termite boring its way 
through a rock. There seemed nothing to do but live. He sat so still that it would not have 
startled him if birds had flown down and perched on his shoulders. (66) 
After the farm proved to be not as remote a refuge as imagined by Michael K, he relocates to 
the mountain range above Prince Albert. Immersing himself in nature, he is happy to finally 
feel “lost”. By getting lost he manages to retain a more natural self, away from the 
categorizations of society which place him on a low rung of the social strata. He finds a cave 
and remains there for an indeterminate time. The birds perching on his shoulder point to the 
legend of Franz of Assisi and his communion with nature. Michael K, however, likens himself 
to an impossible insect, a rock termite, whose appetite cannot be satisfied: “He felt hungry but 
did nothing about it. Instead of listening to the crying of his body he tried to listen to the great 
silence about him.” (66) The fasting cleanses him of desire: “Whatever the nature of the beast 
that had howled inside him, it was starved into stillness.” (68) His assimilation to inanimate 
nature is reflected in his interior monologue: 
I am becoming a different kind of man, he thought, if there are two kinds of man. If I were 
cut, he thought, holding his wrists out, looking at his wrists, the blood would no longer 
gush from me but seep, and after a little seeping dry and heal. I am becoming smaller and 
harder and drier every day. (67) 
The body of Michael K becomes the tool of his transformation, of his immersion into 
inanimate nature. The experience of growing hunger (in between he eats some ant grubs and 
some flowers) is accompanied by long periods of sleep: “Now, in front of his cave, he 
sometimes locked his fingers behind his head, closed his eyes, and emptied his mind, wanting 
nothing, looking forward to nothing.” (69) Emptied of all desire, his mind wanders to 
Wynberg Park, to the hunger experienced in Huis Norenius, to the Visagie boy hiding on the 
farm. Ultimately, his body signals its demise and Michael K suddenly decides to climb down 
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the mountain. This almost religious experience of nature has not transformed him after all. We 
see no change in his personality, no change in his approaches. In Prince Albert he is picked up 
by the police and transferred to a camp: “I am like an ant that does not know where its hole is, 
he thought.” (83) The image of the hole, here used synonymously for home, is later used to 
describe Michael K’s self-understanding: 
Always, when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a gap, a hole, a 
darkness before which his understanding baulked, into which it was useless to pour words. 
The words were eaten up, the gap remained. His was always a story with a hole in it: a 
wrong story, always wrong. (110) 
This meta-commentary on K’s reasoning reveals the extradiegetic position of the narrative 
voice, which here clearly transcends what Michael K could possibly express; and thereby the 
narrative provides the reader with a warning regarding the reliability of Michael K’s thoughts. 
Interestingly, this is immediately followed by a memory of the classroom at Huis Norenius, 
where Michael K is “[n]umb with terror” (110) when confronted with a math exercise. Shortly 
before it had resurfaced in the context of reflecting on bringing up children in these times: 
“My father was the list of rules on the door of the dormitory, the twenty-one rules of which 
the first was ‘There will be silence in dormitories at all times,’ […]” (104-105) The meta-
commentary is thereby in direct neighbourhood with a recollection of the traumatic 
homestead of his childhood and youth, whereby it is marked as authoritarian. Michael K’s 
attempt to escape from society and retreat to the mountains to live the life of a hermit gives 
expression to his terror. 
2.5.4 The Gardener 
The burying of his mother marks a turning point for Michael K: “This was the 
beginning of his life as a cultivator.” (59) In the abandoned farmhouse he finds a packet of 
pumpkin seeds.92 
His deepest pleasure came at sunset when he turned open the cock at the dam wall and 
watched the stream of water run down its channels to soak the earth, turning it from fawn to 
deep brown. It is because I am a gardener, he thought, because that is my nature. […] The 
impulse to plant had been reawakened in him; now, in a matter of weeks, he found his 
waking life bound tightly to the patch of earth he had begun to cultivate and the seeds he 
had planted there. (59) 
Of course we cannot miss the symbolic character of Michael K’s acts of restoration, both of 
the abandoned farmland and of himself. It is also telling that Michael K limits his efforts to a 
 
92 Imagine Michael K stranding on the island previously inhabited by Cruso and Friday (Foe), finding ready-
made terraces where to plant his seeds. 
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manageable section of land, making use of the skill he had acquired as a gardener; 
unfortunately these didn’t include knowledge of aquifers: 
The borehole, pumped dry, yielded only a weak and intermittent stream. It became K’s 
deepest wish for the flow of water from the earth to be restored. He pumped only as much 
as his garden needed, allowing the level in the dam to drop to a few inches and watching 
without emotion as the marsh dried up, the mud caked, the grass withered, the frogs turned 
on their backs and died. He did not know how underground waters replenished themselves 
but knew it was bad to be prodigal. He could not imagine what lay beneath his feet, a lake 
or a running stream or a vast inner sea or a pool so deep it had no bottom. Every time he 
released the brake and the wheel spun and water came, it seemed to him a miracle; he hung 
over the dam wall, closed his eyes, and held his fingers in the stream. (60) 
This passage reveals Michael K’s single-mindedness. While being careful not to be prodigal 
with the water needed for his plants, he is prodigal with the immediate environment of the 
dam – neglecting the withering of life (“watching without emotion”) and instead being 
amazed about the miracle of water reappearing from the depths. 
Reappearing from nowhere, the Visagie grandson disrupts his tranquillity and forces 
him away. For a last time, he irrigates his field, and as readers we get a sense of the emotional 
attachment that has formed between him and the little patch of earth he has begun to cultivate: 
The first stubby pumpkin leaves were pushing through the earth, one here, one there. K 
opened the sluice for the last time ad watched the water wash slowly across the field, 
turning the earth dark. Now when I am most needed, he thought, I abandon my children. 
(63) 
Michael K, who himself has grown up in a state of abandonment, is now forced to abandon 
his own “children”. Even when living as a hermit his thoughts reach out to the pumpkins: 
“There was a cord of tenderness that stretched from him to the patch of earth beside the dam 
and must be cut. It seemed to him that one could cut a chord like that only so many times 
before it would not grow again.” (65-66) The familiarity Michael K feels for this little piece 
of land emphasizes his emotional attachment: 
Every stone, every bush along the way he recognized. He felt at home at the dam as he had 
never felt in the house. […] I want to live here, he thought: I want to live here forever, 
where my mother and my grandmother lived. It is as simple as that. What a pity that to live 
in times like these a man must be ready to live like a beast. A man who wants to live cannot 
live in a house with lights in the windows. He must live in a hole and hide by day. A man 
must live so that he leaves no trace of his living. That is what it has come to. (98-99) 
Having removed himself from human company, he has established ties to the earth and what it 
brings forth. We see him direct his entire attention to the plants, and we can sense how it 
fulfils him: 
As he tended the seeds and watched and waited for the earth to bear food, his own need for 
food grew slighter and slighter.[…] When food comes out of this earth, he told himself, I 
will recover my appetite, for it will have savour. (101) 
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The undernourished body of Michael K lets him feel “a deep joy in his physical being,” (102) 
adding to his air of transcendence: “His step was so light that he barely touched the earth. It 
seemed possible to fly; it seemed possible to be both body and spirit.” (102) At this stage 
Michael K is primarily a body, while his voice no longer reaches out to others, instead only 
his thoughts and actions reach the reader in the form of narrative text. The reader reads how K 
returns to “eating insects” and “roots”: “He had no fear of being poisoned, for he seemed to 
know the difference between a benign bitterness and a malign one, as though he had once 
been an animal and the knowledge of good and bad plants had not died in his soul.” (102) His 
assimilation to an animal state progresses, intensifying when he decides to sleep during the 
day and only venture out at night, so that when he withdraws from the daylight it is “with a 
strange green glow behind his eyelids.” (105) Michael K’s physical state and the descriptions 
of it offered to the reader oscillate between fauna and flora. He develops a symbiotic 
relationship to the plants he is tending, while simultaneously adopting the behaviour of an 
animal and developing his animal instincts – as indicated by his growing distrust towards 
humans and fear of their intrusion (“more timorous than a mouse,” 105), and as when he 
grows accustomed to moving around in darkness: “Like a worm he began to slither towards 
his hole, thinking only: Let darkness fall soon, let the earth swallow me up and protect me.” 
(107) 
His life as a cultivator comes close to a (sacred) communion with earth, to which he 
wishes to return; underlying this is a sense of infantile regression into the lap of the mother –
tellingly the burrow he builds resembles just that, lodged as it is between two ridges. In the 
mountains Michael K had rid himself of desire, had freed himself of the societal constraints 
imposed on him previously, had reduced himself to being a body and approached an animal 
state. When a group of rebels takes up residence in the abandoned farmhouse, he for a 
moment considers joining them, but instead hopes they leave soon and chooses “to stay 
behind and keep gardening alive, or at least the idea of gardening; because once that cord was 
broken, the earth would grow hard and forget her children.” (109) After they have left, 
Michael notices the damage their donkeys had done to his plants: “I am like a woman whose 
children have left the house, he thought: all that remains is to tidy up and listen to the 
silence.” (111) Not surprisingly Michael K prefers to assume a maternal role in regard to the 
plants, and this train of thought is continued when he discovers two pale melons growing: “It 
seemed to him that he loved these two, which he thought of as two sisters, even more than the 
pumpkins, which he thought of as a band of brothers.” (113) As if to compensate the loss of 
his mother, Michael K assumes a maternal role and adopts the plants as his new family. In an 
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almost cruel and ironic twist, his “firstborn” pumpkin gets cut to pieces and roasted on the 
fire. Underlying the detailed description of this first meal is a feeling of gratitude, when 
Michael K’s “felt his heart suddenly flow over with thankfulness. It was exactly as they had 
described it, like a gush of warm water.” (113) Who “they” could be remains unknown, but 
our emotions are always dependent on templates received by others. If we have no idea that a 
heart can “overflow” with anything, we will not be able to identify such a gust of emotion; 
here we can see that Michael K has been attentive to the people surrounding him, has been 
able to incorporate the displays of emotions: “He chewed with tears of joy in his eyes.” (113) 
The positive emotions flooding him allow him for the first time to truly enjoy the 
consumption of food since departing from Cape Town: “For the first time since he had arrived 
in the country he found pleasure in eating.” (113) 
His nocturnal lifestyle leads to a deterioration of his sight, but also to a heightened 
sense of smell and touch; again bringing him closer to animal nature. This is countered by 
remembrances of his mother (again, doubts about having found the right farm crop up, 116) 
and the realization that all people have been someone’s child at one point – K applies this to 
his mother and grandmother: “I come from a line of children without end.” (117) Having thus 
reintroduced himself into a line of human ancestors, his animal state retreats and he even 
considers the usefulness of a fence to protect his pumpkins and melons. And his body begins 
to show symptoms of malnourishment: bleeding gums and frequent giddiness. He tries to 
resort to killing birds again, but has lost the skill, so instead kills a lizard and eats it; while just 
one page earlier he had compared himself to one: “Like a parasite dozing in the gut, he 
thought; like a lizard under a stone.” (116) 
Michael K harvests thirty pumpkins, gets to eat the two melons, but yet his body 
continues to deteriorate. Sleep and hunger take over and immobilize him: “He raised a hand 
as heavy as lead and put it over his heart: far away, as if in another country, he felt a languid 
stretching and closing.” (118) The heart is reduced to a pumping mechanism; no longer does it 
harbour emotions. The sleep brings dreams of an old man telling him to get off the land and of 
his mother taking a walk with him. “It occurred to him that he might not be fully in possession 
of himself.” (119) After finally having achieved what at first seemed so unlikely, i.e. living off 
the land, his body fails to enjoy this in a sustainable fashion. The involuntary dispossession of 
the self bears unwelcome consequences of estrangement from the land he has grown so 
attached to: “Everything was familiar, yet he felt like a stranger or a ghost.” (120) Coetzee 
offers the reader one last reminder of K’s animal being before he gets picked up by the 
military: “[O]n hands and knees he drank from a puddle.” (120) One of the soldiers picks up 
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one of his arms: “K did not pull away. The arm felt like something alien, a stick protruding 
from his body.” (121) The soldiers search the entire farm, blow up the house and bury 
numerous landmines; Michael K feels his attachment to the earth in which he had planted his 
“children”: “The sight of the stranger digging up his earth agitated him more than he would 
have guessed.” (123) 
Michael K remains a gardener at heart. The experiment of discovering his animal 
nature had made place for his self-chosen role as cultivator. And even though he succeeds in 
growing his own food, his body ultimately cannot keep up. Michael K is about to collapse 
when finally the soldiers arrive, preventing him from returning himself to the same earth to 
which he had returned his mother, instead forcing him back into the company of others. 
2.5.5 Encounters 
The grand narrative of Life & Times of Michael K presents the protagonist as an 
outsider, traumatized in his childhood; “an alienated individual, who has problems with 
relating to other people,” as Liliana Sikorska puts it (Sikorska 2006: 90). Michael’s life story 
tells us more about the society we live in than about Michael K himself and is undercut in 
more than one way by the narrative style of Coetzee. Michael K makes a variety of 
encounters, which illustrate both his own social awkwardness and the awkwardness of social 
conditions. 
Stellenbosch 
After his mother has died, Michael K roams the streets of Stellenbosch when he is 
overtaken by a man on a cart. 
For a while they were moving side by side. The old man gave a little nod; and K, hesitating 
a moment, peering down the long straight avenue of mist, found that there was after all 
nothing any more to keep him. So he hoisted himself up and took his place beside the old 
man. ‘Thank you,’ he said. ‘If you need help I can help.’ 
But the old man did not need help, nor was he in the mood for talk. He dropped K off a 
mile past the top of the pass and turned off down a dirt track. (35) 
This occurs just shortly after K has left the hospital, where he found it hard to understand 
procedures and the communication with the personnel. Now we see him pick up a simple non-
verbal communication, a mere nod, understanding it correctly as an invitation to hop on. He 
politely offers his help in return for the favour, but receives no reply. Soon after, K is dropped 
off. This episode gives little cause for empathy neither on the character level nor on the level 
of reader and writer. However, it shows that Michael K is capable of easy interaction with 
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others. One might suspect the South African colour line at work that has stunted 
communication with apprehension and misunderstanding. 
On the Road 
After passing a convoy, “[…] a soldier in camouflage uniform stepped from behind the 
bushes pointing an automatic rifle at his heart. K stopped in his tracks. The soldier lowered 
his rifle, lit a cigarette, took a puff, and raised the rifle again. Now, K judged, it pointed at his 
face, or at his throat.” (36) In short succession the soldier marks the areas affected by the 
violence rampaging the country: the heart, the face, the throat. All three are vital for a 
communication in the spirit of empathy. He robs K, whose “heart thundered in his chest.” (37) 
Both his heart and his voice are very much alive, but disempowered by the gun. 
Laingsburg 
Any encounter offers the opportunity of taking another’s perspective, of sharing a 
perspective, of developing a new perspective onto oneself. The least it does is creating a 
moment of shared attention. In the next encounter to be discussed here, Michael K is 
confronted with a variety of perspectives, none of which he is able to share; nonetheless, the 
encounter proceeds in an amiable fashion, in a spirit of goodwill. On his way along the 
highway he passes Laingsburg, where a young man warns him about the curfew. “K turned. 
He saw a man younger than himself wearing a green and gold track suit and carrying a 
wooden tool-chest. What the stranger saw he did not know.” (47) Michael lacks a self-image 
which could be accessed through empathetic perspective-taking, all he has is his perspective 
onto the world as it is presented to him. To the young man he states his desire to continue on 
his way to Prince Albert. 
But he went home with the stranger after all and slept at his house, after a meal of soup and 
pan-bread. There were three children. All the while K ate, the youngest, a girl, sat on her 
mother’s lap staring and, though her mother whispered in her ear, would not take her eyes 
off him. The two older children kept their gaze severely on their plates. After hesitating, K 
spoke of his journey. (48) 
The easiness of hospitality being offered and accepted prompts Michael K to offer his story in 
return. The child staring at him would recall memories of previous people and children staring 
at his cleft lip, thus his hesitation. For the first time Michael K gets to enjoy an act of 
hospitality outside of a hospital. “People must help each other, that’s what I believe,” says the 
man and prompts Michael to ponder: 
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K let this utterance sink into his mind. Do I believe in helping people? he wondered. He 
might help people, he might not help them, he did not know beforehand, anything was 
possible. He did not seem to have a belief, or did not seem to have a belief regarding help. 
Perhaps I am the stony ground, he thought. (48)93 
Like Magda in In the Heart of the Country, Michael K has come to perceive himself as 
infertile ground in regard to his social environment. In this scene we get a feeling for the 
traumatization Michael K has gone through; his heart is sound, but his means of expression 
are under-developed, at least in speech, if not in thought, as we can observe when he tries to 
express his gratitude the next morning. 
At the table the urge again came over him to speak. He gripped the edge of the table and sat 
stiffly upright. His heart was full, he wanted to utter his thanks, but finally the right words 
would not come. The children stared at him; a silence fell; their parents looked away. (48) 
The description of the body preparing for speech, but the mouth failing to utter the words, can 
make the readers experience Michael’s tension in their own body via sympathetic 
imagination. The economy of looks marks the end of the encounter: Staring and looking away 
interspersed with silence. With all three modes of non-engagement Michael K has been 
familiarized since his infancy. This final tableau of Michael K and the host family can be read 
either as a keeping of decorum or as a failure of Michael K to express his ‘language of the 
heart’ as fully as he would like to. This scene shows Michael K’s stunted self-confidence in a 
friendly environment. The narrative navigation enhances the empathetic experience. The 
setting of the scene and the description of the constellation of looks and glances, in 
combination with the silence of his heart, raise our awareness of Michael K’s position in the 
world. He spoke of his journey, but from his heart he said close to nothing. 
On the Farm 
The encounter with the Visagie grandson provides a more antagonistic scenario. 
Visagie immediately assumes an air of authority, and Michael K is transported back into his 
infantile position of impotence: “He felt the old hopeless stupidity invading him, which he 
tried to beat back.” (60) The readers witness Michael’s readily accepted humiliation by his 
internal commentary: 
He truly thinks I am an idiot, thought K. He thinks I am an idiot who sleeps on the floor 
like an animal and lives on birds and lizards and does not know there is such a thing as 
money. He looks at the badge on my beret and asks himself what child gave it to me out of 
what lucky packet. (62) 
The Visagie grandson complains about Michael not being cooperative and his words together 
with his gaze makes Michael K helpless once again: 
 
93 Cf. Elizabeth Costello’s statement on belief in “At the Gate.” (EC 216ff) 
106 
 
                                                
He turned his gaze on K. 
The words, whatever they stood for, accusation, threat, reprimand, seemed to K to smother 
him. It is nothing but a manner, he told himself: be calm. Nevertheless he felt stupidity 
creep over him like a fog again. He no longer knew what to do with his face. He rubbed his 
mouth and stared at the grandson’s brown boots, thinking: You can’t buy boots like that in 
the shops anymore. (64) 
The extreme discomfort of Michael K is tangible, and the motion of the “stupidity” that 
moves “like a fog” from his mind to his face and mouth, which leads him to affirm his 
deformed lip (like a mark of shame) by rubbing it, his eyes moving to the ground indicating 
humility. The tight economy of the narrative prose is finely attuned to the emotional 
atmosphere of the scene, presenting to the reader a complex encounter. Luckily, Michael K 
abandons the Visagie grandson and the farm and moves on. 
In the Camp 
Michael K is picked up after his episode in the mountains and deported to the 
internment camp Jakkalsdrif, which brings up memories from his childhood in Huis Norenius: 
“It is like going back to childhood, he thought: it is like a nightmare.” (77) Climbing out of 
the police van he enters the camp “under the eyes of a hundred curious inmates, adults and 
children.” (73) In the afternoon, perched on his bunk, Michael K for the first time has trouble 
finding sleep, thinking to himself: “I am back in Huis Norenius a second time, only now I am 
too old to bear it.” But then somebody touches his bare arm. Michael K flinches, and hears a 
man’s voice asking whether he is alright: “Against the dazzle of light from the doorway he 
could not make out the face.”94 Michael K replies with words that “seemed to come from far 
away. […] K thought: I needed more warning. I should have been told I was going to be sent 
back amongst people.” (74) That evening a “dark shape” enters the hut and approaches him – 
as readers we readily assume this to be the same man as before, now offering K a cigarette. 
He accepts it and in the light of the match sees a “man older than himself.” (77) This notion 
signifies his rough classification system of other men as either older or younger than himself –
a deeply ingrained respect for elders might be one cause for this first consideration. The old 
man convinces Michael K to join the crowd outside. Besieged by their questions, Michael K 
tells his story (here consisting of bringing his mother to Prince Albert, her dying on the way at 
Stellenbosch, and working on the railways). He feels that the burying of his mother’s ashes 
would round off the story, but cannot bring himself to share that intimate moment with the 
crowd, whose attention dissipates quickly. The “man from the hut” (“His name was Robert.” 
 
94 Coetzee uses this staging of a face outlined by light repeatedly, prominently so in Friday’s first encounter with 
Susan Barton (FOE 5). 
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79) shares the story of him and his family with Michael. For the first time someone makes an 
effort to include Michael K, treating him like a friend and not a stranger. 
Returning from a shift of forced labour, Michael K falls into a “dead sleep,” 
interrupted by the crying of a baby: “Aching to sleep, K felt anger mount up inside himself. 
He lay with his fists clenched against his breast, wishing the child annihilated.” (88-89) 
Michael K bodily mirrors the position of the baby, but fails to develop the affect into a 
positive emotional response of care; instead he selfishly wishes the baby dead. Instead of 
intellectually grasping the baby’s situation he mirrors not only its position but also its self-
centeredness. At this point Robert tells the story of a district nurse visiting the camp after it 
was opened, and how appalled she was by the miserable conditions in the camp, so that she 
just “stood in the middle of the camp where everyone could see, and she cried.” (88) This 
public display of emotions doubles the crying of the baby in the night. Robert explains to 
Michael K how the consequent improvements to the situation in the camp were only intended 
to appease the conscience of those in power: “They want to go to sleep feeling good.” (88) 
Michael K signalizes doubt, and Robert urges him: “’You don’t look deep enough […]. Take a 
good look in their hearts, then you’ll see.’” (88) To a shrugging Michael he remarks:  
“You’re a baby,” said Robert. “You’ve been asleep all your life. It’s time to wake up. Why 
do you think they give you charity, you and the children? Because they think you are 
harmless, your eyes aren’t opened, you don’t see the truth around you.” (88-89)  
The motif of the baby carries over into the next paragraph of the narrative, where the reader is 
informed that two days later the baby that had cried in the night died. Is the baby a signifier of 
the truth Robert had been talking about? Was Michael K to blame for the death, after having 
wished the baby dead? (87) For hours he observes the mother sitting beside her tent, 
withdrawn from the world, refusing food and not crying. The crying has found its end with 
the baby’s death. 
Is this my education? he wondered. Am I at last learning about life here in a camp? It 
seemed to him that scene after scene of life was playing itself out before him and that all 
the scenes cohered. He had a presentiment of a single meaning upon which they were 
converging or threatening to converge, though he did not know yet what that might be. (89) 
This interior monologue of Michael K functions like a meta-commentary on previous events 
in the camp. Coetzee has given the reader an almost didactic presentation of life and death in 
the camp. And along with the socio-critical commentary, Coetzee has provided the reader with 
a set of perspectives, reflected in the dialogue or refracted by Michael K’s central 
consciousness. It is not Michael K who learns to understand but the reader. The reader is led 
through infantile regression towards death’s finality, both starting and ending points of 
consciousness. The “single meaning” remains attached to the grieving mother, in who 
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Michael K continues to show intense interest: “K’s first thought each morning was: Will I see 
her today?” (89) In one short sentence she is assessed as “short and fat” and as having been 
abandoned by the father of the baby. Michael K now discovers what the single meaning could 
possibly be: 
K wondered whether he was at last in love. Then after three days the girl re-emerged and 
resumed her life. Seeing her in the midst of other people, K could detect no sign that she 
was different from them. He never spoke to her. (89) 
Michael K stumbles across a central emotional pull, but displaces it as attached to the grieving 
mother, while it was rather directed at more than just her. His heart was reaching out to her 
like it had previously at the breakfast table of his hosts. However, the moment passes and the 
narrative moves on to a fire in Prince Albert and a brutal police raid of Jakkalsdrif. In the 
commotion of collapsing tents and people being forcefully removed, Michael K sits next to a 
woman with two children and a baby. Michael K offers the younger children to sit with him: 
Without taking her eyes from the destruction being visited on them, she stepped over his 
legs and stood within the protective circle of his arms sucking her thumb. Her sister joined 
her. The two stood pressed together; K closed his eyes; the baby continued to kick and 
whine. (90-91) 
The grieving mother and the dead baby are substituted by a woman with three children. Now 
the family tableau of Life &Times of Michael K is as complete as it can be. A man protecting 
two children and a woman holding her baby, united in loving care for each other. 
Robert publicly exclaims that they will be locked up to starve and die. Michael K 
broods over his words and wonders whether the guards could really be indifferent to their 
deaths, jumping on to the question of the bodies left behind and their disposal: “When people 
died they left bodies behind. Even people who died of starvation left bodies behind. Dead 
bodies could be as offensive as living bodies, if it was true that a living body could be 
offensive. If these people really wanted to be rid of us, he thought (curiously he watched the 
thought begin to unfold itself into his head, like a plant growing), […]” (94) The thought that 
grows on him picks up a motif from Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), when the magistrate 
imagines a big pit in which all ‘barbarians’ could be made to disappear (WFB 26), the notion 
of an Endlösung. Michael K senses Robert’s influence on his thoughts: 
It seemed more like Robert than like him, as he knew himself, to think like that. Would he 
have to say that the thought was Robert’s and had merely found a home in him, or could he 
say that though the seed had come from Robert, the thought, having grown up inside him, 
was now his own? He did not know. (95) 
Michael K makes transparent how he has adopted Robert’s perspective, or at least his way of 
thinking. Translated into terms of his political education he has reached a new level of 
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awareness, aided both by events in the camp and by the encounters with its inhabitants and its 
supervisors. 
One night a fight breaks out and the guard with whom Michael K had had a few 
exchanges gets wounded. Michael K rushes to his aid, for the first time raising his voice in the 
camp: “We must take him to the gate!” (96) The tableau of life and death (and love) receives 
an addendum: Michael K supporting a bleeding man amidst the commotion and ensuring his 
rescue. This is the last picture from Jakkalsdrif, as in the same night Michael K climbs the 
fence and returns to the Visagie farm. Impressed on his mind is the education he received 
through the life and death in the camp of Jakkalsdrif, just as it has been impressed on the mind 
of the reader. 
Michael K and the Medical Officer – The Reader as Interrogator and Witness of 
Interrogation 
In section TWO of Life & Times of Michael K, the setting shifts to a hospital ward, 
after Michael has been picked up by the police, brought to a prison and put into the care of a 
medical officer. The narrative focalization shifts to the first person perspective of a medical 
officer. The reader no longer accesses the mind of Michael K, but instead is offered an 
external perspective from the side of the ruling regime. As with the magistrate the medical 
officer’s position will be affected by Michael K. In the beginning, his report concentrates on 
the medical aspects of the new patient. Later, his curiosity will reach beyond the body of 
Michael K. 
When the medical officer describes his condition, the reader gets to hear the full extent 
of K’s physical malnourishment. He weighs less than forty kilos and is described as “a little 
old man.” (129) The medical officer assigns him the name Michaels.95 His initial assessment 
ends in uncertainty: “I am not sure he is wholly of our world.” (130) He acknowledges what 
has resulted from Michael K’s effort to remove himself from what the officer calls “our 
world” – the world that has not been kind to him. Beginning with the cleft lip, which is now 
explained to the reader in medical terms as a “simple incomplete cleft, with some 
displacement of the septum.” (130) When the medical officer offers to correct the lip, Michael 
K simply replies (and the officer here quotes him): “I am what I am.” (130) 
Michael K is passively resigned to his situation and rests on his bed with a smile, 
holding a brown paper bag with dried pumpkin seeds to his chest. The baby trope reappears at 
 
95 Just as Oludah Equiano, a former slave who at the end of the 18th century published his autobiography, is 
named Michael by one of his masters. Cf. Equiano 1995. 
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this point, but the medical officer’s perspective now transcends the body of flesh into the 
metaphorical: 
He is like a stone, a pebble that, having lain around quietly minding its own business since 
the dawn of tine, is now suddenly picked up and tossed randomly from hand to hand. A 
hard little stone, barely aware of its surroundings, enveloped in itself and its interior life. He 
passes through these institutions and camps and hospitals and God knows what else like a 
stone. Through the intestines of war. An unbearing, unborn creature. I cannot really think of 
him as a man, though he is older than me by most reckonings. (135) 
The medical officer is getting closer to Michael K, but the access gained through his external 
assessment cannot compete with the access the reader has through the previous and later third 
person narrative of Michael K. In this section we see Michael K through the eyes of the 
medical officer. As readers we are offered an inside first person perspective on the events, in 
particular on the protagonist; we cannot help but submit to the narrative authority and 
assumed reliability of the medical officer, who shares with us his doubts about the adequacy 
of their measures and about the regime’s strategy. We share his perspective and view Michael 
K in a different light. 
Following the passage quoted above, Michael K shows signs of irritation: “’Do you 
think if you leave me alone I am going to die?’ he said. ‘Why do you want to make me fat? 
Why fuss over me, why am I so important?’” (135) The officer’s weak answer that “[n]o one 
is forgotten” (136) prompts Michael K to give an insightful and moving résumé of his 
mother’s toils and undignified demise. The medical officer retreats to his position of 
supremacy. 
After news of a sabotage act in Prince Albert, the medical officer and his colleague 
Noel again interrogate Michael K, who in the records runs as insurgent providing food to 
enemy troops. Michael K refuses to be implicated: “I am not in the war.” (138) Asked about 
the soldiers taking his pumpkins, he shrugs: “What grows is for all of us. We are all children 
of the earth.” (139) As in the case of Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, I am 
delighted by such naive simplicity of goodwill. The medical officer uses his advantage of 
having talked to K extensively by bringing up the burial of K’s mother. Michael K reacts: 
“His face closed like a stone, and I pressed on, scenting the advantage.” (139) Like on earlier 
occasions, the reader can pick up on the scheming and insincere tone of the narrative voice: “I 
paused; he stared stonily back.”(140) The frustrated medical officer implores Michael K to 
talk: “Give yourself some substance, man, otherwise you are going to slide through life 
absolutely unnoticed.” (140) Michael K. remains unaffected by the officer’s attitude towards 
him. The substance of Michael K remains with him, but the text performs a new access 
through which the reader can explore the character. The medical officer repeats his initial 
111 
 
                                                
assessment to Noel: “He is not of our world. He lives in a world of his own.” (142) And: “No 
papers, no money; no family, no friends, no sense of who you are. The obscurest of the 
obscure, so obscure as to be a prodigy.” (142) 
Surprisingly the medical officer’s narrative continues. He discharges Michael only to 
have him back in the hospital ward two days later. Michael K refuses all food offered to him. 
As readers we can see how the medical officer begins to take Michael K’s side, especially in 
his arguments with Noel, whom he tries to convince to let Michael K slip away; the medical 
officer argues: “Maybe you and I wouldn’t like camp food either.” And: “Maybe he is just a 
very thin man.” (146) In an attempt to supply the right “kind of food” for Michael K, the 
medical officer brings him grilled pumpkin squash. Michael K takes a bite and nods when the 
officer asks him if he likes it. Returning later, the medical officer finds the plate empty, but 
assumes Michael to have disposed of the rest. Michael K still wonders why the medical 
officer is paying him so much attention: “I ask myself: What am I to this man? I ask myself: 
What is it to this man if I live or die?” To which the medical officer replies: “You might as 
well ask why we don’t shoot prisoners. It is the same question.” (148) Refusing to nurture life 
is to him the same as to take a life. Michael K’s voiceless reply shakes the medical officer: 
He shook his head from side to side, then without warning opened the dark pools of his 
eyes on me. There was something more I had wanted to say, but I could not speak. It 
seemed foolish to argue with someone who looked at you as if from beyond the grave. 
For a long while we stared at each other. Then I found myself speaking, in no more than a 
whisper. As I spoke I thought: Surrender. This is how surrender will feel. (148) 
This long exchange of looks seems to indicate a turning point in the medical officer’s attitude 
towards Michael K. Yet it remains unsure how far his allegiance will go. This scene is 
followed by a letter the medical officer addresses to Michaels – even though by now he 
knows his real name to be Michael: “He says his name is not Michaels but Michael.” (131) 
But the medical officer continues to refer to him as Michaels, perhaps to please the protocol 
of the camp. In the heading line of a personal letter it seems like a sign of mistrust; and this 
while the letter takes on the tone of a confession, or at least a statement explaining his 
motives: “The answer is: Because I want to know your story.” The medical officer goes on to 
speculate about Michael K: “You are no soldier, Michaels, you are a figure of fun, a clown, a 
wooden man.”96 In the same vein: 
You are like a stick insect, Michaels, whose sole defence against a universe of predators is 
its bizarre shape. You are like a stick insect that has landed, God knows how, in the middle 
of a great wide flat bare concrete plain. You raise your slow fragile stick-legs one at a time, 
you inch about looking for something to merge with, and there is nothing. (149) 
 
96 Later, in Summertime, Adriana will apply the same phrase („Wooden Man“) to Coetzee himself (ST 200). 
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The medical officer’s assessment shows how he desires to subject Michael K to a system of 
classification. By choosing an insect as point of comparison, the gap is solidified by an 
emphasis of his being-apart. Accordingly, the idea of displaying Michael K in a museum (with 
label and plaque) objectifies him further, annulling even the frail attempts of the stick-insect 
to establish contact with the world. The letter ends with an appeal to Michael K to yield. (152) 
He signs the letter: “A friend.” (152) Imposing his nomenclature on Michael K is a one-sided 
procedure and compared with Michael K’s encounters with the man in the green and gold 
track suit and his friendship with Robert, this relationship is nowhere close to being a genuine 
approximation between two strangers. The reader is not informed whether the letter is ever 
delivered to Michael K, nor is there any reply. It seems more a self-serving monologue on the 
side of the medical officer, whose attempts to gain a better understanding of Michael K are 
misdirected and ultimately doomed to fail. Accordingly, Michael K escapes from the 
Kenilworth camp without leaving any trace behind: “He must have tiptoed out, climbed the 
wall – God knows how – and stolen away. The wire does not seem to have been cut; but then 
Michaels is enough of a wraith to slip through anything.” (154) The medical officer hereby 
completes his mystification of Michael K, which serves to reinforce his otherness within the 
categories imposed by the camp and its regulations. By the end of his stay in this camp, 
Michael K weighed “[t]hirty-five kilos, all skin and bone.” (156) 
The medical officer has failed to make an impact on Michael K, has failed to take his 
perspective and develop any sincere empathy, instead remaining sympathetic with a touch of 
pity and amazement at his obduracy. However, the impact of Michael K on the medical officer 
can be traced throughout his report. After Michael K’s escape he again begins to question the 
sense of their mission, which will now change from rehabilitation to mere internment. In a 
very Coetzeean moment he ponders the option of abandoning his work, if just for one day: 
Maybe the universal sum of happiness would be increased if we declared this afternoon a 
holiday and went down to the beach, commandant, doctor, chaplain, PT instructors, guards, 
dog-handlers all together with the six hard cases from the detention block, leaving behind 
the concussion case to look after things. (157) 
This is contrasted by Noel’s assessment: “We are fighting this war [...] so that minorities will 
have a say in their destinies.” (157) The minority in this case being the ruling (white) class. 
This passage ends with a derogative remark from the medical officer, who still remains 
attached to the paradigms connected to Noel’s statement: “Michaels with his fantasy of 
making the desert bloom with pumpkin flowers is another of those too busy, too stupid, too 
absorbed to listen to the wheels of history.” (159) Though Michael K is no longer present, the 
report continues to relate to us the delivery of four hundred new prisoners. Again, the medical 
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officer considers abandoning his post and following Michael K’s example of “walking a little 
closer to the earth.” (160) Michael K’s presence is now shifted to the text and the resonance of 
the encounter with the medical officer, which has affected the latter far more than the former. 
Adding to previous assessments, the medical officer offers a new idea: 
With Michaels it always seemed to me that someone had scuffed together a handful of dust, 
spat on it, and patted it into the shape of a rudimentary man, making one or two mistakes 
(the mouth, and without a doubt the contents of the head), omitting one or two details (the 
sex), but coming up nevertheless in the end with a genuine little man of earth, the kind of 
little man one sees in peasant art emerging into the world from between the squat thighs of 
its mother-host with fingers ready hooked and back ready bent for a life of burrowing, a 
creature that spends its waking life stooped over the soil, that when at last its time comes 
digs its own grave and slips quietly in and draws the heavy earth over its head like a blanket 
and cracks a last smile and turns over and descends into sleep, home at last, while 
unnoticed as ever somewhere far away the grinding of the wheels of history continues. 
(161) 
The medical officer imagines the life and death of Michael K. He does not attempt to take 
Michael K’s perspective, but applies his own perspective metaphorically. This reinforces his 
earlier thought that Michael K was “not of this world,” while simultaneously feigning 
Michael’s birth from the earth (like the first man Adam), and his return to dust. As readers we 
have seen Michael K discover (or recover?) and acknowledge his affiliation to the earth that 
sustains him, the medical officer’s speculative imagination express this connection with 
different words. Even though the medical officer expresses it metaphorically, the 
“rudimentary man” is not without substance, but instead a “genuine little man of earth,” 
embodied through birth, burrowing, and finally the return to his earthly grave. 
This act of the medical officer’s imagination is a runner-up for the next more 
sympathetic scenario. Using first-person narration he imagines having followed Michael K, 
having dogged “him”. He imagines Michael K wondering: “Who is this behind me? What 
does he want?” (162) Using direct speech at this point prepares the reader for the shift of 
narrative perspective. “And here, in the light of day, you would have at last turned and looked 
at me.” (162) For the first time since writing the letter, the report of the medical officer 
addresses Michael K and speaks of him in the second person. This represents a significant 
shift of perspective and mode of narration. Now the Medical officer’s hypothetical narration 
slips into the perspective of Michael K, tries to grasp what Michael K might see in him, and 
provides a catalogue of K’s abuse through himself: 
[T]he pharmacist turned makeshift medical officer turned foot-follower who before seeing 
the light had dictated to you when you might sleep and when you might wake, who had 
pushed tubes up your nose and pills down your throat, who had stood in your hearing and 
made jokes about you, who above all had unrelentingly pressed food on you that you could 
not eat. Suspiciously, angrily even, you would have waited in the middle of the track for me 
to approach and explain myself. (162) 
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The reader has been steered into an imaginary encounter between the medical officer (I) and 
Michael K (you). The reader might now inhabit the position of Michael K, taking the place of 
the “you” being addressed by the text (though he is safely removed from emotional contagion 
through the use of past tense for this scenario). Resorting to epic-biblical tone, the scene 
continues: “And I would have come before you and spoken.” (162) In the following sequence 
the officer asks for forgiveness, pleads to be allowed to follow Michael K like a disciple, 
asking to be taught how to stay out of the camps: “[T]herefore I have chosen you to show me 
the way.” (163) This lengthy appeal (presented as direct speech) is intensified by increased 
proximity of the protagonists: “Then I would have stepped closer till I was within touching 
distance and you could not fail to see into my eyes.” (163) Continuing his appeal, he 
comments on the “originality of the resistance” Michael K offered, and explains to what 
insight it has led him: “Then as I watched you day after day I slowly began to understand the 
truth: that you were crying secretly, unknown to your conscious self (forgive the term), for a 
different kind of food, food that no camp can supply. [...] Now I had been taught that the body 
contains no ambivalence. The body, I had been taught, wants only to live.” (164) Again the 
appeal is interrupted, and Coetzee – through his third-person narrator – inserts a reminder of 
the setting (on the outskirts of the Flats, an area of Cape Town), providing some atmospheric 
noise, together with a reminder of the eye contact established between the two: “[M]y 
glittering eye would have held you, for the time being, rooted where you stood.” (164) The 
reader experiences an act of shared attention, in which he remains in the position of ‘neutral’ 
observer; this scenario supplies excellent conditions for narrative empathy to develop in the 
reader. The medical officer goes on to describe the impact Michael K has had on him, creating 
yet another scenario in which he stands in the door to K’s room and watches him sleeping, 
sensing “a thickening of the air, a concentration of darkness, a black whirlwind roaring in 
utter silence above your body, pointing to you [...]” (164), sensing a “gathering of 
meaningfulness,” (165) while at the same time questioning the sincerity of his perspective, 
which now directs the reader’s attention back to himself: “And standing in the doorway I 
would turn my bleakest stare in upon myself, seeking by the last means I knew to detect the 
germ of dishonesty at the heart of the conviction.”97 Meaning the conviction that Kenilworth 
is “a privileged site where meaning erupted into the world.” (165) The thickening air and the 
increased meaningfulness are clearly produced by the officer’s narrative, and he himself 
 
97 Though this novel predates the publication of Coetzee’s seminal essay „Confession and Double Thoughts: 
Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky” (1985), the fundamental suspicion against all modes of confession already finds 
its expression in the presentation of the medical officer’s report. See also section 5.1.7. 
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comments on the fallibility of his perceptions. On the level of reading the mode of shared 
attention, directed by the medical officer’s narrative, could be said to correspond with the 
increasing of meaning, as the shared perspectives of author (Coetzee), character (medical 
officer/Michael K), and reader converge and ultimately produce new lines of interpretation 
induced by the use of their sympathetic imagination. The medical officer turns his gaze 
outwards again and imagines how he has lost Michael K’s attention. He imagines hurrying 
after him to finish what he has to say, even running after him and calling after him: “Your stay 
in the camp was merely an allegory, if you know that word. It was an allegory – speaking at 
the highest level – of how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning can take up residence in 
a system without becoming a term in it.” (166) 
The allegory the medical officer speaks of applies mainly to his encounter with 
Michael K. The meaning Michael K has taken on within this report has been ascribed to him 
by the medical officer. And it has affected him by activating and redirecting his sympathetic 
imagination, through which he has been able to develop empathy for Michael K beyond the 
initial attitude of pity. In fact, his perspective-taking is as far-reaching as it can be, for in the 
end of this hypothetical scenario the medical officer continues running after Michael K, who 
he calls an “escape artist.” (166) In a last effort of grasping the “meaning” of Michael K, he 
speaks of K’s garden: 
Let me tell you the meaning of the sacred and alluring garden that blooms in the heart of 
the desert and produces the food of life. The garden for which you are presently heading is 
nowhere and everywhere except in the camps. It is another name for the only place where 
you belong, Michaels, where you do not feel homeless. It is off every map, no road leads to 
it that is merely a road, and only you know the way. (166) 
By ascertaining that Michel K does not belong in any camp, the medical officer is in a way 
acknowledging Michael K’s autonomy. The medical officer continues to run after K in his 
imaginary scenario, imploring him to reply to his elaborate appeal. But the scenario (and the 
report of the officer) ends without any reply from Michael K. 
The report of the medical officer sets an example of a shift in perspective, both in 
narrative terms and in terms of character. The first person narration invites us to take the 
perspective of the officer. Then, by shifting to an imaginary scenario in the last part of this 
section, Michael K is transposed into a second person position, which invites the reader to feel 
addressed more or less directly by the text. Thereby, the reader has access to both character 
positions, to both subject (I) and object (you), while at the same time remaining an external 
observer of events. Focalized through the medical officer, the narrative instructs us how to 
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arrive at a position of empathy towards Michael K, illustrating the process through the 
officer’s report. 
2.5.6 Cheer up, Michael K 
The encounters I have discussed previously have shown another side of Michael K, a 
more active and outreaching side. And there are numerous instances in which we see Michael 
K actively communicating with others, as when his mother, Anna K, is released from the 
hospital and he asks for a wheelchair (which he doesn’t get). (5) At the railway station he 
pleaded with the clerk for an earlier departure. (9) He explains to the warden of his flat that he 
and his mother will be leaving. (16) At the hospital in Stellenbosch he volunteers to work, but 
the “man in a white coat” sends him to an office he doesn’t find. (29) Later, at Jakkalsdrif, he 
sits next to a boy with a bandaged stump of an arm. “’What happened?’ said K. The boy 
turned away and did not reply.” (72) In this case it is the other who refuses communication, 
just like the woman at the police counter and later the shop owner in Prince Albert. 
One encounter in particular stands out in its normality. It is a short encounter with a 
man in the hospital at Stellenbosch. The casualty and genuine goodwill displayed in this 
scene, including anecdotes and personal information revealed to K by the man, deserves to be 
quoted fully: 
A man in the hospital yard fell into conversation with him. ‘You here for stitches?’ he 
enquired. K shook his head. Then he told a long story of a tractor that had toppled over him, 
crushing his leg and breaking his hip, and of the pins the doctors had inserted in his bones, 
silver pins that would never trust. He walked with a curiously angled aluminum stick. ‘You 
don’t know where I could get something to eat,’ asked K. ‘I haven’t eaten since yesterday.’ 
‘Man,’ said the man, ‘why don’t you go and get us both a pie,’ and passed K a one-rand 
coin. K went to the bakery and brought back two hot chicken pies. He sat beside his friend 
on the bench and ate. The pie was so delicious that tears came to his eyes. The man told 
him of his sister’s uncontrollable fits of shaking. K listened to the birds in the trees and 
tried to remember when he had known such happiness. (29-30) 
As usual, Coetzeean moments of bliss and/or serenity are accompanied by birdsong, a small 
but intriguing detail which frequently reappears in Coetzee’s fictions. The normality of the 
exchange touches K’s heart; a simple gesture of sharing food together is sometimes all it 
takes. 
In all of these encounters Michael K shows initiative and articulacy, which stands in 
opposition to the social isolation of Michael K emphasized by the text. Michael K is not a 
trauma victim that calls for pity, which in no case is a helpful response anyway. The Michael 
K created by Coetzee teaches us a lesson about our perception of others, and the text 
implicitly promotes a potential shift of perspective towards a more empathetic emotional 
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response to others. If the readers allow the virtual encounter with Michael K to affect them, as 
well as Michael K’s encounters with others, then their empathetic capacities have been 
exercised and enhanced, and any Michael K they ever meet will benefit from their reading 
experience, as might others. And then we might be able to agree with a man from the railroad 
labour gang addressing K: “‘Cheer up!’ said the man, giving K a smile, punching him lightly 
on the shoulder. ‘Soon you’ll be your own man again!’” (43) 
3. Silence and Scripture in Foe, Age of Iron, and The Master of 
Petersburg 
While Coetzee’s first four novels strongly focus on the inner life of the main 
protagonists, with the social context as a backdrop to their development or lack thereof, the 
following three novels mark a shift of attention towards a stronger emulation and 
foregrounding of social context. Waiting for the Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K 
already showed first signs of this shift of attention: the Magistrate reveals his inner struggles 
to the reader, but his environment (frontier and empire) and its impact on him play a crucial 
role for his moral growth; Michael K’s position of non-power and his attempted withdrawal 
from the political stage reflect the social structures of South Africa. In contrast, Eugene Dawn, 
Jacobus Coetzee, and Magda are far more solitary figures. Clearly, it makes little sense to 
propose clear “phases” in Coetzee’s oeuvre, as has been done repeatedly with artists of all 
kinds, fairly prominently with Pablo Picasso and the colour-coded phases attributed to his 
works. On the other hand, in terms of my overall approach, it is fair to assume shifts of 
emphasis and to mark certain developments in Coetzee’s writing. However, by emphasizing 
the development of the sympathetic imagination in Coetzee’s fiction, I am not inferring a 
teleological reading of his work. 
A closer look at the characters in the following three novels and the main protagonists’ 
encounter with others will reveal how much the quality of reflection on others and on their 
social context has changed. Susan Barton (Foe) reveals more about her thoughts on Cruso, 
Friday, and Foe than about herself. On a literary level, Foe is a reflection on narrative 
authority and truthfulness in combination with a postcolonial re-writing of a founding text of 
European literary modernity. The (self-)characterisation of Elizabeth Curren (Age of Iron) 
once again is closer to a psychogram, but the emphasis lies on her reflections on her social 
environment, which she learns to appraise during the course of the novel – as a consequence 
she reflects on her responsibility towards others. All this is presented as a letter to her 
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daughter, creating a proxy writer who controls the narrative. Lastly, the Dostoevsky figure in 
The Master of Petersburg offers reflections on writing at a more personal level, but also in 
relation to a society at a time of approaching transformation. Age of Iron and The Master of 
Petersburg feature a far more personal tone than the novels before, which were artfully kept at 
a distance from Coetzee’s own life. His writing now seems influenced by his family 
background, more specifically the death of Coetzee’s mother Vera and of his son Nicolas. My 
reading suggests that the more personal (at least more obviously so) investment of Coetzee 
raises the stakes of his writing, in particular in regard to the sympathetic imagination. 
In the analysis of the early novels I largely concentrated on distinct categories of a 
rather physiological nature98 related to a (un-)sympathetic engagement on the side of the 
protagonists (the eyes and heart), in a second step inferring an empathetic reaction on the side 
of the reader in his perception of the characters. Life & times of Michael K marked a transition 
to a more situational analysis on the text level. This will also be the focus of the following 
analysis. 
Taking up the approach of Fritz Breithaupt (Kulturen der Empathie; see 1.5) and 
applying his concept of ‘narrative empathy’, I will focus on the character constellations and 
their interactions with others. In the case of Susan Barton in Foe, the primary focus lies on her 
attitude towards and dealings with Friday, but also her relations to Cruso and Foe will be 
considered. In Age of Iron, Elizabeth Curren’s encounter with Vercueil will be in the centre of 
attention, with the boys Beki and John as additional reference points. In The Master of 
Petersburg Dostoevsky’s search for the fate of his deceased son Pavel will constitute the point 
of departure of my reading, followed by a look at his relationship with his landlady and her 
daughter, but also his encounter with the revolutionary Nechaev. 
3.1 Foe (1986) – The Barton Archipelago 
If Michael K was attempting to lead an insular and secluded life (I am an island), 
Susan Barton can be said to look for connections between groupings of islands (I am an 
archipelago): “The World is full of islands, said Cruso once. His words ring truer every day.” 
(FOE 71)99 Later Foe comments: “The island is not a story in itself.” (117) In light of the 
 
98 In accordance with my overall approach these categories were meant to serve as emphasis on the body; in 
contrast to more textual approaches which are the more obvious choice in assessing Coetzee’s very literary 
narrative constructions. Especially In the Heart of the Country foregrounds textual aspects rather than aspects of 
plot and character; but an alternative reading is possible and offers insightful angles of interpretation. 
99 Coetzee 1987 [1986]. All quotes in section 3.1 will be from FOE unless indicated otherwise. 
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metaphor employed above, no single character can form a story without any kind of social 
context.  
As usual, Coetzee avoids an easy categorization of his novel in terms of genre. First of 
all, it is the rewriting of a classic, as others have done before him (Michel Tournier, Muriel 
Spark, Adrien Mitchells; cf. Horstmann 2005: 105). The first section resembles a travel report, 
in which she relates to the reader the story of her encounter with Cruso and Friday on the 
island. It begins with Susan Barton being washed ashore on a solitary island where she 
encounters Friday and Cruso (in this order) and continues with her rescue and subsequent stay 
in London with Friday (while Cruso dies on the ocean passage). This reminds us of the death 
of countless slaves on their passage, and in analogy to the rape of Lucy in Disgrace it might 
possibly be a suggestion of some form of retributive justice of history. 
All paragraphs of the first two sections are opened by single quotation marks, a 
closing quotation mark to be found only at the end of the sections; the sections are thereby 
qualified as open-ended speech acts. At first the addressee is the reader (by default), only in 
the second section the dated letters mark out Foe as her addressee.100 In section III and IV the 
quotation marks are omitted, indicating that we have moved on from reporting to story-
telling.101 All the first three sections are narrated in first person past tense. Only in the final 
section a heterodiegetic perspective supplants her homodiegetic account, without any apparent 
focalizer. 
The foregrounded textuality of the narrative shifts the arena of the sympathetic 
imagination to the textual level. As readers we are not challenged to engage with Susan 
Barton (or Friday), our sympathetic imagination becomes activated in the final section only. 
Before then, we witness Susan Barton’s attempt to reach out to Friday by employing her 
sympathetic imagination. For our understanding, it is important to discuss her position of 
relative narrative authority. Coetzee manages to overlap in Susan Barton the writer’s as well 
as the reader’s perspective. In the first section, she is presented as a writer trying to make 
sense of events and characters. In her encounter with Friday she becomes a reader, using her 
sympathetic imagination to close the gap between Friday and herself (never quite successful). 
In her encounter with Foe she is both writer and reader, but the discourse shifts towards the 
ethics of writing and the negotiation of narrative authority; here the sympathetic imagination 
is of little relevance. The discussions with Foe reflect on her relationship with Friday, and 
 
100 Although later in her conversation with Foe she says of them: “[…] letters that were never read by you, and 
were later not sent, and at last not even written down, I continued to trust in my own authorship.” (FOE 133) 
101 For more details regarding the formal structure see Tiffin 1994: 27-28. 
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questions of narrative entitlement keep surfacing. The challenge for Susan Barton remains in 
attuning her sympathetic imagination to Friday; and in the end she does reach a state of 
empathetic engagement, though in a very limited way. 
3.1.1 Enter Susan Barton 
Susan Barton arrives on the island “carried by the waves,” (5) but unlike Botticelli’s 
Venus she is dressed in a petticoat. In the course of her narration the reader receives details of 
her background story, though the reliability of this account is questionable, which Susan 
Barton explicitly infers. Her father is French and originally carried the name Berton, which 
was then “corrupted in the mouth of strangers.” (11) Susan’s only daughter was abducted to 
the New World; where Susan searches for her in Bahia without any success. On her trip back 
home to Lisbon a mutiny takes place, and she ends up being set afloat in a little boat, which 
she ultimately quits (“I slipped overboard”), and then “[t]he waves took [her] and bore [her] 
on to the beach.” (11) Later in the novel she characterizes herself curtly: “I am the woman 
washed ashore.” (99) 
Susan Barton gives us some details that could be seen to amount to a description of her 
features, in its disparity and brevity far from the minute details provided by Daniel Defoe in 
his original narrative of Robinson Crusoe. She is “a tall woman with black hair and dark 
eyes.” (81) Towards the end of the novel, reporting to Foe on her trip with Friday to the ports 
of Bristol, she summarizes the demise of her appearance: “My clothes are in tatters, my hair is 
lank. I look like an old woman, a filthy old gypsy-woman.” (125) This is as far as her account 
of her outward appearance goes, the paper embodiment of Susan Barton. 
3.1.2 Susan Barton’s Narrative 
Susan Barton presents the story to the reader, and Coetzee’s rewriting of Defoe’s 
canonical text insinuates that Defoe appropriated Susan Barton’s story.102 At first glance this 
appears to be an act of female empowerment in the face of a story originally quite void of any 
female figures.103 Ultimately she loses her struggle to maintain control over her narrative, 
since the historical (De)Foe will omit her from the story and embellish her account to 
accommodate the thrills of adventure and exotism which the public seems to hunger for, the 
considerations of the book market outweighing all of Susan’s pleas for factuality and 
 
102 Attridge discusses Foe as a comment on literary canonicity (Attridge 1992). 
103 See Atwell 1991: 106-110. 
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truthfulness.104 Susan Barton rebels against Foe’s utilization and appropriation of her life in 
terms of his fictional production: 
I am not a story, Mr Foe. I may impress you as a story because I began my 
account of myself without preamble, slipping overboard into the water and 
striking out for the shore. But my life did not begin in the waves. There was a 
life before the water which stretched back to my desolate searchings in 
Brazil, thence to the years when my daughter was still with me, and so on 
back to the day I was born. All of which makes up a story I do not choose to 
tell. I choose not to tell it because to no one, not even to you, do I owe proof 
that I am a substantial being with a substantial history in the world. I choose 
rather to tell of the island, of myself and Cruso and Friday and what we three 
did there: for I am a free woman who asserts her freedom by telling her story 
according to her own desire. (131) 
The substantiality Susan claims for herself here is questioned earlier in the narrative, when 
she speaks of herself as a “paper being” or asks: “Who is speaking me?” (117) Dominic Head 
comments this acutely: “The self-conscious ontological uncertainty of the character, familiar 
in postmodernist writing, is given a metafictional richness.” (Head 1997: 117)105 Derek 
Attridge comments: “We are both invited to give this first-person text, with its deictics and its 
direct address, the emotional and axiological investment of an autobiographical account and at 
the same time are kept at a distance, made to feel that the very status and function of 
autobiography are being put in question.” (Attridge 1998: 206) The letters in section II follow 
a similar logic, even though they are addressed directly to Foe: “To whom am I writing? I blot 
the pages and toss them out of the window. Let who will read them.” (64) In a different vein, 
Ulrich Horstmann sees Barton as a projective proxy of Coetzee, whereby he reflects on his 
artistic self-understanding and self-assessment (Horstmann 2005: 109). Although this follows 
the all too simple identification of author and character, I consider it as some indicator of 
Coetzee’s investment in his fiction. The figure of Foe also prompts self-reflection on the work 
of an author and his dealings with source material. Coetzee himself can be quoted with his 
comment on Bakhtin: 
By no means all historical situations permit the ultimate semantic authority of the creator to 
be expressed without mediation in direct, unrefracted, unconditional authorial discourse. 
When there is no access to one’s own personal “ultimate” word, then every thought, feeling, 
experience must be refracted through the medium of someone else’s discourse, someone 
else’s style, someone else’s manner. (Coetzee 1996: 223) 
 
104 Dominic Head discusses this as a “repression of male experience” and remarks: “Following the premise that 
Susan Barton’s story of the island is the Ur-text of Crusoe, we must conclude that she is effaced from this text of 
Defoe’s, and placed in another (Roxana).” (Head 1997: 115) 
105 Susan Barton repeatedly comments her own narrative in brackets and directly addresses the reader: “(of 
whom I will say more later)” (7); “(I shall have more to say of the terraces later)” (15); “My palms were soon 
blistered –see! – but I dared not rest […] (11; emphasis added); “(I have not yet told you of Cruso’s stove, which 
was built very neatly of stone)” (14); “For readers reared on travellers’ tales, the words desert isle may conjure 
up a place [...]” (7) 
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This pins down what Susan Barton somewhat naively was hoping to achieve with her 
narrative, asking Foe only to brush up on the language – of course a thorough reader of 
Coetzee will doubt the attainability of “one’s own personal ‘ultimate’ word.” 
Narrative Cannibalism or Salvation? Kisses and Embraces 
Barton characterizes Foe as “the author who had heard many confessions” (48), but 
soon she has to learn that his confidentiality is not to be trusted. In Stranger Shores Coetzee 
writes about Defoe’s original: “It [Robinson Crusoe] is fake autobiography heavily influenced 
by the genres of deathbed confession and the spiritual autobiography.” (Stranger Shores 22) 
Rosemary Jolly picks up on this: 
The metaphor of salvation resonates throughout the tale of Susan Barton’s 
endeavors. This metaphor describes what Susan Barton believes narrative can do for 
her and her ghostly companions, “shipwrecked” by Coetzee in a narrative that 
imposes the problem of its own dis-closure on its own fictional narrator. Susan 
Barton has the desire of any castaway to be saved. However, in Coetzee’s novel this 
desire is given metafictional expression in the linking of Susan Barton’s desire to be 
saved literally –that is, from the island –to her desire to be saved literally, in and by 
her own narrative. [...] The rejection of salvation through narrative, signalled by the 
refusal or rejection of the figures of Friday and Cruso to be translated into narrative, 
suggests a violation demonstrated in and inflicted by Susan Barton’s narrative 
throughout the fiction. This violation has its basis in the inability of narrative, 
especially a narrative that attempts to de-scribe characters as figures of “the truth,” 
to deal with bodies as bodies, rather than as figures of speech. (Jolly 1996: 7-8) 
In its narrative presentation Coetzee goes through similar notions as Defoe did in the original 
story. Birk and Neumann comment on the structuring of narrative perspective in Robinson 
Crusoe: The homodiegetic narrator represents the sole normative centre of meaning and 
orientation. In accordance with this unitary projection, polarizing differences are constructed 
between Crusoe’s European identity and the ethnic alterity of Friday and the indigenous 
tribes. This abets the idea of an imperial superiority and represents it as the only binding order 
of reality (Birk/Neumann 2002: 134). 
Susan Barton’s struggle with the intended author of her story reflects the power play 
between character and author; something Coetzee might mean quite literal, as he professes to 
belong to the school of writers whose characters speak to them and develop their own life 
within the confines of a narrative (or at least of the paper it is written on). Again, Susan 
struggles to maintain control over her narrative against Foe’s suggestions of altering it by 
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introducing elements such as cannibalism to increase sales.106 Rosemary Jolly applies the 
metaphor of cannibalism more extensively to the text: 
The metaphor used to convey this violation of the body by narrative in Foe is that of 
cannibalism. The only cannibals in Foe are its narrator-characters, and the only 
cannibalism is that which they inflict upon their subjects in the process of turning 
them into stories. Foe, in the process of trying to turn Susan Barton into a story, is 
depicted actually biting her, then sucking the wound and murmuring, “This is my 
manner of preying on the living.” (139) (Jolly 1996: 7-8)107 
 Susan Barton, however, insists on her narrative authority and ownership: “It is still in my 
power to guide and amend. Above all, to withhold. By such means do I still endeavour to be 
father to my story.” (123; emphasis added) Coetzee here highlights the traditionally male 
image of the artist ‘giving birth’ to art. In her negotiations with Foe, Susan Barton again and 
again becomes susceptible to self-doubt – at this point it might be helpful to point out that 
Coetzee’s depiction of female narrators tends to cast them rather traditionally without 
reducing their complexity.108 Once Susan Barton finally encounters Foe face to face, she 
senses her insecure ontological status as a fictional character, even proposing the absence of 
any addressee (in section II her letters were explicitly addressing Foe): 
Why do I speak, to whom do I speak, when there is no need to speak? 
In the beginning I thought I would tell you the story of the island and, being done with that, 
return to my former life. But now all my life grows to be story and there is nothing of my 
own left to me. I thought I was myself and this girl a creature from another order speaking 
words you made up for her. But now I am full of doubt. I am doubt itself. Who is speaking 
to me? Am I a phantom too? To what order do I belong? And you: who are you? (133) 
At this moment Foe kisses her, as if to prove her substantiality, and she returns the kiss; 
similarly Susan had embraced and kissed the girl, supposedly her child, just shortly before. 
These gestures are somewhat mechanical – as are both the intercourses with Cruso and later 
with Foe; almost as if Coetzee wanted to demonstrate how physical interaction (in the spirit of 
embodiedness) can run empty without an accompanying motion of the heart, i.e. the 
sympathetic imagination. A telling remark of Susan shows her emphasis on word exchanges 
as superior to physical contact: “Who would venture to say that what passes between lovers is 
of substance (I refer to their lovemaking, not their talk), yet is it not true that something is 
passed between them, back and forth, and they come away refreshed and healed for a while of 
their loneliness?” (97; original italcs) Immediately after their coupling Cruso dies aboard the 
 
106 To which she candidly replies: “All I say is: What I saw, I wrote. I saw no cannibals; and if they come after 
nightfall and fled before the dawn, they left no footprint behind.” (54) Which of course ironically alludes to the 
emblematic scene of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe discovering footprints on the beach. 
107 Josephine Dodd takes this one step further and sees literary cannibalism at work in Coetzee’s appropriation of 
intertexts: “There are plenty of stories of daughters in search of their mothers: A Room of One’s Own is one, and 
one which Coetzee seems happy enough to vampirise in Foe. Adrienne Rich’s poem ‘Diving into the Wreck’ is 
another.” (Dodd 1998: 161) 
108 Cf. Kossew 1998: 166-179. 
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ship carrying them towards the English metropolis; note the cannibalistic undertones of her 
appropriation of Cruso, of whom she claims to have inherited the story of the island: “Do you 
think of me, Mr Foe, as Mrs Cruso or as a bold adventuress? Think what you may, it was I 
who shared Cruso’s bed and closed Cruso’s eyes, as it is I who have disposal of all that Cruso 
leaves behind, which is the story of his island.” (52) 
Of Foe she expects narrative salvation: “Return to me the substance I have lost, Mr 
Foe: that is my entreaty.” (51) These exchanges are not forms of empathetic engagement, but 
hollow attempts at feigning intimacy. As a reader we experience no warmth or gentleness in 
these proceedings, but observe a strategic interplay framed by issues of authorship and 
narrative authority. Susan’s comment points in a similar direction: “Thus I conclude you are 
aware that ghosts can converse with us, and embrace and kiss us too.” (134) Not the “full 
electric being” (EC 111) is enacted here, and Coetzee leaves little doubt about it. However, 
one can sense a yearning in Susan Barton. Susan craves for a kiss, for an embrace: an 
answering kiss: “Why do you think we do not kiss statues […]?” (79) But Cruso and Foe have 
little to give her; her reflections on being a saviour for Cruso and a muse for Foe are not 
shared by the men she preys upon (Foe could be said to prey on her as well, as the above 
scene shows; whereas Cruso is impartial to her advances. Cruso in particular is characterized 
as an anti-Robinson, void of any ambition to make the island inhabitable or any desire to be 
saved. Susan Barton stubbornly presupposes a mutual exchange of sympathies with Cruso and 
Foe, while doubting Friday’s capacities in this respect: “But Friday stood like a statue. 
[remember Susan asking: Do we kiss statues?] I have no doubt that amongst Africans the 
human sympathies move as readily as amongst us. But the unnatural years Friday had spent 
with Cruso had deadened his heart, making him cold, incurious, like an animal wrapt entirely 
in itself.’ (70) Her remark applies more to Cruso than to Friday, of whom she knows close to 
nothing. 
Mutual Embrace of Paper Ghosts 
In analogy to her craving for a mutual embrace, Susan Barton also craves for answers 
from Friday, whose muteness (he literally has no tongue) complicates the matter considerably 
and gives his paper being a ghostly quality.109 Susan senses the similarity of her desire for 
 
109 See Kossew 1998: 172 and Marais 1996: 69. Also Jolly 1996: 144; and Dominic Head’s chapter “Maze of 
Doubting,” (Head 2009: 112-128) which engages with Helen Tiffin’s 1987 essay “Post-Colonial Literatures and 
Counter-Discourse.” 
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mutual embraces and for answers from Friday: “I say that the desire for answering speech is 
like the desire for the embrace of, the embrace by, another being.” (80) 
The trope of ghosts – which she also applies to her supposed daughter,110 points 
towards her doubts about her ontological status; even suspecting a force controlling her from 
the background of her narrative. One of her metafictional comments points – with obvious 
irony – to the voice that authors her, namely the author Coetzee: 
Do we of necessity become puppets in a story whose end is invisible to us, and towards 
which we are marched like condemned felons? You and I know, in our different ways, how 
rambling an occupation writing is; and conjuring is surely much the same. We sit staring 
out the window, and a cloud shaped like a camel passes by, and before we know it our 
fantasy has whisked us away to the sands of Africa and our hero (who is no one but 
ourselves in disguise) is clashing scimitars with a Moorish brigand. A new cloud floats past 
in the form of a sailing-ship, and in a trice we are cast ashore all woebegone on a desert 
isle. Have we cause to believe that the lives it is given us to live proceed with any more 
design than these whimsical adventures?’ (135) 
The logic of authorial identification with a character (author in disguise), both engaged with 
an emerging narrative, is almost a parody on Coetzee’s side, since his intricate narrative webs 
lay bare the mechanics of narrative construction without disrupting the narrative. Susan makes 
further observations on the profession of writing, which ring true and correspond to other 
passages in Coetzee’s oeuvre – both in his fiction and in his criticism: “Letters are the mirror 
of words. Even when we seem to write in silence, our writing is the manifest of a speech 
spoken within ourselves or to ourselves.” (142)111 Foe drives home the point of Susan 
Barton’s ontological uncertainty: “But have you considered that your doubts may be part of 
the story you live, of no greater weight than any other adventure of yours?” (135) This could 
be taken further and applied in a more general sense to most of Coetzee’s fictional characters, 
where doubt plays a central role, both for the character and for the reader. And often enough 
the characters themselves voice their own doubts. For Susan it culminates in her statement 
quoted above (I am doubt itself) that echoes the position of Magda in In the Heart of the 
Country. Doubt also explains Coetzee’s reluctance to give in too easily to ready-made 
assumptions. Foe says at one point, after Susan tells him a story about the endless confessions 
of a woman: “To me the moral of the story is that there comes a time when we must give 
reckoning of ourselves to the world, and then forever after be content to hold our peace.” 
(124) Susan comes to a quite different conclusion: “To me the moral is that he has the last 
word who disposes over the greatest force.” (124) In this case, Foe and his story about 
 
110 Another context transplanted from Roxana, where the servant Amy presents the lost daughter to Roxana, who 
refuses to acknowledge her. See Atwell 1991: 110 for more detail. 
111 This points to the dialogism of Bakhtin, to the awakened countervoices within narrative discourse, on which 
Carrol Clarkson has commented in terms of grammatical choices in her Coetzee monograph Countervoices. 
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Robinson Crusoe prove more powerful than Susan’s narrative – it remains to be seen how 
Coetzee’s contestation of Defoe’s narrative fares over time. 
In an exchange shortly after, Susan attempts again to assert her substantiality, and Foe 
tries to reassure her by reminding her of her perceptions of the girl, the embrace and kiss 
given and received, to which Susan replies: “No, she is substantial, as my daughter is 
substantial and I am substantial; and you too are substantial, no less and no more than any of 
us. We are all alive, we are all substantial, we are all in the same world.” (152) To which Foe 
curtly replies: “You have omitted Friday.” (ibid.) This small comment points to the centre of 
her engagement with Friday, who throughout the first three sections remains insubstantial in 
regard to his inner life, no matter how hard Susan tries to establish some kind of rapport with 
him. Accordingly, she announces herself at the beginning of section III on their first visit to 
Foe: “’It is I, Susan Barton,’ I announced – ‘I am alone, with Friday.’” (113) Friday is an 
insubstantial shadow to her, and she Claims to remain alone in spite of his company. 
3.1.3 Susan Barton and Friday 
Susan Barton’s substance pertains primarily to her inner life, to her beliefs and 
intentions. Friday’s substance remains primarily physical, resting with his embodiedness; of 
his inner life close to nothing is revealed, neither to Susan Barton nor to the reader. In both 
cases it will be difficult for the reader to apply his sympathetic imagination and develop 
empathy for either character. Being confronted with Barton’s beliefs and intentions without a 
proper embodiment leaves the reader with little to infer through empathetic engagement. 
Being presented Friday’s physical embodiedness might offer a starting point, but Susan 
Barton’s overpowering focalization prevents the reader from adopting Friday’s perspective, 
stalling our sympathetic imagination and our empathetic engagement. 
First Encounter 
After Susan is washed ashore in the opening paragraph of section I, Friday makes his 
first appearance: “A dark shadow fell upon me, not of a cloud but of a man with a dazzling 
halo about him.” (5) The allusion to the angel-like appearance – which conforms with 
Friday’s insubstantiality in the course of the narrative (Thomas of Aquinas once postulated 
that countless angels would find place on the tip of a needle) – is immediately followed by a 
more qualified description from Susan: “He was black: a Negro with a head of fuzzy wool, 
naked save for a pair of rough drawers. I lifted myself and studied the flat face, the small dull 
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eyes, the broad nose, the thick lips, the skin not black but a dark grey, dry as if coated with 
dust.” (5-6) This description is heavily slurred with racial denotations. Her first thought when 
he reaches for her arm is the fear of having encountered a cannibal: “He reached out and with 
the back of his hand touched my arm. He is trying my flesh, I thought. But by and by my 
breathing slowed and I grew calmer.” (6) Comparing this with the physical contact she later 
has with Cruso and Foe, one cannot fail to notice the tenderness of Friday’s gesture, which 
ameliorates even the worst suspicion. As Susan’s foot catches a thorn and renders her 
immobile, Friday offers to carry her, to which she hesitatingly submits herself: “So part-way 
skipping on one leg, part-way riding on his back, with my petticoat gathered up and my chin 
brushing his springy hair, I ascended the hillside, my fear of him abating in this strange 
backward embrace.” (6) This backward embrace constitutes the point of closest contact 
between Susan and Friday, while in the course of the narrative the distance continuously 
increases in spite of all her attempts to connect with Friday on a level of meanings. He is an 
angel for her, but the annunciation is limited to her very first impression.112 Susan Barton’s 
imagination originally draws on her fear and prejudice, but the physical proximity forced on 
her by circumstances of helplessness immediately override her initial assumptions, rendering 
her more sympathetic to Friday. 
The prominent physical character of their first encounter points to the physical 
substantiality of Friday (in contrast to his inner insubstantiality), which even exceeds that of 
Foe and Susan, who give the impression of “paper beings” caught in their intimations of 
power and desire. In Doubling the Point Coetzee addresses this in a very straightforward 
manner: 
Friday is mute, but Friday does not disappear, because Friday is body. If I look back over 
my own fiction, I see a simple (simple-minded?) standard erected. That standard is the 
body. Whatever else, the body is not “that which is not,” and the proof that it is the pain it 
feels. The body with its pain becomes a counter to the endless trials of doubt. (One can get 
away with such crudeness in fiction; one can’t in philosophy, I’m sure.) 
Not grace, then, but at least the body. (DP 248; original italics) 
This notion corresponds with what Coetzee in The Lives of Animals characterizes as 
embodiment. However, embodiment alone does not lead to empathy; here the focalization 
through Barton stalls empathy. 
 
112 In the discussion of Age of Iron I will discuss how Vercueil plays a very similar role for Elizabeth Curren. 
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Educating Friday: Signs and Symbolic Gestures of an Embodied Other 
Susan Barton’s hermeneutical enterprise in regard to Friday compares well to that of 
the medical doctor (in Life & Times of Michael K) – whom Atwell labels as “hermeneutic 
parasite.” (Atwell 1991: 97) Barton is primarily concerned with meanings; but a look at her 
dealings with others shows that she also assumes physical control over them. Her lovemaking 
with Foe reveals this clearly, but her tendency to take control over others can be traced back 
to her escape from the island. She forces both Cruso and Friday to leave the island against 
their will, ordering the rescue crew of the ship to capture Friday, who went into hiding: 
Nothing you can say will persuade him to yield himself up, for he has no understanding of 
words or power of speech. It will cost great effort to take him. Nevertheless, I beseech you 
to send your men ashore again; inasmuch as Friday is a slave and a child, it is our duty to 
care for him in all things, and not abandon him to a solitude worse than death. (39) 
Obviously she is projecting her own emotional state on him, assuming a stance of care similar 
to that of the Magistrate towards the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians. 
Unknowingly, Susan Barton assumes control over the bodies she encounters far more 
successfully than her attempts at understanding – here a hermeneutics of the body are at work, 
recalling the body as the single standard erected. Cruso doesn’t survive the displacement, and 
Friday certainly does not prosper and would most likely have been better off on the island by 
himself than in the hands of Susan Barton, who cannot help but record his demise in the 
metropolis: “Friday grows old before his time, like a dog locked up all its life.” (55) She 
conjures the imagery of the ‘noble savage’ but does not conclude that she might have been 
wrong in extracting him from his prior habitat: 
From eating too much and lying abed he is growing stupid. Seeing him with his belly tight 
as a drum and his thin shanks and listless air, you would not believe he was the same man 
who brief months ago stood poised on the rocks, the seaspray dancing about him, the 
sunlight glancing on his limbs, his spear raised, ready in an instant to strike a fish. (57) 
Just as absurdly as she attempts to tame a lizard on the island (7), Susan wishes to educate and 
domesticate Friday; but her general failure gives her intimations of the inadequacy of her 
approach: 
I tell myself I talk to Friday to educate him out of darkness and silence. But is that the 
truth? There are times when benevolence deserts me and I use words only as the shortest 
way to subject him to my will. At such times I understand why Cruso preferred not to 
disturb his muteness. (60) 
But Susan Barton persists in her project of educating Friday, clearly failing to develop a more 
empathetic understanding of Friday. 
In the second section Susan Barton and Friday have arrived in London. Susan 
approaches Foe to turn her account into a proper story without corrupting it; and the two of 
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them take up residence in Foe’s house after he has eloped from his creditors. Friday 
accompanies her wherever she goes; Susan Barton categorizes him as a slave when she 
ponders whether he will remain unkissed. While there is no indication that Friday has any 
desire to be kissed, Susan yearns for physical contact, so she projects her own desires and 
emotional states on Friday: “Where are you to meet a woman of your fate? Where are you to 
meet a woman of your own people? We are not a nation rich in slaves. I think of a watch-dog, 
raised with kindness but kept from birth behind a locked gate.” (80) For her benefit one can 
say she is aware of how compromised her enterprise regarding Friday is. But all doubts are 
countered by her one fundamental assertion: “He does not understand that I am leading him to 
freedom. He does not understand what freedom is.” (100) Later she has an exchange with Foe 
revealing how much more she invested in her project for her own sake: 
[Susan:] “He desires to be liberated, as I do too. […] There is an urging that we feel, all of 
us, in our hearts, to be free; yet which of us can say what freedom truly is?” (149) 
[... Foe replies:] “It is but the name we give to the desire you speak of, the desire to be free. 
What concerns us is the desire, not the name.” (149) 
[... Susan:] “Friday is no more in subjection than my shadow is for following me around. 
He is not free, but he is not in subjection. He is his own master, in law, and has been since 
Cruso’s death.” (150) 
Following the same logic, she presents to the captain the “paper signed in Cruso’s name” 
declaring Friday free, his “papers of manumission.” (110) She hopes that the captain will 
deliver Friday home, not knowing where that could be, but supposing it must be somewhere 
in Africa. Sensing the futility of her request (and in her reasoning foreshadowing what 
Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron will say of her feelings for the boy John) she aborts this 
attempt and resumes her self-imposed responsibility for Friday: 
A woman may bear a child she does not want, and rear it without loving it, yet be ready to 
defend it with her life. Thus it has become, in a manner of speaking, between Friday and 
myself. I do not love him, but he is mine. That is why he remains in England. That is why 
he is here. (111) 
After their return to London, she acknowledges Friday’s dependence on her, and senses that 
she has no right to expect gratitude or even love for her enterprise of abducting Friday from 
the island and calling it an act of liberation. When Foe inquires whether Friday has ever 
grown enamoured of her, Susan replies: “How are we ever to know what goes on in the heart 
of Friday? [...] We have lived too close for love, Mr Foe. Friday has grown to be my shadow. 
Do our shadows love us, for all that they are never parted from us?” (115) Repeatedly Susan 
Barton directs her thoughts to Friday’s inner life, but her sympathetic imagination does not 
reach far, and Friday’s mute resistance stalls her attempts. 
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A Strange Duet 
Searching through Foe’s belongings (yet another act of appropriation on Susan’s side) 
Susan Barton comes across some recorders (Blockflöte); she takes the smallest and hands it to 
Friday: “The next morning I heard him toying with it; soon he had so far mastered it as to play 
the tune of six notes I will forever associate with the island and Cruso’s first sickness.” (95) 
Back then Friday had played it over and over on his “little reed flute.” (28) As Friday again 
repeats this tune over and over again, Susan comes to remonstrate him, finding him “spinning 
slowly around with the flute to his lips and his eyes shut.” (95) It occurs to Susan “that if there 
were any language accessible to Friday, it would be the language of music.” (96) She 
practices Friday’s tune and joins in with his tune the next morning, “first in unison with him, 
then in the intervals when he was not playing.” (96) This seems one of the genuine moments 
of Susan connecting with Friday, but it remains tainted and incomplete: “The music we made 
was not pleasing: there was a subtle discord all the time, though we seemed to be playing the 
same notes. Yet our instruments were made to play together, else why were they in the same 
case?” (96) The same could be said of their souls, which are both trapped in each respective 
body. Susan belittles this by musing whether this might count as conversation after all – still 
trapped in her world of words and meaning: “Is conversation not simply a species of music in 
which first the one takes up the refrain and then the other?” (96) Instead of finding 
satisfaction in this precious moment of shared attention and coherence, Susan soon gets tired 
and reminds herself of her self-imposed duty to educate Friday. She tries to teach Friday other 
tunes: “[W]e cannot forever play the same tune and be content. Or so at least it is with 
civilized people.” (97) Friday does not respond but continues with ever the same tune, 
seeming to be in a “trance of possession, and his soul more in Africa than in Newington.” (98) 
Her irritation produces tears, and she senses in him a “disdain for intercourse with [her].” (98) 
As readers we become acutely aware of the strong desire in Susan to connect with others, to 
validate herself and her narrative through others, in this case Friday. We feel her pain and 
follow through her motions of surprise, discomfort, irritation and anger: “Watching him 
whirling in his dance, I had to hold back an urge to strike him and tear the wig and robes away 
and thus rudely teach him he was not alone on this earth.” (98) The frustration of Susan 
Barton at this point might give occasion to the reader’s sympathetic imagination, allowing the 
reader to feel her disappointment and share it empathetically. 
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Pas de Deux - It always takes two 
At one point, Susan Barton reports to Foe (in letters that never reach him) that Friday 
discovered Foe’s robes in a wardrobe. Friday dons the robes and dances a curious dance, 
which closely resembles the dance of a dervish, who keeps spinning in a circle with arms 
spread out wide in an attempt to lose himself and reach spiritual ecstasy and celestial 
communion. She writes: “In the grip of dancing he is not himself. He is beyond human 
reach.” (92) On the road to Bristol, while Friday is absent (who has gone off but will soon 
return), Susan imitates Friday’s dance, mirrors what she has observed earlier. At first, she 
justifies her imitation with the practical reason of drying her clothes. But the dance overrides 
her rationale, and she believes to have come closer to understanding Friday: “I have 
discovered why Friday dances in England, I thought, smiling to myself.” (103) While thinking 
this, she enters a trance-like state and only dizzily returns to her actual surroundings. She 
senses “a glow of after-memory” that makes her realize “there were other lives open to [her] 
than this one.” (104) As sleep allowed the magistrate and Michael K to lose themselves, the 
dance allows Susan to imagine another life apart from her own. The imitation of Friday’s 
actions would require activity of mirror neurons on her behalf, which helped in recording the 
movements and imitating them, and might now have opened a space for empathetic 
engagement. In her last comment we see how previous restraints (similar to Magda being 
stuck with herself) of her sympathetic imagination might have been loosened. Susan imagines 
how Friday might have danced to “remove himself, or his spirit, from Newington and 
England, and from me too” – never has her intuition been closer to a plausible truth about 
Friday’s inner life. 
Friday’s Hieroglyphs: Eye to Eye 
“‘All my efforts to bring Friday to speech, or to bring speech to Friday, have failed,’ I 
said. ‘He utters himself only in music and dancing, which are to speech as cries and shouts are 
to words. […]’” (142) Along with music and dance there is a third instance of self-
representation on the side of Friday. Prompted by Foe, Susan Barton attempts to teach him 
how to write (her language), employing a “child’s slate and pencil.” (144) The first words she 
chooses to teach him are house, Africa, mother, and ship (145-146); soon she is frustrated by 
Friday’s apparent lack of understanding: “Long and hard I stared at him, till he lowered his 
eyelids and shut his eyes. […] I reached out and took him by the chin and turned his face 
toward me. His eyelids opened.” (146) The mechanical and forced nature of this eye contact 
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stalls empathetic engagement. Susan searches Friday’s eyes for a “spark of mockery” to 
confirm her suspicion that he is pretending to be more stupid than he actually is – she no 
longer trusts the face value presented by Friday, confused as she is by the incongruous mental 
images of Friday created by her narrative. The force of her gesture corresponds with the 
hermeneutical pressure applied by her, fuelled by her desire to fill the gaps of her story, of 
which Friday has become a part, to unveil the truth concealed by Friday’s silence. 
Soon after Susan and Foe watch Friday fill the slate with what at first glance seems to 
be a design of leaves and flowers (cf. the petals he spreads over the pond; see following 
section): “But when I came closer I saw the leaves were eyes, open eyes, each set upon a 
human foot: row upon row of eyes upon feet: walking eyes.” (147) As she reaches out to take 
the slate in order to show it to Foe, Friday won’t let it go; he “put three fingers in his mouth 
instead and wet them with spittle and rubbed the slate clean.” (ibid.) What could be read as a 
refusal to be appropriated by Western narrative and its hermeneutics is similar to the 
resistance Susan Barton shows towards Foe’s attempts to appropriate her story into the 
discourse of the adventure novel envisioned by him. 
The “open eyes, each set upon a human foot” have led to various speculations on the 
side of the critics.113 Ayo Kehinde points out the connection to the emblematic footprints 
Defoe’s Crusoe had discovered on the beach. Barbara Eckstein sees a depiction of the galleys 
of a slave ship here, the eyes of the slaves seeing only the feet of sailors.114 More generally, 
Claudia Egerer sees Friday’s drawings as “contesting the very notion of Friday as empty, as 
nullified” (Prentice summarizing Egerer). Most originally, Mike Marais has read it as a trope 
of the “travelling eye/I”, which could both refer to imperialist notions of omnivision (these 
can be traced back to Jacobus Coetzee’s ideas of the “spherical eye” in Dusklands) as well as 
to Friday himself as a travelling eye, with no tongue to speak – all perceptions without any 
form of expression beyond his physical body (therefore the song and dance). Being true to 
Coetzee’s ambiguity, I would accord all of these accounts some credibility. Hardly any of the 
critics take Susan Barton’s explanation seriously, when she relates his drawing to the 
 
113 Chris Prentice has compiled interpretations in a footnote in his essay Foe. (Prentice 2011: 91-112) 
114 Cf. Kehinde 2007; also Eckstein 1996 and Egerer 1999. Mike Marais comments: 
Friday’s sketch, which is a graphic evocation of the eighteenth century literary topos of the reader 
as traveller, constitutes an image of reading within the text and mirrors the reading I/eye who holds 
the literary object in the grip of his/her ‘hermeneutic gaze’ (White Writing 9). This technique of 
internal mirroring recurs shortly afterwards when, in the novel’s brief concluding section, an 
unidentified ‘I’ enters the text and, upon finding the manuscript embarks upon a journey of reading 
during which he/she reads the opening sentence of the novel (F 155). Foe thus ends with a striking 
reflection of the subject position of dominance which the reading I/eye assumes in relation to the 
text as other. (Marais 1996: 72) 
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scattering of petals on the surface of a pool of water, a ritual observed by her during her stay 
on the island. I shall return to this in the final section of this analysis. 
Shortly after his first drawings Friday takes Foe’s place at the desk, as Susan had done 
before; yet another comment on positions of narrative authority and the evocation of shifts 
taking place, this time in favour of Friday and signalling his ascension to narrative authority 
beyond the realm of words and narrative texture. Friday writes endless rows of zeros or the 
letter ‘o’, on which Foe comments she should teach him the letter ‘a’ next. (152) Atwell picks 
up on this and remarks that this might be hinting at the alpha and the omega; the omega 
representing the end of the story, and Foe asking for a beginning to make the story complete 
or at least give it a beginning that might help to make sense of the end. (Atwell 1991) The 
third section ends here. 
None of the self-expressions elicited from Friday by Susan Barton allow her to bridge 
the gap between her narrative and the ever-silent core of Friday’s story, which remains 
unattainable or rather unintelligible for her. Her attempt to “to build a bridge of words” to 
return Friday to the “world of words” (60) has failed. Susan Barton remains an insubstantial 
paper being, with Friday trapped as her bodily shadow. 
3.1.4 Silences 
Coetzee artfully links Susan Barton’s narrative – with its own blank spots – to the 
story of Friday, which remains concealed through the absence of a tongue that could translate 
it into terms of narrative. “That is to say, many stories can be told of Friday’s tongue, but the 
true story is buried within Friday, who is mute. The true story will not be heard till by art we 
have found a means of giving voice to Friday.” (118) As shown above, the hermeneutic 
enterprise of giving Friday a for(u)m of expression has failed. “Yet the only tongue that can 
tell Friday’s secret is the tongue he has lost!” (67) Friday’s silence is both symptomatic of the 
cruelties suffered under colonial exploits and the lack of voice as discussed by Gayatri Spivak 
in her seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak” (1988), which discusses both the position of 
the colonial subject that has no voice and the speaking for others attempted by colonial 
cultural production.115 Susan Barton suspects Cruso of having mutilated Friday; thinking of 
their seemingly peaceful coexistence on the island this seems highly unlikely, but Susan 
Barton can be stubborn in her narrative assumptions: “Better had he drawn his teeth instead!” 
(95) This once again reflects her deep fears of cannibalism, here metonymically condensed to 
 
115 See also Spivak 1990. 
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the symbol of teeth. Foe also senses the importance of Friday’s fate, and calls it “the heart of 
the story,” or better even “the eye of the story” (141) – the slight shift from heart to eye 
corresponds with the picture of “eyes on feet”; a shift that can also be applied to a more 
general sense of this novel being concerned more with matters of perception and intellectual 
appropriation rather than matters of the heart. In another instance of Susan’s musings she 
notes: “The tongue is like the heart, in that way, is it not? Save that we do not die when a 
knife pierces the tongue. To that degree we may say the tongue belongs to the world of play, 
whereas the heart belongs to the world earnest.” (85) Foe as a narrative remains in the realm 
of tongues, only barely touching issues of the heart. The absence of Friday’s story 
corresponds with his first appearance and Susan Barton’s initial impression of him as a dark 
shadow with a halo: “The shadow whose lack you feel is there: it is the loss of Friday’s 
tongue.” (117)116 The halo could be seen to resemble the aura Friday attains by remaining 
impenetrable to the hermeneutic discourse of penetration; that Susan Barton takes part in this 
discourse can be seen in her sexual domination of Cruso and Foe, something Friday is never 
subjected to – the physical intimacy resembles a relinquishing of narrative power. 
Mike Marais offers a compelling analysis of how Coetzee utilizes Friday’s silence in 
terms of postcolonial empowerment: 
In his representations of the silent other, Coetzee invests silence with power: silence is cast 
as the means by which the other preserves its alterior status against assimilation by the 
West. [...] Silence is neither a sign of submission nor merely a strategy of passive 
resistance, but a counter-strategy through which the other preserves, even asserts, its 
alterior status and in so doing interrogates the fixity of dominant power structures and 
positions. (Marais 1996: 74f; echoing Gayatri Spivak) 
Friday’s counter-strategy of maintaining his alterior status forestalls acts of empathy, for this 
requires the perception of similarity, preceded by a general acknowledgement of alterity. In 
the case of Friday, the alterity remains almost absolute, so that Barton’s sympathetic 
imagination finds no leverage to approximate their positions. Marais continues: 
For Coetzee, then, silence is not, as Salman Rushdie would have it, “the ancient language 
of defeat” (89). It is a potent political tool through which the other escapes and challenges 
the “conceptual constraints of imperial cultures whose programmes of conquest and 
annihilation are enshrined in language” (WW 176). (Marais 1996: 75)117 
What remains of Friday, when the hermeneutic enterprise of Susan (and Foe) fails? Like in 
Life & Times of Michael K, the simple standard erected by Coetzee in regard to Friday is the 
body, which in this case includes the inscribing of pain and torture, etched into the memory of 
 
116 The trope of the shadow existence is repeatedly applied to Friday by Susan: “Friday is no more in subjection 
than my shadow is for following me around. He is not free, but he is not in subjection. He is his own master, in 
law, and has been since Cruso’s death.” (150) 
117 Marais is here referring to Rushdie, Salman. Shame. London: Pan Books, 1984. 
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the body, visible as scars and absences. In Susan’s terms, it is a state of insufficiency, of 
inadequacy, comparable to that of a child: 
What is the truth of Friday? You will respond: he is neither cannibal nor laundryman, these 
are mere names, they do not touch his essence, he is a substantial body, he is himself, 
Friday is Friday. But that is not so. No matter what he is to himself (is he anything to 
himself?), what he is to the world is what I make of him. Therefore the silence of Friday is 
a helpless silence. He is the child of his silence, a child unborn, a child waiting to be born 
that cannot be born. Whereas the silence I keep regarding Bahia and other matters is chosen 
and purposeful: it is my own silence. (121f) 
In spite of his silence, Friday remains not only a “substantial body” (which in itself should be 
considered sufficient and adequate), but also forms the silent centre of the narrative, which in 
all its turns briefly illuminates the background story of Susan but far more prominently 
focuses on Friday’s hidden story. 
3.1.5 The Final Passage 
In every story there is a silence, some sight concealed, some word unspoken, I believe. Till 
we have spoken the unspoken we have not come to the heart of the story. I ask: Why was 
Friday drawn into such deadly peril, given that life on the island was without peril, and then 
saved? (141) 
The peril Foe refers to here draws on two of his constructions, the one involving an enormous 
kraken hidden beneath a bed of seaweeds, the other imagining a ship at the bottom of the pool 
with all its dead people (slaves and sailors) staring up at Friday while he rows on the surface 
of the pool and spreads petals over the water, as if he is commemorating the lost souls. To the 
reader Foe’s thrill-seeking comment bears some irony, since Friday is more at peril in London 
than he ever was on the island. Susan initially surmises Friday’s ritual to be an “offering to the 
god of the waves to cause the fish to run plentifully, or performing some other such 
superstitious observance.” (31) Rosemary Jolly, like Marais drawing on Spivak, summarizes 
Coetzee’s narrative setup in Foe: 
The figure of Friday, noncenter of the narrative of Foe (as Susan Barton keeps on pointing 
out to Foe), can be situated at the nexus between these two “contradictory” (from our point 
of view) movements in postcolonialism, namely the maintenance of a mimetics that is not 
simplistically recuperative but is nevertheless recreative, and the simultaneous refusal of a 
fixed referent. (Jolly 1996: 144) 
To the reader the centre (or anchor) of the narrative remains obscure. We reach no 
comprehensive understanding of Susan Barton and her lost daughter, of Cruso and how he 
came to live on the island, of Foe and his debts, and ultimately of Friday and the story of his 
mutilation. In White Writing Coetzee poetically compares the reflecting surfaces of water 
pools with earth’s eyes staring at the sky. In a similar vein, Foe remarks: 
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“I said the heart of the story,” resumed Foe, “but I should have said the eye, the eye of the 
story. Friday rows his log of wood across the dark pupil – or the dead socket – of an eye 
staring up at him from the floor of the sea. He rows across it and is safe. To us he leaves the 
task of descending into that eye. Otherwise, like him, we sail across the surface and come 
shore none the wiser, and resume our old lives, and sleep without dreaming, like babes.” 
(141) 
Foe’s comment anticipates the final fourth section of the novel, the point of which he seems to 
foreshadow: “It is for us to open Friday’s mouth and hear what it holds: silence, perhaps, or a 
roar, like the roar of a seashell held to the ear.” (142) This is the roar that issues from the lips 
of Friday in the very final lines of the narrative. In section IV (no quotation marks!) an 
unnamed narrator enters a sunken ship, then the home of Foe. A girl sits on the landing 
(maybe Susan’s lost daughter), Foe and Susan lie in bed together, Friday on the floor next to 
them, wrapped in “soft, heavy stuff” (a body bag?). The unnamed visitor touches Friday’s 
hair, testing its quality. 
After a long while, [...] he stirs and sighs [...] The sound his body makes is faint and dry, 
like leaves falling over leaves. [...] His teeth part. [...] 
At first there is nothing. Then, if I can ignore the beating of my own heart, I begin to hear 
the faintest faraway roar: as she said, the roar of waves in a seashell; and over that, as if 
once or twice a violin-string were touched, the whine of the wind and the cry of a bird. 
Closer I press, listening for other sounds: the chirp of sparrows, the thud of a mattock, the 
call of a voice. 
From his mouth, without a breath, issue the sounds of the islands. (154) 
Two asterisks mark the end of this passage, after which the narrator enters a house, remarking 
on a plaque marking it as the house of Daniel Defoe (not Foe!). While it was night in the first 
sequence, we now read “a bright autumn day.” (155) The personnel in the room is nearly the 
same (the girl is omitted); the visitor notices a scar running around Fridays neck, “left by a 
rope or chain” (marking him as ex-slave and as a tortured body). In a dispatch box the visitor 
finds Susan Barton’s text and begins reading its first sentence, marked by quotation marks. 
The text continues as before in the first person narrative only now the narrative “I” re-enacts 
Susan’s slipping out of her boat, thereby re-entering the narrative beginning of Foe, only now 
being caught in seaweed and descending into the pool where Friday casts his petals. The “stub 
of candle” (156) carried around the neck is useless; no hermeneutic light will shine in these 
depths. The “mud of Flanders” (the infamous battlefield WW II) is invoked as the narrative 
voice crawls into the wreck, situating its individual fate in a long history of death (shortly 
after, the wreck is dated back three hundred years, quite likely dating the given account in 
Coetzee’s present time). In the cabin, behind the bloated bodies of Susan Barton and the 
captain, Friday sits in the corner, “half-buried in sand, his knees drawn up, his hands between 
his thighs” and a “chain about his throat.” (157) The narrative voice addresses him by name, 
which approximates it to the voice of Susan Barton: 
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But this is not a place of words. Each syllable, as it comes out, is caught and filled with 
water and diffused. This is a place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of 
Friday. (157) 
The foregrounding of Friday’s body as his primary and incorruptible signifier complies with 
Coetzee’s idea of embodiment as a central function of literary representation. Like in the first 
sequence, the visitor wants to hear Friday’s voice, only now his fingernails probe the closed 
mouth of Friday for a way of entry. Just then: 
His mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without breath, without 
interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; it passes through the cabin, 
through the wreck; washing the cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and 
southward to the ends of the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my 
eyelids, against the skin of my face. (157) 
The final words of Foe direct our attention to the face of the narrative I, in whose shoes we 
have been walking and diving through this final section, submerging ourselves into the 
narrative. In the light of my larger argument, this passage is a strong example for how Coetzee 
manages to manipulate the reader and awaken our sympathetic imagination. The shift of 
narrative position and focalization in this last section redirects our narrative attention and 
shifts our position beyond a mere observer, luring us into an inside perspective. 
As readers we are strongly invested in the focalisation of the final passage. At this 
point, we have lost any certainty as to who is speaking the narrative. At first the reader will 
assume that the first person perspective still refers to Susan Barton, as she has narrated all 
previous sections in the first person present tense. This assumption gets tested when a female 
dead body appears; one might argue that it now is the disembodied narrative voice of Susan 
Barton speaking, visiting her own history and seeing her own dead body. This idea might lead 
to the competing notion of the voice of Coetzee entering his own text in the first person form 
– not all too implausible considering Coetzee’s fondness of literary experiments and 
metafictional and metanarrative interruptions and intrusions.118 In the second passage the 
same options could be considered. So far the narrative visitor was in a neutral mode of 
observation, making its way into the setting, but taking no action and not interfering with the 
scene. The unexpected turn of events as the narrative voice enters the narrative and takes 
action topples all previous assumptions of a disembodied narrator. We as readers can no 
longer avoid inhabiting the narrative point of view, having lost all footing of where to locate 
the narrative I. Coetzee’s handling of perspective draws us into the text, forces us to inhabit 
the central perspective and look into the century-old face of slavery, condensed in the face of 
 
118 This taste for experiments can be seen in his criticism, linguistic studies, fictions and reading preferences: 
“But I must say that I get impatient with fiction that doesn’t try something that hasn’t been tried before, 
preferably with the medium itself.” (Auster/Coetzee 2013: 165) 
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Friday, who speaks for all of them as his roar flows out to all corners of earth. This account 
should move any reader and touch his emotions, ultimately awakening our empathy in 
listening to the pain of Friday closing this narrative.119 
Rosemary Jolly speaks of the “helplessness of power” (read: narrative authority) being 
demonstrated in the final section exposing the “heartlessness of the enterprise of 
representation.” (Jolly 1996: 7) According to her postcolonial reading, “[t]his violence [of 
representation] becomes evident, ironically, when the narrative fails to master its subjects: 
when it ‘loses its voice.’” (Jolly 1996: 3) In her reading Susan Barton narrates the final 
section, but at the very end makes way for the embodied Friday, “speaking in the voice of the 
unnamed, indeterminate narrator.” (Jolly 1996: 144) Helen Tiffin sees Coetzee’s narrative 
method as “continually rehearsing Friday’s silence itself as the interpretative problem which 
fractures all the potential narratives Barton and Foe attempt to construct.” (Tiffin 1987: 30-31) 
The argument continues: 
In the final chapter of the novel he dispenses with the author, Foe, whose image now 
coalesces with that of the Captain, Cruso/e, and all of white slaving imperial history and its 
complicit narrativization, and with the female “castaway” Susan Barton. The “I” narrator 
now becomes “Coetzee,” who, as author still necessarily the “foe” of alterity, but who now 
situates himself directly in relation to Friday and Friday’s potential for speech. (Tiffin 1987: 
31) 
Dominic Head, citing Ina Gräbe, also proposes that Coetzee himself enters the 
narrative, as suggested above: 
[T]he final section represents the most self-conscious diegetic level, so that the appearance 
of a voice representing Coetzee permits the author to occupy the ‘privileged position of the 
ultimate focalizer of the previous three levels’. This also demands of the reader ‘a 
reassessment of the entire foregoing enterprise’. [...] Indeed, the effect of the final section is 
to offer a compromise rather than an authorial imposition. (Head 1997: 123) 
This argument tunes in well with the entire text’s questioning of narrative authority. Denis 
Donaghue is quoted by Robert Post: “I take it to be the voice of the poetic imagination.” (Post 
1989: 152) Post also quotes Jane Gardam as being convinced that in these pages “Coetzee 
himself goes searching for the body of Friday, seeking it in the waters off the island in the 
wreckage of the slave ship.” (Post 1989: 153) Post himself offers another reading: 
 
119 In the first section of the narrative Susan uses earplugs to “shut out the sound of the wind. So I became deaf, 
as Friday was mute; what difference did it make on an island where no one spoke?” (35) The roaring wind 
corresponds with the roar emitted from Friday’s mouth in the final section, and Susan’s refusal to listen is telling. 
On another level, she seems to attempt to equal Friday’s lack of his speaking faculty, but oddly by shutting off 
her hearing. If she were interested in a shared experience, not talking and thereby turning mute would be a more 
adequate but just as pointless an exercise. Instead, she closes off her receptive faculty in favour of her 
transmitting faculty; Susan Barton must insist to maintain her sender position for the sake of her narrative, 
holding on to her authority. Giving up her narrative authority would mean the immediate end of the story, but by 
keeping it she can impossibly achieve any more intimate proximity and understanding of Friday: she is caught in 
her own world of words and meanings. 
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Another possibility is that Susan Barton continues to speak in these final pages as she has 
done throughout the narrative […] Through his speaker, Susan Barton, the poetic 
imagination of Coetzee is calling out for nonwhite South Africans to be permitted speech so 
that their plight will be heard and recognized throughout the world. (Post 1989: 152-53) 
Apart from the last bit about a direct reading it cannot be dismissed too easily. Though a 
literary-minded reader would most likely prefer more complex interpretations, such as that 
offered by Sue Kossew: 
Coetzee’s rewriting of this ending evokes a complex and ambivalent response: Friday’s 
“voice” still has no words (“bodies are their own signs”) and the author-figure of the final 
section is unable to resist its power (“it beats against my eyelids, against the skin of my 
face”), yet avoids speaking for Friday, allowing his voice to emerge only in a metaphoric 
way. It could be argued that, after the models of authorship rejected in the previous 
sections, this model most closely approximates that of Wilson Harris’s “infinite rehearsal” 
(and the repetition, echoing and rewriting of previous sections reinforces this reading), 
which seeks to avoid appropriation, absorption and betrayal of the subject by restructuring 
patriarchal language. (Kossew 1996: 175; drawing on: Maes-Jelinek 1989) 
One critic sees a possible connection to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Mike Marais an allusion 
to Wordsworth – the second thought more original and likely (Marais 1998b: 57). Surely 
many more varieties of similar and maybe more ingenious readings are imaginable. The final 
section takes seriously Walter Benjamin’s notion of the end of a narrative representing death 
(in: Der Erzähler, 1936/37), which Rukmini Nair could be imagined giving a comment on in 
her volume Narrative Gravity: 
Death. The point has been made before that the end of a story anticipates death. The closing 
of the narrative sequence, its coda, marks a formal separation from all the other cogs still 
merrily spinning along. It metaphorically describes the final dissolution of the ‘self’. (Nair 
2003: 24) 
3.1.6 Closing Remarks - Not quite empathetic, at least not yet! 
On their way to Bristol Susan once again muses on whether Friday has a cannibal past, 
pondering whether he is ‘unclean’ and should be repelling to her: 
I grant without reserve that in such thinking lie the seeds of madness. We cannot shrink in 
disgust from our neighbour’s touch because his hands, that are clean now, were once dirty. 
We must cultivate, all of us, a certain ignorance, a certain blindness, or society will not be 
tolerable. (106) 
This could also have been voiced in a similar fashion by Coetzee’s later heroine Elizabeth 
Costello, who reserves her vegetarian habits for her own food. Susan Barton’s sets a good 
example of cultivating “a certain ignorance, a certain blindness” in order to overcome initial 
prejudices and fears in her approach to Friday; however, the same blindness and ignorance 
had been cultivated for far too long to allow her to actually bridge the gap between her and 
Friday, to combine their narratives into one grand narrative; the stories are too disparate, each 
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with its own gaps and holes. Coetzee’s lets Susan make a first step, but also shows the limits 
of her still colonial imagination, which is not quite empathetic, at least not yet. 
With the formal means of narrative Coetzee has taken us by the hand and led us 
towards a narrative dissolution of our selves, allowing us a glimpse of the other, sounding the 
echo of its anonymous roar. The staging of otherness has reached the centre stage of narrative 
attention in Foe: 
Otherness, then, is at stake in every literary text, and in a particularly conspicuous way in 
the text that disrupts the illusions of linguistic immediacy and instrumentality. Among these 
texts are some in which the other is thematized as a central moral and political issue, and in 
these texts the capacity of formal techniques to stage otherness can be exploited with 
particular force and relevance. J. M. Coetzee’s novels are cases in point. (Attridge 1998: 
204) 
3.2 Age of Iron (1990) – Urban Isolation 
3.2.1 Up Close and Personal 
Age of Iron marks a significant shift in Coetzee’s choice of protagonists and settings 
for his fictions from the allegorical towards a realist representation of South Africa under 
apartheid. The tone becomes more personal, and the realist setting of Cape Town comes closer 
to his own situation. The main character Elizabeth Curren held an academic position teaching 
literature in Cape Town, South Africa, just like Coetzee himself. The increased intimacy of 
tone is not so much due to the setting but reflects the thematic engagement with parental 
affiliation and filial remonstration. Age of Iron began as an epistolary novel in which Coetzee, 
writing from a first person perspective, addressed his mother Vera, who had died shortly 
before.120 Coetzee, however, decided to give up the autobiographical perspective, and adopted 
the perspective of a mother writing to her daughter about her growing political awareness. 
The dedication of Age of Iron presents three sets of initials and the respective life dates 
of his mother: V.H.M.C. (1904-1985), his father: Z.C. (1912-1988) and his son: N.G.C. (1966-
1989). In a short period of about five years Coetzee lost both his parents and his son; the son’s 
untimely death resulting from an accident. The dedication for Age of Iron has a 
commemorating function, honouring the dead. Coetzee’s work of mourning is continued even 
more openly in The Master of Petersburg, but removed in time and place to Russia at the end 
of the 19th century (see 3.3). 
 
120 At a conference in Gießen in 2012, David Atwell discussed the early manuscripts of Age of Iron, now made 
available at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Austin, Texas. The results of his research will be made 
available in more detail in Atwell’s forthcoming intellectual biography of Coetzee. 
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3.2.2 A Dead Place 
There is an alley down the side of the garage, you may remember it, you and your friends 
would sometimes play there. Now it is a dead place, waste, without use, where windblown 
leaves pile up and rot. (AI 3)121 
With these opening words Coetzee leads us into the epistolary imagination of Elizabeth 
Curren in Age of Iron, by which she mourns bygone days of her daughter’s childhood, as if 
reclaiming those memories from the “dead place” was as futile as Orpheus’ attempt to reclaim 
Eurydice from the land of the dead.122 Elizabeth Curren addresses her daughter, whose 
position we inhabit via the “you” we read in her address; in the case of a South African reader, 
the resonance of a shared collective memory will certainly be stronger than to readers from 
elsewhere. 
As opposed to Susan Barton, who even in her letters would use the first person present 
tense, Elizabeth Curren narrates events in the past tense, but in close proximity to the events 
narrated, speaking of “[y]esterday” and “now”. (3) The suggestive immediacy of her 
reflections resembles a diary, or even a deathbed confession: “To embrace death as my own, 
mine alone. / To whom this writing then? The answer: to you but not to you; to me; to you in 
me.” (6) Curren conflates writer (I) and addressee (you), in the narrative herself and her 
daughter, beyond the narrative author and reader. Here Coetzee lets Curren comment on the 
singularity of death, which is always experienced individually; but the quote also hints at the 
self-reflexive nature of any address: in encountering others we find ourselves. The theme 
foreshadows Coetzee’s later autobiographical fiction Summertime, which enacts a post 
mortem self-analysis, in this regard surpassing Elizabeth Curren’s ante mortem narrative. 
Curren starts her writing after she has received a terminal cancer diagnosis, which 
gives her narrative voice a twist of Walter Benjamin’s Erzähler, whose death ends all 
narrative, but who also postulates death as a precondition for all narrative. In Curren’s words 
of a binary logic: “Death may indeed be the last great foe of writing, but writing is also the 
foe of death.” (115-116) In her case the terminal sickness constitutes a beginning of sorts; the 
impulse to leave the cave of unwitting complicity and see the light of the harsh truth of 
apartheid.123 
 
121 Coetzee 1990. All quotes in section 3.2 will be from AI unless indicated otherwise. 
122 Sam Durrant extensively discusses the works of Maurice Blanchot and the myth of Orpheus in relation to Age 
of Iron and The Master of Petersburg (Durrant 2004). 
123 Fiona Probyn offers an astute reading of Age of Iron, relating cancer and Apartheid to each other. At one point 
she remarks: “Cancer in particular problematizes the inside/outside, self/other distinction which constitutes or 
fortifies perceptions of a unified self because it is anomalous and abject; one example (of many) is that tumours 
located inside the body of the cancer patient are referred to by doctors as “non-self”, suggesting that the 
discourse of oncology generates ontological confusion.” (Probyn 1998: 214; original emphasis) Probyn is aware 
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The novel opens with Elizabeth Curren’s encounter with Vercueil in that dead place, 
and in the end he is at her side when the final moment comes. In my reading I shall mainly 
concentrate on her relation with Vercueil and with John, Bheki’s friend. 
3.2.3 Unlikely Companions 
The Smells and Dirty Fingernails of Vercueil 
Vercueil enters the narrative as a “derelict. […] Asleep in his box, his legs stretched 
out like a marionette’s, his jaw agape. […] Unclean.” (4)124 He is described as “tall, thin, with 
a weathered skin and long, carious fangs, wearing a baggy gray suit and a hat with a sagging 
brim.” (3) From the very beginning Elizabeth Curren marks him as “unclean,” a line 
continued in her perception of his smell: “For a while I stood staring down at him, staring and 
smelling.” (4) The physical body is again foregrounded in the encounter, as opposed to 
cultural assumptions and prejudices. Curren perceives Vercueil as “[a] presence or a smell.” 
(13) She makes no effort to hide her disgust at his bodily presence, but not without “a flicker 
of embarrassment” about her own attitude. (84) The clash of different sets of personal hygiene 
is obvious. The text invites the reader to overcome this disgust, to sweep it aside in order to 
allow the encounter to grow into something more, something approximating companionship, 
however unlikely it may seem. The embarrassment about being repelled is already an 
advanced level of self-awareness and attests her will to overcome the conventions insidiously 
imbibed in a lifetime of segregation. When they are out searching the hospitals for Bheki’s 
friend, she and Vercueil at one point end up waiting for Florence and Bheki: “In silence we 
waited in the car, Vercueil and I, like a couple married too long, talked out, grumpy. I am even 
getting used to the smell, I thought.” (70) At one point they are in her kitchen, and Vercueil 
cuts himself a slice of bread: 
His fingernails filthy. Who knows what else he had been touching. And this is the one to 
whom I speak my heart, whom I trust with last things. Why this crooked path to you? 
My mind like a pool, which his finger enters and stirs. Without that finger, stillness, 
stagnation. 
A way of indirection. By indirection I find direction out. A crab’s walk. 
His dirty fingernail entering me. (82) 
that Coetzee made a similar connection: “In an essay entitled ‘The Mind of Apartheid: Geoffrey Cronjé (1907-),’ 
Coetzee traces the development of the association between apartheid and metaphors of disease through the work 
of Geoffrey Cronjé, who was a founding ‘thinker’ behind the formulation of apartheid.” (Probyn 1998: 221) See 
also Marais 1998b: 228. 
124 This potentially invites a discussion of Kleist’s essay on the Marionettentheater and how the 
machine/automaton effect of Coetzeean others might support the intellectual distancing mechanism and favour 
narrative empathy. 
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This passage highlights how overcoming her distaste for his “filthiness” opens up new 
possibilities for her thinking, and consequently her changed attitude towards Vercueil, whose 
“dirty fingernails” are stirring the “pool of her mind” – not the domain of the soul, at least not 
yet. The reader accompanies her from a state of being repelled to a state of actually longing 
for his touch, in spite of his unclean appearance and the “faint haze of alcohol about him.” 
(82) 
Life Stories, Smiles and Mutual Grinning 
Their verbal exchanges are not all recorded in Elizabeth’s letter to her daughter – the 
text makes us aware of omissions, but over the course of the novel the reader acquires more 
and more information about the backgrounds of both of them. The name Vercueil is first 
mentioned when Curren announces his presence to her maid Florence about him: “Vercueil, 
Verkuil, Verskuil. That’s what he says. I have never come across such a name before. I am 
letting him stay here for a while. He has a dog […]”(37) The name of Elizabeth Curren is first 
indicated in a note to Florence signed E.C. (41) Between Curren and Vercueil no introduction 
takes place, placing their encounter outside of conventional social contact. 
Early on, it is Elizabeth Curren who shares stories from her life, such as a childhood 
story of her mother, or shows him a picture of her daughter, which she then regards “through 
his eyes” (31), applying her sympathetic imagination and exercising perspective-taking, one 
of the vital steps on the road towards empathy. Later she also mentions to him the removal of 
one of her breasts; probably the most intimate detail about her body she could possibly share 
with him. (166) Sharing all this, she expects Vercueil to equally share his stories in return: “It 
was time for him to say something now, about hills or cars or bicycles or about himself or his 
childhood. But he was stubbornly silent.” (17) Similar to Friday in Foe, Vercueil displays a 
resistance to reveal himself to her; but his resistance is temporary and softens up. When he 
does reveal facts about himself, such as the fact that he was at sea (84) – later adding that he 
worked at the SPCA, at their kennels; like David Lurie in Disgrace (187) – Elizabeth Curren 
is unsure how reliable his narrations are, and we as readers share her doubts. But by the time 
he relates the story of how his hand was crushed by a pulley when abandoning a ship (186), it 
is not met primarily with doubt but with curiosity: 
I always knew he had a story to tell, and now he begins to tell it, starting with the fingers of 
one hand. A mariner’s story. Do I believe it? Verily, I do not care. There is no lie that does 
not have at its core some truth. One must only know how to listen. (187) 
Along with the attention she directs at his words, her attention is also directed at his body: 
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I pinched his ring finger lightly. “Can’t you feel anything?” 
“No. The nerves are dead.” (187) 
That he permits her to touch his disfigured finger shows how their intimacy has grown, but 
the asymmetry of sensation reflects the narrative asymmetry – the sensations occur almost 
exclusively within Elizabeth Curren, of others we only get to know what she attempts to 
imagine. 
Elizabeth Curren like Susan Barton in Foe cannot help herself but pry for more details, 
but of course her curiosity is not satisfied when Vercueil offers: “I was at sea.” (84) Curren 
pries on, claiming her curiosity about her companion to be “quite natural.” To this Vercueil 
simply shakes his head: 
He gave that crooked smile of his in which one canine suddenly reveals itself, long and 
yellow. You are hiding something, I thought, but what? A tragic love? A prison sentence? 
And I broke into a smile myself. 
So we stood smiling, the two of us, each with our private cause to smile. (84) 
In this instance we feel the acceptance of otherness on her side. They can share a smile, even 
if its cause remains private. They are not yet smiling at each other, but the empathetic 
approximation is progressive. The distance she keeps in the beginning didn’t stop her from 
having intimations of the bond existing between them: “Two souls, his and mine, twined 
together, ravished.” (30) After their separate but synchronous smiles Elizabeth Curren even 
imagines a shared future for the two of them: 
A pity, I thought (my last thought before the pills took me away): we could set up house, 
the two of us, after a fashion, I upstairs, he downstairs, for this last little while. So that there 
will be someone at hand in the nights. For that is, after all, what one wants in the end: 
someone to be there, to call to in the dark. Mother, or whoever is prepared to stand in for 
mother. (85) 
The parent-child relation is evoked repeatedly in the narrative (more instances quoted later in 
this section), usually with Curren in her capacity as mother. Regarding Vercueil, her 
projective imagining quoted above inverts the relation, assigning to Vercueil the nurturing and 
caretaking function. Like a trusting child, Elizabeth holds back little in his presence, as when 
she cries in the car in front of Vercueil (19) and several times on later occasions, when she 
exposes her inner states to Vercueil: “But the truth is, I cry more and more easily, with less 
and less shame. […] A private matter, a disturbance of the pool of the soul, which I take less 
and less trouble to hide.” (70-71) As the narrative progresses, the reader becomes aware of the 
growing intimacy between the two. 
Their empathetic approximation is mirrored not only in their verbal exchanges, but 
also in the way their bodies communicate. While Elizabeth Curren repeatedly discourses on 
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her shame,125 both in a larger political context as well as in regard to her body, Vercueil seems 
immune to any sense of decorum, as is illustrated when she finds him sleeping in the 
bathroom: “The light in the toilet was on. Sitting on the seat, his trousers around his knees, his 
hat on his head, fast asleep, was Vercueil. I stared in astonishment.” (108) This would have 
evoked her disgust before, but now it simply baffles her. The attention they pay each other 
takes on more and more substance, their roles of child and parents/guardian repeatedly 
reversed. 
Curren comments on the attention she receives from Vercueil when she wonders why 
she had agreed to his suggestion of going for a drive: “[W]hat won me in the end was the new 
attention he was paying me. He was like a boy in a state of excitement, and I was his object. I 
was flattered; in a distant way, despite all, I was even amused.” (117) Interesting is also how 
she qualifies their outing: “Like lovers revisiting the scenes of their first declarations, we took 
the mountainside drive above Muizenberg.” (118) And Curren continues to imagine the two of 
them as a couple, as for example when she suggests buying a new hat for him: 
“I would love to buy you a new hat,” I said. 
He smiled. I took his arm; slowly we set off along Vrede Street. (167) 
While most of their relationship takes place in private, Curren later does not hesitate to state 
their affiliation to a policeman interrogating her: “Mr. Vercueil takes care of me. Mr. Vercueil 
is my right-hand man.” (173) 
Elizabeth Curren shows a remarkable tolerance for behaviour one would consider her 
to find unacceptable. It is his otherness which causes her to feel sympathy, sometimes close to 
pity: “Sometimes he does this: contradicts me, provokes me, chips away at me, watching for 
signs of irritation. It is his way of teasing, so clumsy, so unappealing that my heart quite goes 
out to him.” (180) In this scene she had asked him to fix the aerial of her radio, but Vercueil 
instead brings the TV to her room and switches it on. The “anthem of the Republic” (Die Stem 
van Suid-Afrika, words by C. J. Langenhoven, 1918) is playing, and Elizabeth asks him to 
switch it off. 
He wheeled, took in my angry glare. Then, to my surprise, he began to do a little shuffle. 
Swaying his hips, holding his hands out, clicking his fingers, he danced, unmistakably 
 
125 Her notion of shame (“Ashes in my mouth day after day after day, which never ceased to taste like ashes.” 
165) is of course tied to her feeling of complicity with the Apartheid regime, and the novel shows how she comes 
to realize its brutality and the atrocities involved, that now ‘invade’ her privacy: “There is a shame to that private 
knowledge, a shame so warm, so intimate, so comforting that it brings more shame flooding with it. There seems 
to be no limit to the shame a human being can feel.” (119) This resonates with Elizabeth Costello’s claim that 
there are no limits to the sympathetic imagination. More generally speaking, Coetzee continuously explores the 
limits of our emotional capacities in engaging with others and the self, ultimately suggesting a progressive 
delimitation with no ultimate goal. 
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danced, to music I never thought could be danced to. He was mouthing words too. What 
were they? Not, certainly, the words I knew. 
“Off!” I screamed again. 
An old woman, toothless, in a rage: I must have looked a sight. He turned the sound down. 
(180) 
Vercueil gives in, and in an attempt to console her advises her to have patience waiting for the 
end of “it all” – he might refer to the apartheid regime and/or her life and all her pain. But 
with a “toothed leer” (note how the more common phrase toothless leer is here inversed) he 
tells her that she might still have time, an idea she instantly embraces: 
For an instant it was as if the heavens opened and light blazed down. […] He nodded. Like 
two fools we grinned each at the other. He clicked his fingers suggestively; awkward as a 
gannet, all feathers and bone, he repeated a step of his dance. (181) 
The shared subtle smile from earlier has evolved into the mutual grinning of two fools.126 
3.2.4 Two Hearts in Harmony 
Bach 
After having discussed how these two “[u]nlikely companions” (30) have undergone a 
transformation in their empathetic approximation, mirrored by their physical closeness and in 
the way they look at each other, I will now analyze the textual discourse on their hearts in 
relation to music. Early on, we learn that Elizabeth Curren, lecturer on the classics of Ancient 
Rome, plays the classics on the piano: Bach’s “Well-Tempered Clavier,” Chopin, Brahms. 
(23) Having tired from the “sweetness of Brahms,” she closes her eyes and plays chords, 
searching for what she calls “my chord” (23), “the lost chord, the heart’s chord.” (24) As if to 
underline the spirituality of this moment, the tune “Jerusalem”127 comes to her together with 
sentimental childhood memories; but the moment fades and she returns to playing Bach’s 
“first fugue from Book One.” (24) She finds Vercueil overhearing her: 
I was playing for myself. But at some point a board creaked or a shadow passed across the 
curtain and I knew he was outside listening. 
So I played Bach for him, as well as I could. [...] Has it made its way into the heart too of 
the man in the sagging trousers eavesdropping at the window? Have our two hearts, our 
organs of love, been tied for this brief while by a cord of sound? (24) 
The music still echoing in her heart, she makes an effort to transpose her perception to the 
perspective of Vercueil, asking herself whether some communion has taken place through the 
 
126 With Coetzee’s essay on Erasmus of Rotterdam in mind, one would concede that there lies much wisdom in 
their folly. (Coetzee 1996: 83-103) 
127 “And did those feet from Ancient Times” by William Blake, 1804-1810. Since 1916 the song version by 
Hubert Parry has become part of British heritage, at first serving as the official hymn of the British Women’s 
Institute, today being performed before international cricket games as well as at the wedding of Prince William 
and Kate Middleton in 2011. 
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shared experience of this music. Another time she listens to a recording of Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations and knows that Vercueil will hear it as well, being outside the window smoking. 
“Perhaps he saw me, perhaps not. Together we listened. / At this moment, I thought, I know 
how he feels as surely as if he and I were making love.” (30) She expands her imagining, even 
though “it fill[s] [her] with distaste”, envisioning their bodies pressed together in a crowded 
touring bus taking them through Sicily – hard to imagine this in segregated South Africa. 
Curren is not unaware of the incommensurateness of their music experience, and the insect 
image she chooses to draw on as point of reference indicates this: 
Across the courtyard he squatted, smoking, listening. Two souls, his and mine, twined 
together, ravished. Like insects mating tail to tail, facing away from each other, still except 
for a pulsing of the thorax that might be mistaken for mere breathing. Stillness and ecstasy. 
(30) 
Being reminded of their real environment of apartheid, she takes refuge to the love-making of 
insects as an analogy for the only possible kind of sexual relationship between a coloured man 
and a Caucasian woman – as whites were called under apartheid; nobody must notice 
(stillness) despite the “ecstasy”. The distance in space (a courtyard apart) contrasts with the 
assumed interlocking of their souls, the heightened intensity reflected in the love-making of 
the insects that intimates physical proximity, which then is countered by the perceptive 
attention being directed away from each other – twice removed this reflects the apartheid 
experience of being separated spatially but sharing the same fundamental humanity. 
Birdsong 
After the incident at her house with Bheki’s friend John (see 3.2.5 and 3.2.7) and her 
subsequent eloping into the streets, Vercueil finds her and carries her to a “dark wooded 
place” (potentially a locus amoenus), prompting her to say: “‘I am so happy to see you,’ […] 
the words coming from my heart, heartfelt.” (161) After a drink from his bottle (no hesitation 
even though she knows the alcohol will not quench her thirst; they are living on his terms at 
this moment) she falls asleep. She awakes noticing his arm “flung […] across [her] neck”: 
I could have freed myself, but preferred not to disturb him. So while by slow degrees the 
new day broke, I lay face to face with him, not stirring. His eyes opened once, alert, like an 
animal’s. “I am not gone,” I murmured. The eyes closed. 
The thought came: Whom, of all beings on earth, do I know best at this hour? Him. Every 
hair of his beard, every crease of his forehead known to me. Him, not you. Because he is 
here, beside me, now. (162) 
They are now “face to face” not “tail to tail” (like the insects in previous quote). With open 
eyes they confirm each other’s presence. They are as close as they could possibly be, both 
physically and in emotional intimacy. Not surprisingly, this moment is followed by a long 
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soliloquy of Elizabeth Curren (She: “Do you mind if I talk?” He: “Talk.” (162)) reflecting on 
the death of Bheki’s friend John and her own complicity with the apartheid regime, on her 
responsibilities, giving Vercueil “as full a confession as [she] knows how,” claiming to 
“withhold no secrets” – a claim Coetzee previously deconstructed in his essay on “Confession 
and Double Thought: Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Rousseau.”128 Again not surprisingly, the 
confession of complicity is immediately contrasted with her notion of being a “good person”: 
“I have been a good person, I freely confess to it. I am a good person still. What times these 
are when to be a good person is not enough!” (165) However empty the clause “good person” 
might seem, as readers we cannot deny the efforts she makes, if somewhat clumsy at times, to 
enrich her bond with Vercueil with substantial companionship. 
After Curren finishes her confession she discovers that he is asleep, wondering how 
much of her confession has been heard by him and whether it mattered in the end. Returning 
to the mundane, she goes “behind a bush”: “Birds were singing all around. […] It was like 
Arcady.” (166)129 Her renewed awe of nature does not have the character of an epiphany – 
releasing her bowels counters any such notion –, but might point to an awakening of her 
faculties of perception, a renewal of her bond with nature, instigated by the bond that has 
developed between her and Vercueil. Lying down again beside Vercueil on a “flattened-out 
box in the vacant lot” (166), the “dark wooded place” now turns out to be a profane empty 
space (i.e. a vacant lot) that might be waiting for something new to be constructed; a fitting 
place for the construction of their unlikely companionship, for the entwining of their hearts. 
Elizabeth ponders on how they are exposed to passersby: “That is how we must be in the eyes 
of angels: people living in houses of glass, our every act naked. Our hearts naked too, beating 
in chests of glass. Birdsong poured down like rain.” (166) This last wonderful image of 
“raining birdsong” turns their location into an Arcady of their hearts, which both of them have 
laid bare to each other; by narrative privilege Curren more so than Vercueil. 
3.2.5 Children of the Revolution 
In this section we will watch how Elizabeth Curren learns to change sides by 
developing empathy. After having warmed up to Vercueil’s attention, Curren starts to 
recognize her house servant Florence’s family. She develops an interest for Florence’s son 
Bheki, later her interest shifts to his friend John. When Bheki and his friend have a bicycle 
 
128 Coetzee 1985 (also DP 251-294). See 5.2.3 for a discussion. 
129 In Youth, young John has his epiphany in a public park; it is also preceded by the sounds of nature, in his case 
the humming of insects (Y 117). See 5.5.2 
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accident, caused by a police van pushing them into a parking van,130 John suffers a head 
wound and bleeds profusely, and is taken to a hospital. Curren and Vercueil go to the hospital 
and find Bheki’s badly injured friend. While presenting to him “some fruit” (an apple and a 
pear) and receiving no sign of gratitude, she muses about his lack of charm: “I did not like 
him. I do not like him. I look into my heart and nowhere do I find any trace of feeling for him. 
As there are people to whom one spontaneously warms, so there are people to whom one is, 
from the first, cold. That is all.” (78) She goes on to remember “an old ginger tom” she had 
been nursing, once again inviting a human-animal comparison: “Even when he was at his 
weakest his body was hard, tense, resistant under my hand. Around this boy I felt the same 
wall of resistance. Though his eyes were open, he did not see; what I said he did not hear.” 
(79) This scene is almost an anti-thesis to the attachment that has developed between her and 
Vercueil, heightened by the impression she gets when she touches the boy’s hand: “It was not 
a clasp, not a long touch; it was the merest brush, the merest lingering of my fingertips on the 
back of his hand. But I felt him stiffen, felt an angry electric recoil.” (79) Curren is strongly 
aware of the gap between them, and herself paints a picture of white people as a herd of sheep 
continuously bleating “I!” “I!” “I!” and being watched over by savage old boars grunting 
“Death!” “Death!” (80) This series of thoughts allows her to imagine the boy’s perspective: 
“Though it does me no good, I flinch from the white touch as much as he does; would even 
flinch from the old white woman who pats his hand if she were not I.” (80) Speaking of 
herself (I) in the third person (she) while maintaining her first-person position – posing a non-
identity with herself – illustrates perfectly an instance of developing empathy. Recognizing 
their dissimilarity Elizabeth Curren makes an imaginative effort to take his perspective and 
thus to further her understanding of the boy. The import of this effort is augmented by her 
initially stated dislike: 
Children of iron, I thought. Florence herself, too, not unlike iron. After which comes the 
age of bronze. How long, how long before the softer ages return in their cycle, the age of 
clay, the age of earth? (50) 
As Elizabeth Curren reflects on her short exchange with Florence about children and their role 
in the struggle against apartheid; for her a matter of inappropriate instrumentalisation, for 
Florence a matter she takes pride in. After bringing Florence home one day and witnessing her 
husband at work killing chicken (42-43), Curren is inevitably drawn into these separate lives. 
Bheki’s friend John enters the scene with a lot of pride (Curren calls it “self-
important”), almost immediately imposing on Vercueil by taking his brandy away with the 
 
130 The description of this accident is similar in its description to the accident Paul Rayment suffers in Slow Man. 
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comment: “They are making you into a dog!” (45) Little later the boys and Vercueil get into a 
fight, which ends up with Vercueil on the ground getting kicked and lashed with a belt by the 
boys until Florence, called by Elizabeth Curren, puts an end to it with her commanding voice. 
Bheki’s friend regards Curren as she enquires from Florence who he is: “I did not like that 
look: arrogant, combative.” (47) When Florence sides with the boys and derides Vercueil as 
“rubbish,” Elizabeth Curren sharply replies to her: “There are no rubbish people. We are all 
people together.” (47) Thinking back to Vercueil’s first appearance, Florence’s assessment is 
understandable, but Elizabeth is clearly aiming for higher ground when she goes on, “He is 
my messenger.” (48) Consequently, she has a low regard of Bheki’s friend: “He is nothing to 
me.” (65) As we can see, she is still making divisions, again showing how arbitrary her 
previous statement “We are all people together.” is in its actual application. 
3.2.6 Descent into Gugulethu 
When Florence tells Elizabeth Curren about trouble in the township Gugulethu and the 
involvement of her son, she drives Florence there.131Vercueil refuses to accompany them with 
a simple “Fuck off.” (88)132 They find Bheki’s dead body laid out in a burned-down school. 
For Elizabeth Curren this moment is an eye-opener in the most literal sense: 
I was shaking: shivers ran up and down my body, my hands trembled. I thought of the boy’s 
open eyes. I thought: What did he see as his last sight on earth? I thought: This is the worst 
thing I have witnessed in my life. And I thought: Now my eyes are open and I can never 
close them again. (102-103) 
Elizabeth Curren again makes an effort to imagine herself into the position of the other, now 
the dead boy Bheki. The repetition of “I thought” parallels her speechlessness. Note how the 
colon is dropped after the first phrase, as if thinking of the open eyes shifted her perception 
into a more immediate imagining of his position, yet still presented as thought. The colons 
used in the following attribute additional weight to every single phrase. Her forever open eyes 
mirror the eyes of the dead boy (that remain open until someone closes them for him). 
Shortly after Curren’s eye-opening moment she directs a comment at her daughter (the 
“you” in the address again reaching out to the reader as well) on her limited narrative 
perspective, reminding both her daughter and the reader that she is the only point of 
focalization in this narrative: 
I tell you the story of this morning mindful that the storyteller, from her office, claims the 
place of right. It is through my eyes that you see; the voice that speaks in your head is mine. 
 
131 Patrick Hayes brilliantly relates this episode to Don Quixote’s descent into the cave of Montesino. (Hayes 
2010: 144-145;149) 
132 For a discussion of rudeness in the work of Coetzee see Pollard 2013. 
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Through me alone do you find yourself here on these desolate flats, smell the smoke in the 
air, see the bodies of the dead, hear the weeping, shiver in the rain. It is my thoughts that 
you think, my despair that you feel, and also the first stirrings of welcome for whatever will 
put an end to thought: sleep, death. To me your sympathies flow; your heart beats with 
mine. 
Now, my child, flesh of my flesh, my best self, I ask you to draw back. I tell you this story 
not so that you will feel for me but so that you will learn how things are. It would be easier 
for you, I know, if this story came from someone else, if it were a stranger’s voice sounding 
in your ear. But the fact is, there is no one else. I am the only one. I am the one writing: I, I. 
So I ask you: attend to the writing, not to me. If lies and pleas and excuses weave among 
the words, listen for them. Do not pass them over, do not forgive them easily. Read all, even 
this adjuration, with a cold eye. (103-104; emphasis added) 
In light of my overarching argument this is a crucial moment in Elizabeth Curren’s narrative. 
She explicitly points out to us that we as readers inhabit her perspective, that our sympathetic 
imagination is evoked by her reflections, that our sympathies are directed by her narrative, 
that we are led on by her to take part in the movements of her heart and mind. 
The second paragraph of above quote more directly addresses her daughter (“my 
child” instead of “you”) and Curren now suggests the daughter should keep her distance, 
should read with “a cold eye.”133 In terms of empathy this sounds like an instruction manual 
for Breithaupt’s cognitive empathy. First: Approach with caution in taking someone’s 
perspective. Then: Give yourself up to it, but beware of getting too close and taking it for 
granted. Lastly: Allow the other perspective to affect you, to be embodied in you. Summarily: 
Allow yourself to inhabit the narrative, but never without caution. The face once again serves 
as primary site of encounter: “So why should I grieve for him [Bheki]? The answer is, I saw 
his face. When he died he was a child again.” (125) This occurs in yet another of her 
monologues she shares with Vercueil. 
3.2.7 Children of the Revolution Part II 
The episode in Gugulethu is central both in terms of its position in the centre of the 
narrative as well as in its effect on E. Curren. But just as her encounter with Vercueil marked 
the beginning of her soul’s journey towards an unachievable redemption, so is her relation 
with Bheki yet another stage of this journey, or more precisely a final wake-up call to the 
political struggle. 
Her relationship with Bheki’s friend marks yet another stage of her transformation. 
One night the boy John appears in her kitchen, “his forehead with the bullet wound covered 
 
133 Samantha Vice in her 2010 essay “Truth and Love Together at Last” comments: 
The radical love and trust upon which the soul depends are achieved, the novel suggests, through a 
different kind of vision and truth. The image of the cold eye is countered by complex images that 
track the working of this alternative. The images of sight remain, but not ‘cold’ sight, and often 
turn to blindness and closed eyes, the sight of the imagination and heart. (Vice 2010: 307) 
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by white bandage” (133); she takes the boy to be an apparition, a visitation, and accordingly 
mistakes him for dead Bheki, but then wakes up from her misperception and takes him in: “So 
this house that was once my home and yours [her daughter’s] becomes a house of refuge, a 
house of transit.” (136) This recalls Vercueil’s earlier proposition of turning her house into a 
boarding house. In another direct address of her daughter she ponders her feelings for the boy: 
I do not love this child […]. My heart does not accept him as mine: it is as simple as that. In 
my heart I want him to go away and leave me alone. 
That is my first word, my first confession. I do not want to die in the state I am in, in a state 
of ugliness. […] How shall I be saved? By doing what I do not want to do. That is the first 
step: that I know. I must love, first of all, the unlovable. I must love, for instance, this child. 
Not bright little Bheki, but this one. He is here for a reason. He is part of my salvation. I 
must love him. But I do not love him. Nor do I want to love him enough to love him despite 
myself. 
It is because I do not with a full enough heart want to be otherwise that I am still wandering 
in a fog. 
I cannot find it in my heart to love, to want to love, to want to want to love. 
I am dying because in my heart I do not want to live. I am dying because I want to die.  
Therefore let me utter my second, dubious word. Not wanting to love him, how true can I 
say my love is for you? For love is not like hunger. Love is never sated, stilled. When one 
loves, one loves more. The more I love you, the more I ought to love him. The less I love 
him, the less, perhaps, I love you. 
Cruciform logic, which takes me where I do not want to go! (136-137) 
This passage constitutes another act of Elizabeth Curren’s sympathetic imagination. She 
discourses about the movements of her heart, which “must love,” but at the same time realizes 
how her social instincts put up a strong resistance against this insight, her heart not being “full 
enough.” She moves on to connect her capacity to love her daughter to her capacity to love 
this boy; not a scale with two sides to choose from, but rather a potential that can only be 
realized in application to both, and for all that matters, to anyone and everything. 
She takes the boy in and feeds him. As if in return he reveals his name to her: “John: a 
nom de guerre if ever I heard one.” (147) When the police comes looking for the boy at her 
house and when she realizes that he has lost the right to live, she wants “to embrace him, to 
protect him.” (152) She knows that she cannot change the course of events and confesses 
helplessly: “I stand on the other side. But on the other bank too, the other bank of the river. 
On the far bank, looking back.” (154) She hereby indicates the distance she has put behind her 
in her soul’s journey so far; so far she had never sided with the state apparatus, but had also 
not opposed it. Now she has crossed that line. The police force Curren away from the door to 
Florence’s room. In a last attempt of resistance, she resorts to her sickness (cancer) to keep 
them from forcefully removing her from the scene: 
“Where is the pain?” asked the woman, frowning. “In my heart,” I said. She looked 
puzzled. “I have cancer of the heart.” Then she understood; she shook her head as if 
shaking off flies. (155) 
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The “cancer” that attacks Curren’s heart is an almost beneficial tumour, one that opens her up 
for a more empathetic engagement with the other, while the cancer that attacks her body will 
ultimately destroy her. 
The boy is shot. In yet another act of sympathetic imagination she imagines John’s 
position at the moment just before he was shot, only this time not inhabiting his perspective, 
but instead taking the position of a proximate witness (“beside him I stand and hover.” 175); 
just like we as readers are witnesses to the account she gives to her daughter in her letter: 
His eyes are unblinking, fixed on the door through which he is going to leave the world. 
His mouth is dry but he is not afraid. His heart beats steadily like a fist in his chest 
clenching and unclenching. 
His eyes are open and mine, though I write, are shut. My eyes are shut in order to see. (175) 
Note the emphasis on the embodiment of Curren’s sympathetic imagining and how the 
description of the body is utilized to indicate corresponding inner states, capturing well the 
intensity of the moment.134 The shut eyes of Elizabeth Curren mark the act of imagining and 
point to the inwardness of the process that fuels her transformation. 
3.2.8 A Letter to Nowhere 
Blood on Paper 
I remember, when the boy was hurt, how abundantly he bled, how rudely. How thin, by 
comparison, my bleeding onto the paper here. The issue of a shrunken heart. (137) 
Elizabeth Curren writes this in her letter to her daughter, just as everything we read is 
supposedly contained in this 200-page letter.135 Attributing lack of propriety to the “rudely” 
spilling blood bears some irony, which comes to carry in the second statement, where she sees 
the propriety of her writing as maybe holding back too much. Yet, she isn’t really holding 
back at all, as any reader will see in the course of the novel. The quote above continues as 
follows: 
I have written about blood before, I know. I have written about everything, I am written out, 
bled dry, and still go on. This letter has become a maze, and I a dog in the maze, scurrying 
up and down the branches and tunnels, scratching and whining at the same old places, 
tiring, tired. (137)136 
 
134 Cf. Vice 2010: 308. 
135 Patrick Hayes and John Su astutely comment on the satirical nature of employing this form, which they 
connect to the epistolary novel of 18th-century England, contrasting the narratives of vestal virgins with “pure 
hearts” about their search for a good husband with the narrative of an old woman with “a shrunken heart” on her 
search for redemption, both hoping to achieve their ends through acts of love (this is as far as the similarity goes) 
(Hayes/Su 2010: 133). 
136 Her subsequent phrase „God is another dog in another maze,” (138) foreshadows an expression Elizabeth 
Costello will use in the chapter “At the Gate” in Elizabeth Costello. 
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The maze she has entered is related to the maze Magda finds herself in In the Heart of the 
Country. It is the maze of a heart constricted by years of living with racial segregation. As 
opposed to Magda, however, Elizabeth Curren is not a young woman struggling to shape her 
own identity, but instead is confronted with the task of reshaping her imagination. Addressing 
her daughter proves an ill-conceived attempt to do this: “[W]ith every day I add to it the letter 
seems to grow more abstract, more abstracted, the kind of letter one writes from the stars, 
from the farther void, disembodied, crystalline, bloodless. Is that to be the fate of my love?” 
(137) Towards her distant daughter (living in the US) her voice must seem disembodied, but 
not for lack of substance, rather due to the increasingly faint connection to her, as the daughter 
refuses to return to South Africa even for a visit, and Curren cannot muster the courage to 
travel overseas at her age. She recalls their goodbye at the airport and her daughter’s 
declaration about never returning: 
Then you shook the dust of this country from your feet. There is something as terrible as it 
is admirable in that will of yours, in the letters you write in which – let me be candid – 
there is not enough love, or at least not enough of the loving-yielding that brings love to 
life. Affectionate, kind, confiding even, full of concern for me, they are nonetheless, the 
letters of someone grown strange, estranged. (139)137 
This estrangement might bear autobiographical significance and might have been something 
Coetzee’s mother could have said about the son who eloped abroad, leaving her behind: 
“Come, says this letter: do not cut yourself off from me.”138 Echoing Emile Zola she writes: 
“J’accuse.” (139) 
The letter is ascribed a variety of functions in the course of the novel, but it is 
primarily an account of Curren’s journey of conscience and her encounter with Florence, 
Bheki, John, and most prominently Vercueil. As Curren puts it, it is not “a baring of my heart. 
It is a baring of something, but not of my heart.” (15) She cannot lay bare something she 
herself is only truly discovering in the course of events related in the letter.139 
Recalling her last conversation with her daughter, whose name is never disclosed to 
us, she contemplates the emptiness of their exchange, contrasting it with what the letter might 
be able to convey: 
 
137 The same phrase (shaking the dust of a country of your feet) is used also in Youth and Remembering Texas. 
138 Her first/second/third word would make for another argument, which I will not pursue here. 
139 Marais offers an insight in regard to the intimacy of the letter: 
Thus it [Mrs Curren’s text] is presented as an intimate letter from the writer-as-mother to the 
reader-as-daughter, a letter in which the writer attempts to restore the broken ‘filial’ connection. 
Being a letter of ‘love,’ and therefore the product of a reconstructed ethical consciousness, it 
constitutes an attempt to represent a mode of intersubjectivity which undermines the state’s 
oppositional relations and, after the manner of the moly, restores to the reader – also a victim of the 
Circe-like state – her humanity.” (Marais 1998b: 234; original emphasis) 
Note: Moly is a herb given to Ulysses to protect him from Circe’s spells. 
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On the telephone, love but not truth. In this letter from elsewhere (so long a letter!), truth 
and love together at last. In every you that I pen love flickers and trembles like Saint Elmo’s 
fire; you are with me not as you are today in America, not as you were when you left, but as 
you are in some deeper and unchanging form: as the beloved, as that which does not die. It 
is the soul of you that I address, as it is the soul of me that will be left with you when this 
letter is over. Like a moth from its case emerging, fanning its wings: that is what, reading, I 
hope you will glimpse: my soul readying itself for further flight. A white moth, a ghost 
emerging from the mouth of the figure on the deathbed […] – all part of a metamorphosis, 
part of shaking myself loose from the dying envelope. (129; original italics) 
[…] 
The moth is simply what will brush your cheek ever so lightly as you put down the last 
page of this letter, before it flutters off on its next journey. It is not my soul that will remain 
with you but the spirit of my soul, the breath, the stirring of the air about these words, the 
faintest of turbulence traced in the air by the ghostly passage of my pen over the paper your 
fingers now hold. (130) 
This letter “from elsewhere” (from beyond death) is a way of saying goodbye to her daughter. 
And in the spirit of a deathbed confession she believes to have brought together love and truth 
– the love she feels for her daughter, and the truth of her life in South Africa under apartheid. 
The turn of phrase “truth and love together at last” comes slightly surprising, considering 
other comments made about the mother-daughter-relationship by Curren. Tellingly, those 
comments refer to actual exchanges, such as the goodbye at the airport when the daughter left, 
and a long-distance conversation on the phone. Seemingly, the distance implied in the letter-
writing – removed in space and delayed in time – is beneficial to their relation; or at least it 
seems so for Elizabeth Curren. In relation to Breithaupt’s blockades, one can imagine how 
Elizabeth Curren’s empathy is enhanced in spite of the distance, promoted through the 
thought processes recorded in the letter. The familial affiliation of Elizabeth Curren expands 
in the course of the narrative. New patterns of affiliation emerge. Elizabeth Curren encounters 
a whole family of black people with whom she forms meaningful attachments: Vercueil-
Bheki-John-Florence. They are represented by Curren as substantial characters. In contrast, 
Mr. Thabane is a generic character about whom we learn next to nothing apart from the views 
expressed in his conversations with Curren. All white people she encounters also remain 
rather generic type characters (her doctor who tells her she will die; her neighbours; the 
policemen and officers). Even about the addressee of the letter, her daughter, we learn only 
little. The relationship to Vercueil is central to her narrative, with Bheki and John as further 
steps of her inner transformation. Florence plays a less important part, but is the point of 
access to the children. 
The above-quoted passage finishes with a mention of the actual act of writing, though 
here only as an idea. In the course of the letter she mentions its actual production only twice, 
the first time reflecting on the effect the writing has on her: 
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I write these words sitting in my bed, my knees pressed together against the August cold. 
Gratitude: I write down the word and read it back. What does it mean? Before my eyes it 
grows dense, dark, mysterious. Then something happens. Slowly, like a pomegranate, my 
heart bursts with gratitude; like a fruit splitting open to reveal the seeds of love. Gratitude, 
pomegranate: sister words. (55-56) 
The writing affects her, causes her “heart to burst open.” How the daughter is affected by the 
reading of the letter we cannot imagine, but we as readers can record the effect it has on us. 
Most likely we will not follow her example and our hearts will not burst open, but as readers 
we have been prepared to follow her when the occasion arises. Elizabeth Curren’s remark on 
the double nature of the writing process (including editing), where the writer is also the first 
reader, granting the writer a depth of perception regarding thes text not available to the reader, 
who only co-creates the text in a supplementary and largely preconscious fashion. In regard to 
the sympathetic imagination, this could be a vital difference in its application by the writer 
and by the reader. 
The second time she mentions the act of writing follows a reflection on how she 
imagines immolating herself publicly and wondering how Florence would perceive her last 
act, casting her as ultimate judge of her life. Her train of thought is interrupted by John: “His 
voice startled me as I sat in the kitchen writing.” (142) Coetzee is playing with the formal 
framework of an epistolary novel, which usually is presented as a recollection of events that 
lie in the past; here it seems there is an immediacy of experience entering the narrative. The 
text reflects events that lie in the recent past (in the style of a diary), so that the reader’s 
experience is almost synchronous with events recorded. This narrative technique of reporting 
events in the past tense while conveying immediacy reduces the distance between focalizing 
consciousness and the reader’s perception. 
How does the epistolary form relate to the sympathetic imagination and to empathy? 
On a formal level, the letter highlights the personal tone of Elizabeth Curren, marks the 
confidentiality of her discourse. As readers we become witness to an inter-personal 
monologue, a one-sided dialogue with her daughter. The imminent death of Elizabeth Curren 
lends the narrative the character of an extended goodbye. Curren occupies a non-position as a 
voice speaking from beyond death. Her letter opens a space within her, and by mirroring her 
notions the reader might experience a similar opening up. Our sympathetic imagination as 
readers is primarily directed towards Elizabeth Curren, the only character who gives us full 
access to her thoughts and emotions (again, the letter genre abets this). As readers we also get 
to witness her sympathetic imagination engaging with Vercueil, Bheki and John. We see 
patterns of empathy emerge in her, and as we read these patterns are inscribed into our 
consciousness. 
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Vercueil, the Messenger  
Vercueil plays a central part in Elizabeth Curren’s soul journey. In the framing 
narrative, his function is to send off the letter to Curren’s daughter, to deliver her final 
message. When first asking him for this favour (31), she doubts his trustworthiness: “Private 
papers. These papers, these words that either you read now or else will never read. Will they 
reach you?” (32)140 Vercueil finally agrees to send off the parcel to Curren’s daughter. (33) 
Elizabeth Curren imagines how her words gain substance by being read by her daughter, 
hopes her truth will thereby “take on flesh”: “If Vercueil does not send these writings on, you 
will never read them. You will never even know they existed. A certain body of truth will 
never take on flesh: my truth: how I lived in these times, in this place.” (130) The “truth” –
bracketed by colons – is characterized as a report. The “how” of her living  (experiences and 
encounters) is expressed in her narrative through a strong focus on her inner perceptions of 
her social position; the “what” of her life (dates and events) serves as a backdrop for her 
empathetic evolution. 
As messenger Vercueil inhabits an intermediary position between sender (Curren) and 
receiver (daughter/reader). His arrival on the scene opens the narrative, giving the impulse for 
Elizabeth Curren to cultivate her sympathetic imagination, exposing her personal experiences 
to her daughter and ultimately to the reader in this very long letter. Vercueil delivers her from 
her rigor and accompanies her on her last journey. 
For Elizabeth Curren, the delivery of the letter was a central concern in the beginning, 
and she struggled hard to make Vercueil agree to deliver it. In the end, the delivery itself 
comes second to the trust she puts in him. A trust that finds its realization in the empathetic 
approximation of these two unlikely companions: 
What is the wager, then, that I am making with Vercueil, on Vercueil? 
It is a wager on trust. So little to ask, to take a package to the post office and pass it over the 
counter. So little that it is almost nothing. Between taking the package and not taking it the 
difference is as light as a feather. If there is the slightest breath of trust, obligation, piety left 
behind when I am gone, he will surely take it. 
And if not? 
If not, there is no trust and we deserve no better, all of us, than to fall in a hole and vanish. 
(130) 
Derek Attridge comments on Curren’s paradoxical formulations of love and trust, claiming 
that they form “the ethical core of the text.” (Attridge 1994; see also Worthington 2011: 116) 
The secret imperative guiding Elizabeth Curren compels her to care for others, following the 
 
140 This motif will return in Dostoevsky’s discussion with Councillor Maximov about the papers of Pavel in The 
Master of Petersburg. (MOP 38-40) 
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formula: “You have to become someone other than yourself.” (119) Samantha Vice in her 
essay urges all of us to strain our utopian imagination to accommodate the boundlessness of 
the ethical imperative implied in Age of Iron: 
Finally, perhaps the most crucial lesson in light of the content of this ethical vision, is that 
of realizing just how hard it might be to live it. The vision that Mrs. Curren –and Coetzee –
is drawn to requires a groundless love and trust that is astonishingly stringent, that makes 
the responsibility for others boundless, and that may very well require the abdication of 
deeply entrenched and even admirable habits and principles, the shrugging aside of dignity 
and the need to be loved oneself. It is both helpful, and necessary for philosophers to have 
before them some subtly imagined world in which this is the goal, to see just what it entails 
and how difficult it is. Only by fully inhabiting such a world in intellect, emotion, and 
imagination can its resources or truthfulness be adequately assessed. (Vice 2010: 312; 
original emphasis) 
Vercueil/Daughter 
Why do I write about him? Because he is and is not I. Because in the look he gives me I see 
myself in a way that can be written. […] When I write about him I write about myself; 
when I write about the house I write about myself. Man, house, dog: no matter what the 
word, through it I stretch out a hand to you. In another world I would not need words. I 
would appear on your doorstep. “I have come for a visit,” I would say, and that would be 
the end of words: I would embrace you and be embraced. But in this world, in this time, I 
must reach out to you in words. (9) 
Curren expresses precisely how similarity and difference (he is and is not I) go together to 
create mutual and self-recognition. By sympathetically imagining Vercueil’s perspective 
Curren gains access to a written narrative of herself, the words reaching out to her daughter. 
Curren formulates a three-prong approach of writing this letter: 1) reaching out to her 
daughter in words 2) learning more about herself 3) by learning more about Vercueil. While in 
the first part of this passage, Curren talks about the need to write words to define herself in the 
mirror of the other, she declares her preference of a world of spoken and body language in the 
second half of the quote. “In another world” she imagines an actual encounter with her 
daughter, a scene comparable to the closing scene of the later novel Disgrace, in which 
Coetzee creates just such a scene of visitation between Lurie and Lucy (see 4.1.4). 
The letter form and the quoted dialogues with Vercueil present to the reader a 
continuously shifting point of address, conflating the daughter and Vercueil (both “you”). 
Though all conversation between Curren and Vercueil is marked as such, the thoughts voiced 
in the letter to the daughter seem primarily to be directed at Vercueil, at some points it 
effectively is directed at him without being spoken out loud. 
Vercueil serves as an antidote to Curren’s loneliness. Her daughter being far away, she 
is inclined to find a substitute; by chance this turns out to be Vercueil. The personal motive of 
Vercueil in choosing her house is revealed late in the narrative – “You didn’t have a dog.” / 
“Why else?” / “I thought you wouldn’t make trouble.” (184) – and does not preclude 
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Elizabeth Curren’s speculations on the deeper meaning of their encounter. The steadily 
growing intimacy between Vercueil and Curren corresponds with the growing distance 
between Curren and her daughter – an emotional distance of estrangement. Vercueil makes 
the impression of being a neutral bystander to her narrative, but he is essential for Curren’s 
writing, as she once comments: “He, Mr. V., to whom I speak. Speak and then write. Speak in 
order to write.” (83) That the unlikely companions sit “side by side on the sofa” indicates how 
replacement of the daughter happens not only on an emotional level, it also occurs on the 
physical level of bodies. As Curren re-imagines stroking her not-yet-awake daughter, she 
records the sounds sleeping Vercueil makes and links them to her daughter: “[Y]our sleepy, 
comfortable murmur reborn in the throat of this man.” (57) Imagining stroking her daughter, 
she feels a “current of love” coursing through her hand, as if her imagining had achieved to 
evoke the “electric being” of her daughter, or at least their how-ever-faint connection. 
When contemplating Vercueil’s personal hygiene, wondering about her diminishing 
disgust and her growing affection and attachment, Curren writes: “How easy it is to love a 
child, how hard to love what a child turns into!” (57) Though she speaks of her daughter, the 
thought is connected to Vercueil, as she was just at that moment contemplating stroking his 
hair instead of her daughter’s. 
Being like Iron 
When Elizabeth Curren talks to Vercueil about her daughter, she says: “She is like 
iron.” Vercueil replies: “You are like iron too.” The narrative voice of Curren continues: “A 
silence fell between us. Inside me something broke.” She repeats this thought out loud to 
Vercueil: “‘Something broke inside me when you said that,’ I said, the words just coming.” 
(75) Instead of holding back her hurt feelings, she wants Vercueil to know that his remark hit 
her to the core. 
Within the three-age system of human prehistory the age of iron is the last one before 
human history proper began. Coetzee transposes this semi-global model of history to the 
South African context and has Curren write: “Children of iron, I thought. Florence herself, 
too, not unlike iron. After which comes the age of bronze. How long, how long before the 
softer ages return in their cycle, the age of clay, the age of earth?” (50) Coetzee inverses 
Hesiod’s progression from dull to shiny metals, with softness as the state to be aspired. 
Elizabeth Curren embodies this inversion through the softening of her attitude and her 
perceptions of others. 
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Later in the narrative, the analogy to stages of civilization is reviewed from a slightly 
different angle: “Let me tell you, when I walk upon this land, this South Africa, I have a 
gathering feeling of walking upon black faces. […] The age of iron waiting to return.” (125) 
The age of iron is associated with the ruthlessness and absence of empathy typical of 
oppressive systems. 
When Vercueil says that she is also “like iron,” she if forced to realize how her implicit 
complicity with apartheid has affected her more than she would like to admit. I read her shock 
as a moment of insight; what breaks inside her may be her previous self-image. Curren has 
come to wish to be soft (like clay) and not hard (like iron). In her daughter she expressly 
misses softness, but the softness she believes to have maintained in spite of apartheid turns 
out to be a self-coveted illusion, a keeping up of appearances. Coetzee in his 1987 Jerusalem 
Prize Acceptance Speech speaks of the “inner deformation,” the “stunted souls” of South 
Africans living under apartheid. (DP 98) 
The conversion narrative of Curren tells us how she softens up. This can especially 
seen in the way she develops a sense for the feelings of her companion:  
Luminous with curiosity, Vercueil followed me into the kitchen and prowled about while I 
was having breakfast. At last, irritated, unsettled, I burst out: “Would you please leave me 
alone!” At which he turned away with a look of such childish hurt that I gave his sleeve a 
tug. “I didn’t mean that,” I said. (116) 
But while the empathetic approximation to Vercueil progresses, the empathetic distance to her 
daughter increases. The pressing feeling of being estranged from her daughter and the 
countermovement of feeling closer to Vercueil culminates in Curren’s estrangement from even 
the word “daughter”: “Words vomited up from the belly of the whale, misshapen, mysterious. 
Daughter. […] There is something degrading about the way it all ends – degrading not only to 
us but to the idea we have of ourselves, of humankind. […] You will not understand this, yet. 
Vercueil will.” (140) 
The Empathetic Unsettlement of Elizabeth Curren 
Age of Iron illustrates well the empathetic unsettlement felt by Elizabeth Curren and 
caused by the apartheid environment. Dominic LaCapra, in his study Writing History, Writing 
Trauma (2001), develops this concept in view of Holocaust survivors and the German 
population after WWII, but his argument can be generalized and applied to all contexts of 
collectively experienced traumatizing oppression: 
Being responsive to the traumatic experience of others, notably of victims, implies not the 
appropriation of their experience but what I would call empathic unsettlement, which 
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should have stylistic effects or, more broadly, effects in writing which cannot be reduced to 
formulas or rules of method. (LaCapra 2001: 41; emphasis added) 
What Capra describes here can be easily applied to Elizabeth Curren’s realizations in regard 
to Bheki and John. Curren is careful not to appropriate their experience, instead tries her best 
to engage with it empathetically. The feeling of something breaking inside could be 
categorized as a secondary trauma, as Capra explains: 
Such a coming-to-terms [with wounds and scars of the past] would seek knowledge whose 
truth claims are not one-dimensionally objectifying or narrowly cognitive but involve affect 
and may empathetically expose the self to an unsettlement, if not a secondary trauma, 
which should not be glorified or fixated upon but addressed in a manner that strives to be 
cognitively and ethically responsible as well as open to the challenge of utopian aspiration. 
Trauma brings about a dissociation of affect and representation: one disorientingly feels 
what one cannot feel. (LaCapra 2001: 42) 
The complex conflict between disorientation and utopian aspiration is embodied in Elizabeth 
Curren. Apartheid in its historical manifestation has primarily caused the oppressed non-white 
population to suffer, but in a secondary degree it has affected all others as well. For Curren, 
the absence of her daughter has made her a “subject to structural trauma” (LaCapra 2001: 79): 
The traumatizing events in historical trauma can be determined (for example, the events of 
the Shoah), while structural trauma (like absence) is not an event but an anxiety-producing 
condition of possibility related to the potential for historical traumatization. (LaCapra 2001: 
82) 
The anxieties of Elizabeth Curren are played through variously in the course of the narrative. 
Her attempts to reach out and connect are often frustrated, yet she prods on and does not give 
up. Again, Capra insightfully supplies a comment to her plight: 
There is, moreover, the ethically induced feeling that one may not be responding with 
sufficient empathy, a reaction that increases the anxiety one feels both because of the 
evident, often overwhelming pain of the survivor recalling and even returning to the 
position of helpless victim and because of one’s own helplessness in doing anything about 
what is being recounted or relived. (LaCapra 2001: 92)  
Elizabeth Curren’s experience of Bheki’s death runs along these lines of anxiety and 
helplessness. The evening after her trip to Gugulethu she collapses at her kitchen table, crying 
over the boy’s death: “Wherever I turned he was before me, his eyes open in the look of 
childish puzzlement with which he had met his death.” (109) Her grief over the loss of a 
precious life – “the most generous of all gifts” – leads her to wonder about herself and her 
social awareness: “Have I ever been fully awake?” (ibid.) Sue Kossew, in her essay 
“‘Women’s Words’: A Reading of Coetzee’s Women Narrators” (Kossew 1998: 166-179), 
comments on how Curren’s “self-loathing is linked with her own identity as a white South 
African, an identity which she sees as like that of a doll, manipulated by outside forces, 
without agency, and hollow, lacking substance.” (Kossew 1998: 175) Kossew quotes 
Elizabeth Curren asking herself: “A doll’s life? / Is that what I have lived?” (109) The 
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ruptures in her thoughts and her narrative are stylistic indicators of her empathetic 
unsettlement: 
I would in general argue that in history there is a crucial role for empathic unsettlement as 
an aspect of understanding which stylistically upsets the narrative voice and counteracts 
harmonizing narration or unqualified objectification yet allows for a tense interplay 
between critical, necessarily objectifying reconstruction and affective response to the voices 
of victims. (LaCapra 2001: 109) 
Likewise, the ambivalence of her relationship with Vercueil, ranging from distaste to close 
companionship, can be read in the terms of LaCapra’s argument: 
I would also note that the response to extreme, traumatizing events or limit cases, notably 
those involving victimization, tends to be ambivalent and often combines attraction and 
repulsion. One crucial role of certain moral norms is to help resolve this ambivalence in the 
direction of empathy with the victim and repulsion toward the perpetrator, including 
inhibitory repulsion with respect to the tendency toward perpetration or victimization in 
oneself. (LaCapra 2001: 133) 
For Elizabeth Curren the ambivalence of “attraction and repulsion” leads to a more 
empathetic engagement with others. 
3.2.9 Trusting the Other and Facing Death 
When would the time come when the jacket fell away and great wings sprouted from his 
shoulders? (160-161) 
Elizabeth Curren writes this as Vercueil carries her away from the underpass to her house, 
mirroring how Friday once picked up Susan Barton in a “backward embrace” (see 3.1.3). The 
coincidence of Vercueil’s arrival and Curren’s diagnosis of cancer likens him to a harbinger of 
death. In her narrative her imagination of Vercueil oscillates between angel and scavenger: 
“Not an angel, certainly. An insect, rather, emerging from behind the baseboards when the 
house is in darkness to forage for crumbs.” (14) Curren notes how her impressions of Vercueil 
are half-perceived and half-created: “I wondered whether you were not, if you will excuse the 
word, an angel come to show me the way. Of course you were not, you are not, cannot be – I 
see that. But that is only half the story, isn’t it? We half-perceive but we also half-create.” 
(168) As an angel Vercueil serves a dialectical function: Accompanying her to the other side 
(to eternal sleep) and awakening her sympathetic imagination (inducing empathetic 
wakefulness). Coetzee playfully aligns her previous complacency with a state of sleep: “The 
angel goes before, the woman follows. His eyes are open, he sees; hers are shut, she is still 
sunk in the sleep of worldliness.” (168) As if Vercueil were waking her up, confronting her 
with the nightmare of apartheid. 
Just as Elizabeth Curren is forced to face the iron injustices of apartheid, she is also 
forced to face her own death. In her writing she tackles the task of imagining death, while 
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simultaneously sensing her own resistance against such imaginings. The contradiction of 
writing and thinking leads to a bodily moment of objectification under the multiple lenses of a 
fly settling on Elizabeth Curren’s eye: 
Death is the only truth left. Death is what I cannot bear to think. At every moment when I 
am thinking of something else, I am not thinking death, am not thinking the truth. 
I try to sleep. I empty my mind; calm begins to steal over me. I am falling, I think, I am 
falling: welcome, sweet sleep.  
Then at the very edge of oblivion something looms up and pulls me back, something whose 
name can only be dread. […] A fly settles on my cheek. It cleans itself. It begins to explore. 
It walks across my eye, my open eye. I want to blink, I want to wave it away, but I cannot. 
Through an eye that is and is not mine, I stare at it. It licks itself, if that is the word. There 
is nothing in those bulging organs that I can recognize as a face. But it is upon me, it is 
here: it struts across me, a creature from another world. (27; original emphasis) 
Curren searches for a face to recognize, but the “creature” offers nothing to mirror her 
anxiety.141 The phrase “it is upon me” bears weight and links the fly to death, echoing how 
Vercueil came to her. A scene one might expect to find in a Bunuel movie, with its extreme 
close-up on the horror of a fly walking over an open eye. The “eye that is and is not mine” 
points to a state of self-estrangement, of non-identity, as in death. The first-person perspective 
invites us to take part, to see for ourselves the fly, the “creature from another world”. Could 
this be the “electric being” of the ultimate otherness, an embodiment of death? 
When Elizabeth Curren later takes a drive with Vercueil and contemplates suicide, but 
keeps being deserted by her “sense of urgency” (119), she imagines the final decision to put 
an end to life: 
It seems to me that something other than the will must come into play at the last instant, 
something foreign, something thoughtless, to sweep you over the brink. You have to 
become someone other than yourself. But who? Who is it that waits for me to step into his 
shadow? (119) 
As in the passage quoted before Curren imagines “being other than oneself”, here in relation 
to death. The exercise of imagining death progresses as Curren and Vercueil undergo a 
process of empathetic approximation. “Like lovers revisiting the scenes of their first 
declarations” (118) they take the mountainside drive above Muizenberg, parking at the same 
spot as before, with a view over False Bay. “If we had a boat you could take me out to sea,” 
(118) she murmurs (to Vercueil) and imagines being set afloat by him and perishing under the 
“great white wings” of an albatross. Curren immediately returns to her present situation and 
her plan to immolate herself in front of the parliament, and her “sense of urgency.” The 
 
141 Samantha Vice writes: “While there is nothing in this passage [fly walking over Mrs. Curren’s eye] about 
love, it is an instance of that familiar encounter between the protagonist and the alien Other hat we find in most 
of Coetzee’s novels. The ethical task is to imagine and love these creatures from another world – whether 
Vercueil’s world of sufficiency and terrible innocence or Bheki and John’s world of comradeship and narrow 
courage or, perhaps, even her daughter’s safe life in America.” (Vice 2010: 308) 
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conversation continues, Curren verbose as usual, Vercueil interspersing her monologue with 
short answers, questions and remarks. She reminds him of the story she told about her mother 
(a night spent underneath an ox wagon), and reveals the special nature of her relationship to 
Vercueil: 
I have held on to that story all my life. If each of us has a story we tell to ourself about who 
we are and where we come from, then that is my story. That is the story I choose, or the 
story that has chosen me. It is there that I come from, it is there that I begin. (120) 
She goes on to express her loss of attachment to the country (“the place where I join the 
world” 121), and to her failing resolve: “I am sitting here next to you and drowning.” (122) 
This picks up the theme of being set afloat in the ocean, tied to a plank of wood. Vercueil 
pulls out a box of matches and urges her on towards her self-determined and self-willed death, 
but Curren recoils, seeing in Vercueil madness (“he is cruel, mad, a mad dog” 122). Vercueil, 
who so far was mostly passive in his dealings with Curren, now seems determined to see her 
through to the end. He next attempts to douse her with booze (“It’s not brandy, it’s medicine.” 
123), and it soon takes its effect: “I swallowed and closed my eyes. Something began to lift 
inside me: a curtain, a cloud. […] Is this how Vercueil points the way? […] The veil of 
grayness that had covered everything grew visibly lighter.”(123) 
She picks up her monologue again and describes to Vercueil how seeing the dead body 
of Florence’s son Bheki has shaken her, how seeing the face of the dead boy has urged her to 
want to disappear from the face of this country, where she perceives a “gathering feeling of 
walking upon black faces” (125). But instead of burning herself, she refuses the bottle 
Vercueil again offers her, attempts to throw it out the window, is stopped by Vercueil, who 
takes the keys of the car, gets out and throws them into the bushes, leaving her “[b]urning 
with rage.” (126) Another car enters the parking area with loud music blaring. Curren asks the 
newly-arrived couple to turn down the music, but they desist, instead parking at the other end 
of the outlet. Then follows an interesting analysis of the face of the woman in the car, who 
turns to “glare” at Curren: 
Her face was not unattractive yet ugly: closed, bunched, as if afraid that light, air, life itself 
were going to gather and strike her. Not a face but an expression, yet an expression worn so 
long as to be hers, her. A thickening of the membrane between the world and the self inside, 
a thickening become thickness. Evolution, but backward. Fish from the primitive depths (I 
am sure you know this) grew patches of skin sensitive to the fingerings of lights, patches 
that in time became eyes. Now, in South Africa, I see eyes clouding over again, scales 
thickening on them, as the land explorers, the colonist, prepare to return to the deep. (127) 
All this from one fleeting look at a face. Followed at first by a reflection on escaping South 
Africa by leaving it behind: “Should I have come when you invited me?” (127) In the first 
instance, this seems to point to Vercueil’s invitation to her own death, but in the following the 
165 
 
reader is reminded that this “you” is her daughter, whom she addresses in this letter; yet 
another instance where Vercueil and the daughter blur into each other in a synonymous “you”. 
In the next thought, Curren reflects on how much she might be similar to the woman whose 
face she just described, and enters a short act of perspective-taking: “That woman in the car: 
perhaps, as they drove off, she was saying to her companion: ‘What a sour old creature! What 
a closed-off face!’” (128-129) 
This passage has been quoted at length to show how Coetzee manages to conflate a 
variety of perspectives in the voice of Elizabeth Curren; starting with her own perspective, she 
shifts to the daughter (and via her also to Vercueil), then to the woman (who to the reader is 
not more than a face) and finally back to herself. For the reader this offers a richness and 
depth of perception in regard to her position in her own narrative. This variety of perspectives 
enhances our understanding of her situation, of her emotional state, which allows us to move 
from sympathy (not far from pity) to empathy, allows us to better understand Elizabeth Curren 
and what she is going through. Hearing (reading) only her voice would not give us this 
insight, but instead would prompt us to remain merely sympathetic, if not even to only feel 
pity for this aging woman and her late remorse. 
3.2.10 Companionship Transformed – Dog Bodies and A Deadly Embrace 
I may seem to understand what I say, but, believe me, I do not. From the beginning, when I 
found him behind the garage in his cardboard house, sleeping, waiting, I have understood 
nothing. I am feeling my way along a passage that grows darker all the time. I am feeling 
my way toward you; with each word I feel my way. (131) 
Elizabeth Curren embraces the contradictions of her own thinking, which at times assumes a 
position of knowing (in accordance with her teaching vocation), then again falters in the face 
of apparently incomprehensible otherness, which ranges from Vercueil over Bheki and John to 
her estranged daughter. The “you” takes on a dimension surpassing her daughter, pointing to 
the ultimate otherness of death itself. In The Master of Petersburg Dostoevsky will be going 
through similar notions of drowning and reaching out to his dead son Pavel, who like 
Elizabeth Curren’s daughter comes to represents otherness. 
In the final sections of Age of Iron the relationship between Curren and Vercueil 
reaches a stage where contradictions become tolerable: “Because I cannot trust Vercueil I 
must trust him.” (130) This echoes her statement about her love for Bheki’s friend, John, and 
indicates her effort to struggle on, to preserve her soul in spite of her imminent death: “I am 
trying to keep a soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul.” (130) The complexity of their 
riddled companionship remains and is not smoothed over into terms of simple friendship: “I 
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give my life to Vercueil to carry over. I trust Vercueil because I do not trust Vercueil. I love 
him because I do not love him. Because he is the weak reed I lean upon him.” (131) Elizabeth 
Curren is forced to admit that her supposed acts of kindness can hardly be seen as such by 
Vercueil, since they are tainted by a history of segregation which cannot be undone: “What I 
give he does not forgive me for giving. No charity in him, no forgiveness. (Charity? says 
Vercueil. Forgiveness?) Without his forgiveness I give without charity, serve without love. 
Rain falling on barren soil.” (131; original emphasis) Note how the bracket offers the reader a 
response of Vercueil as imagined by Curren. In the concluding metaphor she is the “rain”, he 
the “barren soil” (her fertility is affirmed by having a daughter, his barrenness by his 
childlessness). In a different spirit, the fertility metaphor might suggest that she and Vercueil 
could bear a child together, that she might give him a child in a final act of charity, however 
ill-received. This idea is taken up in her following thoughts, but immediately rejected and 
shifted to the terms of her own life and death: 
When I was younger I might have given myself to him bodily. That is the sort of thing one 
does, one did, however mistakenly. Now I put my life in his hands instead. This is my life, 
these words, these tracings of the movements of crabbed digits over the page. These words, 
as you read them, if you read them, enter you and draw breath again. They are, if you like, 
my way of living on. Once upon a time you lived in me as once upon a time I lived in my 
mother; as she still lives in me, as I grow toward her, may I live in you. (131) 
Elizabeth Curren turns herself into a paper being – shortly before she described the dead 
bodies of white people as “papery” (124), wherefore they burn well – in this letter to her 
daughter. She hopes the words will enter her daughter and live on in her; but on the level of 
the text (and beyond), Curren will live on in the minds of the readers of Coetzee’s novel. 
Elizabeth Curren’s death is approaching at an increasing pace, one indicator being her 
telephone conversation with the pharmacist, whom she asks for the strongest pain killer (“the 
last one prescribed” 184). Vercueil offers his help and closes his hands around her neck, but 
Elizabeth Curren whispers a simple “Don’t” (185), instead taking his hands and beating them 
on her chest “in a gesture of lamentation quite foreign to [her].” (185) She asks for the 
company of Vercueil’s dog in her bed (“For the warmth.”), and when Vercueil points out that 
the dog won’t stay, she invites him as well. 
He lay down at my back, on top of the bedclothes. The smell of his dirty feet reached me. 
He whistled softly; the dog leapt up, did its circle dance, settled between his legs and mine. 
Like Tristan’s sword, keeping us honest. (185) 
How far their unlikely companionship has taken them! Ultimately, the approximation of their 
bodies has now come as far as possible under the circumstances (and further, if we consider 
Curren’s earlier musings about their conjugation). The bodies form the basis for enhancing 
their empathetic approximation, the condition sine qua non, even if Curren proposes a 
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contrary thought: “This was never meant to be the story of a body, but of the soul it houses.” 
(186) By now Curren has firmly established that her soul has just lately begun to rise from the 
ashes of a life spent in forgetful blindness: “Vercueil and his dog, sleeping so calmly beside 
these torments of grief. Fulfilling their charge, waiting for the soul to emerge. The soul, 
neophyte, wet, blind, ignorant.” (186) In a way quite similar to the magistrate in Waiting for 
the Barbarians, Elizabeth Curren has undergone a transformation, both in the dying body and 
the reborn soul. 
In the final sections of the narrative (which has no distinct sections, unless one takes 
free spaces of two lines to mark sections) a last return to the mundane takes place: “Every day 
he goes off to do the shopping. In the evening he cooks, then hovers over me, watching to see 
that I eat.” (189) They talk about how Vercueil “lost the use of his fingers” in an accident at 
sea, where “his hand was caught in a pulley and crushed” (189) – comparable to David’s 
finger being crushed in Boyhood. Illustrating their intimacy, Curren shows no hesitation when 
she pinches his ring finger lightly to test whether he feels anything (in his finger), but the 
“nerves are dead.” (187) Their intimacy now seems permanent, and also seems to have 
extended beyond their bodies, even if these remain the primary site of display for this 
intimacy: 
We share a bed, folded one upon the other like a page folded in two, like two wings folded: 
old mates, bunkmates, conjoined, conjugal. […] A dry creature, a creature of air, like those 
locust fairies in Shakespeare with their whipstock of cricket’s bone, lash of spider film. 
(189) 
Elizabeth Curren in passing becomes aware of how awkward the impression on her daughter 
must be: 
From the side of her shadow husband your mother writes. Forgive me if the picture offends 
you. One must love what is nearest. One must love what is at hand, as a dog loves. 
Mrs V. (190) 
This is followed by the last spacing of two lines, as if to mark the end of the letter with a 
strange signature signalling her allegiance to her “shadow husband” Vercueil, as if finally 
marking the distance to her daughter, as if completing the estrangement, granting Vercueil 
precedence over her daughter: “In this respect she relinquishes, at last, the sovereignty of the 
monologic ‘I’ that dominates the text; she overcomes her will to live and gives her life, 
literally, into Vercueil’s hands – just as Coetzee, figuratively, relinquishes authority over his 
text in giving it to his reader.” (Worthington 2011: 126) 
By closing the letter formally, the very last section assumes the status of not being part 
of the letter anymore, but more an epilogue telling of her final departure. This is echoed by 
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the dates given at the very end of the novel in cursive writing: “1986-89.” (198) Since the 
events described in the letter could hardly encompass a time of three years, it points to the 
time it took the author Coetzee to write this book containing Elizabeth Curren’s 
narrative/letter. However, it continues as first person narrative, thereby approximating the 
position of character and author. 
The release comes in the final paragraph. Elizabeth Curren’s death coincides with the 
end of the narrative, but at the same time its announcement has marked its beginning, making 
death (by cancer) the alpha and omega of her narrative. That Elizabeth Curren has the 
presence to narrate her moment of death in the first person emphasizes the artfulness and 
fictionality of the narrative, and like a death aria in the opera her final words constitute a 
prolonged moment as she is poised on the brink of death. In the very last paragraph, Elizabeth 
Curren notes how she does not smell Vercueil anymore; and surely his bodily odours have not 
vanished, but rather her distaste and heightened awareness of it has diminished to nothing. 
The paragraph also offers two common death tropes, “tunnel” and “curtains parted,” 
presented in very literal terms: 
I got back into bed, into the tunnel between the cold sheets. The curtains parted; he came in 
beside me. For the first time I smelled nothing. He took me in his arms and held me with 
mighty force, so that the breath went out of me in a rush. From that embrace there was no 
warmth to be had. 
 
1986-89 (AI 198) 
The final embrace of Vercueil offers only the comfort of death and painlessness. Her unlikely 
companion, who remains with her in her final moments, who has listened to her long 
discourses on shame and love, has helped her soul bloom for a last time. For the most part he 
remained passive, active only in his resistance to submitting himself to her completely. In this 
last paragraph his final action is an embrace, from which “there was no warmth to be had.” 
It is of little importance whether Vercueil delivers her letter, since the daughter is 
merely a point of address in this narrative, but never fleshed into a character. We as readers 
have received it, and Vercueil has played his role in delivering its message to us. We as 
readers have followed Elizabeth Curren on her journey from quiet repulsion by to an 
acknowledgement of injustice, have seen the horrors of death through her eyes. We have 
accompanied her and Vercueil in their beautiful, if somewhat melancholic pas de deux, 
moving back and forth while the distance between them got less and less, until it ultimately 
vanished in a final embrace. 
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3.3 The Master of Petersburg (1994) – Fathers and Sons 
Confession is everywhere in Dostoevsky. (Coetzee in Doubling the Point 1992: 275) 
Whereas Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron was facing her own death and addressing her 
emigrated daughter, we now encounter Dostoevsky as aging parent facing the grief over the 
death of his stepson Pavel in The Master of Petersburg. The personal tone adopted in the 
previous narrative is continued, only now in the third person past tense and removed in time 
to Russia at the end of the 19th century. Age of Iron was synchronous with the time of its 
production, the late 1980s, and set at the site of its production, Cape Town, South Africa. The 
setting of The Master of Petersburg has been related to Coetzee’s own biography in terms of 
living in an interregnum.142 The central theme of grief over a lost son clearly reflects 
Coetzee’s loss of his son Nicholas in 1989. Coetzee uses the medium of fiction to explore his 
very personal act of mourning.143 The sympathetic imagination of the author Coetzee allows 
him not only to send Dostoevsky through the streets of Petersburg in the search for traces of 
dead Pavel, but also to reflect on the position of the writer and his inspiration, on his source 
material and the ethical responsibilities this might entail. 
In The Master of Petersburg the patterns of empathy are primarily evoked by the 
presentation of the main character himself, but also in his relations to others, most notably in 
his relation to his stepson. In regard to source material and a writer’s responsibilities, 
Dostoevsky’s relation to Matryona and her mother Anna Sergeyevna illustrate how the 
imagination can lead a writer to dark places, even while affected by processes of empathy. As 
readers we witness the theme of one of Dostoevsky’s five major novels, namely The 
Possessed, emerging in the writer’s imagination (related to us by Coetzee’s narrative). 
Mirroring the confession of Stavrogin about his seduction of a young girl and her subsequent 
suicide, Dostoevsky’s involvement with his landlady and her daughter takes a similar 
direction, only without the fatal outcome of The Possessed.144 
 
142 Mike Marais observes: 
Both [novels, i.e. AI and MOP] depict societies which, temporally, find themselves in the 
interregnum between a decaying, old political order and a new one seeking to establish itself. In 
each novel, a protagonist who embodies the values of western society confronts revolutionary 
nihilists who challenge his/her ethical assumptions. In the conflictual relationship which then 
develops, each protagonist condemns his/her antagonist’s nihilism in ethical terms. Finally, the 
protagonists of both novels embark on literary exercises which reflect the assumptions that 
underpin their relationships with the nihilists. (Marais 1998b: 230) 
143 For a more comprehensive assessment see Durrant 2004: 23-52. 
144 For a more detailed discussion of The Possessed as intertext see Adelman 2000. 
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We closely follow the main character as sole focalizer of the unfolding events. The “I” 
of Elizabeth Curren’s narrative now becomes the “He” of Dostoevsky’s narrative, told not by 
himself but by a neutral heterodiegetic narrator. The reader is no longer invited to inhabit the 
main character’s perspective; instead he takes on the role of an observer. In Breithaupt’s 
model of narrative empathy this allows for a distance that potentially enhances the 
narrative/cognitive empathy of the reader for the main character. On the other hand it makes 
the narrative at first seem less emotionally invested, an impression that is soon corrected by 
the transparent intimacy of Dostoevsky’s thoughts and feelings. 
3.3.1 Exposition: The Father, the Son, and the Suit 
Coetzee establishes the “He” of the narrative with great care, the name of the main 
character being revealed only later in the narrative. After establishing the scene, Petersburg in 
October 1869, we first encounter the protagonist: 
The passenger steps out. He is a man in late middle age, bearded and stooped, with a high 
forehead and heavy eyebrows that lend him an air of sober self-absorption. He wears a dark 
suit of somewhat démodé cut. (MOP 1)145 
This can hardly be called an embodied character, rather resembling a brief sketch of the man 
we are to follow on his odyssey through Petersburg in search of an answer to the death of his 
stepson Pavel. The “air of sober self-absorption” befits the writer (as it would Coetzee); the 
old-fashioned “dark suit” sets up a contrast to the white suit of Pavel, which acquires 
symbolic importance in the course of the narrative.146 His first steps lead him to the former 
dwelling of his son, where he meets Matryona (whose name is revealed early on), “a girl with 
fair hair and striking dark eyes” (2), who leads him upstairs to the lodgings of her mother 
Anna Sergeyevna Kolenkina (her full name is given), who has “the same dark eyes and 
sculpted eyebrows as the child, but her hair is black” (2). These observations are made in the 
vein of an external observer; no eye contact is made (or at least not reported). Coetzee 
continues to keep the reader in the dark about the protagonist’s name, even when he 
introduces himself: “‘Forgive me for coming unannounced,’ he says. ‘My name…’ He 
hesitates. ‘I believe my son has been a lodger of yours.’” (2) Dostoevsky presents himself in 
his function as “the father of,” omitting his own name. Only much later will his actual name 
be revealed to the reader by councillor Maximov. (33) Showing the mother and the girl a 
 
145 Coetzee 1999 [1994]. All quotes in section 3.3 will be from MOP unless indicated otherwise. 
146 The dark suit of the father and the white suit of the son could be connected to Plato’s theory of the passions: 
the white horse representing the rational and moral instincts, the dark horse representing irrational instincts, i.e. 
dark desires (Phaedrus 246e-254e, in Plato 1925). 
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daguerreotype of the son, the child whispers his name: Pavel Alexandrovich; almost as if she 
was calling out to the dead Pavel in an orphic gesture of resurrection. Pavel constitutes the 
epicentre of this narrative, and all events unfold around his unsolved death by falling from a 
shot tower.147 Dostoevsky suspects murder and follows a trail to the revolutionary and nihilist 
Nechaev, modelled after a historical figure (who the historical Dostoevsky never met).148 
Left alone in the room formerly occupied by his son, he first tries to catch a scent of 
his son from the pillow, “but he can smell nothing but soap and sun.” (3) He attempts to evoke 
the physical presence of the son. He opens the son’s suitcase, that is among the few things 
remaining of him, to find a white cotton suit, to which he presses his forehead (where his 
mirror neurons are located): “Faintly the smell of his son comes to him. He breathes in deeply, 
again and again, thinking: his ghost, entering me.” (3f) We as readers stand by to witness the 
father employing his sympathetic imagination to call forth the spirit of his dead son, here 
represented by the embodied expression of a “faint smell” – imagine mirror neurons firing 
away after being activated by a smell that triggers a neurological representation (spirit image) 
of the son. 
Pavel represents the other Dostoevsky is trying to approximate, is trying to connect to. 
The text continuously evokes Pavel’s presence in the mind of the aging author, gyrates around 
his repeated attempts to reach out beyond death to his lost son. Dostoevsky waits “for the 
darkness to thicken, to turn into another kind of darkness, a darkness of presence. Silently he 
forms his lips over his son’s name, three times, four times.” (5) Unlike Orpheus, of whose 
journey into the realm of death he is reminded, he has no music to appease the spirits, but 
only words, boiling down to the calling of his dead son’s name: Pavel. At this moment “[h]is 
head begins to swim” (5) and he falls asleep, imagining “himself plunging down a long 
waterfall into a pool, and gives himself over to the plunge.” (6) With these words the first 
chapter, simply titled “Petersburg,” ends.149 
 
147 A “shot tower” was used to make ammunition. Herein lies the probably most suggestive parallel to the death 
of Coetzee’s son Nicholas, who fell from a balcony; Coetzee’s grief remains his own, but the dimension it takes 
on in his fiction about the Russian writer is made available to the reader and thereby transcends the private, as 
expressed by Dostoevsky to councillor Maximov: “A private matter, an utterly private matter, private to the 
writer, till it is given to the world.” (40) For a highly original discussion see Lawlan 1998. 
148 In an interview with Joanna Scott, Coetzee sublimely comments: “The death of Pavel brings Dostoevsky face 
to face with Nechaev, which is something that didn’t happen in real life, so to that extent it allows me to engineer 
a meeting between two very important historical figures.” (Scott 1997: 100) 
149 This is the first novel where Coetzee uses titled chapters, maybe as a homily to the author Dostoevsky. The 
formal use of chapter titles otherwise recurs only in the essay fiction Elizabeth Costello. 
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3.3.2 Diving into Grief 
As in the final section of Foe, when the narrative dives into the wreck of history and 
loses its voice, the theme of losing oneself recurs in The Master of Petersburg in the form of 
epileptic attacks. The “head beginning to swim” could be an auratic indicator for a seizure, 
but at this point only leads to the forgetfulness of sleep. The theme of “losing himself” is 
explicitly expressed in the narrative early on: “[…] breathing softly, trying to lose himself, 
trying to evoke a spirit that can surely not yet have left these surroundings.” (12) The loss of 
self is supposed to make room for the spirit of the dead son to take residence. 
Another theme that resonates with the final section of Foe, in particular the notion of 
diving into deep waters, recurs prominently in The Master of Petersburg, as in one of 
Dostoevsky’s dream visions: 
He knows what he is in search of. As he swims he sometimes opens his mouth and gives 
what he thinks of as a cry or a call. With each cry or call water enters his mouth; each 
syllable is replaced by a syllable of water. He grows more and more ponderous, till his 
breastbone is brushing the silt of the river-bed. (17) 
The syllables being replaced by water are simply the name of his son: Pavel. As with Vercueil 
and with Friday, Pavel represents an other we learn very little about. In terms of the 
sympathetic imagination, leaving the other as a fairly blank space challenges the reader far 
more, even though it implies repeated frustration. In the end, this opens space for our 
sympathetic imagination to explore, and thereby allows us to practice our faculty of empathy, 
and there is no need to come to a final conclusion in regard to the other. Sam Durrant 
comments on the difference between what Elizabeth Costello preaches and what many 
characters in Coetzee’s fictions go through: 
Costello’s lecture preaches the necessity of awakening to the reality of other lives, a 
passage from willed ignorance to willed wakefulness that only comes about through an act 
of volition, a conscious decision to open the heart. Coetzee’s novels, by contrast, describe a 
kind of fall into sleepfulness, a cessation of the will that leads to a dreamy or 
somnambulistic mode of attentiveness to other lives. And yet these trajectories may not be 
as far apart as they may appear. (Durrant 2006: 121f)  
Whereas Elizabeth Curren actively sought to reshape her imagination, Dostoevsky’s opening 
up to the other takes place subconsciously. 
In the case of Dostoevsky, the impossibility of closure in regard to his lost son 
becomes apparent in his thoughts, related to us in indirect discourse: “From somewhere to 
somewhere I am in retreat, he thinks; when the retreat is completed, what will be left of me?” 
(19) At this point Dostoevsky has not yet realized the futility of his work of mourning, of his 
work of losing himself. In the end he will remain himself more than he wishes to, and his self 
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will be the inescapable Rubicon of his existence; the only way forward will be the words he 
writes on paper. But even at the early stages of his search, the metaphor of submerging 
himself into a realm of water points to this futility: “The stream that carries him still moves 
forward; but that purpose is no longer life. He is being carried by dead water, a dead stream.” 
(20) Later, it will come to him in more precise terms: “I am I, he thinks despairingly, 
manacled to myself till the day I die. Whatever it was that wavered toward me, I was 
unworthy of it, and now it has withdrawn.” (82) 
Dostoevsky puts up resistance to the death he encounters again and again: “All day 
and all night he breathes life into the water.” (21) Only his thoughts can animate the waters, 
only the vision of a writer’s mind. The character is aware of his bookishness (a term also 
attributed to Coetzee by Coetzee in Summertime): “He tries to speak, but his voice emerges 
strangled. I am behaving like a character in a book, he thinks.” (27) We read “the strangled 
voice” of the grieving father, who is lacking the right words to conjure his son back to life. All 
relations he forms are connected to Pavel: Pavel’s landlady and her daughter; Councillor 
Maximov, who is in possession of Pavel’s private papers; Nechaev, a revolutionary comrade 
or possibly his murderer; finally Ivan and the dog, intermediaries of a third kind, empathetic 
foils for Dostoevsky. Through all of them he hopes to reconnect to his lost son. 
In the case of Anna Sergeyevna, he longs for her to understand his soul-searching, 
hopes that together they might be able to hear Pavel’s voice: 
How can he make her understand? To make her understand he would have to speak in a 
voice from under the waters, a boy’s clear bell-voice pleading out of the deep dark. “Sing to 
me, dear father!” the voice would have to call, and she would have to hear. Somewhere 
within himself he would have to find not only that voice but the words, the true words. 
Here and now he does not have the words. (110f) 
He continues this thought and muses about whether these orphic “words” might not be found 
“in the breast of the Russian people [...]. Or perhaps in the breast of a child.” (111) This 
foreshadows the function Matryona will take as a character in Dostoevsky’s next novel, the 
child who loses her heart and life to Stavrogin. The lost child thereby appears threefold, once 
as Pavel, twice as Matryona – Coetzee’s character and Dostoevsky’s character. The author 
figure Dostoevsky struggles to maintain what he calls “the integrity of his grieving”: 
He shakes his head as if to rid it of a plague of devils. What is it that is corrupting the 
integrity of his grieving, that insists it is nothing but a lugubrious disguise? Somewhere 
inside him truth has lost its way. As if in the labyrinth of his brain, but also in the labyrinth 
of his body – veins, bones, intestines, organs – a tiny child is wandering, searching for the 
light, searching to emerge. How can he find the child lost within himself, allow him a voice 
to sing his sad song? 
Piping on a bone. […] Father, why have you left me in the dark forest? Father, when will 
you come and save me? (125f; original italics) 
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The orphic, here paired with biblical undertones (Jesus in the Garden Gethsemane, Luke 
22:39-46; Matthew 26:36-46), is imagined both as father’s duty and as child’s plea for help. 
Dostoevsky is determined to rescue what is left of Pavel’s spirit, to spare Matryona from 
ignominy and to relegate the imagined atrocity into his realm of fiction, where a child will be 
sacrificed to make a point about the elusiveness of salvation. Dostoevsky turns Pavel into the 
fictional Stavrogin, who remains in the care of the author figure Dostoevsky, miraculously 
extending his fatherhood. How much he cares for the stepson finds its expression in extending 
his lifeline by implanting his spirit in his forthcoming fiction. Dostoevsky imagines how dead 
Pavel feels and explains to Anna Sergeyevna: “[...]Pavel is above all lonely, and in his 
loneliness needs to be sung to and comforted, to be reassured that he will not be abandoned at 
the bottom of the waters.” (111) Instead of abandoning him, he chooses to betray him in an act 
of love and art. 
Early on Dostoevsky hints at the dark ambiguity of his undertaking, for instance when 
he wears Pavel’s white suit: 
He opens Pavel’s suitcase and dons the white suit. Hitherto he has worn it as a gesture to 
the dead boy, a gesture of defiance and love. But now, looking in the mirror, he sees only a 
seedy imposture and, beyond that, something surreptitious and obscene, something that 
belongs behind the locked doors and curtained windows of rooms where men in wigs and 
skirts bare their rumps to be flogged. (71) 
The early “I” of Dostoevsky believed his bond to Pavel to be uncorrupted and pure, 
but as he moves from “I” to “He” his former beliefs are contested and doubt seeps in. 
The white suit can no longer satisfy his hunger for consolation and salvation, the 
rational enquiries will not deliver what he was hoping for; instead the search for the 
truth about his son’s death turns into a self-scrutiny, turns to his darker passions and 
liberates them, both in his emotional dealings with his landlady and her daughter and 
his artistic aspirations, which he comes to discuss with Maximov and Nechaev in 
regard to their political implications and with himself in regard to their moral 
implications. 
3.3.3 Seizures of the Self; From I to He 
The descent into deep waters collates the ancient myth of Orpheus with the more 
psychological theme of descending into a subliminal range of the unconscious. Diving into 
the deep corresponds with the descent into the underworld, the world of the dead – as in the 
final section of Foe. The repeated use of aquatic metaphors corresponds with the theme of 
leaving behind the self. On the narrative level of the text, the “I” transforms into a “He”; this 
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happens literally when we change from reported dialogue and indirect thought back to the 
third person narrative, but it is also reflected on by Dostoevsky on the level of the story. 
His dreams and visions are another vehicle of insight, both producing in him states 
beyond his conscious control: 
Visions that come and go, swift, ephemeral. He is not in control of himself. Carefully he 
pushes paper and pen to the far end of the table and lays his head on his hands. If I am 
going to faint, he thinks, let me faint at my post. (53) 
The fainting anticipates an epileptic seizure, which he suffers in varying intensity; this time he 
hopes to remain “at [his] post.” The seizures represent states in which he loses control, but 
without anything memorable taking place in his brain; a blanking out rather than an opening 
of secret channels. At the same time it indicates a loss of embodied substance and of identity: 
When he wakes it is into darkness so dense that he can feel it pressing upon his eyeballs. 
He has no idea where he is, no idea who he is. He is a wakefulness, a consciousness, that is 
all. It is as if he has been born a minute ago, born into a world of unrelieved night. (69, after 
first fit) 
The inner turmoil is paralleled by bodily discomforts that either accompany his seizures or 
come involuntarily: 
He lies down, pressing an arm across his eyes as if to ward off a blow. Everything spins; he 
has the sensation of falling into endless blackness. When he comes back he has again lost 
all sense of who he is. He knows the word I, but as he stares at it it becomes as enigmatic as 
a rock in the middle of a desert. 
Just a dream, he thinks; at any moment I will awake and all will be well again. For an -
instant he is allowed to believe. Then the truth bursts over him and overwhelms him. (71) 
The symbolic “I” as a “rock in the middle of the desert” brings to memory the figures of 
Jacobus Coetzee, Magda, Michael K, the Magistrate, Eugene Dawn and even Elizabeth 
Curren. All of these characters share the notion of a dominant “I” they either wish to ascertain 
(Jacobus and Eugene), or have serious doubts about (Magda), or wish to transcend by either a 
return to a state of nature (Michael K) or a rebirth of the soul (Magistrate, Elizabeth Curren, 
Dostoevsky).The reunion with nature and the symbolic rebirth are paralleled by the narrative 
shift from “I” to “He”. Life & Times of Michael K, Waiting for the Barbarians, Age of Iron 
and The Master of Petersburg are all third person narratives, in which the shift from “I” to 
“He” is already formally implicated by them being third person narratives. The characters 
struggle to overcome the enigmatic nature of their selves (as the first person narrators Eugene 
and Jacobus failed to do) and reach an enlightened third person position in regard to 
themselves as well as to make room for the other to inhabit their imagination. In a first step 
they employ their sympathetic imagination (sometimes more, sometimes less sympathetic to 
others), in a second step their empathy is aroused, ultimately enabling them to no longer be a 
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rock in a desert but rather a corn of sand and therefore a complementary part of a desert rather 
than standing out in a solitary fashion. 
Dostoevsky senses the result of his investigations, based on reason, will be limited. 
Almost like a detective in a crime story he tries to reconstruct events, talk to witnesses and 
people who knew Pavel.150 But this rational approach is sidelined by his inner journey, for 
which the acquaintances he makes are the catalysts. The following quote illustrates the 
conflict between his rationalizations and his convictions regarding the soul: 
If he expects his son to speak in the voice of the unexpected, he will never hear him. As 
long as he expects what he does not expect, what he does not expect will come. Therefore –
paradox within paradox, darkness swaddled in darkness – he must answer to what he does 
not expect. (80) 
Therefore Dostoevsky comes to believe that he must empty himself of pre-formulated 
expectations, which are part and parcel of the rational “I”, and achieve a state of mind in 
which he can respond to what he does not and cannot expect. What is needed is a mode of 
attentiveness beyond observation, an opening of the self to the other. The rational mind allows 
him to express his thoughts, whereas the language of the heart operates beyond a writer’s 
words: “It is as though a fog has settled over his brain. If he were a character in a book, what 
would he say, at a moment like this when either the heart speaks or the page remains blank?” 
(97) Not only does reclaiming Pavel require moving beyond reason, but his own salvation 
does heavily depend on it: “[H]e knows too that as long as he tries by cunning to distinguish 
things that are things from things that are signs he will not be saved. (83) 
Towards the middle of the novel, in the central chapter “The shot tower,” Dostoevsky 
learns from Anna Sergeyevna that the police are investigating a murder that took place in the 
vicinity. The beggar Ivanov, whom Dostoevsky had taken in the night before, has been found 
dead in an alley.151 Not having heard the end of the news, Dostoevsky reacts with shock to the 
police investigation: “Time stops; he stands frozen. ‘Why should they come here?’ The words 
come from him but he seems to hear them from afar, the thin words of someone else.” (109) 
These thin words indicate what it might mean to speak in the voice of another, a “He” residing 
within the “I”; a state of self-estrangement that opens avenues to the other. 
 
150 “Behind the metafictional vexation games, the blending of factual biography, the rewriting of a classic and the 
revision of revision, which will supply work for generations of interpreters, a double detective story. It tries on 
the one hand to solve the mysterious death of Pavel Alexandrovich Isaev, keeping the reader on his toes, on the 
other hand a far greater mystery is explored and spied out, namely the riddle of how not this or that novel, but 
how masterworks in general come into existence.” (Horstmann 2005: 125; my translation) 
151 This corresponds with historical events. The revolutionary Nechaev had sacrificed one of theirs, namely 
Ivanov. 
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Finally, the seizures take on a new quality for Dostoevsky. Instead of treating them as 
phenomena of the pathological order, he now sees them in the light of his spiritual 
debasement. Whereas the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians was actively seeking a 
restoration of his soul, Dostoevsky comes to realize the twisted turns his soul has taken, 
fuelling his imagination and enabling him to create powerful works of art. He gains a new 
perspective on himself, an effect that even applies to his seizures:  
It is as though for the first time his eyes have been open to where he is when he is seized. In 
fact, he must wonder whether seizure is any longer the right word, whether the word has not 
all along been possession – whether everything that for the past twenty years has gone 
under the name of seizure has not been a mere presentiment of what is now happening, the 
quaking and dancing of the body a long-drawn-out prelude to a quaking of the soul. 
The death of innocence. […] darkness multiplies, fold upon fold. (213) 
The “quaking of the soul” was initiated by his search for his dead stepson’s spirit, but he was 
prepared for it by his history of epileptic fits. The notions he is forced to face regarding both 
Pavel and himself prove him guilty, but only in the last chapter of the novel will he reveal the 
nature of his transgression. For now, let the following quote foreshadow part of his final 
insight: 
The madness is in him and he is in the madness; they think each other; what they call each 
other, whether madness or epilepsy or vengeance or the spirit of the age, is of no 
consequence. This is not a lodging-house of madness in which he is living, nor is 
Petersburg a city of madness. He is the mad one; and the one who admits he is the mad one 
is mad too. Nothing he says is true, nothing is false, nothing is to be trusted, nothing to be 
dismissed. There is nothing to hold to, nothing to do but fall. (235)152 
3.3.4 Imagining Death 
The chapter “The shot tower” forms the epicentre of the narrative. The father visits the 
place of his son’s death. Together with Nechaev he climbs up the shot tower and is lead to the 
very railing over which Pavel fell. Dostoevsky faces the death of his son in a very literal way: 
A metaphor, he tells himself, that is all it is – another word for a lapse of consciousness, a 
not-being-here, an absence. Nothing new. The epileptic knows it all: the approach to the 
edge, the glance downward, the lurch of the soul, the thinking that thinks itself crazily over 
and over like a bell pealing in the head: Time shall have an end, there shall be no death. 
He grips the rail tighter, shakes his head to chase away the dizziness. Metaphors – what 
nonsense! There is death, only death. Death is a metaphor for nothing. Death is death. (118; 
original italics) 
The metaphor is an instrument of comparing the unlikely, of establishing unusual connections 
between disparate matters. Dostoevsky dismisses metaphors as “nonsense” in the face of his 
son’s death, but at the same time his quest for his deceased son proceeds in a metaphorical 
fashion, various terms and people serving as intermediates between himself and his dead son. 
 
152 This once again resonates with Coetzee’s essay about Erasmus (GO 83-103). 
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Nechaev explains to him that the police might have made Pavel drunk and led him up 
here; at the same time Dostoevsky suspects Nechaev of having sacrificed Pavel. At this 
moment we witness the struggle between the knowledge imparted to him by his epileptic fits 
and his literary intellect, searching for an expression of his sentiments. 
Believe: another word. What does it mean, to believe? I believe in the body on the 
pavement below. I believe in the blood and the bones. To gather up the broken body and 
embrace it: that is what it means to believe. To believe and to love – the same thing. 
“I believe in the resurrection,” he says. The words come without premeditation. The crazy, 
ranting tone is gone from his voice. Speaking the words, hearing them, he feels a quick joy, 
not so much at the words themselves as at the way they have come, spoken out of him as if 
by another. Pavel! he thinks. 
[…] 
“I believe in the resurrection of the body and in life eternal.” (122) 
Believing is connected to the embodied experience of death and of love, epitomized in the 
father’s imagined embrace of the dead body. The conflict between thinking and feeling is not 
resolved, but at least made productive through the sympathetic imagination being directed 
towards re-imagining his son’s death. Dostoevsky recovers some faith in his assertion (or 
assumption) of the religious doctrine of resurrection, the last resort for comfort in the face of a 
loved one’s death. The faith in resurrection is expressed “as if by another.” Through this 
process of sympathetic imagination he takes the place of Pavel and lets the son take his place: 
“I am the one who died and was buried, he thinks, Pavel the one who lives and will always 
live. What I am struggling to do now is to understand what form this is in which I have 
returned from the grave.” (124) Taking Pavel’s place is something Dostoevsky already 
imagined early on in the novel: 
At moments like this he cannot distinguish Pavel from himself. They are the same person; 
and that person is no more or less than a thought, Pavel thinking it in him, he thinking it in 
Pavel. The thought keeps Pavel alive, suspended in his fall. (21) 
Pavel lives on in Dostoevsky’s imagination, but his embodied self is lost and only vaguely 
present in the father, “faded copy of the son.” (67) The writer longs for more, cannot give up 
his search for a more satisfying resolution: 
Why this plodding chase across empty country after the rumour of a ghost, the ghost of a 
rumour? 
Because I am he. Because he is I. Something there that I seek to grasp: the moment before 
extinction when the blood still courses, the heart still beats. (53) 
This thought was previously expressed by Elizabeth Curren when she ponders on why she 
feels urged to love Bheki’s friend John (see 3.2.7). 
Towards the close of the novel, the eyes of the child Matryona tell us how much 
Dostoevsky’s transformation has achieved, how successful his assimilation to Pavel has 
become, how close he got to resurrecting his lost son: “‘Pavel used to sit like that when he 
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was writing,’ she says. ‘I thought you were Pavel when I came in.’” (246) However, it is 
impossible for dead Pavel to take permanent residence in the writer, and vice versa. 
Dostoevsky early on characterizes himself as “the most transient of sojourners” (66), and as 
the narrative progresses we see how this applies both to his detective work and the encounters 
involved, as well as to his soul-searching in regard to Pavel. The shifting between “I” and 
“He”, formally a permanent feature of the narrative, can only be momentary; but these 
moments constitute stepping stones for his inner journey: 
He knows what he is doing. At the same time, in this contest of cunning between himself 
and God, he is outside himself, perhaps outside his soul. Somewhere he stands and watches 
while he and God circle each other. And time stands still and watches too. Time is 
suspended, everything is suspended before the fall. 
I have lost my place in my soul, he thinks. (249; original italics) 
Suspending his position of a narrative “He” through quoted thoughts comes at the price of 
losing his sense of self, or, as expressed here, losing his place in his soul. Ultimately, what 
seems to be a loss proves to be a gain, although not without a price to pay. And his ability to 
enter alternative states of mind has increased the scope and pace of his inner movements, as 
when he imagines wanting to kiss Pavel after his return to life: “As he speaks the words he 
hears how mad they are. He seems to move into and out of madness like a fly at an open 
window.” (140) 
If we as readers at first imagined Dostoevsky as identifying himself with Orpheus, 
attempting to resurrect Pavel (read: Eurydice) from the dead, we are now confounded by a 
repeated reversal of the roles. Coetzee does not allow us the comfort of a smug allegorical 
relation, but instead lets the image flicker and invert its chromatics. Pavel is “piping on a 
bone” to his father from the depths, taking the place of the singer Orpheus instead of being the 
muse Eurydice. Dostoevsky also taps into the ending of the myth of Orpheus, who is torn to 
pieces by the Maenads after returning from Tartarus without his beloved. Just after 
contemplating his “power to write” (152), he turns his mind to memories of Pavel that haunt 
him while he wanders through the city of Petersburg. These memories are now equated with 
the scattered body parts of Orpheus, while at the same time Dostoevsky likens his poetic 
powers to those of Orpheus. Both father and (step-)son are related to Orpheus, while Eurydice 
remains outside of the picture: 
Nowhere and everywhere, torn and scattered like Orpheus. […] 
The task left to me: to gather the hoard, put together the scattered parts. Poet, lyre-player, 
enchanter, lord of resurrection, that is what I am called to be. And the truth? Stiff shoulders 
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humped over the writing-table, and the ache of a heart slow to move. A tortoise heart. 
(152f)153 
From the myth his thoughts move to the everyday toil of the writer, commenting on the 
slowness of the writing process in bringing about movements of the sentiments, of the heart. 
The “tortoise heart” might be taken for a central metaphor of Dostoevsky’s slow inner journey 
from searching for a lost son to finding a new theme for the next novel; in both cases resulting 
in the realization of what price he is paying for his artistic endeavours. In this sense we can 
take another thought from the final chapter to indicate the two-fold nature of his grief over the 
lost son: “A corpse improperly buried; buried now within him, in his breast, no longer 
weeping but hissing madness, whispering to him to fall.” (234) 
3.3.5 Anna and Matryona – Unlimited Delimitation? 
Anna Sergeyevna comes close to being an amanuensis for the writer Dostoevsky (as 
his wife Anya – both in the novel and historically – was to him; in name reappearing as 
secretary of Señor C in Diary of a Bad Year). While Dostoevsky’s dealings with Maximov and 
Nechaev offer a site of political negotiation in regard to the responsibility of a writer, Anna 
and Matryona offer a site for a more personal exchange. 
The conversations between her and Dostoevsky are of a more intimate nature, and not 
only because they end up making love. The act of love-making brings him one step closer to 
assimilating himself to Pavel through a recollection of his own youth: “He feels a pang of a 
kind. Memories of old feelings stir; the young man in him, not yet dead, tries to make himself 
heard, the corpse within him not yet buried.” (226) At the surface it appears as if his own 
memories are revitalizing him, but on a deeper level “the young man in him”, “the corpse 
within him not yet buried,” points to Pavel. In the early acts of making love the initiative lies 
with Anna: “She comes to his room late and without warning. Again, through her, he passes 
into darkness and into the waters where his son floats among the other drowned.” (58) 
Towards the close of the novel they make love again, her lovemaking surprising him 
“by its recklessness.” Her “cries and pantings” are not “sounds of animal pleasure,” but “a 
means she uses to work herself into an erotic trance” (230): “At first her intensity carries itself 
over to him. There is a long passage in which he again loses all sense of who he is, who she 
is.” (230) Losing a sense of self is a recurring theme, and Anna later points out to him: “There 
are times when I am not myself, you must get used to that.” (232) At her climax, she whispers 
a word in his ear that he only half-catches: devil. (230) He muses: “The devil: the instant at the 
 
153 Looking forward, we could compare this with Paul Rayment’s slow heart in Slow Man. 
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onset of the climax when the soul is twisted out of the body and begins its downward spiral 
into oblivion.” Looking at her in this moment, “[…] it is not hard to see her too as possessed 
by the devil.” (230) 
The theme of the novel about to emerge, The Possessed, is artfully woven into the 
fabric of the narrative. In contrast, their first sexual encounters were carried out with little 
passion: “In the act there was nothing he can call pleasure or even sensation. It is as though 
they are making love through a sheet, the grey, tattered sheet of his grief.” (56). Later, she is 
“growing ‘electric’ in the manner of so many other women he has known.” (230) Her 
‘electric’ quality can be related to the “electric being” Elizabeth Costello proposes as a 
measure for the successful representational embodiment of living beings. In their embodied 
states the two lovers have a brush with evil; this becomes more obvious in the conversation 
that follows, where Anna begs him to leave her and her daughter alone, accusing him of using 
her as “a route to [her] child” (231), going on to claim he is “in the grip of something quite 
beyond [her].” Her sexual compliance is now revealed to be a strategy to protect her daughter 
from his dark desires. Dostoevsky rejects her accusation and swears he would never hurt the 
child, but Anna replies: “What do you believe in that you can swear by?” (232) Again we 
might think of Elizabeth Costello “At the Gate” (EC 193-225), who claims to hold beliefs 
only provisionally, failing to deliver a convincing statement of belief in the final chapter.154 
Their talks home in on matters of the heart and the soul. Anna is the most pragmatic 
character of the novel, not only in her function as Dostoevsky’s landlady, but also in her 
straight-forward manner of addressing problems, both her own and his. She senses how the 
writer tries to use her as a vehicle to reach out to Pavel, but expresses that his artistic rather 
than his erotic faculties might be better suited to the task: 
“You are an artist, a master,” she says. “It is for you, not for me, to bring him back to life.” 
Master. It is a word he associates with metal – with the tempering of swords, the casting of 
bells, a foundry-master. Master of life: strange term. But he is prepared to reflect on it. He 
will give a home to any word, no matter how strange, no matter how stray, if there is a 
chance it is an anagram for Pavel. 
“I am far from being a master,” he says. “There is a crack running through me. What can 
one do with a cracked bell? A cracked bell cannot be mended.” (140f) 
He takes in her words and processes them, still hoping to find a trace of Pavel in the words he 
receives from her. The metaphor of the cracked bell recalls the orphic theme of calling out to 
the dead through music; the idea behind it (proposed by Anna but here refused by 
Dostoevsky) being that literature might be a more adequate means of reaching out to those not 
 
154 I have omitted the act of writing in which Nechaev tricks him into giving a written statement in the chapter 
“The printing press”; it is directed at a writer’s political responsibility, which would shift the discussion too 
much away from the sympathetic imagination and its relation to empathy. 
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at hand. The term “Master of life” does not originate from his dialogue with Anna, but from 
his own thoughts; and it reflects the authority a writer assumes in the creation of his fictional 
worlds – a thought that recurs in Elizabeth Costello’s turn of phrase “secretary of the 
invisible” (EC 199).155 In this narrative, Dostoevsky could be seen as assuming a similar role; 
searching for the invisible remains of Pavel, finding a new theme for his art through the 
mother and daughter he encounters. Attempting to penetrate their raison d’être, he can only 
recognize the forces at work in himself, revealing his dark passions. 
After the sexual encounter he compares himself to a lion (128) – earlier he was an “old 
blinkering horse” (186). When he tries to hide Nechaev’s clothes, turning more and more 
desperate in the attempt and ending up in a small alley, the animal comparison becomes 
embodied: “On all fours, raising his head, sniffing the air like a wild animal, he tries to 
concentrate his attention on the horizon inside himself.” (164) The “wild animal” inside of 
him makes him aware of his “inner horizon”; I take this to refer to the potential movements of 
his inner being, of his heart and soul, limited by a distant horizon. It points both to his 
sympathetic imagination, which will enable him to cover ground within his inner cosmos, and 
to his empathy, which will allow him to feel himself into the spots he moves to. Translated 
into the terms of the outside world, Dostoevsky will not only be able to reach out to his fellow 
humans, but instead will be forced to transgress all propriety in appropriating all encounters 
into his art. Coetzee might here have developed a case study of how both the sympathetic 
imagination and the power of empathy can turn against both the writer and the subjects of his 
imagination; one could relate this to the chapter “The Problem of Evil” in Elizabeth Costello, 
where Costello discusses whether the sympathetic imagination might go too far in some cases. 
Her initial claim that there are no limits to the sympathetic imagination is largely technical, 
without any moral imperative implied. On the contrary, in moral terms she cautiously raises 
objections to a boundless sympathetic imagination in “The Problem of Evil.” 
When Matryona discovers her mother and the writer in bed together, Dostoevsky, 
seeing “the grave child at the door” (232), thinks to himself: “She sees all, she knows all.” 
(233) The innocent child we read about in the beginning – her first appearance in front of the 
house on 63 Svechnoi Street shows her playing with other children, throwing pebbles into 
 
155 The phrase refers to the poem “Secretaries” by Czeslaw Milosz: 
I am no more than a secretary of the invisible thing  
That is dictated to me and a few others.  
Secretaries, mutually unknown, we walk the earth  
Without much comprehension. Beginning a phrase in the middle  
Or ending it with a comma. And how it looks when completed  
Is not up to us to inquire, we won't read it anyway. (Milosz 2001: 141) 
183 
 
puddles – has now been corrupted by the writer’s presence, by his need to channel his 
memories of Pavel through her. In a sense Dostoevsky has become Stavrogin, as the final 
chapter of the novel is titled. 
The writer’s authority brings along the writer’s responsibility for his fictions and the 
effect they have on the reader, and also how they reflect back on the writer. Dostoevsky’s 
dealing with Anna Sergeyevna’s daughter Matryona, eponymous with the seduced child in 
The Possessed, showcase this potential conflict. In the chapter “Disguise” we read how 
attached Matryona was to Pavel, maybe even in love with him, and how subsequently she 
regards Nechaev as a trustworthy friend, since he was a friend of Pavel – more so than 
Dostoevsky, the stepfather, ever was. The writer senses that Matryona’s connection to Pavel, 
even after his demise, is stronger than the bond he is attempting to evoke. When he notices 
that Matryona is no longer tending to the shrine built to honour Pavel, he surmises: “Does she 
guess […] that the only voices he [Dostoevsky] hears now are devil-voices?” (126) In a 
conversation with the mother, Dostoevsky calls the child a “conductress of souls” (139), 
expressing his hope that she might lead him to Pavel. 
When his desire for the mother again becomes intense, he imagines writing a book of 
transgression – the informed reader will recognize this as an outline for Stavrogin’s 
confession in The Possessed. He terms it “Imaginary memoirs. Memories of the imagination.” 
(134) He names Anna Sergeyevna as “true begetter” of this story (a term familiar from Susan 
Barton and her narrative of the island). The victim in the evolving story is the daughter, to 
whom the narrator shamelessly reveals the story of how he seduced a young girl. This story of 
his distresses the daughter so much that she ultimately gives herself up to him “in the most 
shameful of ways” (in The Possessed it results in her suicide). Dostoevsky continues his line 
of thought, wondering whether the writing of a “book of evil” could “liberate himself from 
evil” or would instead “cut himself off from good.” (134) He realizes how Pavel has no place 
in this story (the father has taken the place of the son), and cannot help but feel “a quiver of 
dark triumph.” (135) The “murderous tenderness” of the father for his dead child (125) now 
also comes to affect the girl, at least in the writer’s imagination, which remains the main stage 
of the whole narrative. 
3.3.6 On Writing and Demonic Desires – Acts of Writing 
The Master of Petersburg unfolds before us a panorama of the writing process, 
embodied by the writer figure Dostoevsky. In Foe Coetzee used the trope of the writer Daniel 
Defoe, but it didn’t go much further than showcasing the writing desk and placing Susan 
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Barton and Friday in the writer’s position. In The Master of Petersburg, the reader gets a 
closer look at the writer’s imagination. Being presented from the perspective of the writer in a 
third person narrative, we become witness to the spurning of a new novel. 
Several acts of writing take place in the course of the narrative. The first act of writing 
produces a letter: “He writes to his wife in Dresden. His letters are reassuring but empty of 
feeling.” (22) The second time he writes a note to Apollon Maykov, a benefactor of both 
himself and Pavel. (51) He then again writes to his wife, attempting to grasp the lingering 
presence of Pavel’s spirit, but then tears up the letter: “It is nonsense; it is also a betrayal of 
what remains between himself and his son.” (52) Abandoning the letter, he continues his 
thoughts for us to read: “His son is inside him, a dead baby in an iron box. [...] Every gesture 
of his hands is made with the slowness of a frozen man.” (52) Tearing up the letter to his wife 
has symbolic value, as it frees him from old responsibilities and allows him to follow a more 
selfish course of action, such as dealing with his grief and finding the theme for his next work 
of art. 
The next time he sits down to write, it is a letter addressed to Anna Sergeyevna, after 
she does not join him in bed for a third night of love-making. (59) She leaves the letter on the 
table, un-opened; turning his attempt of written communication into a failure. This writing 
still remains in the realm of ‘private matters’, but has shifted from old connections to a new 
encounter, which in turn will spawn the theme for his next novel. Communications with his 
wife (reporting his situation) and Maykov (asking for money) are from here on reduced to a 
minimum. (168) 
Acts of creative writing are of greater interest in this context, and Coetzee depicts two 
such moments. The first time occurs very early in the narrative, even before the written 
communications mentioned above, but it is stunted and leads to nothing: 
Following old habit, he spends the morning at the little desk in his room. When the maid 
comes to clean, he waves her away. But he does not write a word. It is not that he is 
paralysed. His heart pumps steadily, his mind is clear. At any moment he is capable of 
picking up the pen and forming letters on the paper. But the writing, he fears, would be that 
of a madman – vileness, obscenity, page after page of it, untameable. He thinks of the 
madness as running through the artery of his right arm down to the fingertips and the pen 
and so to the page. It runs in a stream; he need not dip the pen, not once. What flows on to 
the paper is neither blood nor ink but an acid, black, with an unpleasing green sheen when 
the light glances off it. On the page it does not dry: if one were to pass a finger over it, one 
would experience a sensation both liquid and electric. A writing that even the blind could 
read. (18)156 
 
156 Compare this to Susan Barton sitting at Foe’s desk and writing: “It is as though animalcules of words lie 
dissolved in your ink-well, ready to be dipped up and flow from your pen and take form on the paper.” (FOE 93) 
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The production of narrative text is shown to be the result of a habitual routine. In this case, 
however, there is no result; instead, Coetzee describes in detail the inner state of the writer in 
relation to his writing, imagining the “acid” sensation of the act of writing. The passage shows 
how personally invested acts of writing can be, lending the script a “sensation both liquid and 
electric.” The physical properties of the ink are invoked, linked at the same time to the act of 
reading, which picks up on what the author invested into the text. 
Dostoevsky is unforgiving in his self-assessment as writer. In the last chapter, 
“Stavrogin,” he recalls how Maximov’s assistant asked him what kind of books he writes, and 
the reply he gave: “Stories. Story-books.” Questioned further, he added: “Nothing that could 
offend a child,” and as an afterthought: “But the heart has its dark places,” [...] “One does not 
always know.” (144) In the meantime he has learnt more about the dark places of his heart 
through his grief over Pavel’s death and his dealings with Anna and Matryona, Nechaev and 
Isaev. Now he thinks of a more truthful answer: “I write perversions of the truth. I choose the 
crooked road and take children into dark places. I follow the dance of the pen.” (236) 
The theme of betrayal runs deep in this novel; the grieving father suffers from the 
notion that his writing is a betrayal. His sense of transgression dates back to his childhood: 
As a child he used to spy on visitors to the household and trespass surreptitiously on their 
privacy. It is a weakness that he has associated till now with a refusal to accept limits to 
what he is permitted to know, with the reading of forbidden books, and thus with his 
vocation. (71) 
The aged writer has left behind the privacies of the household and has become entangled with 
the intricacies of politics. After reading the diary of Pavel, Dostoevsky comments on his 
relationship to Russia in a way that resonates with Coetzee’s statements about his conflicted 
relationship to South Africa: 
I mean that I am not here in Russia in this time of ours to live a life free of pain. I am 
required to live – what shall I call it? – a Russian life: a life inside Russia, or with Russia 
inside me, and whatever Russia means. It is not a fate I can evade. [...] 
In fact, it is not so much a life as a price or a currency. It is something I pay with in order to 
write. That is what Pavel did not understand: that I pay too. [...] 
A life without honour; treachery without limit; confession without end. (221-2) 
Writing is here proposed to be a type of endless confession of someone implicated in the 
doings of a wholly undesired regime – this theme was also addressed and explicated in 
Waiting for the Barbarians. The Magistrate ultimately stood up against the politics of the 
empire he was representing, his transformation initiated through the encounter with the 
barbarian girl in the privacy of his chamber. Dostoevsky follows a different route. His 
opposition to the state authority remains within the sphere of private matters, so the writer 
rejects joining any cause beyond his own. This refusal of a course of action beyond the art of 
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writing is part of what occasions his sense of betrayal. In a more private sense, it is the 
betrayal of those close to him, who he cannot help but to incorporate into his art: “Perversion: 
everything and everyone to be turned to another use, to be gripped to him and fall with him.” 
(235; original italics) Earlier in the novel, in the chapter titled “Nechaev,” Dostoevsky 
imagines the Finn girl and Pavel making love: “He resists the thought, then yields.” He yields 
to his imagination, allowing it to create an obscene image of the coupling. He goes on to 
compare this feasting on his imagination to the act of a scavenger, an “old grey rat” feasting 
on the corpse of Pavel, seeing “what is left for him.” (107) 
Compared with the first writing session and its futility, his pen has resumed its dance 
in the final chapter. What Coetzee writes in the closing paragraph of his essay collection 
Giving Offense – Essays On Censorship about Breytenbach’s compromised position applies 
equally to the writer figure Dostoevsky: 
In intense moments, writing can throw up evidences of bloody or asphyxiating struggles 
against blockages and resistance: gagged words gagged out. The voice struggles to breathe 
in, breathe out, against intimate persecutory figures. […] But the very gesture of blaming, 
so widespread in his writing, mirroring the blaming of him by censor and judge, belongs to 
an ultimately futile strategy of demonization and expulsion. The poems that emerged with 
him from prison into the fresh air point to a much harder task: that of living with his 
daimon and his demons. (GO 232) 
In The Master of Petersburg the political dimension of writing emerges in the encounters with 
the state (represented by Councillor Maximov) and the revolutionary forces (represented by 
Nechaev); most prominently in the chapters “Maximov” and “The printing press.” The figure 
of the censor transgresses the political dimension and also appears in the personal struggle of 
the writer figure Dostoevsky. The following passage (with several omissions) illustrates the 
writer’s confrontation both with himself and with the figure of the censor: 
He moves the chair so as not to face the mirror. But the sense of someone in the room 
besides himself persists: if not of a full person then of a stick-figure, a scarecrow draped in 
an old suit, with a stuffed sugar-sack for a head and a kerchief across the mouth. [...] 
For hours he sits at the table. The pen does not move. Intermittently the stick-figure returns, 
the crumpled, old-man travesty of himself. He is blocked, he is in prison. […] 
He closes his eyes, makes himself confront the figure, makes the image grow clearer. 
Across the face there is still a veil, which he seems powerless to remove. Only the figure 
itself can do that; and it will not do so before it is asked. To ask, he must know its name. 
What is the name? […] 
If he let the pen fall, would the figure across the table take it up and write? [...] 
From the figure he feels nothing, nothing at all. Or rather he feels around it a field of 
indifference tremendous in its force, like a cloak of darkness. Is that why he cannot find the 
name –not because the name is hidden but because the figure is indifferent to all names, all 
words, anything that might be said about it? 
The force is so strong that he feels it pressing out upon him, wave upon silent wave. [...] 
He knows he is in peril of gambling on the second chance. As soon as he lays his stake on 
the second chance, he will have lost. He must do what he cannot do: resign himself to what 
will come, speech or silence. (236-239) 
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The censor figure oscillates between the political and the personal realm. The scene is set up 
so as not to place Dostoevsky facing the mirror, but the ensuing thoughts nevertheless create a 
mirror image of the writer. The struggle he is going through here resembles closely the 
struggle with his grief and his reaching out to Pavel. Expecting the unexpected, attending to 
the unattended without pre-positioning his attention or pre-formulating his expectations. 
Remaining open to what is to come, emptying oneself of the “I” in order to embrace the ”He”; 
a redoubled self relieved of all its properties. This seems to be the credo of the writer at work, 
and: “This is the spirit in which he sits at Pavel’s table, his eyes fixed on the phantasm 
opposite him whose attention is no less implacable than his own, whom it has been given to 
him to bring into being.” (240) Whereas in his earlier attempt he failed to overcome silence 
and arrive at speech, he is now only a moment away from crossing the threshold into his own 
fiction. From this emerges a “vision of Pavel grown beyond childhood and beyond love” (“in 
the manner of an insect”). “Confronting it is like descending into the waters of the Nile […] 
This presence, so grey and without feature – is this what he must father, give blood to, flesh, 
life?” (240) Dostoevsky considers whether it is not himself (or a version of himself) he must 
give birth to in his writing, resurrection becoming the overpowering impulse regardless of its 
subject: “Following this shade he will go naked as a babe into the jaws of hell.” (241) The 
orphic theme (following a shade) leads on to an imaginary confrontation with Pavel’s dead 
body, “naked and broken and bloody.” (241) In the chapter “The shot tower” Dostoevsky had 
been confronted with the death itself, re-imagining it; now he faces its result in all its finality, 
the dead body of his stepson Pavel. This somewhat final acceptance of Pavel’s death, now 
embodied and going beyond what the writer’s sympathetic imagination had tried so hard to 
hold on to, to bring back to life, triggers a release in the writer: “Thus at last the time arrives 
and the hand that holds the pen begins to move. But the words it forms are not words of 
salvation.” (241) 
His pen moves to tell the story of a child in bed with a man, a man with a face “that 
will not be seen.” (241) He stops, resisting “a descent into representations that have no place 
in the world” (241), sensing the moment that announces his fall, “a moment of which he is 
becoming a connoisseur, a voluptuary. For which he will be damned.” (242) Nonetheless, the 
writer also feels that Pavel is returning to life in the disguise of his new literary character, with 
a body “as perfectly formed as a god’s” (241) – quite in contrast to the shattered body 
Dostoevsky had confronted himself with earlier. In a literary sense, Dostoevsky has 
conquered his grief and returned Pavel to life: 
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In the blood of this young man, this version of Pavel, is a sense of triumph. He has passed 
through the gates of death and returned; nothing can touch him any more. He is not a god 
but he is no longer human either. He is, in some sense, beyond the human, beyond man. 
There is nothing he is not capable of. (242) 
While until now Pavel has been the dead centre of the novel, mourned for and remembered 
with sympathy, he now returns as the monster of Dostoevsky’s imagination that will constitute 
the epicentre of The Possessed. The imagination of the writer figure reaches beyond the 
sympathetic, creating a figure whose empathy is directed at enticing a little girl and perverting 
her through untimely sexual arousal and abandonment. Dostoevsky aborts the narrative, but 
his restlessness drives him to pick up a new thread: 
From the suitcase he takes Pavel’s diary and turns to the first empty page, the page that the 
child did not write on because by then he was dead. On this page he begins, a second time, 
to write. (242) 
This time Coetzee gives to the reader the text being created under the heading “The 
Apartment.” While the first attempt depicted the aftermath of Stavrogin’s seduction of the 
child, of which he reports in his confession to Tikhon in The Possessed, this next attempt 
takes a step back and shows how Stavrogin notices the child’s curiosity about his sexual 
affairs and how he decides to seduce her. This passage covers about two-and-a-half pages, 
before the master narrative picks up again: 
He writes all of this in a clear, careful script, crossing not a word. In the act of writing he 
experiences, today, an exceptional sensual pleasure – in the feel of the pen, snug in the 
crook of his thumb, but even more in the feel of his hand being tugged back lightly from its 
course across the page by the strict, unvarying shape of the letters, the discipline of the 
alphabet. […] 
If he writes so clearly today, it is because he is no longer writing for her [his wife’s] eyes. 
He is writing for himself. He is writing for eternity. He is writing for the dead. (245) 
The reader is now introduced to the “sensual pleasure” of the act of writing, at this point not 
linked with the sensual pleasure elicited in the text itself, the transgression Dostoevsky 
commented on as being grossly pleasurable. It stands in contrast to his earlier attempt, when 
the writer anticipated the vileness of what would flow from his pen. The grief has been 
transformed into art, and Pavel has been resurrected in literature, not as himself but as a new 
other, a terrible and forsaken manifestation that abandons all morals in favour of self-
excitement and entertainment. 
Coetzee sets an example of the crooked paths writing can take under given 
circumstances, and also what sacrifices the vocation of a writer might entail when those 
closest to him are lost to him and then sacrificed for the sake of art. After Dostoevsky had 
read the “private papers” made available by Maximov, he expressed his thoughts about the 
story Pavel has written, laying bare the anguish of his profession: 
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If you are blessed with the power to write, he wants to say, bear in mind the source of that 
power. You write because your childhood was lonely, because you were not loved. (Yet that 
is not the full story, he also wants to say – you were loved, you would have been loved, it 
was your choice to be unloved. What confusion! An ape on a harmonium would do better!) 
We do not write out of plenty, he wants to say – we write out of anguish, out of lack. Surely 
in your heart you must know that! As for your so-called true father and his revolutionary 
sympathies, what nonsense! Isaev was a clerk, a pen-pusher. If he had lived, if you had 
followed him, you too would have become nothing but a clerk, and you would not have left 
this story behind. (Yes, yes, he hears the child’s high voice – but I would be alive!) (152; 
original italics) 
3.3.7 On Embodied Reading 
Acts of writing are showcased prominently in The Master of Petersburg. Acts of 
reading are commented on in a supplementary fashion, and they are presented as a form of 
embodiment. When Dostoevsky reads Pavel’s diary, Dostoevsky’s attention shifts to the 
production of the text, away from the narrative content: 
What makes reading so difficult he cannot say, but his attention keeps wandering from the 
sense of the words to the words themselves, to the letters on the paper, to the trace in ink of 
the hand’s movements, the shading left by the pressure of the fingers. (216) 
The writer assimilates the writing of his son to his own acts of writing; yet another instance of 
identifying with the lost son, of attempting to inhabit the empty space left behind, just as he 
sits at Pavel’s desk to perform his own writing. The writer’s position is doubled, and in his 
reading Dostoevsky senses this: “Every word double: to the one, passion and the promise of 
surrender; to the other, a plea, a reproach. Split writing, from a split heart. Would Maximov 
have appreciated that?” (219) 
In his conversation with Maximov the aged writer discusses the effects reading might 
have: “Let me tell you then: reading is being the arm and being the axe and being the skull; 
reading is giving yourself up, not holding yourself at a distance and jeering.” (47) To which 
Maximov replies: “But you speak of reading as thought it were demon-possession.” (47) We 
are again at the heart of the matter; in this case the matter of reading. Coetzee seems to point 
out how acts of reading might be not too different from acts of writing. Both are invested with 
the sympathetic imagination unbound. The reader inhabits a text, which was previously 
inhabited by the writer. The text becomes embodied in both the writer and the reader, takes 
possession of them. The demons mentioned by Maximov are merely a metaphor – just as 
muses are – for the inner movements evoked by a text. As the writer embodies his characters 
he encourages an embodied reading. 
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3.3.8 The Trajectory of Grief – It tastes like gall 
In The Master of Petersburg we follow in the tracks of a grieving father until he 
arrives at the inception of his new novel. Needless to say, the main character is a proxy for 
Coetzee himself – not as part of an equation but as a fellow spirit, evoked by the author. 
Coetzee portrays the writer figure Dostoevsky with great care and attention, which is directed 
at the writer’s grief, his political allegiances and his artistic articulations. Particularly in the 
portrayal of the father’s grief the reader can sense the intensity of his emotions; reading of the 
author’s desperate struggle for redemption will necessarily inspire feelings of empathy in the 
reader. We learn about the convolutions of grief, and though it might remain a second-hand 
experience, Coetzee brings it close to us by employing his sympathetic imagination in the 
creation of the writer figure Dostoevsky. The reader cannot help but feel himself into the 
writer’s situation in an empathetic co-existence. 
The complex trajectory of grief allows the self-centred fatherly “I” to adopt the 
position of a more compassionate “He”. Along with this comes the insight into the sacrifice he 
has made for the sake of his art, for his calling, his vocation. In the end, Dostoevsky denies 
the acute pleasure of guilt accepted and embraced, but is instead left with a bitter emptiness. 
Whereas all previous novels had either ended on a note of potential redemption, or provided 
the reader with somewhat open endings, the reader is now confronted with the finality of 
death and the endless grief of a bereaved father: 
He picks up his hat and leaves his lodgings. He does not recognize the hat, has no idea 
whose shoes he is wearing. In fact, he recognizes nothing of himself. If he were to look in 
the mirror now, he would not be surprised if another face were to loom up, staring back 
blindly at him. 
He has betrayed everyone; nor does he see that his betrayals could go deeper. If he ever 
wanted to know whether betrayal tasted more like vinegar or like gall, now is the time. 
But there is no taste at all in his mouth, just as there is no weight on his heart. His heart, in 
fact, feels quite empty. He had not known beforehand it would be like this. But how could 
he have known? Not torment but a dull absence of torment. Like a soldier shot on the 
battlefield, bleeding, seeing the blood, feeling no pain, wondering: Am I dead already? 
It seems to him a great price to pay. They pay him lots of money for writing books, said the 
child, repeating the dead child. What they failed to say was that he had to give up his soul 
in return. 
Now he begins to taste it. It tastes like gall. (250) 
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4. Academia and the Aging Body– Disgrace (2003) and Slow 
Man (2005) 
4.1 Disgrace - The Sympathetic Imagination of David Lurie 
My first encounter with the fiction of Coetzee occurred in a course at the Free 
University of Berlin in 2005 offered by Robert Stockhammer. We read Disgrace next to Philip 
Roth’s The Human Stain (2000). As much as Coetzee’s compelling prose delighted me, I 
found it hard to relate to the aging professor and his problematic sexual desires (Lurie in this 
regard is comparable to Roth’s protagonist Coleman Silk). Obviously, this presentation has 
strategic purposes, as Kate McInturff remarks: 
The character David is, himself, notoriously unsympathetic to the novel’s readers. The 
portrayal of David as stubborn, self-indulgent, and sexist (or misogynist) is itself a 
provocation to the reader to consider the difficulties inherent in sympathizing with another 
being and to avoid the failures represented by David’s own attempts at sympathy. 
(McInturff 2007: 8) 
Only now, in a renewed reading with the sympathetic imagination and processes of empathy 
in mind, have I come to reassess Disgrace and have found it to be an intimate study of how 
the sympathetic imagination can develop in a man who thinks himself beyond moral 
development: “His temperament is not going to change, he is too old for that. His 
temperament is fixed, set. The skull, followed by the temperaments: the two hardest parts of 
the body.” (D 2) This notwithstanding, in Disgrace Coetzee challenges the reader to 
accompany David Lurie on his personal journey towards a more sympathetic imagination. 
4.1.1 The Predator David Lurie and His Female Encounters 
For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex 
rather well. (D 1)157 
This first sentence of Disgrace contains in nuclei the tragic flaw of David Lurie, who believes 
to have arrived at a satisfactory solution for his sexual desires, which have absolute priority 
for him. In the following his complacency is harshly disrupted. The first woman we hear 
about is the prostitute Soraya, who serves as solution to Lurie’s “problem of sex.” When she 
disappears from his life, the student Melanie appears on the scene and Lurie invites her to his 
home and seduces her. Their affair turns sour soon, but Lurie fails to withdraw his attention 
from her, and Melanie files a complaint with the university. Lurie is subjected to a hearing 
 
157 Coetzee 2000 [1999]. All quotes in section 4 will be from D unless indicated otherwise. 
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before a commission that asks him to publicly apologize, which he stubbornly refuses; 
consequently he is relieved of his duties. After this first turning point, Lurie leaves Cape Town 
behind and goes to visit his daughter Lucy on her farm in Salem in the Eastern Cape. Father 
and daughter do not get along too well, but things get worse when they are assaulted by three 
men, who rape Lucy and set Lurie on fire – this marks the second turning point in the novel. 
The physical assault and Lurie’s helplessness in the face of it initiate a change in him, towards 
a position of humility. Tentatively, he begins to help Bev Shaw in her animal clinic, where she 
treats animals and puts down dogs that are “too menny.” (146; original italics and original 
spelling) Lurie has a brief affair with Bev, in spite of not feeling attracted to her. His 
awakening humility before life allows him to establish more meaningful relations – ironically 
primarily with dogs, but also with his daughter and others. 
Coetzee showcases Lurie’s change of heart and thereby illustrates the awakening of his 
sympathetic imagination. In a first step, I will discuss the failure of his sympathetic faculties 
in regard to Soraya, Melanie and Lucy.158 The gradual improvements of the relationship 
between father and daughter and Lurie’s growing fondness for the dogs will serve to illustrate 
Lurie’s emotional development. In the end, the reader might still not like the character; but he 
will find it hard to deny the development of his – Lurie’s, and ultimately the reader’s – 
sympathetic faculties. Especially Lurie’s shifting relation to the dogs links back to the 
discussion of The Lives of Animals in the introduction. 
Soraya 
The opening chapter of Disgrace introduces us to Soraya, or rather to David Lurie’s 
perception of her. For the narrative, Soraya’s function is merely to introduce us to David 
Lurie’s perception of women, which focuses largely on appearances and imagined reciprocity: 
“Soraya is tall and slim, with long black hair and dark, liquid eyes.” (1) The dark liquid eyes 
might remind the reader of the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians, who served as a 
projection surface for the Magistrate, just as Soraya does for Lurie. 
Because he takes pleasure in her, because his pleasure is unfailing, an affection has grown 
up in him for her. To some degree, he believes, this affection is reciprocated. Affection may 
not be love, but it is at least its cousin. Given their unpromising beginnings, they have been 
lucky, the two of them: he to have found her, she to have found him. (2) 
 
158 Kate McInturff provides an excellent reading of Disgrace with a stronger focus on Lurie’s narcissist 
utilization of others (both women and dogs): “Coetzee’s assertion of the importance of imagining the body of the 
other in its non-utilitarian being allows for an ethics of sympathy that does not deny the difference or 
objectifying difference as it recognizes it.” (McInturff 2007: 11) 
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The attachment expressed here seems largely connected to his habituated sexual satisfaction. 
But already at this early point, David Lurie is not without insight regarding his own 
shortcomings: “His sentiments are, he is aware, complacent, even uxorious. Nevertheless he 
does not cease to hold to them.” (2) Aware of the one-sidedness of their agreement, Lurie 
pronounces a fairly modest self-assessment: “Intercourse between Soraya and himself must 
be, he imagines, rather like the copulation of snakes: lengthy, absorbed, but rather abstract, 
rather dry, even at its hottest.” (3)159 
As common in relations of this nature, Soraya knows a lot more about him than he 
about her. Lurie has only a vague impression of her: “In her general opinions she is 
surprisingly moralistic.” (1) She is offended by the loose morals of tourists and thinks 
vagabonds should be put to work. That is as far as it goes: “How she reconciles her opinions 
with her line of business he does not ask.” (1) The one-way communication (words and semen 
go in one direction only) reveals a total lack of interest in her private life – a failure largely 
resulting from their professional relation, but beyond that indicating Lurie’s self-centeredness. 
One day he spots her in the city with two boys. He trails them and passes by twice 
outside the inn they have entered.” For an instant, through the glass, Soraya’s eyes meet his.” 
(6) This eye contact in a public setting unsettles their private relation. In this moment, the real 
woman has stepped out behind the masquerade that Lurie has enjoyed so far. His first reflex is 
to classify the look on Soraya’s face as one of desire, but he immediately concedes his 
mistake: “He has always been a man of the city, at home amid a flux of bodies where eros 
stalks and glances flash like arrows. But this glance between himself and Soraya he regrets at 
once.” (6) During their next appointment he imagines the two boys to be standing by and 
witnessing their coupling (“presences between them” 6); while he “becomes, fleetingly, their 
father: foster-father, step-father, shadow-father” (6) – we might think of Coetzee’s 
Dostoevsky (shadow-father to Pavel) here, likewise of Paul Rayment in Slow Man (foster-
father to young Jokić). On their fourth meeting after the incident she informs him that she will 
take a break to look after her mother. Hiring a detective agency, he tracks down Soraya, well-
aware of his transgression: “He ought to close that chapter.” (9) Instead he calls her, but is 
rejected and even commanded to never call her again: “Her shrillness surprises him: there has 
been no intimation of it before. But then, what should a predator expect when he intrudes into 
the vixen’s nest, into the home of her cubs?” (10) 
 
159 This corresponds with the ironic self-portrayal of Coetzee as a lover in Summertime. 
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At the close of the first chapter we see David Lurie for what he is (or rather how he 
sees himself): a predator of women. Though unaware of the other’s thoughts and feelings, he 
is well aware of his own ambivalences and self-serving fictions. After a disappointing affair 
with a secretary he graphically imagines self-castration, by which he might outwit his 
predatory nature: “A man on a chair snipping away at himself: an ugly sight, but no more 
ugly, from a certain point of view, than the same man exercising himself on the body of a 
woman.” (9) To cut it short, Coetzee has introduced us to Lurie’s inner ugliness and 
emptiness, which will be revealed further in his dealings with Melanie. 
Melanie 
The second chapter continues the course taken in the beginning. He runs into Melanie: 
“She is small and thin, with close-cropped black hair, wide, almost Chinese cheekbones, 
large, dark eyes.” (11) This brief description echoes the description of Soraya in chapter one, 
creating a link between the two as prey of David Lurie. As in chapter one, where Lurie 
reminisces on the glances he used to earn from women, he is well-aware of the implications of 
his gaze: “Does she know he has an eye on her? Probably. Women are sensitive to it, to the 
weight of the desiring gaze.” (12) 
In contrast to his dealings with Soraya, the affair with Melanie is marked by sparks of 
conversation, commented on by Lurie in a reflective and cautious manner, as for example 
when they watch a dance movie, a moment that accentuates the gap between them: “He wills 
the girl to be captivated too. But he senses she is not.” (15) For the first time we see Lurie 
making an effort to sense the other’s feelings; in this case arriving at a plausible assessment. 
After being invited to stay over, she decides to leave. As if to reassert his initial position of 
predator, “[h]e reaches out, enfolds her. For a moment he can feel her little breasts against 
him. Then she slips his embrace and is gone.” (17) Depending on the reader’s own position, 
one might find Lurie’s attempted seduction abominable (abuse of power), flawed (misguided 
desire) or even acceptable (consenting adults). Opening chapter three, Lurie concedes: “That 
is where he ought to end it.” (18) Instead, he follows the same pattern as with Soraya and 
obtains Melanie’s phone number from the student records and calls. She fails to refuse his 
invitation for an outing. Afterwards, back at his house, they make love on the living-room 
floor: “[T]hough she is passive throughout, he finds the act pleasurable, so pleasurable that 
from its climax he tumbles into blank oblivion.” (19) Just like the Magistrate after his ritual 
washing of the barbarian girl, the physical encounter with the woman allows the man to lose 
himself, with the woman being left behind. When he comes back (from oblivion) he takes in 
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the picture of the two of them: Him with his trousers around his ankles and his hands under 
her sweater on her breasts, her with a slight frown on her face. (19) His reference to the 
painter George Grosz, famous for his depictions of the deformities of humans (both war 
victims and others), shows how aware he is of the abnormity of the situation. Melanie’s 
discomfort is palpable to the reader, but hardly registered by Lurie at this point: “Averting her 
face, she frees herself, gathers her things, leaves the room. In a few minutes she is back, 
dressed. ‘I must go,’ she whispers. He makes no effort to detain her.” (19) Unaffected by her 
hurried departure, Lurie revels: “He wakes the next morning in a state of profound well-being, 
which does not go away.” (19-20) Having achieved his goal, any budding empathy for 
Melanie becomes superfluous. 
Two days later (it rains) he offers her a ride home: “Her face is flushed; he is aware of 
the rise and fall of her chest. She licks away a drop of rain from her upper lip. A child! he 
thinks: No more than a child! What am I doing? Yet his heart lurches with desire.” (20; 
original italics) Lurie remains a man driven by desire, unwilling or unable to restrain himself. 
He reads Melanie’s body language alternately as urging him on or as displaying her 
discomfort. When he gives his lecture on Wordsworth, “[h]e casts a quick glance at her. Her 
head is bowed, she is absorbed in the text, or seems to be.” (22) During the lecture, which has 
a double edge to it in references that could be applied to their situation, “[a] memory floods 
back: the moment on the floor when he forced the sweater up and exposed her neat, perfect 
little breasts. For the first time she looks up; her eyes meet his and in a flash see all. Confused, 
she drops her glance.” (23) Note how the term “forced” is introduced casually in reference to 
the removal of her sweater. Note also the mirroring of the look Lurie exchanged with Soraya, 
which was the beginning of the end of their relation. Her seeing “all” in a flash could imply 
her recognition of his predatory nature, though it seems to imply far more than just that. His 
ramblings on Wordsworth go on for another paragraph, only to be followed by a moment of 
self-deprecation: “Enough! He is sick of the sound of his own voice, and sorry for her too, 
having to listen to these covert intimacies.” (23) For the first time, we detect empathy in 
Lurie. On the other hand, his growing attachment closely resembles the habituation he had 
experienced with Soraya: “A week ago she was just another pretty face in the class. Now she 
is a presence in his life, a breathing presence.” (23) He goes to watch a rehearsal of Melanie, 
then on the next day visits her at her flat: “He has given her no warning; she is too surprised 
to resist the intruder who thrusts himself upon her. When he takes her in his arms, her limbs 
crumple like a marionette’s.” (24) The predator-prey scenario is continued here, now with the 
added image of Melanie as a lifeless puppet, subjected to Lurie’s desiring gaze and the 
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longing of his body. This time, she resists and struggles, tells him “No, not now!”; “But 
nothing will stop him. He carries her to the bedroom, brushes off the absurd slippers, kisses 
her feet, astonished by the feeling she evokes.” (25) Whereas their first coupling was largely 
consensual, this scene has caused an extensive debate over whether Lurie is here raping 
Melanie. My impression is that male readers are more willing to excuse Lurie’s behaviour, 
while female readers condemn his actions more readily; in my personal view, both positions 
are built into the text and coexist in the narrative. The predatory metaphor recurs in the 
depiction of this scene: 
She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes. She lets him 
lay her out on the bed and undress her: she even helps him, raising her arms and then her 
hips. Little shivers of cold run through her, as soon as she is bare, she slips under the 
quilted counterpane like a mole burrowing, and turns her back on him. 
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nonetheless, undesired to the core. As though she had 
decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the 
fox close on its neck. So that everything done to her might be done, as it were, far away. 
(25) 
Lurie’s unsympathetic imagination allows him to carry on, to pull through with what his 
desire has driven him to. In the following, Melanie ceases to come to classes and does not 
answer the phone. Then, surprisingly, she visits him at his flat and asks to stay overnight: “He 
makes up a bed for her in his daughter’s old room, kisses her good night, leaves her to 
herself.” (26) The fatherly manner again mirrors a moment in his dealings with Soraya; the 
predator takes a break. Only to return the next morning, albeit still in the guise of fatherly 
care: “He sits down on the bed, draws her to him. In his arms she begins to sob miserably. 
Despite all, he feels a tingling of desire.” (26) Melanie asks if she can stay “for a while,” and 
Lurie, with a moment’s hesitation, allows her to stay. In the afternoon, when he returns from 
his classes, “[s]he seems thoroughly at home.” (27) Asking her about the cause of her distress, 
“[s]he avoids his eye. ‘Not now,’ she says. ‘I have to go, I’m late. I’ll explain next time.’” (28) 
Lurie senses that she has managed to regain some control over their relationship: “But if she 
has got away with much, he has got away with more; if she is behaving badly, he has behaved 
worse.” (28) What do we make of Lurie’s self-criticism? Lurie is well-aware of his 
transgression, but lastly justifies it with his over-powering desire. He presents it not as a 
question of choices, but as if he is compelled to follow through his course of action. 
Back at university Melanie “keeps her distance” (31), but does reappear at the Monday 
class accompanied by a young man. Lurie lectures on Byron’s scandals, and as before with 
Wordsworth, the poet’s misadventures allude to the professor’s own. Lurie glances at 
Melanie: “Today, looking thin and exhausted, she sits huddled over her book. Despite himself, 
his heart goes out to her. Poor little bird, he thinks, whom I have held against my breast!” (32) 
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The phrase of “the heart going out to someone” is a recurring theme in Coetzee’s characters 
(remember Eugene Dawn and his wife). The image of the bird is here phrased with pity in 
terms of an embrace, even though the terms of a predator might have more rightfully placed 
her in his jaws. His lecture on Byron’s ‘Lara’ reflects his own behaviour: 
[…] Note that we are not asked to condemn this being with the mad heart, this being with 
whom there is something constitutionally wrong. On the contrary, we are invited to 
understand and sympathize. But there is a limit to sympathy. For though he lives among us, 
he is not one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, that is, a monster. […] (33-
34) 
Coetzee is testing the limits of our sympathy by juxtaposing ‘the monster’ Byron and Lurie, 
who both believe to stand outside (and above) social conventions, instead conceding 
supremacy to their desire. And once again, his desire presses him to call Melanie to him after 
class: “Pinch-faced, exhausted, she stands before him. Again his heart goes out to her. If they 
were alone he would embrace her, try to cheer her up. My little dove, he would call her.” (34; 
original italics) David Lurie feels sympathy (benevolent pity) for Melanie, and though his 
desire remains a standing fact, his sympathy seems genuine, but not welcomed by Melanie. 
Back at his office he asks her to take the test she missed. And here a significant shift takes 
place. Until now, dialogue was our only access to Melanie’s thoughts. Now, we get to hear 
Lurie’s speculation on her thoughts, which are presented in italics: 
She stares back at him in puzzlement, even shock. You have cut me off from everyone, she 
seems to want to say. You have made me bear your secret. I am no longer just a student. 
How can you speak to me like this? […] 
She raises her chin, meets his eye defiantly. Either she has not understood or she is refusing 
the opening. (35; original italics) 
Whether Lurie’s speculation is accurate or not we cannot tell, but its plausibility is 
underscored by the changed typeset, as if he was reading her mind. For the first time, we see 
an empathetic attitude in Lurie, albeit in dire circumstances. 
In chapter five his affair with his student becomes public. At first, he receives a call 
from Melanie’s worried father, Mr Isaacs, who asks Lurie to talk Melanie out of dropping out 
of university – obviously he is unaware of the affair: 
“She always takes things so to heart, Professor, that’s her nature, she gets very involved. 
[…]” 
So Melanie-Meláni, with her baubles from the Oriental Plaza and her blind spot for 
Wordsworth, takes things to heart. He would not have guessed it. What else has he not 
guessed about her? (37) 
These are new questions in Lurie’s repertoire. With Soraya, Lurie failed to even consider her 
position, her perspective. With Melanie, Lurie begins to open up to the possibility that she has 
feelings and that it might be worth the effort to imagine what they might be. In his dealings 
with Melanie his sympathetic imagination is awakened; not in a very strong sense, but we can 
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sense the beginning of something. However, things come to a head and Mr Isaacs appears in 
person to confront him, a complaint is filed and Lurie is charged with sexual harassment and 
has to appear before a university committee (chapter six). Chapter five ends with Lurie 
meeting his ex-wife Rosalind (43-44), who states her position regarding the affair clearly: 
Don’t expect sympathy from me, David, and don’t expect sympathy from anyone else 
either. No sympathy, no mercy, not in this day and age. Everyone’s hand will be against 
you, and why not? Really, how could you? (44; original italics) 
Rosalind’s stance will most likely be shared by many readers; at the same time Coetzee has 
already navigated the reader into a position of proximity to Lurie. And Lurie’s awareness of 
his transgressions (as opposed to straight-out denial) does point towards a potential series of 
confession, repentance and redemption.160 
Lucy  
After losing his position at the university, David Lurie goes to visit his daughter Lucy 
in “Salem on the Grahamstown-Kenton road in the Eastern Cape.” (59) The setting shifts 
from urban to rural, from prostitutes and affairs to his daughter. The very first encounter 
between the two marks the difference: “Comfortably barefoot, she comes to greet him, 
holding her arms wide, embracing him, kissing him on the cheek. What a nice girl, he thinks, 
hugging her; what a nice welcome at the end of a long trip!” (59) While enjoying the display 
of affection of his daughter, we soon find out that he has a low opinion of her lifestyle: 
Dogs and a gun; bread in the oven and a crop in the earth. Curious that he and her mother, 
cityfolk, intellectuals, should have produced this throwback, this sturdy young settler. But 
perhaps it was not they who produced her: perhaps history had the larger share. (60-61) 
When he sees how well she has settled into the place, Lurie offers a more consoling 
assessment: “A solid woman, embedded in her new life. Good! If this is to be what he leaves 
behind – this daughter, this woman .then he does not have to be ashamed.” (62) 
Their relation seems cordial, but not free of tension. Lurie takes care not to make her 
uncomfortable, such as when they have tea: “He is hungry: he wolfs down too blocklike slices 
of bread with prickly-pear jam, also home-made. He is aware of her eyes on him as he eats. 
He must be careful: nothing so distasteful to a child as the workings of a parent’s body.” (61) 
His thoughtfulness towards his daughter contrasts strongly with his urban relations to women. 
The predator in him is forced to rest, but does appear on the sidelines, be it in a small way as 
in “wolfing down” food, or in a sudden flashback of Melanie’s body: “Without warning a 
 
160 In his 1985 essay “Confession and Double Thoughts” Coetzee discusses extensively the series of 
transgression-confession-repentance-redemption (DP 251-294; see discussion in 5.1.7). 
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memory of the girl comes back: of her neat little breasts with their upstanding nipples, of her 
smooth flat belly. A ripple of desire passes through him. Evidently whatever it was is not over 
yet.” (65)  
The new circumstances (Lurie’s disgrace, Lucy’s embeddedness) allow for a new 
quality in their interactions: “Never before have he and Lucy spoken about his intimate life. It 
is not proving easy. But if not to her, to whom can he speak?” (69) Lurie quotes Blake on 
“unacted desires” (“Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires.”) to 
justify his affair with Melanie: 
“Every woman I have been close to has taught me something about myself. To that extent 
they have made me a better person.” 
“I hope you are not claiming the reverse as well. That knowing you has turned your women 
into better people.” 
He looks at her sharply. She smiles. “Just joking,” she says. (70) 
Lucy pinpoints the self-centred nature of his argument, which exclusively considers what his 
affairs have done to him, and not what they have done to the women. Lucy stands her ground, 
but doesn’t push the matter further, avoiding open conflict. And Lurie accepts her new 
position and even takes pleasure in the setup, such as when she takes him along to the 
Saturday market: 
So: a new adventure. His daughter, whom once upon a time he used to drive to school and 
ballet class, to the circus and the skating rink, is taking him on an outing, showing him life, 
showing him this other, unfamiliar world. (71) 
The reversal of roles is commented on directly by Lurie. The defamiliarisation taking place 
unsettles Lurie. At first, he remains the sceptical academic, but has already gained a new 
sense of self which is able to reach out to others mentally more than before. Physically, his 
encounters with dogs (both on the farm and in the clinic of Bev Shaw) bring about a change in 
Lurie. 
In the following scene Lucy proposes to David activities like cutting meat for the 
dogs, helping out Petrus and Bev Shaw; the ways he responds illustrate three prominent 
aspects: 
1) Lurie’s stubborn refusal to reform his character 
“All right, I’ll do it. But only as long as I don’t have to become a better person. I am not 
prepared to be reformed. I want to go on being myself. I’ll do it on that basis.” (77) 
2) The new status of his daughter 
She teases him as her mother used to tease him. Her wit, if anything, sharper. He has 
always been drawn to women of wit. Wit and beauty. With the best will in the world he 
could not find wit in Meláni [his preferred pronunciation of her name; the “dark one”]. But 
plenty of beauty. 
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Again it runs through him: a light shudder of voluptuousness. He is aware of Lucy 
observing him. He does not appear to be able to conceal it. Interesting. (78) 
3) The effect of the physical proximity of a dog 
He gets up, goes out into the yard. The younger dogs are delighted to see him: they trot 
back and forth in their cages, whining eagerly. But the old bulldog bitch barely stirs. 
He enters her cage, closes the door behind him. She raises her head, regards him, lets her 
head fall again; her old dugs hang slack. 
He squats down, tickles her behind the ears. “Abandoned, are we?” he murmurs. (78) 
He stretches out beside her on the bare concrete. Above is the pale blue sky. His limbs 
relax. (78) 
Resonances with The Lives of Animals (1999) are obvious in the last part, which comments on 
our treatment of animals not as beings in their own right, but as extensions of a household.161 
Lurie’s approach towards the bitch Katy shows him as sympathetic as never before. As for 
Lucy’s new status, equivocated with her mother’s, Lurie cannot help but be impressed; 
unfortunately, his desires come into play and tinge the moment of appreciation with a return 
to his predatory thought patterns. 
Lurie’s open refusal to “better himself” gains an ironic edge through the following 
encounter with Katy, which does seem to indicate a reformation of character. Lurie’s refusal 
stems from his strong sense of self, but is prone to undergo changes in the face of a new 
situation. Maybe Lurie refuses to be changed from without, but inside of him the change has 
already begun – the decisive difference might be that it happens largely on his own terms. So 
far, his “own terms” have revolved largely around women and his desire for them. Lurie 
himself reflects on the shifting of his own terms: 
His own terms, what are they? That dumpy little women with ugly voices deserve to be 
ignored? A shadow of grief falls over him: for Katy, alone in her cage, for himself, for 
everyone. He sighs deeply, not stifling the sigh. “Forgive me, Lucy,” he says. 
“Forgive you? For what?” She is smiling lightly, mockingly. 
“For being one of the two mortals assigned to usher you into the world and for not turning 
out to be a better guide. But I’ll go and help Bev Shaw. Provided that I don’t have to call 
her Bev. It’s a silly name to go by. It reminds me of cattle. When shall I start?” (79) 
The “shadow of grief” is a first indicator for his changing attitude – and his grief begins with 
Katy and extends far beyond himself (to everyone). And this insight immediately leads to a 
gesture of repentance, when he asks Lucy for forgiveness; transparently his failure as parent is 
a substitute for a more general self-acquittal regarding his character faults. This early 
repentance is premature, since Lurie still holds on to his predatory instincts and sexual desire. 
Chapter eleven opens with Lucy and Lurie watching three white geese settling on the 
dam – a moment of shared attention. She marvels over their annual return and her feeling of 
privilege to be chosen by them as worthy of their visit. Lurie instead imagines a happy 
 
161 See in particular the account of Barbara Smuts referring her encounters with baboons and her relationship 
with her dog. (“Reflections,” LOA 106-120) 
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threesome (“a solution of sorts”) with Lucy and Melanie or Melanie and Soraya (88) – here he 
doesn’t seem to realize how ridiculous his idea is and how little it takes into consideration the 
women’s own desires and wishes. 
After initially good signs of progress in their relationship, the attack on the farm 
causes a deep crack to emerge, forming a gap between them. For the purpose of my argument, 
the rape scene itself lends itself to evoke empathy for Lucy and the immediate aftermath puts 
David’s sympathetic imagination and his empathy to the test. 
Soon after the attack, when Lucy returns from the bathroom “[…] her hair is combed 
back, her face clean and entirely blank. He looks into her eyes. ‘My dearest, dearest…’ he 
says, and chokes on a sudden surge of tears.” (98) Her blankness indicates the posttraumatic 
stress she experiences but which Lurie cannot grasp. At the close of the chapter, he again 
holds out his arms to her: “When she does not come, he puts aside his blanket, stands up, and 
takes her in his arms. In his embrace she is stiff as a pole, yielding nothing.” (99) After 
initially good signs of progress in their relationship, this catastrophic event has torn them 
apart. 
After returning from hospital they get put up by the Shaws. “In the middle of the night 
he awakes in a state of utmost clarity. He has had a vision: Lucy has spoken to him; her words 
– ‘Come to me, save me!’ – still echo in his ears. In the vision she stands, hands outstretched, 
wet hair combed back, in a field of white light.” (103) He immediately gets up to see her; she 
appears in the doorway of the room she sleeps in and sends him back to sleep: “Lucy is not at 
all like in the vision. Her face is puffy with sleep, she is tying the belt of a dressing-gown that 
is clearly not hers.” (103) Once again, Lurie acts on intimations of a higher order, only to find 
reality at odds with his vision – what to him seems a special insight, is to Lucy just an 
overactive imagination: “She is right, of course. It is three in the morning. But he cannot fail 
to notice that for the second time in a day she has spoken to him as if to a child – a child or an 
old man.” (103-104) The next morning Lurie asks her about what will happen next, and Lucy 
states her intention to continue as before, an idea Lurie opposes immediately. But Lucy is 
adamant: “Sitting up in her borrowed nightdress, she confronts him, neck stiff, eyes glittering. 
Not her father’s little girl, not any longer.” (105) Lucy decides to omit the rape from her 
report to the police. Lurie draws a parallel that marks out their new situation: “Lucy’s secret; 
his disgrace.” (109)162 Though both experienced a traumatic situation, they are unable to draw 
on the shared experience to strengthen their family bond; and surely being assaulted and being 
 
162 The phrase could also be read as indicating her rape being his disgrace due to his failure to protect his 
daughter. 
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raped are two different matters. Lurie’s response is a call for justice, even retribution; and he 
tries to push Lucy to take action against the three perpetrators. In one argument, he proposes 
that she might have the notion of repaying a historical debt, postcolonial rape to balance out 
colonial rape; however, Lucy replies: “You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are 
abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstraction. Until you make no effort to see that, I can’t 
help you.” (112) 
Remember Lurie’s justification for allowing himself to have an affair with a student of 
his: the rights of desire, being a servant to Eros. These are terms of abstraction applied in 
hindsight; in the moment itself he more simply lets himself get carried away. Lucy seems to 
inhabit a more practical position, her pragmatic priority aimed at a peaceful coexistence with 
her neighbours. Lurie’s failure to imagine her perspective, the failure of his sympathetic 
imagination and along with this also his failure to empathize, lead to a rupture between him 
and his daughter: “Never yet have they been so far and so bitterly apart. He is shaken.” (112) 
Being shaken is a good prerequisite for a change of heart, since only then does a mind open 
itself up to other possibilities, which before might have seemed impossible. But the change is 
slow to come: “There is a snappishness to Lucy nowadays that he sees no justification for. His 
usual response is to withdraw into silence. There are spells when the two of them are like 
strangers in the same house.” (124) 
Lucy is teaching her father a lesson and asserts her own autonomy. Consequently, she 
refuses to heed his advice: “No. That is Lucy’s last word to him.” (134; original italics) A gap 
has opened between them that neither of them can bridge; how they negotiate the gap is a 
theme that runs through the rest of the narrative. Lurie has a feeling “as if he has been eaten 
away from inside and only the eroded shell of his heart remains.” (156) The task of 
perspective-taking (Lurie of Lucy) remains the central challenge in the renegotiation of their 
relationship. Bev Shaw repeats to him that it is impossible for him to imagine what his 
daughter went through, what she felt and suffered at the hands of the three men: 
You don’t understand, you weren’t there, says Bev Shaw. Well, she is mistaken. Lucy’s 
intuition is right after all: he does understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, 
be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does 
he have it in him to be a woman? (160) 
David Lurie’s sympathetic imagination allows him to inhabit the position of the perpetrators, 
predators like himself (though of a slightly different order, judging by the physical violence 
applied). But he rightly sees the true challenge in taking a perspective that is not similar to his 
own in any way. McInturff points out Lurie’s rationalist flaw: 
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David [Lurie] fails to recognize the extent to which his rational engagement with others in 
the novel is not sufficient for him to comprehend the experiences, desires, fears, and 
intentions of others. With this failure, the novel appears to be making a distinction between 
the capacity and willingness to understand and the capacity and willingness to sympathise. 
(McInturff 2007: 7) 
He writes a letter to his daughter, again urging her not to “humble [her]self before history” 
(160) and stay on her farm with the permanent threat of the three boys returning. Her reply 
(“an envelope is pushed under his door”) gives a strong impression of her position and her 
view of her father: 
I am a dead person and I do not know yet what will bring me back to life. All I know is that 
I cannot go away. [...] You do not see this, and I do not know what more I can do to make 
you see. It is as if you have chosen deliberately to sit in a corner where the rays of the sun 
do not shine. I think of you as one of the tree chimpanzees, the one with his paws over his 
eyes. (161) 
The letter exchange does not bring new revelations, but allows both of them to state their 
position as clearly as they can without direct confrontation, which as we have seen seems to 
turn sour every time. Again, Lurie senses finality in her reply: “That is their exchange; that is 
Lucy’s last word.” (161) 
In the following two chapters (Twenty-One and Twenty-Two) Lurie revisits his former 
urban life, and already we can see how his attitude has changed. He pays a visit to the family 
of Melanie to offer an apology to the father, who refuses it and instead refers Lurie to the 
mercy of God. Confused, Lurie undertakes a second attempt, now directed at Melanie Isaacs’ 
mother and her sister, to beg for forgiveness: “With careful ceremony he gets to his knees and 
touches his forehead to the floor.” (173) The apparent awkwardness of how the gesture is 
offered underscores Lurie’s sincerity, but also reveals his insecurity and lacking experience 
with apologies. 
In Cape Town he finds his flat ransacked, which he accepts with humility. He visits his 
office at the university, which has been cleared except for one poster on the wall: “Superman 
hanging his head as he is berated by Lois Lane.” (177) Such is the brief comic reflection of 
Lurie’s state of mind, as he is forced to adapt his way of thinking to his new circumstances. 
And we can also see the impact the rural setting has had on him. He misses the geese at the 
dam. “As for the dogs, he does not want to think about them. From Monday onward the dogs 
released from life within the walls of the clinic will be tossed into the fire unmarked, 
unmourned. For that betrayal, will he ever be forgiven?” (178) Lurie’s thoughts reach out to 
others, but still within the frame of his own narrative of confession and repentance. 
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4.1.2 A New Aria – A Change of Heart? 
A shift in perspective in his Byron opera reflects David’s changing heart. Originally 
the hero of his opera was meant to be Byron, with Teresa Guccioli as his mistress: “Yet, first 
on Lucy’s farm and now again here, the project has failed to engage the core of him.” (181) 
As a reader one cannot help but think that if he hadn’t fallen into disgrace, he might have 
proceeded with the opera as planned. Now his attention shifts to Teresa (the new Teresa 
echoes Bev Shaw) and the setting shifts to her home long after Byron’s demise: “Can he find 
it in his heart to love this plain, ordinary woman? Can he love her enough to write a music for 
her? If he cannot, what is left for him?” (182) Lurie recognizes the importance of the task he 
is approaching, and puts his mind to task bringing his new Teresa to life in words and music: 
“That is how it must be from here on: Teresa giving voice to her lover, and he, the man in the 
ransacked house, giving voice to Teresa. The halt helping the lame, for want of better.” (D 
183) Two stages of the sympathetic imagination are depicted here. On the level of the text, 
Teresa brings to life deceased Byron, while on the authorial level Lurie brings to life Teresa 
(while Coetzee brings to life Lurie). 
Lurie also changes the style of the music he imagines for Teresa; grand orchestration is 
reduced to chamber orchestration and a solitary banjo is added, which he places in the hands 
of Teresa herself (a small hint at her empowerment). Lurie’s own position is also altered, from 
being a voice piece for Byron and Teresa to inhabiting the reduced music accompanying 
them: 
He is in the opera neither as Teresa nor as Byron nor even as some blending of the two: he 
is held in the music itself, in the flat, tinny slap of the banjo strings, the voice that strains to 
soar away from the ludicrous instrument but is continually reined back, like a fish on a line. 
So this is art, he thinks, and this is how it does work! How strange! How fascinating! (186) 
Lurie himself is straining to “soar away” from his own self, but as we could already see his 
efforts show only little success and slow progress. But more and more David Lurie learns to 
adapt perspectives outside of himself, as his sympathetic imaginations goes through a variety 
of challenges: “Teresea leads; page after page he follows.” (186)163 
When Lurie meets his ex-wife she mentions Melanie Isaacs’ performance in a theatre 
play. Lurie falls back into his predatory patterns of thought, recounting all the women he has 
 
163 “Then one day there emerges from the dark another voice, one he has not heard before, has not counted on 
hearing.” (D 186) He identifies her as the illegitimate daughter of Byron and Teresa, Allegra. Transparently, she 
echoes his own daughter Lucy – the opera name indicating that she might be the one who speeds up his moral 
transformation from adagio to allegro. The voice of the child rising from the dark could also be related to Susan 
Barton’s quest for her lost daughter (Foe) and likewise to Dostoevsky’s quest for his dead son Pavel (The Master 
of Petersburg). 
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encountered: “A fair field of folk: hundreds of lives all tangled with his.” (192; original italics) 
He goes to see the play and again cannot help but imagine Melanie reciprocating his desire. 
But Melanie’s boyfriend Ryan spots him, asks him if he hasn’t learnt his lesson, hasn’t learnt 
to stay “with his own kind.” (194) The young man adds that Melanie would spit in his eye if 
she were to see him. Lurie leaves, not hiding his shock about Melanie’s presumed hatred for 
him. The chapter closes with a brief scene where Lurie picks up a prostitute (“Why not, he 
thinks, on this night of revelations?” 194; original italics). Despite the changes he has gone 
through, “solving the problem of sex” does not fail to give him deep satisfaction. It is almost 
as if Coetzee is reminding the reader that no complete change of character is to be expected 
from David Lurie. He will not rise from the ashes as a new man, but maybe at least with a 
changed heart. 
From Cape Town Lurie calls Lucy, who reassures him she is doing alright. Alarmed by 
her tone of voice, he checks with Bev Shaw, who hints at new “developments.” (196) Lurie 
immediately makes a trip to Salem, to “Lucy’s farm, Lucy’s patch of earth.” (197) The 
welcome he receives strongly contrasts with the first time he came to visit her, before the 
assault. 
Lucy opens the door wearing a shapeless smock that might as well be a nightdress. Her old 
air of brisk good health is gone. Her complexion is pasty, she has not washed her hair. 
Without warmth she returns his embrace. (197) 
Lucy immediately reveals to David that she is pregnant from the rape. David cannot hide his 
surprise and disapproval, to which Lucy reacts strongly: 
You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main character, 
I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until halfway through. Well, 
contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor. I am not minor. I 
have a life of my own, just as important to me as yours is to you, and in my life I am the 
one who makes the decisions. (198) 
Metanarrative irony left aside, she once again asserts her autonomy. Lurie checks himself and 
announces he will support her, quickly aborting the conservation by going for a walk, 
reflecting on how shaken he is by the news, thinking about the three potential rapist fathers 
and the unborn child: “Standing against the wall outside the kitchen, hiding his face in his 
hands, he heaves and heaves and finally cries.” (199) 
Lucy announces that the boy (Pollux) is a helping hand for Petrus now. Lurie is 
outraged and again begs Lucy to leave: “He goes to bed with a heavy heart. Nothing has 
changed between Lucy and himself, nothing has healed. They snap at each other as if he had 
not been away at all.” (200-201) Lurie confronts Petrus about Pollux, and in a surprising turn 
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Petrus proposes to marry Lucy in order to guarantee her safety. Lurie reports this to Lucy, and 
Lucy says that she will accept the offer, as long as the house remains hers: 
“Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from again. Perhaps 
that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing 
but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.” 
“Like a dog.” 
“Yes, like a dog.” (205) 
4.1.3 A Dog Life 
There is a small variety of animals making an appearance in Disgrace, but doubtlessly 
Lurie’s encounters with dogs have the largest impact on him. On his first visit to the farm 
Lurie notices the bitch Katy having problems defecating and “glancing around shiftily as if 
ashamed to be watched.” (68) Interesting how the first dog he encounters, Katy, puts on a 
display of shame, whereby she takes part in the moral sphere of humans. No shame without 
morals. 
When he visits Bev Shaw’s clinic, he immediately helps holding down a dog that is 
about to be treated: “The dog gives a tremendous jerk, breaks free of him, almost breaks free 
of the boy. He grasps it as it scrabbles to get off the table; for a moment its eyes, full of rage 
and fear, glare into his.” (81) This not reflected on by Lurie at this point, but it marks a point 
of departure in his attitude towards animals, one of which has caught his attention through a 
look of terror. Bev Shaw attests him a “good presence”:  
“I sense that you like animals.” 
“Do I like animals? I eat them, so I suppose I must like them, some parts of them.” (81) 
Lurie questions her about the putting down of the dogs, asking her if she doesn’t mind, to 
which she replies: “I do mind. I mind deeply. I wouldn’t want someone doing it for me who 
didn’t mind. Would you?” (86) Lurie is being initiated into caring for others, regardless of 
oneself, in spite of oneself, or even because of oneself – a lesson he is not aware of yet. 
After the assault Lucy instructs Lurie to bury the dogs that were shot dead. Lurie 
physically exerts himself on the task of preparing the six graves. Tellingly, he spends no 
thought on the suffering of the dogs, but instead imagines how it might have felt for the three 
assailants to shoot them, imagining the exhilaration they might have felt. (110) His 
sympathetic imagination turns to the cruelty of the perpetrators and leaves aside the suffering 
of the dogs. 
Only two chapters later we see Lurie experiencing pity for two sheep that belong to 
Petrus and are tethered to the ground with a rather short rope. Lurie shows sympathy with the 
two sheep intended for slaughter, and for the first time he pays close attention to the animals: 
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A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two Persians, he does 
not know how. The bond is not one of affection. It is not even a bond with these two in 
particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field. Nevertheless, suddenly and 
without reason, their lot has become important to him. 
He stands before them, under the sun, waiting for the buzz in his mind to settle, waiting for 
a sign. 
There is a fly trying to creep into the ear of one of them. The ear twitches. The fly takes off, 
circles, returns, settles. The ear twitches again. 
He takes a step forward. The sheep back away uneasily to the limit of its chain. 
He remembers Bev Shaw nuzzling the old billy-goat with the ravaged testicles, stroking 
him, comforting him, entering into his life. How does she get it right, this communion with 
animals? Some trick he does not have. One has to be a certain kind of person, perhaps, with 
fewer complications. 
The sun beats on his face in all its springtime radiance. Do I have to change, he thinks? Do 
I have to become Bev Shaw? (126) 
Recall the stubborn refusal to reform his character discussed earlier. His encounters with 
animals are an initiation into the realm of empathy. That Lurie is thrown off-balance by this 
comes as no surprise, and his reasoning fails to deliver a sound explanation for his growing 
attachment to the sheep. 
The lesson of attention-giving is repeated when he retrieves dogs from their kennels at 
the clinic and leads them to their death. This passage encapsulates his shift of attitude well 
and deserves to be quoted in full length: 
One at a time he fetches them out of the cage at the back and leads or carries them into the 
theatre. To each, in what will be its last minutes, Bev gives her fullest attention, stroking it, 
talking to it, easing its passage. If, more than not, the dog fails to be charmed, it is because 
of his presence: he gives off the wrong smell (They can smell your thoughts), the smell of 
shame. Nevertheless, he is the one who holds the dog still as the needle finds the vein and 
the drug hits the heart and the legs buckle and the eyes dim. 
He had thought he would get used to it. But that is not what happens. The more killing he 
assists in, the more jittery he gets. One Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he 
actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he 
cannot stop; his hands shake. 
He does not understand what is happening to him. Until now he has been more or less 
indifferent to animals. Although in an abstract way he disapproves of cruelty, he cannot tell 
whether by nature he is cruel or kind. He is simply nothing. He assumes that people from 
whom cruelty is demanded in the line of duty, people who work in slaughterhouses, for 
instance, grow carapaces over their souls. Habit hardens: it must be so in most cases, but it 
does not seem to be so in his. He does not seem to have the gift of hardness.  
His whole being is gripped by what happens in the theatre. He is convinced the dogs know 
their time has come. Despite the silence and the painlessness of the procedure, despite the 
good thoughts that Bev Shaw thinks and that he tries to think, despite the airtight bags in 
which they tie the newmade corpses, the dogs in the yard smell what is going on inside. 
They flatten their ears, they droop their tails, as if they too feel the disgrace of dying; 
locking their legs, they have to be pulled or pushed or carried over the threshold. On the 
table some snap wildly left and right, some whine plaintively; none will look straight at the 
needle in Bev’s hand, which they somehow know is going to harm them terribly. 
Worst are those that sniff him and try to lick his hand. He has never liked being licked, and 
his first impulse is to pull away. Why pretend to be a chum when in fact one is a murderer? 
But then he relents. Why should a creature with the shadow of death upon it feel him flinch 
away as if its touch were abhorrent? So he lets them lick him, if they want to, just as Bev 
Shaw strokes them and kisses them if they will let her. 
He is not, he hopes, a sentimentalist. He tries not to sentimentalize the animals he kills, or 
to sentimentalize Bev Shaw. (142f) 
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One clearly senses Lurie’s futile resistance to getting emotionally involved. The passage also 
shows how Lurie begins to empathize with the animals, sensing their discomfort or even 
terror, allowing them to lick his hand even though he hates it (caring in the sense attributed to 
Bev Shaw above). Lurie takes on the task of taking the dog bodies to the incinerator, where he 
refuses to leave them among other waste until the workers come to burn them the next day: 
“He is not prepared to inflict such dishonour upon them.” (144) When he becomes aware of 
how the workers use shovels to crush the body bags into a fitting shape, he insists on feeding 
the dead dogs into the incinerator himself (unaware of how much Bev Shaw’s spirit has 
already seeped into him): 
Why has he taken on this job? [...] 
For the sake of the dogs? [...] 
For himself, then. For his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels to 
beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing. (145-146) 
The compassion Lurie feels for the dogs opens the gates for his sympathetic imagination. He 
even adopts a phrase from Petrus, calling himself “dog-man”: 
Curious that a man as selfish as he should be offering himself to the service of dead dogs. 
There must be other, more productive ways of giving oneself to the world, or to an idea of 
the world. [...] 
He saves the honour of corpses because there is no one else stupid enough to do it. That is 
what he is becoming: stupid, daft, wrongheaded. (146) 
Only slowly is Lurie developing awareness for the changes taking place within him, though it 
is left to the reader to develop an understanding of how change comes about. The changing 
self-perception of David Lurie is illustrated in two instructive instances. The first occurs when 
he visits the Isaacs to offer his apologies:  
He has a vision of himself stretched out on an operating table. A scalpel flashes; from throat 
to groin he is laid open; he sees it all yet feels no pain. A surgeon, bearded, bends over him, 
frowning. What is all this stuff? growls the surgeon. He pokes at the gall bladder. What is 
this? He cuts it out, tosses it aside. He pokes at the heart. What is this? (170; original 
italics) 
In his discussion of Musil (in Stranger Shores) Coetzee refers to Musil’s nickname “Monsieur 
Vivisecteur,” which points out the psychological precision of his characterizations – a title I 
believe can be attributed equally well to Coetzee himself. In a sense, Coetzee is the surgeon 
laying bare the inside of David Lurie, only to find a defect bunch of inner organs, most 
prominently a useless heart. Important in the context of my argument is how Lurie repeatedly 
steps out of his own body to regard himself; one form of finding oneself by losing one’s self. 
Later, on his return to Cape Town, he has another vision of himself: 
The end of roaming. What comes after the end of roaming? He sees himself, white-haired, 
stooped, shuffling to the corner shop to buy his half-litre of milk and half-loaf of bread; he 
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sees himself sitting blankly at a desk in a room full of yellowing papers, waiting for the 
afternoon to peter out so that he can cook his evening meal and go to bed. (175) 
This passage reveals little more than the dawning realization of the solitude awaiting him 
should he fail to develop any sense of community. It is no surprise then that Lurie does not 
remain in Cape Town, but instead goes back to Lucy’s farm, then boards in near-by 
Grahamstown (211): 
The clinic, more than the boarding-house, becomes his home. In the back of the compound 
he makes a nest of sorts, with a table and an old armchair from the Shaws and a beach 
umbrella to keep off the worst of the sun. (211) 
Compare this to the previous vision. A “nest of sorts” instead of urban solitude; the bird 
metaphor doesn’t reach very far, but could be taken as an indicator for his approximation to 
animal life. 
Sitting at his table in the dog-yard, he harkens to the sad, swooping curve of Teresa’s plea 
as she confronts the darkness. This is a bad time of the month for Teresa, she is sore, she 
has not slept a wink, she is haggard with longing. She wants to be rescued – from the pain, 
from the summer heat, from the Villa Gamba, from her father’s bad temper, from 
everything. (213) 
Remember how Lurie was groping to get a feeling for Teresa Guccioli earlier. Now he seems 
to effortlessly inhabit her in a nearly prototypical application of his sympathetic imagination. 
4.1.4 Empathy at Last? 
The final chapter of Disgrace acts like the coda of a sonata. The main themes are 
picked up again, related to each other, and ultimately lead to the final chord. It opens with 
Lurie at work on his opera, moves on to Lucy’s new situation on the farm that now belongs to 
Petrus, and finally ends with the last final passage of a dog. 
The chapter opens with a subtle narrative shift. Instead of listening to Lurie’s thoughts, 
we now stand by Teresa Guccioli: “In her white nightdress Teresa stands at the bedroom 
window. Her eyes are closed. It is the darkest hour of the night: she breathes deeply, breathing 
in the rustle of the wind, the belling of the bullfrogs.” (213) We hear her sing and whisper, we 
learn about her undying desire for Byron; in short, for the duration of half a page that opens 
the chapter, we enter the mind of Teresa. After five paragraphs we return to David Lurie in the 
dog-yard, where he “harkens to the sad, swooping curve of Teresa’s plea.” (213) In my 
understanding Coetzee presents a prototypical scene of an author’s sympathetic imagination at 
work. Lurie invest himself wholly into feeling her character, up to the point that he can listen 
to her as she emerges from his creative consciousness. It is the only moment in the novel 
where the focalization shifts away from Lurie; symbolically it implies that he has finally 
managed to move beyond the constraints of his self, which had previously stalled all his 
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empathy. Lurie has finally managed to lose himself, to fully enter the realm of his imagination 
in the process of creating this piece of art: “It has become the kind of work a sleepwalker 
might write.”(214) 
Lurie’s growing affection for the dogs shows how he now sees beyond himself. We 
learn that Lurie has developed a “particular fondness for […] a young male with a withered 
left hindquarter which it drags behind.” (214f) Even though Lurie makes an effort to keep the 
level of attachment to a minimum, knowing what the future almost inevitably holds for the 
dog, the dog takes to him quickly: 
It is not “his” in any sense; he has been careful not to give it a name (though Bev Shaw 
refers to it as Driepoot); nevertheless, he is sensible of a generous affection streaming out 
toward him from the dog. Arbitrarily, unconditionally, he has been adopted; the dog would 
die for him, he knows. (215; original italics) 
This echoes Lucy’s statement earlier in the novel, where she comments on the lack of human 
gratitude for canine loyalty. The phrasing presented here inverses the usual human-canine 
partnership; not the dog is adopted, but the dog adopts the man. Driepoot has chosen David 
Lurie – clearly, his choices were limited (i.e. it was either David or the cage, assuming that 
Bev Shaw herself was not an option). The term “adoption” implies an educational 
responsibility in the sense of rearing/taking care of. But how might the dog be able to 
contribute to Lurie’s sentimental education? Can he guide Lurie? It seems that the dog 
approves of Lurie’s new approach to the Byron opera: 
The dog is fascinated by the sound of the banjo. When he strums the strings, the dog sits up, 
cocks its head, listens. When he hums Teresa’s line, and the humming begins to swell with 
feeling (it is as though his larynx thickens: he can feel the hammer of blood in his throat), 
the dog smacks its lips and seems on the point of singing too, howling. 
Would he dare to do that: bring a dog into the piece, allow it to loose its own lament to the 
heavens between the strophes of lovelorn Teresa’s? Why not? Surely, in a work that will 
never be performed, all things are permitted? (215) 
Lurie and the dog pay full attention to the music meant to substantiate Teresa Guccioli. The 
dog seems willing to contribute with his own voice. And that Lurie considers incorporating 
the howling into his piece shows how far he has come, how receptive he has become to 
others. 
Lurie’s relation to Lucy remains fragile, but both make an effort to get along. In the 
previous chapter things had come to a head when Lurie catches Pollux spying on Lucy in the 
shower. Lurie loses his self-control: 
The word still rings in the air: Swine! Never has he felt such elemental rage. He would like 
to give the boy what he deserves: a sound thrashing. Phrases that all his life he has avoided 
seem suddenly just and right: Teach him a lesson, Show him his place. So this is what it is 
like, he thinks! This is what it is like to be savage! He gives the boy a good solid kick [...] 
(206-207; original italics)  
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The David Lurie we were introduced to in the beginning would hardly have resorted to 
physical violence. On his emotional journey Lurie has covered quite a distance, and this 
eruption of violence can be related to the upsurge of emotions he experiences, not all of which 
are benevolent and kind. Lurie has not turned into a saint, he is far from it; but his emotional 
consciousness is awakening and affecting him in surprising ways. Lucy, on the other hand, 
has acquired martyr qualities through her suffering und unrelenting forgiveness – towards 
Pollux and David! She bears it all, just as she bares herself in front of David and Pollux 
(literally her towel drops, 207). After Pollux has run off, Lucy admonishes him for his actions, 
stating that her top priority is to live in peace, which will not be possible if David behaves as 
he has. Lurie rashly decides to pack his bags, even though that was not what Lucy had asked 
for – she had merely said that he needed to restrain himself. And in the paragraph following 
immediately after this confrontation (set apart by a space of one line), we catch a glimpse of 
Lurie’s reflections: 
Hours after the incident his hand still tingles from the blows. When he thinks of the boy and 
his threats, he seethes with anger. At the same time, he is ashamed of himself. He condemns 
himself absolutely. He has taught no one a lesson – certainly not the boy. All he has done is 
to estrange himself further from Lucy. He has shown himself to her in the throes of passion, 
and clearly she does not like what she sees. 
He ought to apologize. But he cannot. He is not, it would seem, in control of himself. 
Something about Pollux sends him into a rage: his ugly, opaque little eyes, his insolence, 
but also the thought that like a weed he has been allowed to tangle his roots with Lucy and 
Lucy’s existence. 
If Pollux insults his daughter again, he will strike him again. Du must dein Leben ändern!: 
you must change your life. Well, he is too old to heed, too old to change. Lucy may be able 
to bend to the tempest; he cannot, not without honour. 
That is why he must listen to Teresa. Teresa may be the last one left who can save him. 
Teresa is past honour. She pushes out her breasts to the sun; she plays the banjo in front of 
the servants and does not care if they smirk. She has immortal longings, and sings in her 
longings. She will not be dead. (208f) 
Undeniably, Lurie’s sense of self has undergone subtle but decisive changes. When he meets 
Lucy at the Saturday market to help out (part of their new agreement) he makes inquiries 
about Petrus. He asks about new developments regarding her position in Petrus’ scheme, 
offering a general comment about how the child, “a child of this earth” might secure her 
autonomy; he receives no reply from Lucy: 
There is a long silence between them. 
“Do you love him yet?” 
Though the words are his, from his mouth, they startle him. 
“The child? No, How could I? But I will. Love will grow –one can trust Mother Nature for 
that. I am determined to be a good mother, David. A good mother and a good person. You 
should try to be a good person too.” 
“I suspect it is too late for me. I’m just an old lag serving out my sentence. But you go 
ahead. You are well on the way.” 
A good person. Not a bad resolution to make, in dark times. (216) 
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For the first time we see Lurie asking the right question. Most readers should be able to see 
Lurie’s improved character emerge, that is if their sympathetic imagination is alert. 
The last encounter of Lucy and Lurie might not tip the scales, but those inclined to see 
the reformed character he so ardently denies get a chance for closure. Lurie visits Lucy on the 
farm, unannounced. Still unnoticed, he observes her doing gardening. He ponders her future, 
the future of the child, his future as grandparent (mingled with a hint at his possible sexual 
austerity and the apprehensive disappointment about this outlook; the predator remains 
present in him). At this point, he softly calls her name but is not heard. He continues to 
wonder what being a grandfather might require of him, what it might entail. 
The wind drops. There is a moment of utter stillness which he would wish prolonged for 
ever: the gentle sun, the stillness of mid-afternoon, bees busy in a field of flowers; and at 
the centre of the picture a young woman, das ewig Weibliche, lightly pregnant, in a straw 
sunhat. A scene ready-made for a Sargent or a Bonnard. City boys like him; but even city 
boys can recognize beauty when they see it, can have their breath taken away. (218; original 
italics) 
The moment carries epiphanic undertones, similar to the epiphany of Elizabeth Curren in Age 
of Iron or of John in Youth. Whereas his previous assessments of his daughter and her lifestyle 
were ambivalent at best, shifting from dismissive to casual appreciation. Only now is he able 
to accept a beautiful moment without ruining it, though he registers his surprise about this 
rural Wordsworthian sentimentality and asks himself: “Is it too late to educate the eye?” (218) 
He calls her name again and “[t]he spell is broken.” (218) She greets him, as does Katy (the 
third survivor of the earlier assault), and asks him simply: 
“Will you come in and have some tea?” 
She makes the offer as if he were a visitor. Good. Visitorship, visitation: a new footing, a 
new start. (218) 
These are Lucy’s last words in the narrative – her previous “last words” were meant to end 
arguments in which her father was imposing his views on her. Lurie seems to have finally 
accepted her autonomy and is willing to approach her with more care, and she in turn 
welcomes him in.164 
4.1.5 Giving Him Up 
He and Bev do not speak. He has learned by now, from her, to concentrate all his attention 
on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer has difficulty calling by its 
proper name: love. 
He ties the last bag and takes it to the door. Twenty-three. There is only the young dog left, 
the one who likes music, the one who, given half a chance, would already have lollopped 
after his comrades into the clinic building into the theatre with its zinc-topped table where 
 
164 For an alternative appreciation of Lurie’s moral evolution see chapter seven in Heinicke 2013. 
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the rich, mixed smells still linger, including one he will not yet have met with in his life: the 
smell of expiration, the soft, short smell of the released soul. 
What the dog will not be able to work out (not in a month of Sundays! he thinks), what his 
nose will not tell him, is how one can enter what seems to be an ordinary room and never 
come out again. Something happens in this room, something unmentionable: here the soul 
is yanked out of the body; briefly it hangs about in the air, twisting and contorting; then it is 
sucked away and is gone. It will be beyond him, this room that is not a room but a hole 
where one leaks out of existence. (219; original italics) 
The man who had earlier claimed to have solved his “sexual problem” now speaks of love. He 
remembers his exchange with Bev about putting dogs down (“It gets harder all the time, Bev 
Shaw once said.” 219; original italics). The narrative opens the imaginative space for the 
dog’s perspective, speculating on how he would react when entering the room where the dogs 
are put down. The narrative mode subtly shifts from speculation (“would”) to a future 
projection (“will not be able”) of the dog’s confusion in the face of pending death; by 
bracketing Lurie’s exclamation and marking it as reported thought, the narrative subtly shifts 
away from Lurie. When it comes to the “unmentionable,” the violent description of the soul’s 
departure, marked by a colon, stems from Lurie. Lurie sympathetically imagines the dog’s 
final moment. 
He imagines carrying Driepoot (he still avoids the name) to the theatre, imagines in 
detail the dog’s final struggle and how he, Lurie, would “caress him and brush back the fur so 
that the needle can find the vein, and whisper to him and support him in the moment when, 
bewilderingly, his legs buckle.” (219) By embodying the encounter, i.e. emphasizing the 
physical properties of the agents, Coetzee creates a scene we can vividly imagine. Coetzee 
delivers another instance of Lurie’s sympathetic imagination reaching out, as previously with 
Teresa Guccioli and with Lucy. Only now the imagination is followed by immediate action, as 
he informs Bev Shaw that today one more dog will be put down (on top of the planned 
twenty-three): 
He opens the cage door. “Come,” he says, bends open his arms. The dog wags its crippled 
rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, his lips, his ears. He does nothing to stop it. “Come.” 
Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery. “I thought you would save 
him for another week,” says Bev Shaw. 
“Are you giving him up?” 
“Yes, I am giving him up.” (220) 
Lurie’s awakened sympathetic imagination and his actions have finally converged in this 
moment of loving sacrifice – though admittedly, the dog remains a non-agent in this equation, 
a stand-in for Lurie’s emotional development.165 
With Disgrace Coetzee has created a tableau of how David Lurie’s sympathetic 
imagination becomes active and learns to engage with others empathetically. Initially, David’s 
 
165 For an alternative reading of the scene see Graham 2002. 
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imagination is largely un-sympathetic, as can be seen in his dealings with Soraya and 
Melanie. The rape of Lucy and subsequent confrontations initiate a shift in his mindset. Lurie 
learns to engage empathetically with others, aided by his imaginative conceptualization of 
Teresa Guccioli and his encounters with animals. Lurie is forced to expand his sympathetic 
imagination and succeeds within limits. 
4.2 Slow Man (2005) 
With Coetzee’s emigration to Australia, the settings of his novels also shift to 
Australia. Elizabeth Costello (2003) marks the beginning of this trend, if only by making the 
heroine an Australian. Slow Man (2005) and Diary of a Bad Year (2007) are set in Adelaide 
and Sydney. In the beginning Slow Man seems to continue the monologic self-observation of 
Disgrace, again in a contemporary and realist setting. We watch an aging man experiencing a 
catastrophe when he loses his leg after a bicycle accident. In a cinematic opening scene, 
simulating a slow-motion moment of last thoughts, we are catapulted into the scene of the 
accident: “The blow catches him from the right, sharp and surprising and painful, like a bolt 
of electricity, lifting him up off the bicycle.” (SM 1)166 While David Lurie was the agent of 
his transgression, Paul Rayment is introduced as the victim of another’s transgression. Paul 
Rayment is not confronted with moral disgrace, instead his physical incapacitation is a source 
of shame for him. Like David Lurie, Paul Rayment has to recover from shame and learn to 
care for others again. 
For the Cape Town professor a violent attack serves as catalyst, with dogs and his 
Guccioli opera as crutches for his crippled heart on his way to an open embrace from his 
daughter Lucy. For Paul Rayment, the caretaker Marijana Jokić and her son Drago remind 
him of how a heart can reach out to others; his desire for Marijana and a growing sense of 
fathership towards Drago contribute to an awakening of his sympathetic faculties. In a 
metafictional twist the author figure Elizabeth Costello appears and seems to fulfil her role as 
“secretary of the invisible” (“At the Gate,” EC 193-225), irritating Paul with her intimate 
knowledge of particulars about him and everybody else. Costello urges him to drive the 
stagnating plot on by making advances on Marijana. Rayment stubbornly refuses to be goaded 
on by Costello. His relationship with the Jokićs remains constrained. In the end, Paul 
 
166 Coetzee 2005. All quotes in section 4.2 will be from SM unless indicated otherwise. 
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Rayment is made a peace offer by Elizabeth Costello, who offers to put together their lots. 
Paul Rayment declines her offer.167 
Paul Rayment suffers from an internal insufficiency of his sympathetic faculties. His 
psychological status can be correlated with the amputated leg, as Tim Mehigan notes. 
Mehigan picks up the trope of the vivisector: 
Coetzee’s project might be likened to that of the vivisector, of the surgeon who, with scalpel 
in hand, probes ever more deeply through layers of tissue in search of the affliction that has 
brought about the subject’s suffering – a suffering hinted at in the novel’s title though not 
explained by it, and a suffering that acquires a visual correlate in the form of the missing 
leg. (Mehigan 2011: 195) 
As with David Lurie, the encounters of Paul Rayment with the Jokićs confront him with the 
stuntedness of his soul. We see an empathetic budding of his heart in his interactions, though 
the intrusion of Elizabeth Costello sours affairs. Her observations and comment bring home 
bitter truths to Paul Rayment, including the final frustration of not being able to follow his 
desires. 
4.2.1 Slow Man meets Blind Woman 
Elizabeth Costello contrives a meeting of Paul Rayment with a blind woman named 
Marianna, who was mentioned earlier in the narrative and who is then brought up by Costello 
later as a possible surrogate for Paul’s desires: “The woman I mentioned, Marianna, the blind 
one – you can’t keep her from your thoughts, can you? Don’t dissemble, Paul, I can read you 
like a book.” (101) She states place and time of appointment, bidding him to dress up for the 
occasion. “Don’t ask me how I do these things, it’s not magic, I just do them.” (ibid.) As in 
Elizabeth Costello, we are presented with a lesson. Costello’s pastes flour and water over the 
eyes of Paul, fixed by lemon leaves and a silk stocking, claiming that Marianna has insisted: 
“I’m sorry it is so complicated, but that is how we human beings are, complicated, each in our 
own unique way.” (102) Before she leaves, Costello reminds him of the required payment. 
Now the scene of the slow man made blind to meet the blind woman unfolds: 
“I am here,” he says into the dark. Despite his unbelief, his heart seems to be hammering. 
 
167 David Atwell relates Slow Man to the middle voice (as discussed by Roland Barthes): 
1. It is a dialogic space, a space of countervoices; the self-of-writing is not unified but acts as a chorus, 
testing a range of positionalities rather than attempting unity (in this reading, the Nobel Lecture, ”He 
and His Man,” is embryonic of Slow Man). 
2. It is dialogic in part because the principal functions of being/acting and writing have different 
relationships with desire (Marijana/Marianna: the former is the object of Rayment’s desire, the latter 
represents Costello’s desire for a tidy story involving the halt and the blind). 
3. The authorial subject-of-writing (Costello) trades in the literary system (intertextuality, allusions, 
illusion) whereas the existential subject-of-writing pulls away from the literary (Rayment repudiates 
Costello at the end of the novel). (Atwell 2011: 16) 
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A gliding, a rustling. The scent of the damp leaves over his eyes overpower every other 
smell. (102) 
Deprived of his visual sense, Paul Rayment becomes even more helpless than before. He now 
co-experiences what Marianna goes through. After her fingers have explored his face, he asks 
to hear her voice: “She clears her throat, and already in the high, clear tone he can hear that 
she is not Marijana Jokić: lighter, more a creature of air.” (103) His comparison shows that 
she is but a substitute for the object of his desire. He is reminded that this experiment was set 
up by Elizabeth Costello, and “on the back of his neck he can feel it.” (103) While Elizabeth 
Costello’s ontological status remains incidental and uncertain, the reader is the one 
continuously breathing down the neck of Paul Rayment. Now it is Paul who explores 
Marianna with his touch; “Uncertainly he stretches out a hand.” (104) As clumsy as he might 
behave, the careful and sensitive interaction is touching. Paul Rayment draws her close, but 
senses how the awkwardness of the situation inhibits them: “[B]etween where they are, man 
and woman, and the exercise of lust a veritable chasm lies. ‘There is no need,’ he begins 
again, ‘for us to adhere to any script. No need to do anything we do not wish. We are free 
agents.’” (105) As they proceed, Paul tries to imagine how she looks: “The image he has of 
her comes only from the lift and from what his fingers tell him now. To her he must be even 
more a jumble of sense-data: the cold of his hands, the roughness of his skin; the rasp of his 
voice, and an odour probably unpleasing to her supersensitive nostrils.” (106f) Early in the 
encounter he noted a slight trembling in her, which by now has affected him: “The woman’s 
trembling has not ceased. He can swear it has affected him too: a light trilling of the hand that 
might be put down to age but it is in fact something else, fear or anticipation (but which?).” 
(107) The discourse of Costello (from Elizabeth Costello) invades his thoughts: 
Eros. Why does the sight of the beautiful call eros into life? Why does the spectacle of the 
hideous strangle desire? Does intercourse with the beautiful elevate us, make better people 
of us, or is it by embracing the diseased, the mutilated, the repulsive that we improve 
ourselves? What questions! Is that why the Costello woman has brought the two of them 
together: not for the vulgar comedy of a man and a woman with parts of their bodies 
missing doing their best to interlock, but in order that, once the sexual business has been 
gotten out of the way, they can hold a philosophy class, lying in each other’s arms 
discoursing about beauty, love, and goodness? (108) 
The narrative moves on to announce the completion of the act “in all its natural parts.” (109) 
Reminding himself of Costello’s description of Marianna, Paul expresses relief that “the 
hunger or thirst raging in her body” remains subdued: 
Whatever is going on inside her she keeps to herself; [...] The sole intimation he has of 
either raging thirst or raging hunger comes in the form of an unusual but not unpleasing 
heat at the core of her body, as though her womb or perhaps her heart were glowing with a 
fire of its own. (109) 
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The inwardness of Marianna finds expression in Rayment’s bodily assessment of her passions. 
Rayment questions her about her relationship with Elizabeth Costello, receiving only vague 
answers. Rayment puts forward his suspicions about Costello up-staging them as “[t]he halt 
leading the blind.” (111) Rayment records how Marianna stiffens after this remark, registers 
her discomfort: “He hears the lips part, hears her swallow, and all of a sudden she is crying.” 
(111) Saying he is sorry he “reaches out to touch her cheek.” The reader witnesses how 
Rayment struggles to empathize with the blind woman on his couch; but his failure results 
from a lack of self-empathy; not being emotionally in touch with himself inhibits his 
sensibility towards others. Costello might have intended to teach him a lesson about how 
impairments open new epistemological spaces in which interpersonal relationships may 
continue to flourish. However, Rayment continues to think poorly of himself (and Marianna): 
“Two lesser beings, handicapped, diminished: how could she [Costello] have imagined a 
spark of the divine would be struck between them, or any spark at all.” (113) And indeed, the 
“biologic-literary experiment” (114) evoked no sparks, and the moment Marianna leaves he 
attempts to tear off the blindfold only to find the paste has caked and hardened, meaning he 
will have to soak it off. 
In this chapter Coetzee imagines how sensory deprivation might affect an encounter. 
The most prominent effect is a heightened attention directed towards the other, puzzling 
together the remaining sensory data. While not being able to detect emotions on her face, 
Rayment instead reads her bodily sounds and posture. He senses her tears, her discomfort, but 
is caught up in projecting and extending his self-pity. As he pities himself for having lost a 
leg, he pities her for having lost her sight. While pity provides a fertile ground for compassion 
to evolve, it leaves little room for romantic sentiments; and more importantly in the context of 
my argument, pity does not promote empathy, since an asymmetrical self-other distinction is 
reinforced and inhibits empathetic approximation. 
Though Rayment attempts to rashly end this episode by regaining his sight, the paste 
applied by Costello refuses to wash off easily. The effect of her experiment lingers on, in spite 
of Rayment’s stubborn refusal to give in to Costello’s promptings. Rayment displays an 
under-developed sympathetic imagination, and the scene discussed above proves it. But the 
arena Costello has ordained him forces him to engage with others and repeatedly tests his 
limits, most obviously expressed in his doubts about Costello’s role in all of this. Large parts 
of the second half of the novel are dedicated to this metafictional stunt, with Rayment (the 
character) imagining what Costello (character/author) is up to, guessing at her motives and 
aims. In a moment of frustration he complains: “‘You treat me like a puppet,’ he complains. 
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‘You treat everyone like a puppet. You make up stories and bully us into playing them out for 
you. You should open a puppet theatre, or a zoo.’” (117) 
While Slow Man picks up prominent themes of Disgrace, such as fatherhood and male 
sexual desire, the metafictional slant of the narrative shifts the quality of encounters. The 
reader can sense the author’s strong presence, mitigated slightly by the introduction of 
Elizabeth Costello. This shift of emphasis diminishes the impact of Coetzee’s sympathetic 
imagination and complicates the development of a sympathetic imagination in the characters, 
which often appear to be puppets in the hands of an author, as Rayment indicates in the quote 
above. The scene of blind Marianna and Rayment, and Paul’s discussion with Costello in the 
following chapter, illustrates well how contrived the plot is. The scene is a literary case study, 
but only barely succeeds in teasing the reader’s sympathetic imagination into action. 
4.2.2 Infinite Responsibility 
Paul Rayment’s entanglement with the Jokić family offers various instances in which 
the sympathetic imagination of the characters is asked for. But the title of the novel already 
indicates that no speedy initiation is to be expected from Paul Rayment. In a conversation 
between Elizabeth Costello and Drago Jokić, she invites him to “[c]onsider the situation from 
[his]mother’s viewpoint” (140), but the perspective-taking is not followed up by young 
Drago. Instead, Costello almost conclusively sums up their situation: “Four people in four 
corners, moping, like tramps in Beckett, and myself in the middle, wasting time, being wasted 
by time.” (141) Drago Jokić, his mother Marijana Jokić, Elizabeth Costello and Paul Rayment 
form the unlikely companions that ultimately cannot come together. 
What remains strong is the underlying notion of regarding people as equally complex 
beings worth of care and attention. This pertains to all four major characters, but also to 
complementary characters such as Marianna. Mike Marais in his reading proposes that the 
text urges the reader to surpass the efforts made by the characters in engaging with each other: 
“[…] the reader’s task is not a finite task but an infinite responsibility. Like the previous 
novels, this work attempts to pass to the reader the burden of responsibility for completing a 
task that its characters and author have failed to fulfill.” (Marais 2009: 216; original italics) 
Even more than Disgrace this novel primarily illustrates the failure of the sympathetic 
imagination in the encounters of the characters, which right until the very end remain 
dissonant and apart from each other. 
In the final chapter Drago presents to Paul a recumbent bicycle, which Paul accepts 
politely while he secretly thinks that he will never make use of. Paul Rayment desperately 
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holds on to a self-image he had before the accident, having failed to come to terms with the 
loss of his leg. Now he considers becoming a “figure of fun” (256), and Costello playfully 
titles him her “knight of the doleful countenance,” a modern day Don Quixote holding on to 
his past. Fittingly, Rayment receives a first smile from Ljuba, the youngest Jokić, as she jokes 
about him not being a rocket man but a slow man. (258) 
In the final conversation of Paul Rayment and Elizabeth Costello, she proposes to him 
a shared livelihood in Melbourne, with her as “faithful old Dobbin.” (260)168 Paul suggests 
she should turn to her children for care, or alternatively to look for “mere good nursing,” but 
Costello rejects this and instead claims to desire “loving care.” (261) Paul Rayment states that 
he lacks the “loving hands” required, to which Costello curtly replies: “No, you do not. 
Neither loving hands nor a loving heart. A heart in hiding, that is what I call it. How are we 
going to bring your heart out of hiding? – that is the question.” (261) A concern central to the 
entire narrative, but with little signs of promise. Rayment considers her proposal: 
He puts on his glasses again, turns, takes a good look at her. In the clear late-afternoon light 
he can see every detail, every hair, every vein. He examines her, then he examines his heart. 
“No,” he says at last, “this is not love. This is something else. Something less.” (263)  
With these words and three kisses on her cheek he dismisses her. The difference between 
“loving care” and “good nursing,” between “love” and “something less” will be explored 
more fully in The Childhood of Jesus. Coetzee embeds the literary characters of David Lurie 
and Paul Rayment in realistic social contexts, shifting emphasis from the sympathetic 
imagination of the individual in encountering others to the social limitations of the 
sympathetic imagination’s application. Disgrace with its strong focus on David Lurie and a 
series of cataclysmic events affecting him provides a range of occasions for Lurie’s inner 
development. In Slow Man one cataclysmic event opens the narrative, but in the end Paul 
Rayment’s “doggedness” (Costello about Rayment, 263) prevails and prevents his 
sympathetic imagination form unfolding and evolving to a level that enhances empathy. Mike 
Marais notes the shift from the personal to the social context: “What is at stake in Slow Man’s 
bid to affect the reader is therefore an attempt to extend the scope of ethical concern to 
everyone irrespective of identity.” (Marais 2009: 217) 
 
168 Continuing the Don Quixote allusion, Costello proposes to become his Rosinante, here supplanted by Francis 
Fawkes’ poem (1761) about late Dobbin, the horse of a butterwoman who “is no more.” (Fawkes 1810) The 
Dobbin of William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1847-48) was similarly exemplary in his faithfulness to 
Amelia, whom he marries in the end. 
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5. The Autobiographical Fictions 1997-2009 
An autobiography is the truest of all books; for though it inevitably consists mainly of 
extinctions of the truth, shirkings of the truth, partial revealments of the truth, with hardly 
an instance of plain straight truth, the remorseless truth is there, between the lines, where 
the author-cat is raking dust upon it, which hides from the disinterested spectator neither it 
nor its smell… the result being that the reader knows the author in spite of his wily 
diligences. 
(Mark Twain in a letter to William Dean Howells, quoted in Abbott 2002: 63) 
J.M. Coetzee has by now published three book-length autobiographical fictions,169 
starting with Boyhood in 1997, continuing with Youth in 2002 and culminating in Summertime 
in 2009. Diary of a Bad Year (2007) is not strictly speaking an autobiographical fiction, but a 
formal experiment with split-page presentation of polyphonic narratives and essays. As in 
Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee creates a proxy character, now Señor C, to present these opinions. 
The opinions expressed by him transparently resemble those one would expect of Coetzee. 
The sympathetic imagination of the reader is challenged more by the format than the actual 
encounter with the characters. The implied author draws back the curtain to reveal more of 
himself. The format of Diary of a Bad Year prepares the ground for the polyphonic self-
refraction enacted in Summertime, which presents again a complicated autobiographical 
fictionalization. 
5.1 The Autobiographical Project – “All the facts are too many facts” 
In Doubling the Point Coetzee speaks of all his fictions and essays (!) as possibly 
being part of a larger “autobiographical project.” While demarcating his writing as emerging 
from his personal life experience, Coetzee remains vague when it comes to formulating the 
aim of this larger project. In “Remembering Texas” he speaks of “finding his own voice” (see 
5.1.6). In regard to the truth value of the enterprise, Coetzee vaguely hints at a personal truth 
to be discovered through writing, while at the same time denying the attainability of truth as 
such. De Reuck comments on Coetzee’s disavowal of autobiographical truth in an interview 
with David Atwell: 
Coetzee, however, has argued that this difference is not as large as it seems: “Among the 
fictions of the self, the versions of the self, that [all writing] yields, are there any that are 
 
169 In a public reading from the completed manuscript of Youth, Coetzee comments on negotiating genre 
classification with his publisher (memoir or fiction?), asking “whether it could not hover in-between”. But for 
practical reasons (bookshops have sections) it would have to be either or; so Youth was marketed in the US as 
fiction and in Britain as biography. In the consequent discussion with Peter Sacks, both of them speak without 
hesitation about the character and the author as if they were identical; in his introductory note Coetzee speaks of 
the boy depicted in Boyhood (the prequel to Youth) as “a child with my name, with my birth date.” (J.M. Coetzee 
with Peter Sacks, 8 November 2001, youtube) 
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truer than others?” (1992, 17). He goes on to question the possibility of simple “truth to 
fact”: [autobiography] is a kind of self-writing in which you are constrained to respect the 
facts of your history. But which facts? All the facts? No. All the facts are too many facts. 
You choose the facts insofar as they fit in with your evolving purpose” (1992, 18). (De 
Reuck 1988: 158) 
I take one “evolving purpose” in Coetzee’s work to be the concept of the sympathetic 
imagination and its application in literature. In the previous chapters I have shown how this 
concept works in his fictions. With the autobiographical fictions, the concept comes full circle 
and is reapplied by the author to himself. Previously, the fictions had depicted the engagement 
of others with others. Now, Coetzee’s fictions depict his own engagement with his past, 
becoming manifest in the third-person characters representing former selves of Coetzee, 
though not in a straight-forward way of autobiographies claiming to be “objective” history – 
i.e. telling us what really happened. 
In Youth the young man John reflects on Gustave Flaubert’s heroine Emma Bovary 
(Madame Bovary, 1856), suggesting her origins lie in the author’s experience and have then 
been subjected to the “transfiguring fire of art.” (Y 25) With the flick of a wrist, the text shifts 
to today’s readers of Flaubert’s classic, in particular the female readers, who are “transformed 
into versions of her. They may not be the real Emma but in a sense they are her living 
embodiment.” (Y 25) In this casual observation, made by a young man, we find all the 
ingredients of how the sympathetic imagination might transpire fiction. Flaubert employed his 
sympathetic imagination to create Emma; the readers follow the lead of the author and 
empathetically engage with Emma Bovary. Depth of character is required to evoke empathy; 
on the surface Emma Bovary might seem little more than a bored housewife, but the intimate 
account of her emotional states turns her into a heroine for many impassioned readers. 
Flaubert is believed to have said: “Madame Bovary, c’est moi.” Coetzee’s 
autobiographical fictions point in an opposite direction: In none of the three fictions do we 
hear the author saying: the young boy/man John is/was me. Coetzee presents almost generic 
types – clouded by the close similarity with the author’s biography, whose historical 
authenticity might only be distinguished as erratic by the reader of a biography of Coetzee. 
The characters of Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime have their origins in the author’s life, but 
before becoming text have been subjected to the “transfiguring fire” of Coetzee’s self-
sympathetic imagination. The result is quite the opposite from Flaubert’s playful dictum on 
his identification with Emma Bovary, and Coetzee ranges closer to Arthur Rimbaud, as Steven 
Kellmann notes (see above p. 21). When Coetzee and David Atwell spoke of 
“autrebiography” in Doubling the Point, Coetzee might have already envisioned a revisiting 
of his childhood and youth. His three autobiographical fictions (in allusion to Flaubert’s 
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Moeurs de la Provence subtitled “Scenes from Provincial Life”) may be read as 
autobiographical in the traditional meaning only by a naïve reader.170 Looking closer, one will 
see how the genre itself is undermined, in so far as Coetzee pointedly refuses to convey a 
coherent and ultimate truth. The texts force us to acknowledge the transmission of a 
perspective onto the world from author to reader: the boy John is in search of a cultural 
identity beyond apartheid; the young man John is in search of the spark that will ignite his 
artistic fireworks; and lastly, the dead man John, given to us in notebook fragments (a fake 
diary) and interviews (with largely non-existing people who supposedly knew Coetzee) 
offering five exterior perspectives on Coetzee (or on encountering him). What is presented to 
the reader is not the “real” Coetzee, but nonetheless a realized perspective that feeds on his 
biography. These three acts of the sympathetic imagination of Coetzee allow us (and him) to 
engage with him (or rather his fictional selves) in a spirit of empathy. 
5.2 Remembering and Confessing: Coetzee and Autobiography 1984-
1985 
Coetzee’s interest in the genre of autobiography can be dated back to his inaugural 
lecture “Truth and Autobiography” at the University of Cape Town in 1984, an essay that 
prepared the ground for his seminal essay “Confession and Double Thought: Tolstoy, 
Rousseau, Dostoevsky” (1985), which was later included in Doubling the Point (1992), as 
was the short autobiographical piece “Remembering Texas” (1984). A discussion of these 
earlier texts will help understand Coetzee’s outlook onto the genre of autobiography. 
5.2.1 “Remembering Texas” (1984) 
In “How I learned about America – and Africa – in Texas” (New York Times Book 
Review, 15 April 1984; later retitled “Remembering Texas”) Coetzee gives an account of his 
three-year stay in the United States of America. The narrative voice establishes its position of 
retrospection in the opening paragraph: “In September 1965 (this is an essay that can begin in 
no other way), I sailed into New York harbor aboard an Italian ship […].” (DP 50) 171 The first 
person narration establishes a personal tone, while the past tense leaves the reader (and the 
author) at a retrospective distance to events described. The comment added in parentheses 
reminds the reader of the textual construction underlying this autobiographical sketch. 
 
170 Sue Kossew has provided a comprehensive discussion of all three autobiographical fictions (Kossew 2011). 
171 The opening paragraph in Elizabeth Costello similarly marks the construction of the narrative voice, only 
without marking the manoeuvre with parentheses as here. 
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Coetzee styles himself as coming from the colonies (“where I came from ultimately”) 
where he had received a “patchy imitation of Oxford English studies.” (50) This self-
stylisation is reinforced when he describes playing cricket “with a group of Indians” against a 
team “also made up of nostalgic castoff children from the colonies.” (51) Arriving by boat in 
New York in 1965 is emblematic of immigration. Coetzee compares Austin, Texas, to South 
Africa (“hotter and steamier than the Africa I remembered”, 50), reversing the cliché climate 
summarization often applied to Africa by visitors from abroad. In a later reminiscence of 
feeling estranged by the Surrey countryside in England (51), Coetzee thoughts reach back to 
South Africa, who’s landscape has imprinted itself on him: “What I missed seemed to be a 
certain emptiness, empty earth and empty sky, to which South Africa had accustomed me. 
What I also missed was the sound of a language whose nuances I understood.” (52) Some of 
these nuances and Coetzee’s appreciation of them find their expression in Boyhood, as does 
his deep attachment to the Karoo. 
The essay switches between university life and more general reflections. The 
electrifying encounter with Samuel Beckett’s Watt (51; also to be found in Youth) and some 
thoughts about literary genius are followed by the juxtaposition of a spree killer at the 
university, the assassination of H.F. Verwoerd in Cape Town, abruptly leading on to a 
conversation about the on-going Vietnam War. The narrative changes into quoted speech, 
citing an unnamed friend asking him why he doesn’t leave the US if he dislikes the war so 
much. The narrative changes back into its previous register of recorded reflections: 
But he misread me. Complicity was not the problem – complicity was far too advanced a 
notion for the time being. The problem was with knowing what was being done. It was not 
obvious where one went to escape knowledge. (51) 
Complicity has been extensively explored by Coetzee in the characters such as the Magistrate, 
Elizabeth Curren, and David Lurie, to name only the more prominent examples. At this point 
in his life – a PhD student in Austin, Texas – he is unwilling to openly face the grim reality (of 
killing in general) presented to him, but wishes to “escape knowledge.” While at the same 
time his studies about the linguistic history of the Cape languages Nama, Malay, and Dutch 
lead him into an imaginative reflection on the imperial minds of an early Cape colonizer and a 
war strategist: 
[…] and then followed the fortunes of the Hottentots in a history written not by them but 
for them, from above, by travelers and missionaries, not excluding my remote ancestor 
Jacobus Coetzee, floruit 1760. Years later, in Buffalo still pursuing this track, I was to 
venture my own contribution to the history of the Hottentots: a memoir of a kind that went 
on growing till it had been absorbed into a first novel, Dusklands. (52; original italics) 
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The imagined memoir, Dusklands, drew its force from the immediacy of the first person 
narrators Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee, underscored by their strong physical presence 
in the text. In “How I learned about America – and Africa – in Texas” the body is largely 
absent, not even cricket occasions a remark or even action beyond “played” and “lost.” In this 
essay the reader joins the author Coetzee in looking back at a portion of the past with today’s 
hindsight, without slipping into his shoes. When he hypothetically favours the last speaker of 
Djerbal (Australian language), wilfully proposing her to be “a fat old woman who scratched 
herself and smelled bad,” over the works of Beethoven and Shakespeare, Coetzee privileges 
indigenous over dominant culture: 
It seemed an odd position for a student of English, the greatest imperial language of them 
all, to be falling into. It was a doubly odd position for someone with literary ambitions, 
albeit of the vaguest – ambitions to speak one day, somehow, in his own voice – to discover 
himself suspecting that language spoke people or at the very least spoke through them. (53) 
We note the narrative’s subtle change to a third person perspective by shifting the subject to “a 
student of English” and then “someone with literary ambitions.” While the narrative moves 
away from the first person perspective into third person narration, the following content 
expresses a central dilemma of autobiographical writing: how to speak in one’s own voice, 
and when one finally does, how much sincerity is a narrative capable of? The notion of 
“language speaking people” or “speaking through them” complicates the matter by delegating 
responsibility to the domain of language. And yet “Remembering Texas” gives the reader no 
cause to doubt the sincerity of Coetzee as narrator. 
“Remembering Texas” and “Truth in Autobiography” were written in the same year. 
The fiction informs the criticism and vice versa. The essay for the New York Times Book 
Review seems like a test-run for autobiographical writing. Coetzee briefly summarizes his 
three-year-stay, alternating reported events with reflections that reach beyond the mere facts –
whether these reflections are retrospectively arrived at or recall actual thoughts of the young 
man Coetzee remains unclear. 
5.2.2 “Truth in Autobiography” (1984)172 
J.M. Coetzee opens his inaugural lecture with an offering of a tentative definition of 
autobiographical writing: 
Autobiography is a kind of writing in which you tell the story of yourself as truthfully as 
you can, or as truthfully as you can bear to. Autobiography is usually thought of not as a 
kind of fiction-writing but as a kind of history-writing, with the same allegiance to the truth 
as history has. (1) 
 
172 All quotes in this section will be taken from “Truth and Autobiography” unless indicated otherwise. 
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This stands in stark contrast to the traditional definition of autobiography as given by 
Phillippe Lejeune, who defined it as “retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person 
concerning his own existence.” (Lejeune 1989: 4) For Coetzee truthfulness is a central 
concern, though he trusts neither the discourse of history nor that of the novel, as he expressed 
eloquently at the Baxter Theatre in Cape Town during the Weekly Mail Book Week in 1988: 
“The categories of history are not privileged, just as the categories of moral discourse are not 
privileged.” (Coetzee 1988a: 4) Both history and novels are “nothing but a certain kind of 
story that people agree to tell each other.” (Coetzee 1988a: 4) Truthfulness no longer relies on 
mere factuality but on the personal unflinching self-investedness in the process of producing 
such truths. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously opened his Confessions with the claim of presenting 
himself “in all the truth of nature.” (1) Rousseau intends to guide his readers to “some kind of 
intuitive understanding” as opposed to an “analytical understanding.” (2) Coetzee is not on a 
fact-finding mission about the misgivings of Rousseau, but rather interested in the mechanics 
of confession in autobiographical writing and their relation to shame and truthfulness. Coetzee 
points out how Rousseau makes use of shameful deeds to present himself in a favourable light 
of a repenting sinner (a strategy which of course he explicitly denies); this brings us to the 
heart of the matter: the best intentions do not necessarily yield the most truthful results. 
With precision Coetzee unveils Rousseau’s “economy of confession,” where 
“everything shameful is valuable: every secret or shameful appetite is confessable currency.” 
(3) Not the self is at risk in the disclosure of shameful events, but the textual medium 
transmitting the narrative (“the goose that lays the golden eggs”, 3). Because autobiography is 
by definition a retrospective genre (or else it were science fiction), “an autobiographer can be 
said to be making the truth of his life.” (4; original italics) And Rousseau has proved himself 
master in creating an autobiography that stands the test of time and is read until today. 
Coetzee identifies two central categories for evaluating autobiographical truthfulness: 
authenticity as trademark of Rousseau’s commitment to his enterprise; and “[…] sincerity, 
which I define as the immediate presence of the moral self to the self.” Adding: “Surely 
whatever is written in a spirit of sincerity is, in some sense, true.” (4; original italics) While 
the first category does not necessarily increase the truth value of narrated events (think of Peer 
Gynt’s grand tone of authenticity, but total lack of truthfulness), the category of sincerity 
implies “moral self-knowledge of the autobiographer” (4); it requires the author to be able to 
access an external perspective in regard to himself, otherwise he would not be able to evaluate 
his moral self, which can only be moral in relation to others. First-person narration bars all 
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access to other perspectives, since it is forced to remain within the parameters of its own 
narration – it can assess other perspectives, but not access them. A third person narration, as 
used by Coetzee in all his book-length autobiographical fictions, allows both the reader and 
the author an outside perspective onto the protagonist, allowing the character’s moral self to 
emerge more clearly than it could in a first-person narration. 
The final category regarding autobiographical truth is privilege (6), and in the case of 
first person narratives the privilege resides solely with the author – similar to the privilege 
assumed by critics in assessing works of fiction. The privileging of the central consciousness 
denies the narrative access to any truth hidden behind the mask put on display by the self, 
hailed as its “own truth”. Only the third person narration creates a chance for a deeper truth to 
emerge. Coetzee’s three autobiographical fictions attest to the author’s desire to circumvent 
the truth-claim inherent in most autobiographies by adopting third person narration. Hereby 
the subject of the text (an earlier I now presented as He) is made non-identical with the author 
(the present I). In his discussion of Rousseau’s cake-shop episode, Coetzee points out the 
necessity of looking “beneath the surface” of past events, and “write down an explanation 
which may be full of gaps and evasions but at least gives a representation of the motions of 
your mind as you try to understand yourself,” in which case the “lies and evasions may be 
more interesting than the visit itself.” (4) Coetzee compares this to one model of 
psychoanalysis: “The patient’s lie becomes the analyst’s truth.” (4) The commitment to 
presenting a full account of past events and including reflections on the lies and evasions 
involved in the depiction amounts to what Coetzee terms authenticity. 
5.2.3 “Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky” (1985) 
The seminal essay “Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, 
Dostoevsky”173 begins by discussing the Confessions of Augustine (398 CE), in particular the 
episode of stealing pears from a neighbour’s garden (just as “Truth in Autobiography” had 
opened with Rousseau’s stealing of cake. Only now, shame and desire are linked to each other 
more closely, one fuelling the other (DP 251)). Coetzee shifts his discourse from the genre of 
autobiography to that of confession, which could either be considered a sub-genre (“a mode of 
autobiographical writing,” 252) or a crucial component of any autobiography that claims to be 
authentic and sincere (with an “underlying motive to tell an essential truth about the self,” 
 
173 All quotes in the following will be from DP unless indicated otherwise. 
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252). In the case of Tolstoy’s and Dostoevsky’s autobiographical writings Coetzee refers to 
“confessional fictions.” (252) 
Coetzee identifies a fundamental sequence resulting from unchecked desire and 
subsequent shame: “Confession is one component in a sequence of transgression, confession, 
penitence, and absolution.” (251) In the case of Augustine, the confession aims at not only 
stating the act of transgression, but also at revealing the author’s motives. Augustine himself 
realizes the conundrum, and Coetzee summarizes: “The truth about the self that will bring an 
end to the quest for the source within the self for that-which-is-wrong, he affirms, will remain 
inaccessible to introspection.” (252) 
Interestingly, Coetzee switches to a first person narration to relate to the reader 
“Pozdnyshev’s Truth” (section heading), followed by a more neutral third person account of 
“Tolstoy’s Truth” (as stated by the author Tolstoy in an “Afterword” responding to letters 
from readers). These two “truths” are followed by a third, which Coetzee scrupulously avoids 
tagging as coming from Pozdnyshev’s “I” (more essential than the “I” presented in the 
narrative). Coetzee presents a psychoanalytical reading of events, marking it as one possible 
reading (but not subscribing to the radical possibility of “an infinity of interpretations”; 257). 
The double meaning of the confession marks it as an “ironic” confession (257), in which the 
face value of the narrative serves to point to what is hidden beneath the surface. But, the irony 
only emerges in a critical reading bent on finding it in the first place, otherwise Coetzee 
attests a “lack of reflectiveness” (258) to the narrative and its presentation of Pozdnyshev’s 
“truth-embodying selfhood.” (260) 
Coetzee discusses the converted self of the narrator and the “truth-bearing” of his 
retrospective account of events, taking into account Tolstoy’s afterword as well as his personal 
history, which includes the earlier publication “A Confession” (259-260, see also DP endnote 
13, p. 420). The conversion described by Tolstoy leads him from secular nihilism to religious 
faith. In passing, Coetzee remarks on how Tolstoy avoided the more “conventional kind of 
language” which proposes a “false self” (of reason) converting to a “true self” (of the heart) – 
a discourse that could well be read into Coetzee’s fictions, only without a clear dichotomy and 
ultimately without a final self to arrive at. Instead, like with Tolstoy, “the self is a site where 
the will goes through its processes in ways only obscurely accessible through introspection.” 
(261) While the teleology of Tolstoy’s confession points to God, Coetzee’s soul-searching in 
his autobiographical fictions (all of which have a confessional undertone) provides no closure, 
but results in an “endless knot of self-awareness”: “Because the basic movement of self-
reflexiveness is a doubting and questioning movement, it is in the nature of the truth told to 
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itself by the reflecting self not to be final.” (263) What both authors share, and what Coetzee 
points out in his discussion of Tolstoy, is “not perfect self-knowledge but truth-directedness,” 
to be achieved by “attentiveness and responsiveness to an inner impulse.” (261) 
Attentiveness and responsiveness are to be found in all of Coetzee’s fictions, and both 
are necessary prerequisites for the sympathetic imagination and empathy to be triggered. In 
the case of Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee both these qualities are directed at a truth 
fabricated by themselves, whereas in later characters the attentiveness and responsiveness to 
others initiate transformations of the self. In the case of the autobiographical fictions, both 
categories are applied to an earlier self of the author, only without any transformation 
resulting from them. The hallmark of a successful application of attentiveness and 
responsiveness (to the self) is sincerity, in the ongoing argument now illustrated by Tolstoy’s 
story “The Death of Ivan Ilyich”: “The sense of urgency that the crisis brings about, the 
relentlessness of the process in which the self is stripped of its comforting fictions, the single-
mindedness of the quest for truth: all these qualities enter into the term sincerity.” (262) 
With recourse to Paul De Man and Jean Starobinski, Coetzee comes to the preliminary 
conclusion that Rousseau’s “self-revelations in fact always have in view the goal of winning 
love and acceptance. Self-revelation offers the truth of the self, a truth that others might be 
persuaded to see.” (267) This act of persuasion requires a language to be invented that can 
“render the unique savor of personal experience.” (268) The position of retrospection is also 
reflected directly in Rousseau’s text: “Yielding myself simultaneously to the memory of the 
impression I received [in the past] and to present feeling, I will give a twofold depiction of [je 
peindrai doublement] the state of my soul.” (Quoted by Coetzee in DP 268; comments by 
Coetzee) At this point follows a distinction of authenticity as producing an “own truth” and 
being oneself (with no distance between present and past self) and sincerity (with a reflective 
distance to the past): “one is in danger of not being oneself when one lives at a reflective 
distance from oneself (a revealing reversal of values for autobiography).” (268) 
Coetzee’s own autobiographical texts celebrate the reflective distance between present 
self (author) and past self (subject of narrative). Just as the presently discussed essay 
ultimately “brings the notion of the truth into question (272, original italics), so do Coetzee’s 
autobiographical fictions avoid proposing any conclusive truth about the person J.M. Coetzee. 
They are marked as inventions by additions and omissions to the biographical facts,174 
nonetheless providing enough “confessable currency” (272) to maintain the text’s sincerity, 
 
174 The biographical facts have been made available to critics in biographies first by Manfred Loimeier (2007), 
then more comprehensively by J.C. Kannemeyer (2012). 
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while neglecting the category of authenticity – the text clearly demarcates the non-identity of 
author and protagonist. This is achieved most obviously by employing third person present 
tense narration, but also by not imposing a retrospective perspective of the later self onto the 
earlier self. This process could be described as confessing with an “open mind,” 
acknowledging the impossibility of attaining truth, “[b]ut there is something literally 
shameless in this posture.” (274) In his autobiographical fictions Coetzee might have 
attempted to circumvent this shamelessness through the narrative strategy of using third 
person present tense, avoiding “a regression to infinity of self-awareness and self-doubt.” 
(274) The question remains whether Coetzee has successfully avoided these by emphasizing 
the fictional character of the narrative. 
The text moves on to a discussion of Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground. 
While Dostoevsky’s narrator claims to “outdo Rousseau in truthfulness, [...] his confession 
reveals nothing else but the desire of the self to construct its own truth.” (279) Coetzee in his 
autobiographical fictions openly embraces the desire to construct his own truth, knowingly 
and willingly. Paradoxically, the sincerity of the text is heightened, while its authenticity is 
relegated to the fictional, and the identity of author and character becomes a question of the 
second order, ontologically speaking. In Notes from the Underground the narrator’s claim to 
truthfulness is doomed to fail in view of his “hyperconsciousness” (Dostoevsky’s term): 
Self-consciousness will not give him the answer, for self-consciousness in Notes from the 
Underground is a disease. What is diseased about it is that it feeds upon itself, finding 
behind every motive another motive, behind every mask another mask, until the ultimate 
motive, which must remain masked (otherwise the endless regression would be ended, the 
disease would be cured). We can call this ultimate motive the motive for unmasking itself. 
[…] 
We are now beyond all questions of sincerity. The possibility we face is of a confession 
made via a process of relentless self-unmasking which might yet be not the truth but a self-
serving fiction, because the unexamined, unexaminable principle behind it may be not a 
desire for the truth but a desire to be a particular way. The more coherent such a 
hypothetical fiction of the self might be, the less the reader’s chance of knowing whether it 
is a true confession. We can test its truth only when it contradicts itself or comes into 
conflict with some “outer,” verifiable truth, both of which eventualities a careful confessing 
narrator can in theory avoid. (280, original emphasis) 
The motive for unmasking could be seen as a theme running through most of Coetzee’s 
fictions, including the autobiographical fictions. In these, the desire to be a particular way is 
outwitted by the fictionalization of the autobiographical material, but reappears as “flaws in 
the structure of the text.” The insistence on an individuality apart from all others runs through 
both Boyhood and Youth, as well as Summertime, along with a general social anxiety. 
Assessing Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground, Coetzee voices a suspicion: 
It would not be surprising, if the narrator’s confession were a lying, self-serving fiction, that 
the repressed truth should break through its surface, particularly at moments of stress, in the 
230 
 
forms of stirrings of the heart, intimations of the unacknowledged, utterances of the inner 
self, or that the truth should soon be repressed again. (281; original italics) 
These fissures in narrative are of particular interest to Coetzee. And he resignedly comments 
that “the one process that is not subjected to the scrutiny of self-awareness is the narrative 
process itself.” (281) In his own fictions, Coetzee on many occasions accentuates such 
fissures and also lets the narrative voice reflect on its own narrative process – the most 
obvious example would be Susan Barton in Foe. In his autobiographical fictions the use of 
third person narration from a neutral vantage point precludes a metafictional reflection of the 
narrative process. 
Coetzee moves on to discuss the confessions presented in Dostoevsky’s novels The 
Idiot and The Possessed, the former providing the title theme of the essay, “double thought” 
(dvoinaya mysl’; 282), the latter providing a confessor (Tikhon) as counterpart to the 
confessant (Stavrogin). The “double thought” infests all confession, since it necessarily brings 
with it an endless masquerade of motives. Tikhon seems to propose – according to Coetzee’s 
reading – a way out of the endless regression of confession, namely “by another regression of 
self-scrutiny that has the potential to extend to infinity but also has true potential to end in 
self-forgiveness.” (290) In the final section of this essay, “The End of Confession,” Coetzee 
goes beyond Tikhon and proposes “faith and grace” to be the only meaningful options for 
bringing confession to an end, claiming that Dostoevsky’s narratives have explored the 
“impasses of secular confession, pointing finally to the sacrament of confession as the only 
road to self-truth.” (291) Returning to Tolstoy’s “Kreutzer Sonata” (and contrasting it with the 
earlier Anna Karenina), Coetzee arrives at the final question, “what potential for the 
attainment of truth can there be in the self-interrogation of a confessing consciousness?” (293) 
Taking a look at Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg, both of which were written 
within a decade after the publication of the three essays discussed above, we can see the 
impact of the confessional mode on the narrative and its voice. Elizabeth Curren lays bare her 
innermost to her daughter in a letter, giving the reader opportunity (or even forcing him) to 
accompany her on her inner journey of redemption, both on the personal level of the mother-
daughter relationship and more significantly on a historical level of being a beneficiary of 
apartheid. At the same time this journey is delayed and interrupted by moments of self-doubt 
and a refusal to present or even propose one final truth, instead opening up more and more 
questions regarding her salvation and the possibility of arriving at self-forgiveness. And 
exactly by maintaining a position of doubt, the narrative voice forces us to empathetically 
engage with the protagonist, allowing us at no point to dismiss her completely, since she 
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keeps arriving at new points of departure (while some of them recur again and again in 
different forms, such as the notion of protest suicide). 
The writer-figure Dostoevsky goes through a very similar process, with inverted 
emphasis: the father-son relationship forms the core element of the narrative, while the 
historical background of Russia during its interregnum provides the ideological background. 
Coetzee’s Dostoevsky also chokes on his own narrative (“It tastes like gall.”) and the reader 
can sense his desire for closure and an end of confession, but self-forgiveness is not available 
to him; Dostoevsky’s path leads him to his next novel, which represents yet another betrayal 
of Pavel (according to Coetzee’s narrative). Curren on the other hand could be thought to 
achieve at least some sense of forgiveness dying in the embrace of Vercueil. The shift from 
Elizabeth Curren’s first person narration to the third person narration of Dostoevsky’s story 
might be symptomatic for acknowledging the limits of the confessional mode. 
Coetzee’s autobiographical fictions can be viewed as continuing the confessional 
mode employed in Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg. Only now he applies it to his 
own personal history, which is fictionalized for two reasons: 1) to reject the notion of an own 
truth/a true self 2) to ascertain the non-identity of authorial self (present) and narrative self 
(past). The use of third person narrative supports both aims. In the autobiographical fictions 
Coetzee turns his sympathetic imagination on himself and enables himself to experience 
narrative empathy for his prior selves. The reader is invited to join him on this journey into 
his own past and to engage empathetically with his childhood in South Africa under apartheid, 
with his years spent in London, and finally with his return to South Africa in the 1970s. 
5.3 Boyhood (1997) and Youth (2001) – Setting the Stage for Self-
Narration 
Traditionally, the identity of author and narrator in autobiography was not doubted; even to 
the point of taking fake autobiographies at face value, only to be disappointed if another truth 
emerged in the aftermath of the publication. Coetzee avoids this simple equation by resorting 
to third-person narration. Responding to Joanna Scott’s questions about childhood 
impressions of the country [South Africa], Coetzee reflects on how his writing has changed 
the quality and reliability of his recollections: 
They were just impressions of life. And by now they have been recalled, revisited, revised 
so often that I can hardly claim with any confidence that they belong to my childhood. They 
belong, by now, to the childhood I have constructed for myself in retrospect, that is, to 
autobiography. (Coetzee in an interview, Scott 1997: 82-83) 
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Coetzee speaks of “the childhood I have constructed,” and reading Boyhood we can see how 
the narrative is manipulated and how selectively it chooses to focus on particular episodes and 
aspects while neglecting others. The third-person narration reinforces the sense of 
discontinuity between former selves of the author and his present self. 
Seen from a different vantage point, one might relate the self-estrangement enacted in 
these autobiographical fictions to Coetzee’s repeatedly experienced frustration – and feeling 
ostracized – through the cultural coding of his immediate environment. Boyhood in particular 
displays Coetzee’s shifting allegiances between his mother’s culture (German become South 
African English) and his father’s (South African Boer). Tonje Vold finds traces of this theme 
both in an interview and a later fiction of Coetzee: 
In Boyhood, Coetzee writes about John: “though he speaks Afrikaans without an accent, he 
could not pass for a moment as an Afrikaner” (124). In Doubling the Point, the author 
speaks of himself: “No Afrikaner would consider me an Afrikaner. That, it seems to me, is 
the acid test for group membership” (341). In Slow Man, Paul picks up the tone: “I can pass 
among Australians, I cannot pass among French. That is, as far as I am concerned, all there 
is to it, to the national-identity business: where one passes and where one does not” (197). 
(Vold 2011: 48).175 
5.3.1 Boyhood – An Introduction to Slaughter 
The opening of Boyhood176 demonstrates Coetzee’s careful construction of narrative 
perspective. The first sentence begins with “They live […]” (1), followed by establishing the 
setting just outside of Worcester – not the frontier of early settlement, but of new settlement 
(new housing). The third person plural present tense is continued throughout the first 
paragraph. The second paragraph introduces the mother’s attempt at keeping chicken, but the 
chicken become sick and the mother is advised by her sister to cut out “the horny shells under 
their tongues.” (1) At this point the narrative perspective narrows down through the use of the 
possessive pronoun “his” in connection with the boy’s “mother” (1). In the same sentence that 
introduces the notion of a third person singular as potential focalizer, the mother’s ‘treatment’ 
of the chicken is described in detail, resulting in the hens’ reaction in the next sentence: “The 
hens shriek and struggle, their eyes bulging. He shudders and turns away.” (2) With the 
introduction of the actual third person “He” comes both a physical reaction (shudders) and an 
emotional reaction (turns away). This is immediately followed by “He thinks […]” (indicating 
 
175 The struggle with an identity derived from both Afrikaner and British culture continues in Summertime. See 
Jacobs 2011. 
176 Coetzee 1998. All quotes in the following will be taken from BH unless indicated otherwise. 
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mental reflection following his initial reaction) and proposing an analogy to the mother’s 
treatment of steaks (=dead meat); and “he thinks of her bloody fingers.” (2)177 
As the third person focalizer is introduced the narrative comprehensively records his 
reaction to the harsh treatment of others (in this case: hens), including his mental reflection of 
what he has witnessed, which anticipates the unconditional but ambivalent love the boy feels 
for his mother. The reader has privileged access to the boy’s consciousness and his emotional 
setup; now it is up to the reader to allow his sympathetic imagination to become active in 
taking part in the boy’s experiences. 
J.A. De Reuck compares Coetzee’s autobiographical fictions to his early narratives: 
The first-person narratives of Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country have a serious 
purpose – that of ensuring that we know and respond to their protagonists as far as possible 
as we do to ourselves. The third person of Boyhood and Youth is carefully chosen: the 
device means that both author and reader relate to him as to a biographical – rather than 
autobiographical – subject. (De Reuck 1988: 158) 
With the protagonists of the early novels the challenge for Coetzee lay in adopting their 
perspective and sharing this experience with the reader. Now the challenge lies in adopting an 
external perspective and treating his former self as a biographical subject. This narrative 
distance allows the reader’s narrative and cognitive empathy to become active and to engage 
with the inner life of the boy. 
The first impression of the boy seems to suggest his heightened sensitivity in regard to 
cruelty towards animals. This is contrasted three paragraphs later with an act of cruelty 
committed by him: “He holds the pipe [of the vacuum cleaner] over a trail of ants, sucking 
them up to their death.” (2) This is not reflected on, instead the text continues: “There are ants 
in Worcester.” (2) The act of violence against the hens is redirected and relived in the violence 
against ants, a simulation that allows the boy to experience first-hand the empowerment that 
comes with violence, and this time there is not even a moment of hesitation, no reflection of 
his actions. As readers we get a feeling for the conflicted nature of his emotional responses. 
The attention of the narrative shifts to the mother, her wish for a means of transport, shifting 
from a horse to a bicycle; the gleeful comments of “his father” are also reported. By now, the 
narrative has firmly established the third person singular as central consciousness between 
“his mother” and “his father”; their actions are reported as perceived or imagined by the boy. 
As the mother clumsily learns how to master the bicycle, the boy joins his father in his glee 
over her imminent failure: “His heart turns against her. That evening he joins in with his 
 
177 The opening scene of Boyhood mirrors the first close reading of his dissertation on Beckett’s style, in which 
he focuses on the horror of Belacqua at the boiling of a live lobster (in Beckett’s Dante and the Lobster). 
(Coetzee 1969: 21) 
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father’s jeering. He is well aware what a betrayal this is. Now his mother is all alone.” (3) 
Soon the mother abandons cycling altogether, and the boy “knows that he must bear part of 
the blame. I will make it up to her, he promises himself.” (4) 
This first chapter serves as an exposition both of setting and characters as well as of 
narrative strategy – the latter performed very subtly. The reader also gets a feeling for the 
compromised position of the boy between mother and father: “He does not often gang up with 
his father against her: his whole inclination is to gang up with her against his father.” (4) This 
theme pervades Coetzee’s depiction of ‘his’ South African childhood. The present tense 
narration forestalls retrospective assessment and judgment, while at the same time 
heightening the immediacy of reported events and emotions for the reader (and for the 
author); it is a reliving of a childhood rather than a retelling. 
5.3.2 Youth – Money Matters, Art and Love Liberate 
In comparison, the previous “They” of the family in Worcester, Youth 178 opens with 
the singular “He” of the bachelor John living in Cape Town. The narrative moves on to 
discuss the mundane procedure of how he pays rent to the owner, spiced up by the admission 
of a lie about his current position (“[…] he is in the flat under false pretences”; 1). This 
admission is immediately modified: “It is not a lie, not entirely.” (1) This introduction links 
the text to the confessional mode I had previously discussed in the context of Coetzee’s 
essays, with shame as “confessable currency” and the self-deceit of excuses made and 
explanations offered. Once we follow this line of thought, we are bound to question the 
truthfulness of the narrative, its reliability in relating the truth. It is almost a technical 
demonstration of the complicated nature of a secular confession. We can also relate the 
character’s admission of being “not entirely” truthful about his circumstances to the text as a 
whole. As if the narrated central consciousness and sole focalizer was warning the reader not 
to expect too much truth. Instead the reader will accompany the main character on his search 
for an “own truth,” which we already know he will not find. 
In the fifth paragraph one central theme of Youth is introduced, when the anti-hero 
supervises the university library in the evening: 
Sometimes he imagines a beautiful girl in a white dress wandering into the reading room 
and lingering distractedly after closing time; he imagines showing her over the mysteries of 
the bindery and cataloguing room, then emerging with her into the starry night. It never 
happens. (2) 
 
178 Coetzee 2003. All quotes in the following section will be taken from Youth unless indicated otherwise. 
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We take part in this little act of the imagination as an observer, but do not inhabit the third 
person perspective. The distance between reader and character is maintained, while at the 
same time giving the reader access to the intimate thoughts and desires of the protagonist. 
The text moves on to enumerate young John’s jobs and earnings, establishing his 
financial independence: “He may only be nineteen but he is on his own feet, dependent on no 
one.” (2) Being a solitary character, the focalization of the narrative achieves a stronger effect 
than in Boyhood, where the narrative occasionally included the perspectives of others. Here, 
the third person perspective dominates the discourse, reinforcing his solitary independence: 
“He is proving something: that each man is an island; that you don’t need parents.” (3) 
Dominic Head notes: “Self-evidently, Youth is characterized as the flow of a voice fitted to the 
author’s mind, and constantly checked by doubts; what is not immediately obvious is that it is 
often funny, most especially when those doubts and scruples give way to open self-mockery.” 
(Head 2009: 14) The following two paragraphs reveal to the reader John’s “sense of how odd 
he looks,” i.e. his self-image: 
He is slim and looselimbed, yet at the same time flabby. He would like to look attractive but 
he knows he is not. There is something essential he lacks, some definition of feature. 
Something of the baby still lingers in him. How long before he will cease to be a baby? 
What will cure him of babyhood, make him into a man.” (3) 
The body comes into play as a reminder of his past childhood, which lingers on in his 
features. And, as his daydream in the library already indicated, he believes his salvation to lie 
in the love of a girl: “The beloved, the destined one, will see at once through the odd and even 
dull exterior he presents to the fire that burns within him.” (3) The idea of salvation through 
love is immediately linked to the salvation through art: “For he will be an artist, that has long 
been settled.” (3) Boyhood (1997) 
5.4 Boyhood (1997) 
5.4.1 Self-Imaging 
He is a liar and he is cold-hearted too: a liar to the world in general, cold-hearted toward his 
mother. It pains his mother, he can see, that he is steadily growing away from her. 
Nevertheless he hardens his heart and will not relent. His only excuse is that he is merciless 
to himself too. He lies but he does not lie to himself. (35) 
By confessing deceitfulness the narrative aligns the reader with the real “He”, which the boy 
reveals to us but hides from the textual others. The persona presented publicly hides the 
turmoil taking place within. In “Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, 
Dostoevsky” Coetzee strongly disavowed the idea of a “true self”; now, in Boyhood, the 
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narrative playfully underlines these doubts. On the level of the text a strategy of narrative 
authentication is enacted, while we remain aware of the artificial fictional gap between 
biographical subject and author. As Coetzee takes one step back and creates a distance 
between himself and his former self, he interrupts the idea of continuity of identity and 
character, preventing a close alignment of past fictional boy self and present authorial self. 
The distance allows the author an unflinching look at who he was, which then again allows 
for self-empathy to arise and enter the text. 
We see the boy oscillating between his desire to belong, a desire to be normal – “He 
wishes she would be normal. If she were normal, he could be normal.” (38) – and the desire to 
stand apart: “I hate normal people.” (78) The continuous pressure the boy experiences creates 
a strong impression of isolation, sometimes self-willed, but altogether a result of both the 
family constellation and the social climate of South Africa under apartheid. Referring to his 
morning sicknesses, which he admittedly fakes on occasion in order to stay home and read 
books, the boy nonetheless feels a lack of trustworthiness in himself, which is registered by 
the people around him: “On every side he is suspected of being a cheat.” (107) The boy 
presents a public and private persona, a duplicity resulting in a fundamental sense of shame 
and a constant fear of being discovered as a fraud: 
If the worst were to happen […] revealing […] that he is still a baby and will never grow up 
– if all the stories that have been built up around him, built by himself, built by years of 
normal behaviour, at least in public, were to collapse, and the ugly, black, crying, babyish 
core of him were to emerge for all to see and laugh at, would there be any way in which he 
could go on living? (112) 
The question of how to “go on living” once his true identity is revealed gives cause for the 
boy to ponder his own death. Like previously Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron (and later 
Costello in Elizabeth Costello), Coetzee puts the boy through the mental exercise of 
imagining his own death. As I have argued, this act of the imagination represents an ultimate 
test of the limits of the sympathetic imagination: 
In this silence he tries to imagine his death. He subtracts himself from everything: from the 
school, from the house, from his mother; he tries to imagine the days wheeling through 
their course without him. But he cannot. Always there is something left behind, something 
small and black, like a nut, like an acorn that has been in the fire, dry, ashy, hard, incapable 
of growth, but there. He can imagine himself dying but he cannot imagine himself 
disappearing. Try as he will, he cannot annihilate the last residue of himself. (112; original 
italics) 
The scrupulous self-doubting is contrasted with a heightened sense of self-importance and 
intellectual superiority: 
Nothing can touch you, there is nothing you are not capable of. Those are the two things 
about him, two things that are really one thing, the thing that is right about him and the 
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thing that is wrong about him at the same time. This thing that is two things means that he 
will not die, no matter what; but does it not also mean that he will not live? 
He is a baby. […] Before him, as she [his mother] advances, everything turns to stone and 
shatters. He is just a baby with a big belly and a lolling head, but he possesses this power. 
(113) 
The regression to a prior state of absolute dependence resurfaces in the thoughts of the boy as 
well as in images included in the narrative, such as the photo of Aunt Annie “with a baby in 
her arms said to be him.” (115) This casual remark points to a sense of self-estrangement 
regarding earlier representations of the self – here in the simple sense of a picture of him as a 
baby. Similarly, Coetzee might look back at Boyhood and refer to the protagonist as a boy 
“said to be him.” 
The notion of a true self is picked up repeatedly in Boyhood. In chapter sixteen, 
dedicated largely to his schooling, one main theme of Youth is foreshadowed, namely the idea 
of the emerging artist-to-be: “Whoever he truly is, whoever the true ‘I’ is that ought to be 
rising out of the ashes of his childhood, is not being allowed to be born, is being kept puny 
and stunted.” (140) Commenting on a reading exercise in school, the narrative establishes a 
connection to the notion of writing: 
What he would write if he could, if it were not Mr Whelan reading it, would be something 
darker, something that, once it began to flow from his pen, would spread across the page 
out of control, like spilt ink, like shadows racing across the face of still water, like lightning 
crackling across the sky. (140) 
This reflection on the matter of writing connects to reflections presented in The Master of 
Petersburg, the thoughts issued by the figure of the matured writer Dostoevsky (cf. MOP 
236); also, the “electric being” later discussed by Elizabeth Costello is evoked in the image of 
“lightning crackling across the sky.” The idea of “dark” impulses recurs frequently throughout 
the text – as in The Master of Petersburg. The narrative conveys the uneasiness of the boy 
regarding the emerging self – which stands apart from the “true ‘I’” mentioned earlier: 
At the age of thirteen he is becoming surly, scowling, dark. He does not like this new, ugly 
self, he wants to be drawn out of it, but that is something he cannot do by himself. Yet who 
is there who will do it for him? (151f) 
The “new, ugly self” carries with it a new quality beyond the untruthfulness of the young boy, 
infused with early sexual impulses. The emerging conflict is situated precisely on the verge of 
growing out of childhood, as the boy self is not yet surpassed but also not anymore available 
as a stable self-image. As the narrative approaches closure, both formally (the book ends) and 
in narrative logic (the boyhood ends), in chapter eighteen, the father’s decline takes centre 
stage, as he loses his job and the tension in the family increases: “They are all four in the 
house now, like rats in a cage, avoiding each other, hiding in separate rooms.” (158) One 
morning when his mother is out of the house, he ponders the silence and wonders whether his 
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father might have committed suicide, quickly embracing the idea and wishing it to be true. 
The boy now speaks of “the war he has waged on his father.” (159) Coetzee builds up the 
scene, letting the boy enter “his room” (159), the italics marking the difference of the third 
person possessive pronoun (here the father) and at the same time heightening the significance 
of the father’s absent presence. As so often, Coetzee creates an atmosphere of meaningfulness 
by evoking the “chirruping of sparrows outside, the whirr of their wings.” (159) The 
foregrounding of animals sounds indicates a heightened awareness of the protagonist (cf. 
birdsong in Age of Iron 166 and Youth 117), subsequently affecting the reader. The aversion 
he feels for his father is here supplemented with an image: “Beside the bed is a chamber-pot 
in which cigarette-stubs float in brownish urine. He has not seen anything uglier in his life.” 
(159) The boy compares the “War” in which his father fought to the war the son has waged on 
him for the past seven years. And the image of his father he has now encountered prompts 
him to announce that “today he has triumphed.” (160) Expanding the pathos of this 
declaration into the historical dimension of war, the boy likens himself to the “Russian soldier 
on the Brandenburg Gate, raising the red banner over the ruins of Berlin.” (160) This image of 
glorious victory is in the next paragraph immediately countered by a sense of his father’s 
shame contaminating his own sense of integrity, combined with a yearning for motherly 
protection (here the grandmother). The narrative shifts back from the boy’s reflection to the 
physical presence of his father asleep in his bed: 
A ball of phlegm catches in his father’s throat. He coughs, turns on his side. His eyes open, 
the eyes of a man fully conscious, fully aware of where he is. The eyes take him in as he 
stands there, where he should not be, spying. The eyes are without judgment but without 
kindness either. [...] The eyes continue to regard him, peaceably, distantly. Then they close 
and he is asleep again. (160) 
This carefully orchestrated gaze of the father encapsulates the frustration of the boy, who 
returns to his room. What follows is not a condemnation of his father, but instead an act of 
perspective-taking that transcends the narrative. The boy almost seems to step outside of the 
text and take a look over the shoulder of the reader: 
Sometimes the gloom lifts. The sky, that usually sits tight and closed over his head, not so 
near that it can be touched but not that much further either, opens a slit, and for an interval 
he can see the world as it really is. He sees himself in his white shirt with rolled-up sleeves 
and the grey short trousers that he is on the point of outgrowing: not a child, not what a 
passer-by would call a child, too big for that now, too big to use that excuse, yet still as 
stupid and self-enclosed as a child: childish; dumb; ignorant; retarded. In a moment like 
this he can see his father and his mother too, from above, without anger: not as two grey 
and formless weights seating themselves on his shoulder, plotting his misery day and night, 
but as a man and a woman living dull and trouble-filled lives of their own. The sky opens, 
he sees the world as it is, then the sky closes and he is himself again, living the only story 
he will admit, the story of himself. (160f) 
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Seeing himself and his parents in this manner, “from above”, playfully enacts the point of 
view usually associated with an omniscient narrator. Extending this vision to include his 
parents shows the boy’s attempt to gain a more neutral perspective on his parents and on what 
he feels to be their shortcomings. The closing line of above quote connects the narrative back 
to its point of focalization, the boy “living the only story he will admit, the story of himself.” 
To the reader, who takes part in the boy’s insight that is staged like an epiphany, all the 
thoughts and reflections are made available by the text, both the secret inner life of the boy as 
well as his publicly presented image. The imagination of the boy grants him only a short 
moment of empathy for his parents’ struggles, quickly returning him to his self-constructed 
“story of himself”; although his double thoughts will continue to be transparent to the reader. 
To me this represents a particular strength of the narrative in Boyhood; the boy shares with us 
both the circumstances he grows up under and his coming-to-terms with himself as a wilful 
and selfish individual, contrasting this process with the impression he imagines making on 
others. The above quoted shift of perspective can be related to Coetzee’s position as an author 
looking back on his former boy self, seeing himself as “from above”. Coetzee presents to us a 
hint as to how fictionalizing his past life might have given him a privileged site of self-
assessment beyond satisfying the curiosity of the reading public. 
 I believe that Coetzee’s narrative presentation of his former self enables him to 
approach it in a mode of empathy, initiated by this narrative act of his sympathetic 
imagination. The perspective from above can only last a blinking moment, for otherwise its 
suspension would disrupt the narrative fabric. The author Coetzee spins a narrative web 
around his boyhood memories, protecting his current identity, while at the same time passing 
unfavourable judgments on his former self. Christine Ann Roux speaks of “the silent ‘I’ in 
combination with the autobiographical mode.” (Roux 2002: 92-93) Through the use of his 
sympathetic imagination Coetzee has allowed himself to create a powerful self-portrait of 
himself as a child without giving himself up to public discourse, retaining a blank spot for the 
“silent ‘I’” that controls the text. Yet, it is an empathetic silence that we can hear ringing 
throughout the text, in spite of all the self-deprecating imagery presented in the narrative. 
5.4.2 Double Thoughts Exposed: Shame and Guilt 
The boy John readily confesses to the reader his double nature, which is revealed not 
only in his ambivalent relationship to his mother: “His rages against his mother are one of the 
things he has to keep a careful secret from the world outside. […] At home he is an irascible 
despot, at school a lamb. […] By living this double life he has created for himself a burden of 
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imposture.” (13) What has been a burden for the boy is confessable currency for the author 
Coetzee. 
In chapter fourteen the family visits Aunt Annie (the aunt of the mother) in the hospital 
and spend one night in her home. A book press standing in Aunt Annie’s storeroom (where 
she keeps her father’s books) catches the attention of the two brothers – one of few 
appearances of the boy’s brother David – and they pin down each others’ arms with the great 
screw. The narrative reports the boy’s thoughts about how little it would take to crush his 
brother’s arm, wondering what stops him from finding out. It then jumps to a visit on a farm, 
where they (he and his brother) come upon a mealie-grinding machine. On the boy’s demand 
the little brother puts his hand in the funnel. This time the boy John turns the handle far 
enough to crush the hand of his brother: “His brother stood with his hand trapped in the 
machine, ashen with pain, a puzzled, inquiring look on his face.” (119) As a consequence, his 
middle finger gets amputated. Recalling the boy’s strong emotional reaction to his mother’s 
cruel treatment of the hens in chapter one, the reader might expect a similar rush of sympathy 
after witnessing the pain suffered by his brother. Instead it takes only a few lines to describe 
the rushing to the hospital, then how after a while the bandage is replaced by a “little black 
leather pouch,” and finally the fact that the six-year-old brother did not complain. (119) No 
immediate reaction from little John is recorded. Instead, the position of the narrative voice 
shifts into the future, into the present moment of writing or reading respectively: “He has 
never apologized to his brother, nor has he ever been reproached with what he did. 
Nevertheless, the memory lies like a weight upon him, the memory of the soft resistance of 
flesh and bone, and then the grinding.” (119) The retrospection offered here is a singularly 
strong instance of breaking with the narrative focalization and allowing a comment from the 
present, reinforced by the revisiting of the embodied pain of the brother. The weight of the 
memory implies a feeling of guilt, not registered by the boy but by the self presently writing. 
The narrative returns to the present visit at Aunt Annie’s house. He recalls Aunt 
Annie’s instructions to love and support his mother and broods over love: “Love: a word he 
mouths with distaste.” (121; original italics) From seeing no sense in love (as boys usually 
don’t see), based on seeing movie actors kissing, the text jumps to the father’s penis (seen 
only once), the parents’ separate beds, and the presumably early days of his parents being in 
love. (121) Coetzee guides the reader through fundamental questions regarding sex and love 
that are common for a young boy, accompanied by the envious love for the mother, which 
oscillates between emotional emancipation and total dependence. The boy’s surprise about 
“the fierce and angry emotions he feels for his mother” being incited by watching “swooning 
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on the screen.” (122) The close analysis of the contradiction, acknowledging the love of his 
mother yet remaining on guard not to allow it to touch him or to be openly displayed, goes 
beyond the common introspection of a young boy. What matters here more than the 
plausibility of the depth of reflection, is the acuity of the observation, which prepares the 
reader intellectually for the following act of the boy’s sympathetic imagination: 
He yearns to be rid of her watchful attention. There may come a time when to achieve this 
he will have to assert himself , refuse her so brutally that with a shock she will have to step 
back and release him. Yet he has only to think of that moment, imagine her surprised look, 
feel her hurt, and he is overtaken with a rush of guilt. Then he will do anything to soften the 
blow: console her, promise he is not going away. 
Feeling her hurt, feeling it as intimately as if he were part of her, she part of him, he knows 
he is in a trap and cannot get out. [...] Love: this is what love really is, this cage in which he 
rushes back and forth, back and forth, like a poor bewildered baboon. [...] His heart is old, it 
is dark and hard, a heart of stone. That is his contemptible secret. (122) 
In this passage the narrative is again infused with retrospective insight, provided by the author 
from beyond the point of narration. But the hard judgment is paired with an act of sympathetic 
imagination leading to empathy on the side of the boy when he pictures the pain of his mother 
should he ever reject her with finality. Imagining her “surprised look” leads to “feeling her 
hurt,” followed by a “rush of guilt.” We are still in the confessional mode, the series of 
transgression-confession-penitence-absolution being played out, though not as might be 
expected in regard to maiming his brother, but instead in regard to his complicated emotions 
for his mother. 
The brother’s physical injury does not affect the boy John, who remains void of an 
empathetic physical reaction when seeing the pain in the face of his brother. On the face of 
things, he remains an observer; only the subsequent retrospective insertion introduces a notion 
of his guilt into the narrative. The “weight” of never having apologized to his brother still 
weighs on the narrating consciousness years later. While writing Boyhood might not deliver 
Coetzee from this “weight”, the re-imagining gives both the author and the reader access to a 
more empathetic experience of the scene. 
Coetzee’s tour through his childhood is complex and rich in introspective detail. The 
reader comes to understand the boy’s conflicted position, the complicated circumstances he 
experiences both in his family and in apartheid society. The renewed attentiveness John’s 
childhood receives in Boyhood prepares the ground for an empathetic re-enactment of it 
through the author’s and the reader’s sympathetic imagination. 
The text Coetzee presents to us readers does not ask for forgiveness, exculpation –
though ultimately the unflinching self-scrutiny is not far from Rousseau’s opening claim to be 
absolutely sincere. But Coetzee marks the myth of revealing a personal truth as a fictional 
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project of the imagination loosely based on remembered events. One is not inclined to like 
this self-conscious and slightly arrogant boy self constructed by Coetzee, with the everlasting 
need to stand out, to excel, to be “special” in one or the other way. But one is forced to 
experience the various pressure points of his childhood – above all the feeling of not fitting in. 
This mal-adjustment also characterizes the boy’s parents, who are not a culturally 
homogenous couple and don’t make it easy for the boy to form attachments. The reader may 
wonder about the few appearances the younger brother makes, how little he takes part in boy 
John’s life. Would he be included more, the narrative might shift away from John as central 
point of focalization. The story is purposely attuned to the purpose of highlighting the 
conditions of a childhood, examining them closely through the lens of third-person 
focalization, with the close scrutiny of Monsieur Vivisecteur (Coetzee 2005: 31).179 For the 
narrative empathy of the reader this setup is most favourable, since he remains an impartial 
observer with an insider’s viewpoint. And the insider reveals to the reader both his bright and 
his dark sides, giving the reader occasion to both empathize with the child and to co-
experience the limitations of his sympathetic imagination. 
5.4.3 The Farm: Voëlfontein 
The setting for the warmest moments of Boyhood is the family farm Voëlfontein, to 
which chapter eleven (with 24 pages the longest chapter) is dedicated. The theme of the 
family farms is introduced in chapter four: “Through the farms he is rooted in the past; 
through the farms he has substance. […] All farms are important. Farms are places of 
freedom, of life.” (22) Chapter eleven opens with a hint at the social isolation of the parents, 
the social contacts limited largely to “kinfolk”: “On the occasion when strangers come to the 
house, he and his brother scuttle away like wild animals, then sneak back to lurk behind doors 
and eavesdrop.” (78) Ordinary (“genteel”) conversation exposes his insecurities. Simple 
questions requiring formulaic answers confuse him, “he mumbles and stammers like a fool.” 
(78) Within his mother’s family he feels accepted; there his “rude, unsocialized, eccentric” 
(78) character matches the cultural codes, whereas in the father’s family he is forced to adapt 
to their codes of conduct. The boy’s attitudes towards the extended families reflect the 
feelings for his parents, and his preference for the mother is clearly stated: “He is her son, not 
his father’s son. He denies and detests his father.” (79) This outburst is immediately followed 
by the memory of a climactic moment when he turned against his father, two years earlier, 
 
179 In a review of Summertime Geordie Williamson reapplies this trope (Williamson 2009). 
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when the mother “let his father loose on him, like a dog from a chain […], and his father’s 
eyes glared blue and angry as he shook and cuffed him.” (79) The incident is mentioned in 
passing; the text does not explore explicitly traumatizing moments of this childhood, but 
instead presents in detail the constitutive landscape of his formation. 
The text returns to the landscape of his heart the moment the traumatic content is 
expressed, as if the idyllic pastoral might restore the peace and make the violence forgotten: 
“He must go to the farm because there is no place on earth he loves more or can imagine 
loving more.” (79) The only catch of his attachment to the farm is that “he will never be more 
than a guest, an uneasy guest.” (79) And though the boy is an “uneasy guest” on the farm, the 
strong bond he feels is expressed in a long elegy: 
The farm is called Voëlfontein, Bird-fountain; he loves every stone of it, every bush, every 
blade of grass, loves the birds that give it its name, birds that as dusk falls gather in their 
thousands in the trees around the fountain, calling to each other, murmuring, ruffling their 
feathers, settling for the night. It is not conceivable that another person could love the farm 
as he does. But he cannot talk about his love, not only because normal people do not talk 
about such things but because confessing to it would be a betrayal of his mother. It would 
be a betrayal not only because she too comes from a farm, a rival farm in a far-off part of 
the world which she speaks of with a love and longing of her own but can never go back to 
because it was sold to strangers, but because she is not truly welcome on this farm, the real 
farm, Voëlfontein. (80) 
Tellingly, the love he feels encompasses only the land, with all people removed from the 
picture. Complementarily, the mother’s uneasiness on the farm is exclusively based on people, 
namely the father’s family. When the extended family conjoins, all twenty-six, he greedily 
“drinks in the atmosphere, drinks in the happy, slapdash mixture of English and Afrikaans that 
is their common language when they get together.” (81) Exclamations of his “devouring love” 
(91) for the farm in the Karoo, “the beloved landscape of ochre and grey and fawn and olive-
green” (90), interlace the stories of guns and men. We cannot help but be reminded of Michael 
K and his love for farm life contrasted with his awkwardness with people, as when the boy 
expresses his desire to escape from people: “Is there no way of living in the Karoo – the only 
place in the world where he wants to be – as he wants to live: without belonging to a family?” 
(91) The desire to live on one’s own terms has been a prominent feature of many of Coetzee’s 
fictional characters, especially those speaking or acting from a position of disempowerment, 
frailty and marginality. The boy is surely the youngest contestant so far (David in The 
Childhood of Jesus faces similar challenges), and his young age bars him from fully asserting 
his desire for autonomy; Youth presents a later stage of this struggle. 
The young man John’s (Youth) insecurity with women is not hard to foresee when 
hearing about the boy’s difficulties in relating to others with ease – not uncommon among 
adolescents (and of course adults too). However, Boyhood features a surprising exception to 
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the usually constrained interactions of the boy. During the annual shearing of the sheep the 
boy’s cousin Agnes is introduced with a scene of the four of them (two brothers, two sisters) 
jumping on the wool being stuffed into bales, “giggling and cavorting as if in a huge 
featherbed.” (93) The joyfulness and carelessness of the moment comes as a surprise in this 
otherwise brooding narrative. The narrative goes on to relate their first meeting at the age of 
seven, how they take a walk in the veld and talk: 
He lost his reserve. As he spoke he forgot what language he was speaking: thoughts simply 
turned to words within him, transparent words. 
What he said to Agnes that afternoon he can no longer remember. But he told her 
everything, everything he did, everything he knew, everything he hopes for. In silence she 
took it all in. Even as he knew the day was special because of her. (94) 
The two immediately bond. He compliments her “softness, her readiness to listen.” (94) For 
the first time we see the boy relax in the company of another: “[T]hey roam around talking 
about things that the grown-ups would laugh at: whether the universe had a beginning; what 
lies beyond Pluto, the dark planet; where God is, if he exists.” (95) He feels “free to be friends 
with her, open his heart to her.” (95) Though he is aware of the incest taboo, he weighs the 
emotions he feels for his cousin Agnes: “Is this love – this easy generosity, this sense of being 
understood at last, of not having to pretend?” (95) Later in Youth the young man will 
repeatedly fail to find a woman he can similarly be at ease with. As the emotional 
transparency of the passage peaks, the narrative returns to a framing narrative; here the 
present shearing of the sheep coming to an end. The text probes the boy’s emotional 
formation, retreating every time it touches on a sore spot. The gracefulness of their friendship 
(reinforced by the memory) revives the boy’s sensitivity. It infuses his love for the farm: “I 
belong to the farm: that is the furthest he is prepared to go, even in his most secret heart.” (96; 
original italics) His attachment is not exclusively restricted to the landscape, but also involves 
the sense of history conveyed by the graveyards and the near-by Bloemhof, site of the first 
farmhouse (from which he is once chased off by angry bees). Via the bees (successfully 
holding their territory) the narrative returns to the sheep, of which each Friday one is 
slaughtered “for the people of the farm.” (98) He watches the farmhands Freek and Ros 
perform the slaughter, which is described in analytical gory detail, just as the castration of the 
lambs. The descriptive prose conveys the fascination of the boy, while remaining silent about 
his terror. This silence is expressed when he tries to approach the subject with his mother: 
“There is no way of talking about what he has seen.” (99)180 We feel both his fascination and 
his unease, though the first is more prominent. He professes that he likes meat, but at the same 
 
180 Find a detailed discussion of how and in how far horrible events can or cannot be represented in literature in 
Coetzee’s 1974 essay about the work of Alex LaGuma (DP 344-360). 
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time is “repelled by the casual ease with which the butcher [back in Worcester] slaps down a 
cut of meat on the counter.” (101) The chapter closes with a sympathetic reflection on why the 
sheep don’t struggle to escape their death on the farm, as a wild buck would. Coetzee 
imagines how the young boy imagines whispering a warning to the sheep: 
But then in their yellow eyes he catches a glimpse of something that silences him: a 
resignation, a foreknowledge [...]. They know it all, down to the finest detail, and yet they 
submit. They have calculated the price and are prepared to pay it – the price of being on 
earth, the price of being alive. (102) 
Boyhood presents to the reader a tableau of the circumstances of the boy’s upbringing. 
His ambivalence towards people is contrasted with his firm rootedness in the countryside of 
the Karoo and the family farm. His fascination for the treatment of animals, leading to him 
being either repelled or attracted, foreshadow the later empathetic engagement of Coetzee 
with animals and the adoption of vegetarianism. 
5.5 Youth (2001) 
The poems he writes are wry little pieces, minor in every sense. Whatever their nominal 
subject, it is he himself – trapped, lonely, miserable – who is at their centre; yet – he cannot 
fail to see it – these new poems lack the energy or even the desire to explore his impasse of 
spirit seriously. (Y 59)181 
The “nominal subject” of Youth is the biographical subject John, a fictionalized version of the 
writer J.M. Coetzee. What the poems of young John lack is now provided in the novel: a 
serious exploration of “his impasse of spirit”. The sense of stagnation permeates the narrative. 
In his monolithic idiosyncrasy John is similar to the protagonists of the first two novels of 
Coetzee, Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country. His encounters with others highlight the 
failure of his sympathetic imagination, an unwillingness to open up to others: 
He has a horror of spilling mere emotion on to the page. Once it has begun to spill out he 
would not know how to stop it. It would be like severing an artery and watching one’s 
lifeblood gush out. Prose, fortunately, does not demand emotion: there is that to be said for 
it. Prose is like a flat, tranquil sheet of water on which one can tack about at one’s leisure, 
making patterns on the surface. (61) 
Ironically, Coetzee’s novel openly demonstrates the ripples of emotions disrupting the 
“tranquil sheet of water” which young John takes prose to be (in contrast to poetry). While the 
protagonist reveals little of his feelings to others, the narrative provides a detailed account of 
his emotional struggles both with others (woman mainly) and with himself. Coetzee’s 
sympathetic imagination is redirected at another former self, no longer the boy struggling with 
growing up under apartheid, but now the artist as a young man. 
 
181 All quotes in 5.5 will be taken from Youth unless indicated otherwise. 
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5.5.1 Cold and Frozen John’s Hot Desires 
If he were a warmer person he would no doubt find it all easier: life, love, poetry. But 
warmth is not in his nature. Poetry is not written out of warmth anyway. Rimbaud was not 
warm. Baudelaire was not warm. Hot, indeed, yes, when it was needed – hot in life, hot in 
love – but not warm. He too is capable of being hot, he has not ceased to believe that. But 
for the present, the present indefinite, he is cold: cold, frozen. (168) 
What the farm was to the boy, the women are to the youth: A promise of home, a promise of 
belonging. The emotional intimacy of Boyhood allowed the reader to feel close to the boy 
John, allowed us to enter his mind and catch a glimpse of his probing of cultural identities, his 
complexly portrayed ambivalent feelings for his parents, but also of his joyful encounter with 
Agnes. In Youth the focus shifts to the portrait of the writer as a young man, hoping to be 
transformed into an artist through sexual encounters; the resulting intimacies remain 
accordingly functional. David Atwell sees “intimacy and detachment” as “the poles governing 
a single, exquisite, condition.” (Atwell 2008: 237) Large parts of Youth are dedicated to his 
artistic aspirations and the artists he considers as role models, alternating with reflections on 
the failed affairs he stumbles into. The apparent irony of his self-deprecation creates a 
distance between author and character, while also distancing the reader. In previous novels 
Coetzee has managed to portray unlikeable characters while still providing access points for 
the reader’s empathy to catch on. In Youth there are virtually none of these: all encounters take 
place without emotional depth, not even the physical encounters are depicted as moments of 
intimacy, neither in the physical nor in the emotional sense. 
Early on, still in Cape Town, he becomes friendly with Jacqueline: “In a secluded 
space among the rocks she turns on him, pouts, offers him her lips. He responds, but 
uneasily.” (5) An afterthought in brackets “(how did that happen?)” is a singular instance of 
narrative rupture in Youth. In Boyhood similar instances indicated the retrospective stance of 
the narrating author, but here it remains plausibly within the tone of the narrative and provides 
no insight but only underlines the social awkwardness of the young man. His passivity 
towards women expresses itself clearly in this first affair: “Within a week Jacqueline has quit 
the nurses’ residence and moved in with him in his flat. Looking back, he cannot remember 
inviting her: he has merely failed to resist.” (7) One day Jacqueline reads his diary entries, in 
which the young man holds back nothing, and leaves him right away. This incident neatly 
illustrates the conflict of an artist drawing on his immediate surroundings including the people 
around him. The core question in his subsequent reflection is not why things go awry with 
Jacqueline, instead the truthfulness of autobiographical writing is addressed: 
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Is he sorry? Certainly he is sorry Jacqueline read what she read. But the real question is, 
what was his motive for writing what he wrote? Did he perhaps write it in order that she 
should read it? Was leaving his true thoughts lying around where she was bound to find 
them his way of telling her what he was too cowardly to say to her face? What are his true 
thoughts anyway? Some days he feels happy, even privileged, to be living with a beautiful 
woman, or at least not to be living alone. Other days he feels differently. Is truth the 
happiness, the unhappiness, or the average of the two? 
The question of what should be permitted to go into his diary and what kept forever 
shrouded goes to the heart of all his writing. If he is to censor himself from expressing 
ignoble emotions – resentment at having his flat invaded, or shame at his own failures as a 
love – how will those emotions ever be transfigured and turned into poetry? And if poetry is 
not to be the agency of his transfiguration from ignoble to noble, why bother with poetry at 
all? Besides, who is to say that the feelings he writes in his diary are his true feelings? Who 
is to say that at each moment while the pen moves he is truly himself? At one moment he 
might truly be himself, at another he might simply be making things up. How can he know 
for sure? Why should he even want to know for sure? (9; first emphasis added) 
Note how the attention is directed back to the young man himself, spending not a moment on 
Jacqueline’s role in the drama (not here nor in the rest of the chapter). The “real question” 
addresses his motives, his choices, his self and its artistic expression. 
Feeling attracted to Flaubert’s Emma Bovary (25),182 to Ingeborg Bachmann (134) or 
the actresses Monica Vitti (48) and Anna Karina (128) is part of this narcissist self-reflection, 
where the “I” suffers delusions of grandeur which seep into his dreams and aspirations: “In a 
perfect world he would sleep only with perfect women, women of perfect femininity yet with 
a certain darkness at their core that will respond to his own darker self.” (32) Naturally, all 
real women who cross his path can only be inferior to his ideal; while he remains painfully 
aware of his own incommensurability. His comments about Emma Bovary illustrate his 
enthrallment to fictional women: 
He likes Flaubert. Emma Bovary in particular, with her dark eyes, her restless sensuality, 
her readiness to give herself, has him in thrall. He would like to go to bed with Emma, hear 
her famous belt whistle like a snake as she undresses. But would Pound approve? He is not 
sure that wanting to meet Emma is a good enough reason for admiring Flaubert. In his 
sensibility there is still, he suspects, something rotten, something Keatsian. 
Of course Emma Bovary is a fictional creation, he will never run into her in the street. But 
Emma was not created out of nothing: she had her origin in the flesh and blood experiences 
of her author, experiences that were then subjected to the transfiguring fire of art. If Emma 
had an original, or several originals, then it follows that women like Emma and Emma’s 
original should exist in the real world. And even if this is not so, even if no woman in the 
real world is quite like Emma, there must be many women so deeply affected by their 
reading of Madame Bovary that they fall under Emma’s spell and are transformed into 
versions of her. They may not be the real Emma but in a sense they are her living 
embodiment. (25f) 
Watching Antonioni’s L’Eclisse (1962) he sees Monica Vitti: “She is disturbed, anguished. 
What she is anguished about he cannot quite define; her face reveals nothing.” (48) This first 
 
182 Echoing David Lurie’s thoughts in Disgrace: “He thinks of Emma Bovary, coming home sated. [H]e would 
[…] show her what bliss can be: a moderate bliss, a moderated bliss.” (D 5-6) 
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impression is telling. Young John registers anguish in the woman, but is not able to see more 
in her face. The actress serves as a projection surface for his fantasies: 
With her perfect legs and sensual lips and abstracted look, Monica Vitti haunts him; he falls 
in love with her. He has dreams in which he, of all men in the world, is singled out to be her 
comfort and solace. There is a tap at his door. He steps forward, enfolds her in his arms. 
Time ceases; he and Monica Vitti are one. (48) 
Hoping for an embodiment of his fantasies (and forgetting there is always a morning after…), 
the actual women never fail to disappoint his expectations and vice versa: “Naked they lie in 
each other’s arms, but there is no warmth between them; and warmth, it becomes clear, will 
not grow. At last the girl withdraws, folds her arms across her breasts, pushes his hands away, 
shakes her head mutely.” (73) This was a girl young John picked up at a poetry workshop; and 
like all other sexual encounters related to the reader in Youth, it ends in mutual 
embarrassment: “The verdict she has delivered on him would be his verdict too.” (74) 
The obvious failure of young John to open up to the women he encounters – I speak of 
failure in view of his aspirations to be transformed by them – is closely related to his artistic 
efforts and his bookishness. In order to maintain the hope for spiritual transformation through 
a sexual encounter (a somewhat jejune notion), his relations to women must remain 
ideational: “If he is a mystery to himself, how can he be anything but a mystery to others? 
There is a pact he is ready to offer the women in his life: if they will treat him as a mystery, he 
will treat them as a closed book. On that basis and that alone will commerce be possible.” 
(132f) On the other hand, the young man does express the wish for a deeper connection, a 
thought attached to the notion of encountering the “right woman”: “His own explanations for 
his failures in love, hoary by now and less and less to be trusted, is that he has yet to meet the 
right woman. The right woman will see through the opaque surface he presents to the world, 
to the depths inside; the right woman will unlock the hidden intensities of passion in him.” 
(134) Young John senses the disparity of his hopes and expectations, hoping his artistic 
endeavours might attract the right kind of woman: “Just as he has fallen in love at a distance 
with Ingeborg Bachmann in one way and with Anna Karina in another, so, he suspects, the 
intended one will have to know him by his works, to fall in love with his art before she will be 
so foolish as to fall in love with him.” (134) 
The helplessness in his encounters with women continues throughout the narrative. 
Marie, the woman from New Zealand (all descriptions remain largely generic), bypasses his 
passivity: 
She embraces him, presses against him, gives him wet kisses. He does not know what to do. 
He does not like her, does not desire her, is repelled by her slack lips seeking out his mouth. 
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First a cold shiver runs through him, then panic. “No!” he cries out. “Go away!” And he 
curls himself up in a ball.” (29) 
The emotional intensity of this moment stands out, but is also downplayed by the brevity of 
the scene. Coetzee follows the established game plan of setting up a physical encounter, 
describing the bodily reaction – here paired with the emotional state (panic) – of the 
protagonist, ending with a resolution of the encounter; in this case a regressive (rolling 
himself up in a ball) rejection of the woman encroaching his personal space. 
In another episode he gets Sarah (from Johannesburg) pregnant: “How could he have 
got someone pregnant? In a certain sense he knows exactly how.” (32) As to be expected the 
episode plays out shamefully. She asks him to drive her somewhere to get an illegal abortion, 
he complies. The whole scene showcases his awkwardness and his failure to provide any kind 
of comfort or consolation, instead rather sitting it out: “In fact, she put him to shame.” (33) 
All his encounters with women reveal how his fantasies forestall an empathetic engagement, 
but also how difficult it can be to feel connected to others at all. While his hot desires urge 
him on, his frozen heart fails to be moved. 
5.5.2 The Transforming Power of Art – Epiphanic Moments 
While one strain of the narrative is dedicated to his affairs, another traces the artistic 
sensibility of the protagonist in formation, primarily in the second half of the narrative. In 
contrast to the affairs, the encounters with works of art touch young John far more deeply –
beyond the above discussed intersections of art and desire – as when he visits a gallery and 
sees Robert Motherwell’s painting “Elegy for the Spanish Republic 24” (1961):  
He is transfixed. Menacing and mysterious, the black shape takes him over. A sound like 
the stroke of a gong goes out from it, leaving him shaken and weak-kneed. 
Where does its power come from, this amorphous shape that bears no resemblance to Spain 
or anything else, yet stirs up a well of dark feeling within him? It is not beautiful, yet it 
speaks like beauty, imperiously. Why does Motherwell have this power and not Pollock, or 
Van Gogh, or Rembrandt? Is it the same power that makes his heart leap at the sight of one 
woman and not another? Does Elegy for the Spanish Republic correspond to some 
indwelling shape in his soul? (92) 
Again, Coetzee uses the physical body to describe the impact of this particular painting on the 
protagonist. The accompanying emotions are metaphorically presented as “a well of dark 
feeling” being stirred up, only to move on to the hope for transformation (connected with the 
idea of the “right woman” is the idea of “the right work of art,” that might “correspond to 
some indwelling shape in his soul”). 
Similarly, he experiences a “state of rapt absorption” watching the Apu trilogy of films 
by Satyajit Ray (1955-59): “Hitherto he has found in Western music, in Bach above all, 
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everything he needs. Now he encounters something that is not in Bach, though there are 
intimations of it: a joyous yielding of the reasoning, comprehending mind to the dance of the 
fingers.” (93) His Apollonian approach to human interaction is countered by his Dionysian 
longings in regard to art; a desire for beauty (and order) in conflict with a desire for 
transformation (and chaos). 
One scene is dedicated to his encounter with Beckett’s Watt: “From the first page he 
knows he has hit on something.” (155)183 Like Motherwell’s painting and Ray’s films, 
Beckett speaks to young John. As does Pasolini’s Gospel According to St Matthew, which is 
described as an “unsettling exp
He winces when nails are hammered through the hands of Jesus; when his tomb is revealed 
to be empty and the angel announces to the mourning women, “Look not here, for he is 
risen,” and the Missa Luba burst out and the common folk of the land, the halt and the 
maimed, the despised and rejected, come running or hobbling, their faces alight with joy, to 
share in the good news, his own heart wants to burst; tears of exultation he does not 
understand stream down his cheeks, tears he has surreptitiously to wipe away before he can 
emerge into the world again. (154) 
The emotional intensity of this episode corresponds with the panic young John felt with 
Marie. These are moments where Coetzee presents cracks in the detachedness and 
impenetrability of young John; potential access point for the sympathetic imagination of the 
reader to catch on and to trigger empathy. However, these moments remain confined within 
the protagonist’s own self-perception without creating an intersection with the perception of 
others – this would not require a change of focalization, but merely an active engagement 
with someone other than himself. Accordingly, the epiphany comes to young John during a 
solitary nap in the park: 
Tired out, one Sunday afternoon, he folds his jacket into a pillow, stretches out on the 
greensward, and sinks into a sleep or half-sleep in which consciousness does not vanish but 
continues to hover. It is a state he has not known before: in his very blood he seems to feel 
the steady wheeling of the earth. The faraway cries of children, the birdsong, the whirr of 
insects gather force and come together in a paean of joy. His heart swells. At last! he thinks. 
At last it has come, the moment of ecstatic unity with the All! Fearful that the moment will 
slip away, he tries to put a halt to the clatter of thought, tries simply to be a conduit for the 
great universal force that has no name. (117) 
The half-sleep recalls the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians; in a similar way, losing 
consciousness opens up new horizons for the protagonist. As in previous narratives (Michael 
K and Age of Iron), the epiphany follows an amalgamation of sounds (children, birds, insects). 
 
183 Chris Ackerley notes:  
Where, then, will he find what he needs to know, or perhaps not to know, “a knowledge too 
humble to know it is knowledge?” The answer comes fifteen pages later with the discovery of 
Watt, and its aesthetic of impotence and failure that is precisely what he is seeking, that aesthetic in 
retrospect having shaped the structure of Youth and, by implication, much of the writing that has 
preceded this fictional memoir. (Ackerley 2011: 26) 
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A bucolic locus amoenus is evoked, with the added acoustic flavour of childhood. Whenever 
such moments of bliss and potential insight occur in Coetzee’s fiction, they are of little 
obvious consequence. Michael K returns from the mountains largely unchanged, Elizabeth 
Curren’s awaking conscience is not boosted by her union with nature (AI 166), and the young 
man John continues his path as before. 
While by the end of the narrative young John has hardly changed or evolved, the 
reader once again has been challenged to employ the sympathetic imagination in encountering 
John and embracing him in spite of his shortcomings, just as Elizabeth Curren and David 
Lurie learn to love others in spite of themselves. 
5.5.3 Remembering South Africa – Echoes from Boyhood 
The first section of Youth is set in Cape Town, foregrounding the young man’s will to 
break free from his family ties, since it was “to escape the oppressiveness of family that he 
left home. […] His mother is distressed by his coldness, he knows, the coldness with which he 
has responded to her all his life. All his life she has wanted to coddle him; all his life he has 
been resisting. […] He must harden his heart against her. Now is not the time to let down his 
guard.” (18) The geographical escape to London makes him only more painfully aware of 
how deeply he is personally invested in his South African past, although of course with strong 
ambivalence. As readers we are pitched into the arena of his self-reflections, being close 
witnesses to his struggles. 
The attention paid to him by his mother – filled with love and worries – infuriates him: 
“How can he make her accept that the process of turning himself into a different person that 
began when he was fifteen will be carried through remorselessly until all memory of the 
family and the country he left behind is extinguished?” (98) As readers we have access to 
young John’s mind, while all other perspectives are excluded. For John, the mother is an 
adversary, holding him down with her love: “That is the trap she has built, a trap he has not 
yet found a way out of.” (99) The family and South Africa are equally felt to be limitations to 
John: “South Africa is like an Albatross around his neck. He wants it removed, he does not 
care how, so that he can begin to breathe.” (101) More than any other of Coetzee’s work, 
Youth sheds light on Coetzee’s complicated relation to South Africa, albeit in fictional 
disguise. The task to empathize is now relegated to the reader, who can follow young John 
and try to share his experience of searching for his place in the world independent of his 
parentage and heritage. At one point, young John repeats an operation familiar from Boyhood, 
“seeing himself from the outside”: 
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South Africa is a wound within him. How much longer before the wound stops bleeding? 
[…] 
Now and again, for an instant, it is given to him to see himself from the outside: a 
whispering, worried boy-man, so dull and ordinary that you would not spare him a second 
glance. These flashes of illumination disturb him; rather than holding on to them, he tries to 
bury them in darkness, forget them. Is the self he sees at such moments merely what 
appears to be, or is it what he really is? What if Oscar Wilde is right, and there is no deeper 
truth than appearance? Is it possible to be dull and ordinary not only on the surface but to 
one’s deepest depths, and yet be an artist? Might T.S. Eliot, for instance, be secretly dull to 
his depths, and might Eliot’s claim that the artist’s personality is irrelevant to his work be 
nothing but a stratagem to conceal his own dullness? (116) 
These flashes are unsettling for him and not welcome, yet he cannot help but wonder – in the 
vague hope Oscar Wilde or T.S. Eliot might provide guidance. The reader becomes aware of 
the split self-image of the protagonist; a sense of (artistic, i.e. literary) greatness battling with 
a compelling sense of dullness. All other characters featured in Youth remain largely generic 
and only serve to illustrate the protagonist’s emotional isolation. 
Even about Ganapthy, an Indian co-worker introduced towards the close of the 
narrative and coming closest to being a friend to John, we learn very little. Functionally he is 
a foil for young John. The two of them are the only foreigners in the work group (145) and: 
“Like himself, Ganapathy is a spoiled, clever boy. Like himself, Ganapathy has run away 
from his mother and the smothering ease she offers.” (147) Like himself, Ganapathy offers no 
point of access for others; only once does young John believe to see behind the public mask of 
Ganapathy, when he rejoices over a Vietnamese suicide bombing attack against US forces: 
“Now, suddenly, in his smile, the glint in his eye, he is seeing Ganapathy’s secret face.” (152) 
Nothing follows, except that young John writes to the Chinese embassy offering assistance in 
their war efforts. The conversation between Ganapathy and John relates mostly to work and 
career options; none of their exchanges goes deep. The novel ends with a fatalistic assertion 
of solitude: 
He and Ganapathy are two sides of the same coin: Ganapathy starving […]because he 
doesn’t eat properly, […]; and he locked into an attenuating endgame, playing himself, with 
each move, further into a corner and into defeat. One of these days the ambulance men will 
call at Ganapathy’s flat and bring him out on a stretcher with a sheet over his face. When 
they have fetched Ganapathy they might as well come and fetch him too. (169) 
Ending on a sour note, Youth remains a study of a young man’s failure to come to terms with 
himself and others, both on a personal and an artistic level. The author Coetzee has created a 
retrospective extension of his self in the young man John in Youth. Carrol Clarkson speaks of 
“sympathetic resonances between the young John of Youth and Coetzee himself,” which allow 
us to “read in the emergent writer an increasing disaffection with deductive assumptions of an 
innate and self-contained structure – assumptions shared by structuralist approaches to 
narrative clearly rooted in Saussurean linguistics, and by approaches in other disciplines that 
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apply the binary systems of computational logic.” (Clarkson 2009: 14) Read in this light, 
Youth becomes a manifesto of doubt, laying out the foundation for Coetzee’s later fictions. 
The young man John offers more questions than answers; and if he does provide answers, 
they are mostly provisional, ready to be revised if circumstances demand it. 
5.6 Diary of a Bad Year (2007) – Literary Fugue and Sympathetic 
Imagination 
The three autobiographical fictions Boyhood (1997), Youth (2002) and Summertime 
(2009) span a decade of literary production, interspersed with the publication of The Lives of 
Animals (1999), Disgrace (2003) and Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005) and Diary 
of a Bad Year (2007).184 Costello and Señor C, the fictional speaker in Diary of a Bad Year, 
represent experimental fictional discourse with a focus on ethical concerns. They serve as 
textual proxies allowing Coetzee to express opinions without explicitly subscribing to 
them.185 In Diary of a Bad Year, the themes shift from the ethical to the political arena 
(“eminent writers pronounce on what is wrong with today’s world.” DOA 21), discussing the 
origins of the state, democracy, terrorism and suchlike. Coetzee chooses an experimental 
horizontal split-page (analogous to cinematic split-screen) format, with essays constituting the 
top section, while the lower section narrates his encounter with his neighbour and later 
secretary Anya, at first from his perspective and then later complemented by Anya’s 
perspective. 
In addition to the cinematic parallel, the split-page technique also simulates musical 
polyphony (simultaneity of voices) and challenges the reader at every turning of the page to 
choose whether to follow one strain of thought onto the next page or to skip back and forth 
between top and bottom section. Additionally, one can repeatedly notice interferences 
between the two/three sections – a thought on the political plane that resonates in the private 
 
184 Coetzee 2007a. All quotes in 5.6 will be taken from DOA unless indicated otherwise. 
185 Johan Geertsema reads Diary of a Bad Year as parody: 
My argument will be that in Diary of a Bad Year Coetzee is staging these opinions parodically, and 
that one of his reasons for doing so may be understood, paradoxically, with reference to his 
seriousness as an artist. In making this argument I draw on two important essays from Giving 
Offense, Coetzee’s 1996 book on censorship: “The Harms of Pornography: Catherine MacKinnon” 
and “Erasmus: Madness and Rivalry.” In the former, Coetzee defines the seriousness of a “certain 
kind of artist” (GO, 73) with reference to the desire to explore “the darker areas of human 
experience” (GO, 74); he defines this project – I would argue – as parodic in character. 
Understanding this parodic character of the project could, moreover, help account for the peculiar 
form of Diary of a Bad Year: it is an attempt to negotiate politics, which Coetzee, in the second 
essay, argues is implicitly rivalrous. (Geertsema 2011: 209) 
See also Poyner’s discussion of Coetzee’s essay fictions as “acts of genre”. (Poyner 2009: 167-184) 
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dealings of Anya and Señor C. The link might be established by using the same words in both 
sections, as in the comment “On terrorism” (19-23), when the supposedly rational decision-
making of Western states is characterized as a “gamble.” In the lower section Señor C 
“gambles” with words to entice Anya, on the page before stating that “an intuitive feel” was 
needed for editing his essays. (18-19) The personal negotiation between the two is thereby set 
in relation to the negotiations of Western states with terrorist organizations, both being 
characterized as a gamble. Another instance is the discussion of remote-controlled warfare 
(“robot soldiers”) paralleled by thoughts about “keyboards with super-size keys” that would 
allow him to type his opinions by himself, if he hadn’t an “insuperable distaste” for typing. 
Here the advance of technology is the common factor. These interferences may even spread 
over a double page, as in the essay “On the curse.” (47-51) Here, sympathy is expressed with 
those who refuse to accept “that there is no justice in the universe,” while in the lower section 
Anya quotes “common decency” as reason for the extra help she provides for Señor C, as in 
cleaning his apartment. (48) On the next page the top section thematizes the “tragic guilt” 
taking shape in the clashes between traditional systems of belief and modern rational 
discourse; in the lower section the theme of common decency, a mirroring of the above 
refracted in the personal sphere, is continued when Alan (Anya’s husband) speaks of the 
relatives as “vultures,” ready to sweep in and collect what remains of Señor C after his death, 
which indicates Alan’s ruthlessness. There are countless more instances of textual 
interferences, some more obvious than others. 
To return to my overall argument, I shall relate the formal structure to the sympathetic 
imagination and to empathy. The characters remain vague “paper beings” with disembodied 
voices, “flat, almost hastily drawn figures that border on caricature.”186 Even though they 
share very private thoughts with the reader, the diary form forestalls the narrative drive. What 
remains are the three perspectives of Señor C, Anya, and later Alan, and the interplay between 
them, the contrast they form together, the interpersonal attitudes they reveal. The resulting 
polyphony succeeds in offering the reader access to three inter-related perspectives. 
Intuitively this would seem an almost ideal situation for the sympathetic imagination of the 
reader to be activated and to be challenged to accommodate conflicting perspectives. 
However, the disembodied nature of these voices – as with Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee does 
 
186 Hermann Wittenberg, in his 2010 essay “Late style in J.M. Coetzee’s Diary of a bad year,” refers to the 
critical responses Diary of a Bad Year received. Wittenberg relates the “narrative minimalism” and “explicit 
political commentary” to Said’s idea of “late style”. (Said 2006) Wittenberg writes: “Said reminds us of the 
exceptional power of late works that reflect a special maturity, a new spirit of reconciliation and serenity often 
expressed in terms of a miraculous transfiguration of common reality’ (2006: 6).” (Wittenberg 2010: 41) 
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merely provide the particulars required to simulate realism – prevents us from fully engaging 
with them. There is little to mirror for the reader, instead one remains a rather impassive 
spectator to the triadic conflict playing itself out in the lower sections. Notwithstanding, we 
can see progress in the relationship of Anya and Señor C, which shifts from unreciprocated 
physical desire to metaphysical care, to which Anya commits herself in the very end, after she 
has left her husband: “I can’t go with you but what I will do is hold your hand as far as the 
gate.” (226) 
5.7 The Sympathetic Imagination in J.M. Coetzee’s Summertime 
(2009)187 
One year before his seventieth birthday, in 2009, Coetzee published Summertime, a 
pseudo-autobiographical montage of interviews, seemingly the final part of what has been 
labelled his autobiographical trilogy.188 A fictional biographer, Mr Vincent, sets out to 
interview people who knew Coetzee in the early 1970s when he returned to South Africa 
after having been expelled from the US for taking part in a protest March at the Buffalo 
University, New York. As a man in his early thirties, this Coetzee might be considered to 
be in his prime. As a writer, this Coetzee is on the verge of getting Dusklands published, a 
rather spring-like debut. While the title Dusklands oscillates between literary reference 
and the mood of approaching darkness, Summertime sets quite a different atmosphere. 
Instead of intertexts Summertime invokes dry and arid heat, as one might experience in the 
Karoo, Coetzee’s personal point of departure. 
In Coetzee’s academic work autobiography has been an ongoing concern, 
beginning with his inaugural lecture “Truth in Autobiography” (Cape Town, 1984; see 
section 5.2.2), peaking in his seminal essay “Confession and Double Thoughts” (Doubling 
the Point, 1992; see section 5.2.3), where he examines the testimonial writings of Tolstoy, 
Rousseau and Dostoevsky, and later extending to a diversity of writers in Stranger Shores 
(2001) and Inner Workings (2007). In Summertime Coetzee engages playfully with the 
genre, deconstructing the truth value ascribed to it, instead demonstrating that “an 
autobiographer can be said to be making the truth of his life.” (Coetzee 1984a: 4, 
emphasis in original). 
 
187 This section was published previously in similar form in: Heinicke/Heister/Klein/Prüschenk 2012. 
188 Following Boyhood (1997) and Youth (2002). Coetzee 2009. All quotes in section 5.7 will be taken from 
ST unless indicated otherwise. 
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Coetzee’s entire literary oeuvre illustrates the concepts of the sympathetic 
imagination and of embodiment. In the words of Elizabeth Costello’s son John, Coetzee 
has “take[n] us out of ourselves” and into the lives and minds of others (EC 23). In 
Coetzee’s fiction, Age if Iron (1990) and The Master of Petersburg (1993) mark a turning 
point with their intensely personal tone and the central theme of a lost child – a fabrication 
regarding the biography of Dostoevsky, a revalorization and fictionalization in Curren’s 
relationship with her absent daughter, an actual event in the life of Coetzee. In Boyhood 
and Youth Coetzee has begun to apply the sympathetic imagination to his earlier selves, 
albeit in the guise of fiction. In Summertime the sympathetic imagination reaches its 
prime, its summertime. 
5.7.1 J.S. Bach and Polyphonic Self-Narration 
The textual polyphony explored by Coetzee in Diary of a Bad Year (see 5.3) in the 
split-page format is carried over to Summertime, only now without the textual 
synchronicity but instead with a stronger horizontal structure that comes close to the 
musical structure of a fugue as formulated by J.S. Bach.  
In his autobiographic fiction Boyhood and in a lecture held in Graz, Austria, in 
1991 (“What Is a Classic?” in Stranger Shores) Coetzee recounts his first encounter with 
European classical music. On a lazy summer day piano music drifts across from the 
neighbouring house. Coetzee is fascinated by the structured sounds reaching his ear – it is 
Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier he hears from next door in Cape Town in 1955. The 
lecture starts off with a treatment of Eliot’s lecture with the same title, discussing the 
concept of the classic. The second part is dedicated to Bach and discusses what qualifies 
Bach’s music as classic and the history of its reception and fame. One dominant aspect of 
Bach’s music is the formal art of composition, lending his music a permanent air of well-
balanced proportion.189 
If Coetzee could be said to be following similar principles as Bach in this literary 
endeavour, Summertime could be understood as a literary fugue. Five voices are present in 
the composition – plus the voice of the diary fragments framing the interviews. The 
subject (theme) of the piece is the life of the young man John Coetzee in the years 1972-
 
189 “In Bach nothing is obscure, no single step is so miraculous as to surpass imitation. Yet when the chain 
of sound is realized in time, the building process ceases at a certain moment to be the mere linking of units; 
the units cohere as a higher-order object in a way that I can only describe as the incarnation of ideas of 
exposition, complication and resolution that are more general tan music. Bach thinks in music. Music 
thinks itself in Bach.” (Stranger Shores 10) 
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77. This theme is introduced in the exposition, the notebook entries from those years, each 
imitating the main theme at different pitches of discourse - personal, political and literary. 
The last section of Summertime consists of further notebook material, only now undated, 
and contains a confession of purposely scratching a favourite record of his father and then 
circles around the demise of his father. For one thing this recapitulates the themes 
presented in the exposition, furthermore it offers a sense of closure with the demise of 
Coetzee’s progenitor. Each entry is glossed with short editorial comments by Coetzee on 
how to continue the material in the future, such as “To be expanded on: […]” (6) or “To 
be explored: […]” (8), forming a metafictional comment that acts as a connecting passage 
to the interviews. The interviews seem to pick up on these comments and expand the 
material through external perspectives. The main body consisting of five interviews (quite 
Aristotelian) resembles the development of the theme. The five voices each give a 
different treatment of the main theme, young John. Repeatedly references to previous 
texts of Coetzee are made, both openly and on the side, marking them as intertexts to the 
given accounts. The five voices create a horizontal structure of imitative counterpoint. If 
Coetzee had again employed the split-page method of Diary of a Bad Year, this would 
have entailed an emulation of the simultaneity musical composition allows for as opposed 
to the sequential polyphony of multi-perspective prose (which we can only read word-by-
word). 
The result of emulating musical composition can be termed literary polyphony; 
Coetzee himself repeatedly refers to Mikhail Bakhtin, as do many of his critics. 
Bakthinian dialogism paves the way for narrative polyphony. Coetzee has created – not 
only in Summertime, but here especially – a mirror cabinet with a multitude of reflections. 
He is no longer a glass sphere, but a shattered mirror with every shard reflecting a partial 
image of the author, showing true mastery of the sympathetic imagination. 
In Summertime we find both the sympathetic imagination and the notion of 
embodiment at work in the characterization of John, an earlier self of the author who since 
Boyhood and Youth has moved out of the shadows of the book covers, not quite into broad 
daylight, but out into the literary open. The observed subject in conflict with others is now 
Coetzee himself. Fragments of notebooks give us a first-person perspective (though 
narrated in the third person), in particular on Coetzee’s relationship to his father. These 
notebook fragments frame the five interviews that in turn add five external focalizations to 
the text. This multiplication of perspectives allows the reader to occupy a variety of 
viewpoints, creating a manifold of instances allowing an empathetic stance. The narrative 
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blockades, in earlier fictions by Coetzee an internalized function of the focalizing 
consciousness (Dostoevsky’s blackouts, Magda’s lapses of consciousness, Michael K.’s 
almost autistic isolation), now become a function of the textual form. These blockades 
allow the readers (and Coetzee), to empathize with the subject on display through 
intersubjective links established between author, characters, and readers. 
Mr Vincent, the biographer, acts as literary agent of the sympathetic imagination, 
and Coetzee is his man. In his Nobel prize acceptance speech, an enigmatic narrative titled 
“He and his man”, Coetzee, inverting the author-character relationship, posits the writer 
Defoe as an agent of Robinson Crusoe travelling the countryside and delivering reports: 
“Every place he goes he sends report of, that is his first business, this busy man of his” 
(HHM 2). As Julia Frankl, the first interviewee, relates her first encounter with Coetzee, 
she refers to him as Vincent’s man: “It was of course your man, John Coetzee” (22; also 
31). Later she comments on Coetzee’s profession: “He makes his living writing reports, 
expert reports, on intimate human experience” (82). This clearly resonates with the reports 
sent to Crusoe by Defoe. Coetzee has been fabricating his own biography in a deceptive 
collage of actual events and invented reminiscences – less so in Boyhood and Youth, 
extremely so in Summertime. Interviewee Julia Frankl ironically comments her reporting 
of direct speech: 
So let me be candid: as far as dialogue is concerned, I am making it up as I go along. Which I 
presume is permitted, since we are talking about a writer. What I am telling you may not be true 
to the letter, but it is true to the spirit (32). 
In the first interview, on which I focus in this essay, Julia reports on her encounter with 
John, the earlier and other Coetzee. Her description of John’s appearance emphasizes a 
lack of appeal: 
He was scrawny, he had a beard, he wore horn-rimmed glasses and sandals. He looked out of 
place, like a bird, one of those flightless birds; or like an abstracted scientist who had wandered 
by mistake out of his laboratory. There was an air of seediness about him too, an air of failure. 
(21) 
The image of a flightless bird is the first in a row of animal comparisons employed to 
characterize John, stressing his deficiency in terms of both humans and animals: a 
flightless bird, a cold fish (47), a frog (83), a tortoise (238).190 At the same time, “John 
wasn’t a rat or an octopus” (57), instead “[h]e wasn’t any kind of animal, and for a very 
specific reason: his mental capacity, and specifically his ideational faculties, were 
overdeveloped, at the cost of his animal self. He was Homo sapiens, or even Homo 
 
190 For a thorough discussion of animal comparisons in the work of Coetzee see Kellmann 2002. 
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sapiens sapiens.” (58; italics in original) John’s “narrow, myopic kind of cleverness” (24) 
gives him an “autistic quality” (52) in his failure to connect with other people and mark 
him as a “loner.” (20) In a later interview cousin Margot reaffirms this impression: “An 
alleenloper, as some male animals are: a loner.” (133) The animal comparisons qualify 
John as detached. 
John’s characterization as “not fully human” (83) and not quite animal opens a 
third option: the automaton. Julia describes “how it felt to be in bed with John” as “[t]wo 
automata having inscrutable commerce with each other’s bodies.” (53) John was “not built 
for love.” (48) In compliance with the Cartesian idea of animals as machines (and of 
humans as only slightly more than ‘just’ machines) John says to Julia: “I never dream.” 
He just “twitch[es] in his sleep.” (54) In another interview Adriana poignantly labels John 
“the wooden man” (200), just as Michael K was a “stick figure”. Adriana comments in her 
capacity as John’s dance teacher: 
– he could not dance to save his life. […] This man was disembodied. He was divorced from his 
body. To him, the body was like one of those wooden puppets that you move with strings. You 
pull this string and the left arm moves, you pull that string and the right leg moves. And the real 
self sits up above, where you cannot see him, like the puppet-master pulling the strings. (198) 
Describing John as disembodied corresponds to the idea of the automaton, which 
altogether contributes to ascertaining his physical make, his literary embodiment.191 The 
puppet-master is the author Coetzee, who is indeed pulling all the strings of the various 
characters. Adriana concludes: “He was not a man of substance.” (195) It almost seems as 
if Coetzee is demonstrating the negative capabilities of the commentators, who mostly see 
him as deficient in one way or another.192 
Julia suggests that for John writing was an “unending cathartic exercise” (59), part 
of a “larger project of self-reformation.” (58) When Mr Vincent asks her whether she 
believes that books “give meaning to our lives”, she answers: “A book should be an axe to 
chop open the frozen sea inside us.” (61) Dostoevsky in The Master of Petersburg replies 
to a similar question from councillor Maximov that “reading is being the arm and being 
the axe and being the skull; reading is giving yourself up, not holding yourself at a 
distance and jeering.” (MOP 47) Julia’s interview forms the largest portion of the book, 
and thereby allows her to play out her position in all its complexity. Julia’s observations 
range from a “verdict” on John’s sexual performance (“too impersonal” 52), on his debut 
 
191 On the lack of embodiment in Summertime see Dee 2009. 
192 Negative capabilities allow us to re-imagine perspectives fundamentally different from our own, 
representing what is not oneself (Kellmann 2002: 326). 
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as writer of Dusklands (“a project of self-administered therapy” 58), ending with her 
“mature conclusion” that he “wasn’t constructed to fit into or be fitted into.” (81) A 
singular mis-constructed puzzle piece. 
Through these manoeuvres of ironic distancing Coetzee sets the stage for the 
enactment of the full-fledged sympathetic imagination, which he here turns on himself in 
an admirable effort to come to terms with his past and his public image (for the ironies at 
play in Mr Vincent’s remarks are not only comic, but also provide a trail of leads on 
Coetzee’s game plan): 
Of course we are all fictioneers. I do not deny that. But which would you rather have: a 
set of independent reports from a range of independent perspectives, from which you 
can then try to synthesize a whole; or the massive, unitary self-projection comprised by 
his oeuvre. (226) 
Just as Julia was “a figure in his life” (35), John was a figure in hers, a rather tragicomic 
character. Julia points out: “I know he had a reputation for being dour, but John was 
actually quite funny. A figure of comedy.” (63) And though John’s social communication 
skills are wanting – John strikes Julia as “not a great talker” (34); when she visits him and 
his father “the flatness of conversation” and the “long silences” (42) irritate her – she later 
remarks on how much she cherished the private conversations with John: “They were fun. 
I enjoyed them; I missed them afterwards, after I stopped seeing him. In fact our 
conversations were probably what I missed most.” (62) She describes John as one of 
“life’s failures” (37), but altogether a “gentleperson.” (58) Julia’s attitude is highly 
ambivalent, alternating between harsh judgements and more benevolent assessments. 
A counterweight to the negative appraisal is one particular night with John. Just as 
her previous assessment of John is highly ambivalent, so is her description of being in bed 
with John. On this “pivotal night” (83), Julia has run from her husband and lodged herself 
in a hotel and John comes to visit her there. Julia here speaks of “piercingly sweet 
lovemaking” (76) and how John “raised [her] once to unexpected erotic heights” (81), 
countering the fleshless animal metaphors. In this night John “for once opened his heart, 
the heart he normally kept wrapped in armour. With open hearts, his and mine, we came 
together.” Julia sees a potential in John that Coetzee explores in his polyphonic self-
imaging in Summertime. Julia diagnoses: “For him it could and should have marked a sea-
change, that first opening of the heart” (83). In conclusion Julia gives another metaphor of 
Coetzee’s elusiveness: 
261 
 
                                                
But the fact is, John wasn’t made for love, wasn’t constructed that way – wasn’t constructed to fit 
into or be fitted into. Like a sphere. Like a glass ball. There was no way to connect with him. 
That is my conclusion, my mature conclusion. (81) 
The apparent irony of the metaphor hints at the humorous drift of this pastiche. 
Summertime points in the opposite direction; Coetzee structurally shatters the glass sphere 
and leaves the reader with shards of glass which each mirror a separate refraction of 
Coetzee’s personality. Julia sees the developmental potential of “a man who loved by 
numbers” (83), the “man who mistook his mistress for a violin.” (83) This refers to an 
episode where John asks Julia to make love to the music of a Schubert string quintet, an 
attempt at “musical sex” (70) that is meant to inspire them with a “history of feelings” 
dating back to the times of Franz Schubert. In the course of this particular sequence, she 
reports how Coetzee commands her to give into the simulation: “‘Empty your mind!’ he 
hissed at me. ‘Feel through the music!’” (69) The medium of music could be equated with 
the medium of the text transferring literary artfulness, Coetzee’s primary mode of 
communication: Feel through the text! Accept the simulation presented to you and give in 
to it, then you will feel the underlying “history of feelings” of J.M. Coetzee. 
Julia and John, a literary representation of Coetzee’s self, live out their conflict in 
front of the reader. Julia claims, that she “never forced John to expose himself.” (65) But 
Coetzee might have flinched at the degree of self-disclosure attained in Summertime, just 
as he does when Julia in a melodramatic fashion throws a plate after him: “He hunched his 
shoulders and turned to me with a puzzled stare.” (71) Elizabeth Costello remarks on the 
puzzled stare of Franz Kafka: 
[...] Kafka saw both himself and Red Peter as hybrids, as monstrous thinking devices mounted 
inexplicably on suffering animal bodies. The stare that we meet in all the surviving photographs 
of Kafka is a stare of pure surprise: surprise, astonishment, alarm. Of all men Kafka is the most 
insecure in his humanity. (EC 75) 
This quote encapsulates all three tendencies on Coetzee’s self-representation: as animal, 
as human and as automaton. In Summertime Coetzee discovers the Nietzschean all-too-
human in himself. Thus I claim that in Summertime Coetzee as an author has finally 
discovered a literary avenue that allows him to take himself out of himself. 
5.7.2 The Empathy Effect in Summertime 
The result is what I call the empathy effect,193 a result of Coetzee’s use of the 
sympathetic imagination: probing into the minds of his characters, taking the reader on a 
 
193 See section 1.7. 
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journey into foreign territory, the mind of an other. Obviously Coetzee draws on previous 
literary traditions, and other authors have delivered similarly compelling accounts of their 
protagonists’ minds, one might even claim this to be one of the trademarks of modern 
literature. But Coetzee’s prose style, his management of literary conventions, and his 
playful approach to existing genres make his work unique and exemplary. His concept of 
the sympathetic imagination, admittedly not expressed fully (yet) in his essayistic oeuvre, 
is a milestone and key to understanding how he manipulates his readers into following his 
path into the minds of his protagonists. Even more compelling is how Coetzee’s 
imagination doubles up on the author himself in his latest works. Any serious 
consideration of autobiography today will have to discuss Coetzee’s innovative style of 
self-reflection. As for Coetzee scholars, closely examining Coetzee’s sympathetic 
imagination will prove very helpful and enlightening. Admittedly, not every reader will 
experience the empathy effect in their encounter with Coetzee’s works, but all those who 
are drawn in by his fictions will most likely gain a fresh perspective in their gaze at the 
other. Coetzee’s application of the sympathetic imagination and embodiment includes a 
utopian moment in proposing an intersubjective route of encountering the other. On a 
practical level, Coetzee’s inherent idealism aims at an improvement of social conditions 
of living together. To Mr Vincent’s question what might have been utopian enough for 
John, Sophie replies: “The closing down of the mines. The ploughing under of the 
vineyards. The disbanding of the armed forces. The abolition of the automobile. Universal 
vegetarianism. Poetry in the streets. That sort of thing.” (230) 
6. Evolution of the Sympathetic Imagination 
J.M. Coetzee’s fictions demonstrate both how the author applies his sympathetic 
imagination in creating fictional characters or alter egos, who in turn illustrate either the 
failure or the application of their sympathetic imagination, and how the text guides the 
reader’s sympathetic imagination, resulting in enhanced empathy. The introduction has 
provided a neuroscientific theoretical framework that brings together the sympathetic 
imagination and empathy, linked to each other through the neurological mechanism of mirror 
neurons. Together, these theoretical reflections have constituted an empathetic lens for my 
close readings of Coetzee’s novels, presented in chapters two to five, which focus either on 
the presentation of characters to the reader or on the interactions of the characters (with the 
reader as observer). These readings take their cue from the preliminary theoretical reflections, 
263 
 
though it has proved difficult to commensurate the methodological jargon of neuroscientific 
and literary discourse. While the neuroscientific approach forms the platform for my analysis, 
the close readings of the individual texts extend the methodology into the literary domain, 
shifting the focus to character constellations and character presentation. Consequently, the 
close readings constitute an act of my own sympathetic imagination that I have shared with 
the readers of this study. The neuroscientific research on mirror neurons has decisively shaped 
my approach, focussing the lens of my close readings on aspects relevant for a discussion of 
empathy and of the sympathetic imagination. The variations of how the sympathetic 
imagination is staged and enacted reveal an evolution of the concept (in the sense of a cultural 
evolution as proposed by Tomasello; see section 1.5.4.3). This development is not necessarily 
progressive and surely not hierarchical, as all variations importantly contribute to the 
refinement of the reader’s sympathetic imagination and the enhancement of his empathetic 
sensibilities. In the close readings I have attempted to show how the literary representations 
discussed could be thought to cause the activation of complex patterns of mirror neurons in 
response to the narrative, which in turn create the neurological basis for our empathy to 
become active. 
The chapter structure and grouping of the novels in this study reflects different phases 
of how the sympathetic imagination is staged in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee. The largely 
chronological order of the close readings was intended to test out whether a progressive 
development takes place over the course of Coetzee’s oeuvre. This has proved true only 
insofar as the autobiographical fictions represent a particularly complex and daunting 
application of an author’s sympathetic imagination to himself. 
The (un)sympathetic imagination of the monolithic characters discussed in the second 
chapter demonstrates how either the sympathetic imagination of the characters fails or how 
their acts of the sympathetic imagination can be stalled. At the same time the isolated selves 
of Eugene Dawn, Jacobus Coetzee and Magda challenge the reader’s sympathetic imagination 
to reach out to them. The first person present tense narration represents an ideal vehicle for 
this task, as it takes us out of ourselves and confronts us with co-inhabiting the idiosyncratic 
views of the main characters. 
Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) and Life & Times of Michael K (1983) represent a 
first shift in how the sympathetic imagination is enacted. Both the Magistrate and Michael K 
prominently strain to apply their sympathetic imagination, but are only partially successful. In 
the case of the Magistrate, his efforts are frustrated (and promoted) by the power games he is 
drawn into with Colonel Joll. Michael K, on the other hand, occupies a position of marginality 
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and non-power, disallowing him any claims on others (as the Magistrate claims the barbarian 
girl). Coetzee’s narrative of the Magistrate focuses on his personal development, showing 
how he continuously becomes more open to engaging with others in the spirit of a 
sympathetic imagination. The first person present tense narrative again draws us in and aligns 
us closely with Magistrate. In Life & Times of Michael K the third person past tense narration 
shifts the position of the reader to that of a more neutral observer. While the Magistrate 
progressively develops his sympathetic imagination, Michael K challenges the reader to 
position himself and his empathetic faculties in relation to the character and the others he 
encounters. Both novels share the opening up to social context and the introduction of 
significant others which challenge either the reader’s and/or the character’s sympathetic 
imagination, in the first case with a character reaching out to others while in the second case 
the character is on the retreat from all social relations. 
The novels discussed in the third chapter share in common the themes of authorial 
responsibility and the themes of loss and grief. Susan Barton, Elizabeth Curren and Fyodor 
Dostoevsky all grieve over lost children. In Foe, the lost daughter of Susan Barton (a theme 
derived from Defoe’s Roxanna) forms the motivational backbone of Susan Barton’s travels, 
but feature less prominently in the course of the narrative than her encounter with Friday. This 
encounter with the other, narrated by Barton in first person past tense narration, constitutes the 
epicentre of the entire narrative, just as Friday’s untold story lies at the heart of the story. 
Susan Barton’s attempts to empathetically engage with Friday all fail (yet we as readers may 
learn from these failures). 
The epistolary narrative of Elizabeth Curren and the narrative featuring Dostoevsky 
represent a significant shift in the staging of the sympathetic imagination. The more personal 
tone (reflecting events in J.M. Coetzee’s own life) together with a preoccupation with death – 
Dostoevsky mourns, as Curren premeditates her own impending death – opens up a new arena 
for the sympathetic imagination, unleashing some of its potential that so far remained hidden. 
More than all previous characters, these two draw us into their inner conflicts as we 
accompany them on their struggle for salvation. The first person past tense narration of 
Elizabeth Curren has a similar effect as in Coetzee’s first two novels, inviting the reader to 
partake fully in the presented narrative perspective, only now we witness how Elizabeth 
Curren opens up and allows her sympathetic imagination to flow more freely, especially to 
those who do not immediately elicit her sympathy. Like Curren, Dostoevsky, whose story is 
related in third person past tense, attempts to apply his sympathetic imagination, though in his 
case it is directed mainly towards his deceased stepson Pavel (prompting him to face the 
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ultimate challenge of imagining death; a task also undertaken by Curren). In the sense of a 
character study, these two novels offer the most intimate view at processes of the sympathetic 
imagination and the empathy aroused by it. Both narratives represent early examples of a 
fictionalized acting out and working through personal grief, continued later in the 
autobiographical fictions. And more than all other novels the acts of perspective-taking 
undertaken by Curren and Dostoevsky blur the lines between “I” and “You” and “He”, 
allowing their empathy to reach out beyond their selves. 
Disgrace provides the most elaborate staging of the sympathetic imagination in 
Coetzee’s oeuvre. The novel tells the complicated story of David Lurie’s inner development. 
While some have questioned the sincerity of his change, few have doubted that change has 
taken place within David Lurie. We follow Lurie at the safe distance of third person past tense 
narration, from his life as a sexual predator with little empathy to a life empathetically spent 
with abject dogs. Coetzee’s presentation is very straightforward and the trajectory of Lurie’s 
development corresponds with how well he applies his sympathetic imagination and how well 
he is able to empathize with others. While Slow Man echoes many themes of Disgrace, it does 
not as strongly reflect on the sympathetic imagination and empathetic sensibility of the 
protagonist. As my brief discussion of the encounter of Paul Rayment and the blind Marianna 
shows, the plot is more contrived and less likely to draw the reader in. 
The autobiographical fictions finally represent a culmination point of how Coetzee 
stages the sympathetic imagination in his novels. The self-reflexive character of the texts 
allows for an unprecedented intimacy with a concomitant self-distancing that allows 
Coetzee’s narrative empathy to be redirected at the author himself. 
6.1 Coetzee’s Autobiographical Fictions: Acting Out and Working 
Through Trauma (Dominic LaCapra) 
While Boyhood and Youth were primarily acting out former selves, Summertime 
contains a stronger notion of working through a former self. In his seminal 2001 study 
Writing History, Writing Trauma, Dominick LaCapra discusses mainly how the holocaust 
is remembered and how the resulting traumatization is processed, but his findings can 
easily be applied to any historical setting of long-term collective traumatization (as in 
South Africa under apartheid). Discussing the status of testimonies as either fiction or 
memoir, LaCapra speaks of an “emerging hybridized genre: the faux mémoire.” (LaCapra 
2001: 34) In relation to the Shoah testimonial of Laub, LaCapra discerns: 
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What she relives of the past, as if it were happening now in the present, may, to a greater or 
lesser extent, be (or not be) an accurate enactment, reconstruction, or representation of what 
actually occurred in the past. It may involve distortion, disguise, and other permutations 
relating to processes of imaginative transformation and narrative shaping, as well as 
perhaps repression, denial, dissociation, and foreclosure. But these issues have a bearing 
only on certain aspects of her account and could not invalidate it in its entirety. (LaCapra 
2001:88-89; emphasis added) 
Though Coetzee at no point claims accuracy for his autobiographical fictions, it involves 
similar mechanisms of distortion, disguise, and permutations in the narrative presentation. 
Yet, in spite of all concealment, these fictions confront us (and the author) with a detailed 
account of how a boy suffers both collective and individual traumatization, how the youth 
suffers from its personal consequences, and ultimately how the late John Coetzee was 
perceived by others. I take the autobiographical fictions altogether to resemble a process of 
what LaCapra terms “acting out and working through”: 
Moreover, especially in an ethical sense, working through does not mean avoidance, 
harmonization, simply forgetting the past, or submerging oneself in the present. It means 
coming to terms with the trauma, including its details, and critically engaging the tendency 
to act out the past and even to recognize why it may be necessary and even in certain 
respects desirable or at least compelling. (The latter is especially the case with respect to a 
fidelity to trauma and its victims, that there is something in the repetition of the past – say, 
in a nightmare – that amounts to dedication of fidelity to lost loved ones and is a kind of 
memorial that is not based on suppression or oblivion.) 
In any case certain wounds, both personal and historical, cannot simply heal without 
leaving scars or residues in the present; there may even be a sense in which they have to 
remain as open wounds even if one strives to counteract their tendency to swallow all of 
existence and incapacitate one as an agent of the present. (LaCapra 2001: 144) 
Remember the young man John conceiving South Africa as “a wound within him.” (Y 116; 
see also above p. 253)194 Youth demonstrates precisely how one can be incapacitated as an 
agent of the present through past traumatization: “The result is a paralyzing kind of all-or-
nothing logic in which one is in a double bind: either totalization and the closure you resist, or 
acting out the repetition compulsion, with almost no other possibilities.” According to 
LaCapra, this “constricted frame of reference” can result in “a politics of utopian hope in the 
form of indefinite deferral of institutional change or even of substantive recommendations.” 
(LaCapra 2001: 145) The indefinite deferral of change is solidified in Summertime by the 
simulated death of the author. But the seemingly primarily personal negotiations of Coetzee in 
his autobiographical fictions have larger implications, in line with LaCapra’s assessment of 
the process of working through trauma: 
[I]t may be possible, and in some sense it has to be possible, if you believe in anything like 
a viable democratic politics, to enable and try to bring about processes of working through 
that are not simply therapeutic for the individual but have political and ethical implications. 
(LaCapra 2001: 152) 
 
194 See also section 5.5.3 Remembering South Africa – Echoes from Boyhood 
267 
 
In the light of my larger argument regarding the sympathetic imagination, I hold these ethical 
implications to be a hospitable acknowledgement of the others already contained in ourselves 
and the others we encounter – as LaCapra notes: “Acting out and working through, in this 
sense, constitute a distinction, in that one may never be totally separate from the other, and the 
two may always mark or be implicated in each other.” (LaCapra 2001: 150) 
Coetzee’s autobiographical fictions constitute an acting out and working through of 
traumas experienced by former selves. It is a proxy simulation allowing a more mature 
reappraisal, with the unflinchingness that is a landmark of Coetzee’s writing. By applying his 
sympathetic imagination to his former selves, he applies what has been exercised in all his 
previous fictions and achieves an empathetic engagement through the fictionalized self-
reflection. For the reader, Coetzee’s acting out and working through complements the lessons 
on the sympathetic imagination received in reading his previous novels; while these taught the 
reader how to direct his sympathetic imagination towards others in a mode of empathetic 
engagement, the autobiographical fictions now teach us how to apply the sympathetic 
imagination to ourselves, complementing and refining our potential for an empathetic 
engagement. Finally, Summertime pretends to offer the closure LaCapra warns of, but instead 
of providing a totalization of his perspective engages in a polyphonic murmur emanating from 
fictional others that supposedly encountered him in the past. And while Coetzee has always 
shown great reluctance to reveal his personal self to the public, he has also repeatedly 
emphasized how all his writing bears an autobiographical strain: 
At this point in the notes, Coetzee breaks with the discussion of Schreiner to write: “Of 
course I am talking about myself. Whenever we talk about something else we are talking 
about ourselves.” But he closes off this autobiographical moment just as quickly, claiming 
that it is not in his interest to pursue this line of thought: “But I choose not to reflect on it, 
turn myself back to look upon it (like Orpheus). Life is too short. (The meaning of the 
Orpheus story: you kill your inspiration by turning back to look at it.)” (Kelly 2011: 143) 
Following this logic, having looked back at himself too much should have killed Coetzee’s 
inspiration; and Summertime did give many readers a feeling of closure, of a last book. But in 
2013 the publication of The Childhood of Jesus marks a new departure in the writing of J.M. 
Coetzee. 
6.2 Coetzeean Utopias: The Childhood of Jesus and Beyond 
Imagine all the people, sharing all the world. (John Lennon, Imagine, 1971) 
In The Childhood of Jesus (2012) Coetzee introduces us to a new world, where people 
speak Spanish and where the displaced are welcome and taken care of: “a quasi-socialist state 
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in which conformity, mediocrity and anonymity are both the norm and the highest values.” 
(Oates 2013) And yet, in spite of the goodwill displayed by the people of Novilla, the life 
offered to Simón and David seems to lack something, the interactions and encounters appear 
“bloodless” (CJ 30) and pale – at least to Simón (his co-workers are “strangely incurious,” CJ 
22). Everything is provided for, and the bureaucratic procedures they undergo are tolerably 
efficient. As readers we are left to wonder what might be at odds in this brave new world. A 
discussion between Simón and Ana from Social Welfare about appetites and desires gives a 
first hint, when they argue about moderation and ‘natural’ impulses (CJ31f) – we might think 
of Lurie’s insistence on acting on his impulses. This discussion feeds into one main theme of 
the novel, namely “How one is to live.” (CJ 54) The appearance of Inés offers a second clue, 
as she and her brothers belong to an apparently aristocratic upper class that is not required to 
work but instead spends their time with leisure (and freely pursuing desires). In a reversal of 
the theme of the lost child,195 Simón is searching for David’s mother, and wilfully decides that 
the young woman Inés (from the upper class, introduced playing tennis at La Residencia, CJ 
68) shall be the surrogate mother for David. When young David, supposedly the Jesus figure 
alluded to in the title, is required to go to school and does not fare well there due to his 
individualistic approach to things and questioning of all authority – a mixture of autonomy 
and stubbornness, this non-compliance leads to the state authorities recommending him to go 
to a special school at Arena Puntes.196 The boy goes there but on his return reports 
counterfactual information about barbed-wire fences and bad treatment, refusing to go there 
again. The mother figure Inés concurs with his refusal and urges Simón to take them away 
from the city to escape the state-imposed measures for the boy’s education. Simón complies, 
and together the three of them drive off north. Coetzee in this novel illustrates the conflict 
between communal compliance (the good of all) and individual dissent (the good of one), 
showing how the goodwill of a community might bring along constraints for the individual: 
“Is he [Simón] insisting on the primacy of the personal (desire, love) over the universal 
(goodwill, benevolence)?” (CJ 57)197 As readers we witness Simón growing accustomed to a 
 
195 As expressed previously in Foe, Age of Iron, and The Master of Petersburg. Many tropes from previous 
novels reappear in The Childhood of Jesus, to be explored in forthcoming studies. 
196 Punta Arenas is a city in the far South of Chile (and in Peru); while J.C. Oates was reminded of a Southern 
European setting (Oates 2013), for me the use of Spanish and the idea of a fresh start pointed rather to South 
America. Obviously Coetzee has created yet another allegorical setting without specific pointers to any actual 
locality. 
197 Joyce Carol Oates tentatively relates The Childhood of Jesus to Buddhist enlightenment and Christian 
salvation: 
For a while I speculated that “The Childhood of Jesus” might be a novel of ideas in which the 
stillness of the Buddhist vision of enlightenment and the striving of Christian salvation are 
contrasted: the one essentially cyclical, the other “progressive”; the goal of one the annihilation of 
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life of goodwill, even urging young David to quit “living in a private world” of his own (CJ 
187); David has a vivid imagination, creating his own private language, comprehending 
numbers in his own individual way, claiming he can read minds. Joyce Carol Oates 
comments: 
At times David seems emotionally disturbed, possibly autistic or mildly schizophrenic; he 
has no friends at school and his teacher finds him essentially unteachable, since he is a 
disruptive presence in the classroom. Yet his immature behavior might be a consequence of 
adult overindulgence. He is unusually bright at times, then again obstinate, exasperating. 
(Oates 2013) 
David and Simón represent the “old way of thinking” with its “endless dissatisfaction” (CJ 
63), which has in this new world been replaced by general goodwill and benevolence for “the 
price of forgetting” (CJ 60). In political terms this can be linked to John Rawl’s thought 
experiment with the “veil of ignorance”, where all participants decide on what terms to live 
ignorant of their position in the society to be created (Rawls 1999: 118); only here the 
individuals actually forget their past in order to make a fresh start: “We all started from 
nowhere, from nothing.” (CJ 103) And: “None of us has a past. We start anew here.” (CJ 97) 
As for enactments of the sympathetic imagination and empathy, this novel has little offer. 
Ultimately, the ending of The Childhood of Jesus – the search for a new beginning elsewhere 
– echoes the scepticism prominent in all utopian thoughts offered in Coetzee’s oeuvre, but 
also provides an optimistic glimpse for a brighter future where love and goodwill are equally 
value. 
All of Coetzee’s fictions contain a nucleus of optimistic alternative, especially when 
we imagine the characters properly employing their sympathetic imagination and 
empathetically engaging with the others they encounter. Jacobus Coetzee might have 
befriended the Hottentots he encountered and established a mutual relation of trust, if not for 
the historical colonial constraints marking his attitude towards them: “How do I know that 
Johannes Plaatje, or even Adonis, not to speak of the Hottentot dead, was not an immense 
world of delight closed off to my senses? May I not have killed something of inestimable 
value?” (DL 106) Likewise, Eugene Dawn might have developed sympathy for the people of 
Vietnam, recommending a less atrocious course of action in his report: “Beyond courage there 
is the humble heart, the quiet garden into which we may escape from the cycles of time. I am 
the individual personality in a sort of universal void, and the goal of the other the “salvation” of a 
distinctly individual personality and its guarantee of everlasting life and reunion with loved ones in 
heaven. More plausibly, it seemed likely that “The Childhood of Jesus” is a Kafka-inspired parable 
of the quest for meaning itself: for reasons to endure when (secular) life lacks passion and purpose. 
(Oates 2013) 
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neat and polite, but I am the man of the future paradise.” (DL 27) While these utopian 
projections are not featured prominently in the narratives themselves, they are recognizable 
for the reader. Magda might have established the kind of peaceful co-existence with Hendrik 
and Anna, if not for the burden of life-long segregation: “Why will no one speak to me in the 
true language of the heart? The medium, the median – that is what I wanted to be! Neither 
master nor slave, neither parent nor child, but the bridge between, so that in me the contraries 
should be reconciled!” (HOC 133) Michael K offers an ambivalent vision, characterized 
largely by a retreat from society, ultimately resulting in his final vision of him and an old man 
living on the water retrieved from a well with a teaspoon. The Magistrate actually manages to 
resist and repel the rule of empire, creating a tabula rasa on which the construction of a new 
community at least seems imaginable. Cruso in Foe proposes his credo: “We eat, we live, we 
die.” (FOE 32) Cruso continues: “On the island there is no law except the law that we shall 
work for our bread, which is a commandment. [...] Laws are made for one purpose only, [...] 
to hold us in check when our desires grow immoderate. As long as our desires are moderate 
we have no need of laws.” (FOE 36) Susan Barton’s relation to Friday can hardly be viewed 
in an optimistic light, although the roar issuing from Friday’s mouth in the final section has 
been read as bringing a new awareness to the world (Post 1989: 152f; see also above p. 138f.). 
Elizabeth Curren can be read as a figure of transformation, albeit on an individual basis; she 
manages to overcome her deeply ingrained attitudes of segregation and her new 
consciousness brings her close to Vercueil. The character Dostoevsky and the narrative he is 
embedded in offers little utopian potential, especially when considering the dark and bitter 
ending. This bitterness continues throughout the autobiographical fictions, contrasted by the 
essay fictions The Lives of Animals, Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a Bad Year, which all 
offer glimpses of a more positive engagement with others. The pessimist strain in Coetzee’s 
fiction culminates in the idea of digging a hole for humanity to vanish in (first expressed by 
the Magistrate, WFB 26, later picked up by Michael K, LTMK 95). In Diary of a Bad Year 
(2007), Senõr C comments on La Boétie, a French contemporary of Montaigne, and his attack 
on political tyranny: “The alternatives are not placid servitude on the one hand and revolt 
against servitude on the other. There is a third way, chosen by thousands and millions of 
people every day. It is the way of quietism, of willed obscurity, of inner emigration.” (DOA 
12) This is the individual escape route; alternatively we might imagine the millions of people 
joining together to create a new fourth way to proceed into the future together. Here, a 
comment by Senõr C in Diary of a Bad Year is illuminating: 
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If, despite the evidence of our senses, we accept the premise that we or our forebears 
created the state, then we must also accept its entailment: that we or our forebears could 
have created the state in some other form, if we had chosen; perhaps, too, that we could 
change it if we collectively so decided. But the fact is that, even collectively, those who are 
“under” the state, who “belong to” the state, will find it very hard indeed to change its form; 
they – we – are certainly powerless to abolish it. (DOA 3) 
In a similar vein Senõr C muses on the French people after end of German occupation: 
Did anyone, in 1944, say to the French populace: Consider: the retreat of our German 
overlords means that for a brief moment we are ruled by no one. Do we want to end that 
moment, or do we perhaps want to perpetuate it – to become the first people in modern 
times to roll back the state? Let us, as French people, use our new and sudden freedom to 
debate the question without restraint. Perhaps some poet spoke the words; but if he did his 
voice must at once have been silenced by the armed gangs, who in this case and in all cases 
have more in common with each other than with the people. (DOA 7) 
The indefinite deferral of change, which LaCapra qualified as one aspect of traumatization, 
can be noted in Coetzee’s self-searching autobiographical fictions, while The Childhood of 
Jesus finally seems to suggest the potential of a far-reaching institutional change towards an 
ethics of care, yet still with some doubts about the price we as individuals might have to pay 
for such a shared future. If considering how political transformation might be achieved, 
Coetzee obviously refuses to propose a specific course of action, as (fictional) former 
colleague Sophie de Noel reveals in her assessment: 
He was not a militant. His politics were too idealistic, too Utopian for that. In fact he was 
not political at all. He looked down on politics. […] He thought that politics brought out the 
worst in people. It brought out the worst in people and also brought to the surface the worst 
types in society. (ST 228) 
In a similar vein she proposes Coetzee to refuse to subscribe to any course of action involving 
violence: “Nothing is worth fighting for because fighting only prolongs the cycle of 
aggression and retaliation.” (ST 231) But what could be the alternative? Sophie continues: 
He looked forward to the day when politics and the state would wither away. I would call 
that Utopian. On the other hand, he did not invest a great deal of himself in these Utopian 
longings. He was too much of a Calvinist for that. (ST 229) 
Sophie concludes: “What his position boiled down to, I said, was old-fashioned Romantic 
primitivism.” (ST 231) 
Shameen Black discusses contemporary fiction (including among others Coetzee’s) 
that “open paths for dialogue, debate, and mediation across socially defined borders,” 
claiming that “[s]uch imaginative projection struggles toward [an] utopian form of 
communication.” (Black 2010:251) Coetzee’s “remolding of the self” (Black 2010:252) in his 
autobiographical fictions represents the final stage of refining the literary application of his 
sympathetic imagination and the consequent enhancement of his empathetic sensibilities. In 
my view, Coetzee’s fictions all strive for a utopian form of communication, while at the same 
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time revealing the limitations and restrictions imposed on the individual by history and social 
classification. Black goes on: “In seeking to represent the lives of others across social borders, 
the novels I explore envision such expansive forms of public cultures. Although novels cannot 
bring about new and enduring solidarity by themselves, they may still work to enlarge their 
readers’ horizons of possibility.” (Black 2010:253) He argues for the novel as a privileged site 
for the renegotiation of social discourses: 
In light of this persistent debate about the proper scope for ethical concern, an art form like 
the novel offers a powerful accommodation between the rational imperative to imagine the 
lives of others and the emotional need to consider them within intimate communities of 
passionate commitment. (Black 2010:254) 
It is exactly this intimacy and passion that Simon is missing in the new world depicted in The 
Childhood of Jesus. 
My reading of Coetzee’s fiction with an empathetic lens and a focus on the staging of 
the sympathetic imagination has followed an impulse expressed by Moses Valdez: 
If Coetzee’s fiction is in the main antipastoral and dystopian, then isn’t our task as critics 
(following his own example) to read dialectically, to subvert the dominant, to discover in 
his work the utopian possibility, the pastoral impulse which cannot be written directly: “Our 
craft,” he says, “is all in reading the other: gaps, inverses, undersides; the veiled; the dark, 
the buried, the feminine; alterities.” (Moses 1994:54; quote from Commitment 194/DP 12; 
White Writing, 81) 
In analysing how the sympathetic imagination of the character’s, of the reader, and of the 
author are staged and activated, in some cases developing progressively in other cases 
remaining in stagnation, this study has attempted to show the evident efforts of empathetically 
engaging with alterity as proposed by Adorno. In combination with the ratchet effect proposed 
by Tomasello as enabling a cumulative cultural evolution of modern man (Tomasello 1999: 
5), this occasions an utopian potential in the propagation and dissemination of Coetzee’s 
(Costello’s) concept of the sympathetic imagination. While the ideas inherent in the concept 
surely date back a long time, there are some indicators that allow me to propose that presently  
we are experiencing a surge in empathetic potential that might allow a stabilization of the 
innovation of our empathetic capabilities through cultural heritage (again in compliance with 
Tomasello’s ideas, 1999: 5-6). Tomasello brilliantly argues that empathy was made possible 
through new forms of cultural learning: 1) learning by imitation 2) learning by instruction 3) 
learning by cooperation. (Tomasello 1999: 5) The development of linguistic representation 
allowed humans to immensely expand the scope of their ideational contexts. (Tomasello 1999: 
8-9) In our present time, literature offers the most complex linguistic representations of the 
minds of others, made available to us in its most complex form in the novel. I therefore agree 
with Black’s assessment of the novel as a privileged site for the renegotiation of our social 
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contexts and our ideas of community. Unfortunately, the privilege comes with a double bind; 
for, being privileged, the novel is today the playground for the ideas of intellectual elites that 
largely fails to reach out to the multitude of people, instead establishing a rather small circle 
of initiated readers. This applies especially to authors as Coetzee, who align themselves with a 
long tradition of ideas, making it hard for some to gain access to the intricate fictions provided 
by him; The Childhood of Jesus marks a shift in this regard through its simplified language 
and syntax and less high-brow references to intellectual traditions. And, by creating links to 
other discourses, the group of potential readers expands – most obviously religious discourse 
has reacted strongly to this new novel. This study has established one such link to the 
discourse of neurosciences in relation to empathy. I hope to have shown the complexity of 
Coetzee’s staging of the sympathetic imagination, with both its limitations and its enormous 
potential. As Geoffrey Baker states, “Coetzee refuses to deliver into his readers’ hands and 
heart a single-minded, unproblematized strategy for social betterment.” (Baker 2005: 43) But 
Coetzee urges us to open our minds and hearts to others, and in Summertime he lets Sophie de 
Noel express a possible vision of a future: 
He longed for the day when everyone in South Africa would call themselves nothing, 
neither African nor European nor white nor black nor anything else, when family histories 
would have become so tangled and intermixed that people would be ethically 
indistinguishable, that is to say –I utter the tainted word again – Coloured. He called that 
the Brazilian future. He approved of Brazil and the Brazilians. He had of course never been 
to Brazil. (ST 232f) 
Finally, last words from The Childhood of Jesus. The boy David asks Simón, “[W]hy are we 
here?” Simón answers: “We are are here for the same reason everyone else is. We have been 
given a chance to live and we have accepted that chance. It is a great thing, to live. It is the 
greatest of all.” (CJ 17) 
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